@@zavod.fiftyseven 照理来说center fire 的步枪应该是没问题的，但是老家伙们撞针的材料不比现在，又放了这么个百八十年，跟现代的肯定没法比。而且也得分，比如德国和瑞典的毛瑟甚至莫辛纳甘都没听说过断的，老李和友坂这类cock on close又不能缓慢释放击针的断的例子就很多。但是老李的好找，日本货就不太好找，甚至三八式还分前期后期，他们的bolt body以及撞针的细节是不一样的，还不能通用。。。
In the view at the micro level, the weapons that Chinese soldiers used were no match to what Japanese soldiers used. According to the source that I read, most of the Chinese soldiers were still using muzzleloader that a soldier needed to pour powder through the muzzle end, used a ram-rod to force a ball or bullet into the barrel through the muzzle end, pulled the hammer back, put a primer cap on it, and then fired. This not only took a long time. The worst part was that the soldier had to stand up in the battle field to do all these if there was no cover -- this was an act of suicide. You could find some Japanese movie about that war, and saw Japanese soldiers shooting from a prone position very close the ground, on the other hand, the Chinese soldiers were lined up like in a parade ground, and had to slowly reload the muskets or rifles. No wonder they lost the battle and the war. The same thing also happened in Europe when Prussian army used their needle gun to defeat Austrian who were still using muzzle-loading rifles in 1866. In the view at the micro level, we also saw the same thing in naval force. The fact that Qing government refused to purchase quick-firing naval guns and the subsequent lack of money to buy explosive shells pretty much sealed the fate of the Chinese naval force. But the view from the macro level is much more useful. And can explain a lot what went wrong in the micro level. Chinese government didn't have a unified leadership. The Qing ruling class was on guard against the Han military generals. And the Han generals knew that they were not trusted, and would not push hard to ask for reform. Without a central leadership, everything was done in piece meal and half heartedly.
