One more attempt.............That by which Hume was able to formulate his proposition and the context in which it functioned and was considered, defines certain necessities that he could not deny OR HE COULD NOT HAVE FORMULATED IT TO BEGIN WITH. Either it is, or it ain’t. 1. He chose to employ in his proposition the concepts of billiard balls specifically to the exclusion of all other things. This cannot be questioned. This means by definition that he had to have recognized and acknowledged the physical characteristics of all of those entities from which he chose the billiard balls or how could he have decided on the billiard balls as opposed to something else such as crochet balls? So the assertion of the form and function of all of those entities in material reality that he had to have perceived (or again, he could not have made the distinct choice he did) was that by which he was able to choose. That he claimed to recognized only sense impressions does not alter the point. There is no escaping this. 2. In that he had to have recognized the characteristics of the billiard balls or the sense impressions of them, again, the only means by which he could have chosen them to the exclusion of all else, he had to have known that motion was not one of those characteristics. First, motion is not tangible (but rather a phenomenon) as is all of that by which the billiard balls were defined in their physicality or the sense impressions which were drawn from them. Secondly, were motion a characteristic of billiard balls, both not just one would have been moving. That the one ball was moving then has to have been the effect of a cause of that motion having been imparted. There is no escaping this. 3. Then, that he had to have known that motion had to have been imparted to the moving ball, he had to have understood that that which imparted that motion was itself a moving entity for which motion was also not a characteristic. I am sorry but this is cause and effect, like it or not. What Hume did in the formulation of his theory was akin to “appealing to truths to formulate a position which denied truth”. He doesn’t get to have done that any more than the rest of us. That entities are distinct, they are that by their characteristics. That they are distinct, they are chosen for their characteristics because each imposes a specific effect from which to choose. The balls were chosen because they would roll, the reality of that to which he had to have surrendered, a given because they were his choice. He did not choose bricks or the like because they wouldn’t roll, necessary to the purpose of the analogy. That recognition in part defeats his theory of no cause and effect. A final point…..the proposition that ball 1 hitting ball 2 would cause it to move, is inductive only in the most general context of consideration. However, in a sub-context where we consider that motion had to have been imparted to the moving ball, it is deductive. His theory makes no sense.
Hume defined an analogy employing two billiard balls and claimed our inability to know unequivocally via induction that a second stationary ball, ball 2 would be made to move if struck by a moving ball, ball 1. Both balls were on a level billiard table. Hume chose the billiard balls for his analogy to the exclusion of all other possible objects, e.g., crochet balls, bricks, rocks, apples, etc. How was he able to do this? Because all of those objects are distinct in their physicality/characteristics and in that, different from each other in some measure. If then he made that choice it was by his recognition of his ability to distinguish between them, the characteristics consequent of their form and function. So, there can be no claim by anyone that he did not or could not know of or respect their physicality, i.e., their physical characteristics. Hume also defined one of the balls, ball 1 as moving and ball 2 as stationary (initially). By definition then, he knew of the phenomenon of motion and that it effected an object’s physical status in a given context of consideration. He then claimed that we could not know via induction that should ball 1 strike ball 2 that it would cause the latter to move, that we could only expect that it would but due only to our experience in witness to such. So, again, Hume knew of the characteristics of the billiard balls which he would have had to, to have chosen them as opposed to all other objects. He also acknowledged his understanding of the phenomenon of motion (of ball 1) for it is structural to the analogy and since he knew of the physical characteristics of the balls (by which he chose them), he would have had to have known that motion was NOT part of those characteristics for it is intangible and only “of concern for” or “about” the physicality of the ball. He knew that ball 1 was moving and though exactly the same in all physical respects to ball 2, ball 2 was NOT moving but stationary. Why? because motion had been imparted to ball 1. In other words, motion was connected in some way to the ball which was moving (there cannot be motion without its object (without the object moving)) and motion was an effect of the progressive change of the physical status of the ball in a particular context. If then the motion was NOT a physical characteristic of ball 1 and was a phenomenon which was not present in a ball being itself (as with ball 2 which was stationary before being struck by ball 1), in and of itself. Absent some imposition upon ball 1 which was otherwise in its natural state, or stationary, BY DEFINITION, motion has to have been imparted to ball 1 (motion was not there otherwise). By our understanding of this in all that stated above, we know that the motion of ball 1 would have had to have been imparted by another object which struck it (so that object was moving before it struck ball 1), imparting that motion. Remember that ball 1 could not have merely started moving by itself with no interaction of other objects because motion is a phenomenon not part of the physicality of the ball but rather “about it”. The motion had to have come from somewhere and something. After being struck, the motion was there. The only source of the motion was the object which struck it which possessed the phenomenon of motion prior to the strike. Thus we know unequivocally that ball 1 striking ball 2 would cause it to move as with the striking of ball 1 by the unnamed object (a pool cue perhaps). Any comments would be very welcome.
