I think it's wrong to say popper was being "negative" about Marxism, or psychology. He was saying they were not scientific. He was open to the idea of non-scientific knowledge.
2 Things make bare falsification naive: 1) Like your man said, almost every theory has anomalies, often right from the getgo- stuff it can’t explain as things stand. Maybe it’ll explain them later, but maybe it won’t. When are we to say that these anomalies falsify the theory?? 2) most theories aren’t even really about what’s true- they are models. Ask yourself, what would it mean to falsify the ideal gas law? What exactly could falsify it?? I mean there are plenty of gases that don’t follow it, but then they aren’t ideal…
Nice exposition - I think Heidegger is getting at "what must be admitted" - in a language of things and actions (time and space) we struggle to grasp what must not be - Nothing. But when we say "not a thing" it becomes a thing. Mytho poetic expressions we face the limit of our activity of siendes (beings) as the lesser - grasp - point toward the limit of our beings toward Being without falling into the Platonic quagmire. Heidegger in this way is inspirational to me.
Terrific summary of Feyerabend, The Case Against Method. Preferably, makes cases against RIGOROUS (by the book) applications of the formalized Scientific Method. In the real world, most scientists and engineers don't follow the Scientific Method as holy scripture. Often, in fact, there is some "art" and "flow" and spiritual feel for situations, research and experiments. That said, science and engineering can't ignore the the method whole hog ... or modern society and law and order would break down. It's good to travel in safe cars and on safe roads and bridges using strict METHODS.
Thank you so much for this video! I'm not one of your students, but a different student trying to digest the Douglas paper. You broke it down nicely, and it was easy to follow instead of the complicated writing of academia
1929 and thereabouts seemed to have been a good year for philosophical connections and communications, what with the Davos event, and philosophers as diverse and Heidegger, Voegelin, Carnap, Cassirer, and others met and talked across lines that have since been erected.
Uhh, you lost me at "...his ideas are original..." I suppose if we ignore the ideas that Popper used to get us to where Popper was at and then ignore Wittgenstein, we can then say that Kuhn was original. Sadly, I think both Popper, Wittgenstein and others existed.
Like every scholar ever, Kuhn draws on other sources for his ideas. Wittgenstein is an important source for Kuhn. Popper, much less so. Ludwig Fleck is probably the most important source for Kuhn's ideas, and obscured by the fact that his work was not available in English for a long time and Kuhn's acknowledgements of Fleck were vague and inadequate. None of this prevents us from acknowledging the originality of Kuhn's work.
You miss the important point that Heidegger rejected rational metaphysics for a more mystical classical metaphysics where being stands above even the Platonic ideas. He is a mystic and a critic of Western rationalism ...AKA a Nazi
You can be both a mystic and a critic of western rationalism without being a Nazi. Heidegger was an open Nazi and never renounced his work as a philosopher for the party, and all the lazy Nazi ideology bleeds into his work. F tier philosopher.
It is quite absurd to suppose that anyone infers from a rejection of rational metaphysics to being a Nazi. Nazism is exactly the sort of ideology that might predispose a a sympathetic intellectual to the vagaries of mysticism. The converse is not true.
I wonder if you could speak to the contention that Wittgenstein dissolved the whole matter in his point they were thinking about it wrong in the first place. In his own attempt to take the fly out of the fly bottle
According to Galison's excellent article, "Aufbau/Bauhaus," a major motivation for Carnap's rejection of metaphysics, in those early days, was that it was part of an attack on the cultural/intellectual underpinnings of the fascistic concept of the Volk that was on the rise in Europe at the time. Carnap thought that fascism was based on mysticism and couldn't thrive in a society where science and reason were properly understood. With that context, might their opposing views on Nazism have contributed to their philosophical differences on logic and science?
