Who hurt you?

a certain degree of comedic irony to that

Yea...That's not even remotely true. Now if you had used people like Tooley, Dawkins, and Dennett as examples erroneous thinking and irrationality, you would have been on to something.

Slightly under-argued.

A common mistake.

No, he isn't. You're just failing to understand that form determines the ends toward which an organism is ordered and that the realization of these ends is the actualization of being (convertible with good) and the frustration of the realization of those ends is bad.

@@oktavianzamoyski9809 Yes but you can give a causal picture of that entire process, so that "teleology" is merely a higher-level description or shorthand.

@@oktavianzamoyski9809an organism isnt "ordered towards an end".

I think Koons would say the physician's oath of doing no harm binds him to know what sort of stuff is harmful, and some of those things may go beyond what their patient needs and is better understood through looking at their final end or telos of the human being. For example, even if a patient wanted to amputate their arm, I think no matter the ethic we'd agree that is harmful to the patient. Don't get me wrong, maybe there is some other ethic that explains why a doctor doing this is harmful, but my point is it seems to go beyond a consumer demanding a service. Whereas an immigration lawyer, in doing her job, doesn't have that same sort of oath (although, I'm sure you can speak to that better than I) but instead is supposed to faithfully help other immigrants within the bounds of the law for the interests. It seems like there are some relevant differences.

@@OriginalWinProductions Excellent dismantling of the parallel a proposed. 👍🏻. Thank you for that. I remain puzzled by the bigger point, however. I simply don’t see telos as in the things, rather as human projections onto those things. That of course is a much bigger discussion than we can have on the RU-vid comments. But I’d be happy to hear your thoughts on it.

I find the idea of things having telos to be useful because it does a lot of work in epistemology and ethics. In epistemology, I really like Plantinga's theories of externalism, proper functionalism, and Reliabilism. I just don't care to much for the A-C model where Christianity is properly basic and a creator of some kind is needed to explain why your cognitive faculties are properly functioning (on Plantinga's view, it's because your faculties are functioning according to the plan of the creator). But then what exactly a "properly functioning cognitive faculty" is would be decided on the design of a designer, which itself brings in numerous differing religions to justify their own system as properly basic. But if the fact x just functions to aim at y (given its nature) is an immanent fact rather than transcendent fact explained by the design plan of God forced onto a creation, then you avoid that inter-religious relativism. Instead, we are warranted in believing our cognitive faculties aim at true beliefs because in denying it is the aim of their nature to provide an accurate representation of the world, we undercut our warrant to believe anything else. This also has benefits in ethics too. For example, why ought we care whether we are functioning properly? Well, desires themselves exist for the aim of reinforcing habits of a properly functioning human being, and if they're not, the amoralist lacks warrant to reinforce habits at odds with that aim, just like the irrationalist would lack warrant in utilizing their intellect to believe in false propositions, since neither cognitive faculties aim for those respective ends. If the internalist is right, we'd have to provide justifications for our designers, but if the externalist is right, then all we would have to do is show that desires exist for their purported purpose or end.

Yes I sort of picture these intellectual/cerebral/smart types, these Aristotelian philosophers, thinking hard and then getting married and having kids, and getting divorced and becoming estranged from their kids. All the brains in the world, and no clue how to be happy. Is happiness the end result of being smarter than the next bear? An innocent thought.

Given that the scope of this lecture is on the indepispencibility of teleology within biology, his introduction of moral prescriptions in reference to teleological orientations may not supported well but isn't really a critique of his argument. To be fair though, he does offer it as a conditional statement. "If one were to exercise medicine on these associations" Obviously this would be an area that would require further investigation and defense. I would like to know whether or not a teleological approach to morality necessarily undermines deontilogical schools of thought. Its difficult to see (atleast now) how teleology doesn't necessarily entail "the ends justify the means" way of making moral judgments.

@@Phill3v7 ​ I thought it seemed rather tendentious, the way that ultimately, this all wound up -- which was, with him stating that abortion and euthanasia and cosmetic plastic surgery, plus sex reassignment surgery, didn't belong in medicine -- this by some stipulated Aristotelian definition of medicine. It spoke volumes about the crowd he was addressing, that nobody interrupted this to object. I want to be clear, I figure it was a very socially-conservative crowd, I'd be fascinated if there were any doctors present, and staying silent, for all of this mansplaining of abstract metaphysical concepts, which seems obviously to come with a very practical agenda. He's arguing backwords from his conclusions, very transparently, no? It seems a facile charade, he has gristle in his heart, not to be rude, but I found it scary. Of course the heart does contain gristle -- it's a metaphor nvm, but I wonder if all Aristotelians can agree on these controversial issues. Probably not, but what if they could? This would be both repellant and instructive, and I mean, here's a rhetorical question: Do we actually care about nonsense metaphysics? Obviously I myself was already up the thread labeling 'these intellectual/cerebral/smart types, these Aristotelian philosophers..' If they're not useless, then can they be used for good *and* for evil? I don't, perhaps, actually know how not to be rude, but I know how to be scared. I think this fellow, is scary. Sad to see what an education can do for a perfect ass.

No, it isn't. Good is convertible with being. Thus, the realization or actualization of an organism's good is the same as realizing its end. The same can be said of faculties which are themselves ordered toward both a subordinate end and by extension the overall end of the organism. The function of a heart is to pump blood. An atrial septal defect, for example, frustrates the operation of the operation of the heart and thus its ability to attain its end, and especially given how essential the heart is to our living, it frustrates our good. An atrial septal defect is a defect only because it defects from the norm proscribed by the nature of the heart and the overall organism. It suffices to observe that organisms do seek to realize their ends, and when their actions are misguided or frustrate that end, they are bad.

@@daniellanglois8807 Hilariously you’re arguing backwards from your conclusions, “metaphysics must be nonsense because if not it implies there’s a difference between using medicine to make an organ function properly and using it to stop an organ from properly functioning.” Your conclusion is that there must not be any sort of objective foundation for good or bad, because that would impose some obligations on you that make you uncomfortable. You reason backwards from this conclusion.