ANOTHER ATTEMPT, SIMPLER STILL..............Hume defined an analogy employing two billiard balls and claimed our inability to know unequivocally via induction that a second stationary ball, ball 2 would be made to move if struck by a moving ball, ball 1. Both balls were on a level billiard table. Hume chose the billiard balls for his analogy to the exclusion of all other possible objects, e.g., crochet balls, bricks, rocks, apples, etc. How was he able to do this? Because all of those objects are distinct in their physicality/characteristics and in that, different from each other in some measure. If then he made that choice it was by his recognition of his ability to distinguish between them, the characteristics consequent of their form and function. So, there can be no claim by anyone that he did not or could not know of or respect their physicality, i.e., their physical characteristics. Hume also defined one of the balls, ball 1 as moving and ball 2 as stationary (initially). By definition then, he knew of the phenomenon of motion and that it effected an object’s physical status in a given context of consideration. He then claimed that we could not know via induction that should ball 1 strike ball 2 that it would cause the latter to move, that we could only expect that it would but due only to our experience in witness to such. So, again, Hume knew of the characteristics of the billiard balls which he would have had to, to have chosen them as opposed to all other objects. He also acknowledged his understanding of the phenomenon of motion (of ball 1) for it is structural to the analogy and since he knew of the physical characteristics of the balls (by which he chose them), he would have had to have known that motion was NOT part of those characteristics for it is intangible and only “of concern for” or “about” the physicality of the ball. He knew that ball 1 was moving and though exactly the same in all physical respects to ball 2, ball 2 was NOT moving but stationary. Why? because motion had been imparted to ball 1. In other words, motion was connected in some way to the ball which was moving (there cannot be motion without its object (without the object moving)) and motion was an effect of the progressive change of the physical status of the ball in a particular context. If then the motion was NOT a physical characteristic of ball 1 and was a phenomenon which was not present in a ball being itself (as with ball 2 which was stationary before being struck by ball 1), in and of itself. Absent some imposition upon ball 1 which was otherwise in its natural state, or stationary, BY DEFINITION, motion has to have been imparted to ball 1 (motion was not there otherwise). By our understanding of this in all that stated above, we know that the motion of ball 1 would have had to have been imparted by another object which struck it (so that object was moving before it struck ball 1), imparting that motion. Remember that ball 1 could not have merely started moving by itself with no interaction of other objects because motion is a phenomenon not part of the physicality of the ball but rather “about it”. The motion had to have come from somewhere and something. After being struck, the motion was there. The only source of the motion was the object which struck it which possessed the phenomenon of motion prior to the strike. Thus we know unequivocally that ball 1 striking ball 2 would cause it to move as with the striking of ball 1 by the unnamed object (a pool cue perhaps). Any comments would be very welcome.
A MORE SUCCINCT CRITIQUE..................ANY THOUGHTS?....................1. Hume surrenders to the understanding that entities are distinct in what they are and by that, that which they are not. A square is distinctively that which it is for its characteristics (squareness) and that which it is not, possessing no characteristics of a circle (circleness). 2. That an entity can be that which it is distinctively and not other things is due to its “distinctive” physical characteristics or physicality. E.g., the billiard ball in his analogous refutation of the deterministic nature of cause and effect is distinctively just that, a billiard ball and not an apple or beach ball or the like. 3. He thus, by definition, accepted that entities are that which they are by the assertion of their form and function (characteristics) into materiality (quantum mechanics validates this unequivocally). Were this not so, he could not have appealed to them that they would be employed in his propositions. 4. He also, by definition, accepted that entities are material, i.e., physical, defined by their physical characteristics (a ball is round and not square, etc.) or they could not be considered at all and could not be participants in his propositions. That he specifically chose billiard balls for the players in his analogy demonstrates his acceptance of this (above) as a recognition. 5. By this he submitted to the understanding that motion for being intangible, could NOT be a characteristic of the billiard ball which is moving but a phenomenon in the context of consideration, it moving toward a stationary billiard ball that it might cause it to move when struck. Motion of the billiard ball in this context is only a phenomenon of concern with the billiard balls physicality or characteristics. 6. Given the above, we know analytically that the motion of the billiard ball had to have been imparted to it by the force of another entity of which it was concerned when it struck the billiard ball. 7. Thus, by that same means by which the motion of the billiard ball was imparted to it by a prior entity also effected by motion, it would be imparted to the stationary billiard ball by the moving billiard ball. 8. We are able then to induce that the stationary billiard ball would in fact move if struck by the first because of the nature of motion as opposed to that of the physicality of the billiard balls for we know analytically that motion cannot be a part or characteristic of the physicality of the billiard balls but only an imparted phenomenon. So if it was imparted to the first billiard ball by it being struck, so too would it be imparted to the second when being struck.
