The lack of a broader succes of a masterpiece like this makes me understand how special his sensibility is, and how it unites us as people who resonate with it. His calmed vulnerability...
My goodness, this is a vain, self-absorbed guy. Weak songs, unexciting musical performances, every song sounds the same. I'd rather read a good book with romantic classical music.😄
I call my boyfriend MoonDoggie and named my dog MoonDoggie. I stumbled across your song and instantly fell in love. Can you share a video about moondog and the significance of this person or name to you?? I’m so curious!!!! Not many people know of this nickname. I got it from the movie/book Gidget.
Damn, I gotta go to one of your live performances! Every song of yours hits differently and plays on a deeper strings. Great style, energy, emotion mixed with so beautifully weird feelings... the whole palette! Not to mention the unique voice and modern melancholic sounds of the arrangement. Thank you for creating, don't ever stop 🥳
You are my go to music man when I just need to chill and let all the stresses of the world fall away. Thank you for your gift. Please come ‘down under’ sometime to see the ‘southern star’ in Oz where you can experience the ‘southern cross’ and the ‘Milky Way’ in the vast outback and be inspired to write more songs like this. Guitar, campfire, remoteness, what more do you need?
What if not having a lawyer was like being an indy rock star a way to actual music outside of the industry that focuses on profits... well first you need talent to match the passion from an inflicted injury, and there... is the problem. It is stated that, “[u]pon granting a petition to commence an original action,” that “the court may require the parties to file pleadings and stipulations of fact.” This rule of procedure indicates the pleadings are a second step. Wis. Ct. Sys., Wisconsin Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedures, at page 4 (May 24, 1984) The most basic elements of the future §1983 pleading were presented to support the petition for Original Jurisdiction. Presentment included the matter of a private parties joint state action in a corrupt conspiracy to corrupt legal processes, among other claims, in that regard original jurisdiction is the proper place to begin because it is the institutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. Wis. Small Businesses United, Inc. v. Brennan, 393 Wis. 2d 308 (Wis. 2020)(“Recognizing the supreme court's institutional responsibility to decide "a significant issue of statewide importance"). The court's original and supervisory jurisdictions are sought to be invoked by the filing of a petition. Wis. Ct. Sys., Wisconsin Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedures, at page 4 (May 24, 1984). When a matter is brought to the Supreme Court for review, the court's principal criterion in granting or denying review is not whether the matter was correctly decided or justice done in the lower court, but whether the matter is one which should trigger the institutional responsibilities of the Supreme Court. Wis. Ct. Sys., Wisconsin Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedures, (May 24, 1984). The criteria for the granting of a petition to commence an original action are a matter of case law. See, e.g., Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. 428 (1939). The Wisconsin Constitution authorizes the Wisconsin Supreme Court to “hear original actions and proceedings.” Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(2). It is left to the Court’s “judgement and discretion” to decide whether to “grant an application to commence an original action in this court.” Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 284 N.W. 42, 50 (1938). The Court has long confined itself to granting only those applications “upon the ground that the questions presented are of such importance as under the circumstances to call for as speedy and authoritative determination by this court in the first instance.” Id.; see also State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 362, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983) (“We granted the petition to commence an original action because this matter is publici juris and requires a prompt and authoritative determination by this court in the first instance.”); Wis. Prof’l Police Ass’n, Inc. v. Lightbourn, 2001 WI 59, ¶ 4, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 627 N.W.2d 807 (“The supreme court limits its exercise of original jurisdiction to exceptional cases in which a judgment by the court significantly affects the community at large.”). Petitioner has presented a matter of public concern as a decision on a local court’s use and implementation of court annexed binding arbitration, according to local policy and under §802.12 (ADR) is one that affects the broader community. The Wisconsin Supreme court generally exercises its jurisdiction as a “court of first resort” over cases affecting “the sovereignty of the state, its franchises or prerogatives, or the liberties of its people.” Heil, 284 N.W. at 45 (quoting Attorney Gen. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 35 Wis. 425, 518 (1874)), and as early as 1892 this Court exercised original jurisdiction over claims by finding such exercise was needed “to secure and protect…political rights and the liberties of the people.” See State ex rel. Att’y. Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, at 449 51 N.W. 724 (1892). The petition used Wisconsin Const. Article 1 §9 to seek Original Jurisdiction. Wis. Const. art. I, sec. 9 “originated out of concerns that citizens not be forced to bribe public officials to get into court.” Hartland-Richmond Town Ins. v. Wudtke, 145 Wis.2d 682, 691, 429 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Ct.App. 1988), overruled on other grounds, Funk v. Wollin Silo Equip., Inc., 148 Wis.2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989). “Accordingly, this article provides persons the right of access to the courts to obtain justice based on the law as it exists.” Id. 148 Wis.2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989)(emphasis added). “[D]ecisions trace its origin to Paragraph 40 of the Magna Carta, which states: "To none will we sell, to none will we deny, or delay, right or justice." Vol. I Wisconsin Statutes 1898, Sanborn and Berryman's Annotations at 9. The purpose of the clause was explained by Justice Marshall in Christianson v. Pioneer Furniture Co., 101 Wis. 343, 347-48, 77 N.W. 174, 77 N.W. 917 (1898). "[E]very subject . . . may take his remedy by the course of the law and have justice and right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay." Id. at 348. Marshall asserted that state constitutional provisions incorporating this principle "do not grant the right" of remedy but rather preserve remedies that existed at common law. Id.” Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 98, 121-22 (Wis. 2000) As Justice Marshall explained: That provision is very old. Its history dates back to the days of Magna Carta. It was designed to prevent a species of official exactions made as the price of delaying or expediting justice. From the lowest officer to the king himself, in the olden times, bribes were freely demanded and taken to procure the benefits of the laws. They bore no relation whatever to our system of exactions for expenses of litigation, called costs, or the charge as a tax on suits, imposed under laws which bear equally upon all; but they were arbitrary exactions sanctioned by the manners of the times, that went to the personal benefit of the judicial head or body controlling the execution of the law, or to servants or officers connected therewith. It was such abuse, among others, that the barons of England forced King John to abolish by granting the Magna Carta. It contained the following as one of the guaranteed limitations upon kingly prerogatives: "We will not sell the right and justice to anyone, nor will we refuse it, or put it off." Says Sir Edward Coke, "The king, in the judgment of the law, is ever present and repeating in all his courts, `Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel justitiam,' and therefore every subject, for injury done him `in bonis, in terris, vel persona,' by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal, without any exceptions, may take his remedy by the course of the law and have justice and right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay." So the right thus obtained as a concession from sovereign power has come down to us through the centuries that have passed, and been preserved in all its integrity in substantially all state constitutions. They do not grant the right, but guarantee the preservation of one that existed under the constitution of England. Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 98, 121-22 (Wis. 2000)(citing Christianson v. Pioneer Furniture Co., 101 Wis. 343, 347-48, 77 N.W. 174, 77 N.W. 917 (1898).) “[I]t has long been held that Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides a right of access to Wisconsin courts. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. State, 192 Wis. 404, 412, 211 N.W. 288 (1927) (concluding that Article I, Section 9 “guarantee[s] to every suitor his day in a [Wisconsin] court of competent jurisdiction to which he may present his claim for judicial relief and in which he may either win a victory or suffer a defeat according to the strength or weakness of the case which he presents”); see also Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis.2d 458, 474, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997) (“The right of access to the courts is secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendment[s]. It entitles the individual to a fair opportunity to present his or her claim.”). Article I, Section 9 does not grant litigants the exact remedy they desire, but rather it guarantees access to Wisconsin courts to proceed on rights and remedies created by constitution, statute or common law. See Doering v. WEA Ins. Group, 193 Wis.2d 118, 130-31, 532 N.W.2d 432 (1995). This constitutional right of access to Wisconsin courts is substantive in nature. See Thomas v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, ¶ 122 n. 36, 285 Wis.2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523.” Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations Corp., 342 Wis. 2d 626, 664-65 (Wis. 2012) The basis for the jurisdiction was additionally grounded in Wisconsin Const. art. I, §22, Maintenance of free governance, in which the petitioner argues there is an implied right of action to redress an injury caused by corruption, and because “[i]t is possible to mine the pronouncements of Wisconsin courts for evidence that art. I, § 9 creates rights, or that it authorizes courts to fashion rights. ” Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 98, 122 (Wis. 2000), the right can thusly be fashioned to the unique circumstances of this case.
Here you go guys: E standard tuning, no capo Verse: E A E x4 B barre C#m barre A x4 B barre A C#m barre E x1 Repeat verse x 1 Chorus: E A E x2 E A E C#m barre A B barre x1 E A E x2 Repeat verse. Repeat Chorus. Ending: E A E x6