Covid masks have become an everyday art form & religious ritual symbol for the masses as a reaction to trauma-fear abd seeking a state of equilibrium, acceptance, and a full-belly 😋
Art and Philosophy both start from the intuitive. Art, to me, wishes to express sensitive intuitions, intuitions obtained through the senses but that are not contained within the senses. The senses reflect an underlying transcendental essence intuited and art is the quest to reflect such an essence through a similar medium, the senses. Philosophy wishes to make sense of rational intuitions, intuitions obtained through reasoning(sometimes through the senses as well, but other times outside the senses). But this is an oversimplification, for in truth there is philosophy in art and art in philosophy, as both reflect the human in its path. In our path, we seek reflection, meaning and expression, and we reflect on the meaning and the expression and we express our meanings and find meaning in our expressions. We also operate in passive and active ways. At times, we think about stuff and derive meaning in an active mode; but at others, meaning is just manifest in itself. I don't have to think about suffering to know what suffering is, suffering manifests itself in itself and at times in ways that are neither chosen nor known to me. This is the revealing aspect of nature. A philosophy can be of active seeking through what is built upon, or active seeking upon that which is manifest in the intuitive(more like reflection/meditation). At times, this method of reflection can bring about truths that are revealed as truths but they weren't actively reasoned as truths. This is a non-issue. At times, it is good to restrict our meaning to what has been actively build upon(this is the more practical), at times it is best to be open to self-revealing meaning and then build upon that(this is the more meaningful). Who was right about language? i think both: while it is true that our active construction of concepts in language can be without meaning(or with little meaning) it is also true that language is meant to reflect our intuitions and through examining language we can examine our collective intuitions. There is no pre-fixed method, both are possible inquiries through different methods. This is known to many of us where by meditating upon reality and language we realize a hidden layer of meaning in language, even at times at odds with the current use of language. It is also important to ponder: meaningful in WHICH sense? Meaning is relational and so when asked about the relations of meaning we are already framing them within given contexts. The religious aims at finding meaning in the supreme sense, devoid of transcendental contexts and so it's aimed at engaging with meaning in the most transcendental sense. Other kinds of senses are also meaningful, in different senses. To constrain meaning to particular frame and exclude it as meaningless in itself is to make your frame total, and those that don't recognize the religiosity of this move are being shallow in their approach to meaning and reality. If I postulate that only that which is given to my senses, for example, is meaningful, I am saying that that the meaning of my senses is total and transcends all contexts, which is patently untrue. It is better to say: "I am interested in these kinds of meaning, or these aspects of meaning, and so everything that is outside it, I am not interested in", rather than making everything outside it meaning-less. But in truth, there is nothing absolutely meaningless, for even meaningless things can be made sense of within certain contexts. The most paradoxical is: they can be made sense of as meaningless things. That's why "Nothing" must be understood properly as a category of meaning, of certain kinds of things with meaning. In the contextual sense, as the negation of another context, and in the absolute sense as that whose only meaning we can make of is whose meaning transcends our tools of meaning(which is why we can talk of it, but we cannot make sense of it; there is something that is meaningful but it is not meaningful to us, to us it seems meaningless, but I can understand its lack of meaning as well as it possessing some kind of meaning).
This is a fantastic series of reflections on the aesthetic philosophy of America’s greatest thinker. Thx for sharing, Matthew, and please consider adding more JD videos! Would’ve expected there to be an explosion of Dewey-related materials like this on RU-vid over the last decade. But you search and find mostly generic overviews and hit-or-miss efforts to summarize his educational philosophy. Assuming I’m not mistaken about that, why is that still not a priority within Dewey scholarship? (For reference: I decided against pursuing professional philosophy after a brief stint in a phd program around 2005. Not well informed as to the current state of JD scholarship and its reception in academia. Back then the so-called revival of pragmatism was only encouraging by contrast with reports of an even bleaker earlier Cold War era of pragmatism’s near-total eclipse.)
7:41 I don't think this is a good argument against realism. The reason why is that scientists try to eliminate biases and do not just stick with one interpretation but experiment with multiple. In other words even though scientists may have have a predisposition to certain interpretations than others they still entertain other ones.
it's true that while certain interpreations that are not consistent with the scientific paradigm are investigated, but generally theories are developed from the assumptions the paradigm provides. So for instance a grant unified theory if it exists, it could be that it exists in a different paradigm of scientific theories. Suppose one theory is able to explain relativity and reproduce the predictions but uses a math that is unfamiliar to us, then we would probably follow our paradigm than reinvent it to make it fit the new theory. This can lead to local maxima and in the end we find a system that explains some phenomena quite well, and others not at all, but then also some that we cannot observe and are left with questions (like the infinite density in the middle of a black hole). This is why I believe this argument still holds, as it just illustrates how our theories are not independently created.
Thank you for the summary - it is quite insightful. As for their political orientations' influence on their metaphysics, I'd imagine both Heidegger and Carnap would welcome such a treatment, but only in song. (-:
Thank you so much for sharing this publicly. I am struggling in my Philo 101 course because of a misalignment with my professor's communication style, so this was a life saver.