Another fundamental aspect of the nature of “being” which is important to our discussion, i.e., of materiality, is that of cause and effect. Denied as being discernable or discoverable by the empiricists and their followers whose ranks included some quite brilliant like Russell, Hume, the master of the master of that school claimed that one could not truly know any connections between two cause and an effect, arguing instead that what we perceived as such was simply a product of experience. Given the absurdity of this I will offer only a limited discussion to dispense with such notions, though my approach might seem somewhat tedious due to the intricacy of the argument and thus the dexterity required. One example given as a demonstration of Hume’s philosophy with regard to cause and effect was that of a child who had only ever been given toys made of soft cotton. One day after receiving a rubber ball as a present which he dropped on the floor, he marveled that it had bounced, it having been beyond his experience. The parents who observed his reaction themselves expected that the ball would bounce but they too could only consider what were their expectations, also a product of experience, they having no true knowledge of any connection between the cause, i.e., the ball falling and the effect, i.e., the ball then bouncing. I think it clear that there were clear signs of the connections between the two. In a more general version of that above, we know without any study or calculations that there cannot be motion absent an object (absent the object moving). This is an absolute analytical truth of materiality. In the example of this, the object being a ball, there is nothing about its characteristics as a such (its “ballness” which I use for convenience) of which motion is a part. Motion could not be observed at all if this were not so. Motion is not a “thing”. It is not tangible but rather a phenomenon of the context in which the ball exists and the state of affairs in that context by which the ball is affected, a state of the ball or of the complete material entity of “balllness” (physicality) relative to other things or existents, addressing only the external relation of the ball to those other things and not of concern to the ball’s internal aspects. The ball is the same ball in all respects in any point along that progression of its motion relative to those other things, illuminating the external relation of motion as a process to its object in that it is progressive, involves an object and thus is not self-sustaining nor self-sufficient. If motion is not a “thing” and thus cannot be a component or characteristic of the ball’s “ballness” (or physicality), and must be external to that “ballness”, it must by definition then have been imparted to the ball from an external source. In other words, if the ball is affected in its state or condition by motion and that motion is not of the ball, it must necessarily have been imparted to the ball in some manner apart from the ball (cause and effect is implicit here as necessarily so). Again, we know that motion is of concern specifically with the physicality (form and function) of the ball. As stated in that above, there can be no moving ball or motion of a ball unless there is first, a ball. If there is first a ball then this is by assertion of its physicality, i.e., by its imposition of its (form and function) ballness (as opposed to the treeness of trees and rockness of rocks, etc.). That which asserts the ball’s ballness is that physicality defining its specific ball like configuration. In a moving ball, it is this which is the ball, which is that which moves. Therefore, motion is of concern and of consequence only of the physicality of the existent in question, in this case the ball. If motion is of concern only with and of physicality, it is then by definition governed by that. That a ball can only “be” by the assertion of those characteristics of ballness and that its existence can only be maintained by rules which also define that initial assertion then all that which is of concern with those characteristics, such as motion is, must be obedient to those rules for motion is of the ball’s ballness and that is subject to those rules. A ball will be that which it is now as well as then (in the future) by those rules, barring any interaction with other existents or it could not be a ball as distinct from other existents to begin with. Were it not capable of this (continued existence as a ball), Hume himself could not have had the continuity of context in which to posit his refutation of cause and effect or even the continuity of concepts by which to define it. Note that in his proposition: 1. the ball (a billiard ball for example) is continually a ball, as opposed to another thing as with the billiard table which is equally constant in being that which it is. So too is a second ball thus demonstrating that constant conditions of objective reality exist about which to be able to initially formulate such a proposition. Additionally, that context which confines our discussion here within which his proposition was formulated, possesses constant boundaries and structure, providing him with terms and concepts necessary for its definition. By this we see that these rules of reality govern. Therefore, if a ball is moving, it is of the characteristics of its ballness and it cannot merely cease to move absent the interaction of its physicality with other existents as governed by those rules which sustain them. Motion then cannot merely cease to be “with” the ball once acquired for again, it is about the ball’s physicality, which is constant for all the reasons stated above and not about the qualities of motion as a function of some self-sufficient nature (for motion has none, it is only about the physicality of the object of which it is of concern and that is governed in its initial existence and continued existence by rules of physical reality). If the ball then, begins to loose motion, it can only be for its interaction with other existents of physicality (i.e., the billiard table or ball 2 which it eventually contacts) whose existence is also governed by those rules mentioned above, also about which motion can be of concern. Motion then can only cease to be an effect on ball 1 for its contact with other existents such as ball 2 to which that motion would then be imparted. Cause and effect then are “not” as purported by Hume and are knowable by our observations of the interrelations of material existents.
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