very surprised at the simplistic dismissal of Berkeley's idealism - Berkeleys's notion is not that the world does not exist - he is in effect saying that the "substance" of the world is framed and held within the mind of God - we interact with a like substance with our ideas. So as our ideas are ordered energetic representations so we interact with ordered energetic representations of a higher order - that appear to be a different substance but they are in effect, at heart, only energy.
The case for Monistic Idealism: a.) the mind exists b.) the interaction of mind-body implies they're the same substance, so substance dualism is false c.) eliminating consciousness is self-refuting d.) consciousness is irreducible as noted by David Chalmers' Hard Problem of Consciousness e.) Nonreductive Physicalism is untenable as pointed out in Jaegwon Kim's _The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism_ If you add all of this up we're backed into Monistic Idealism. If consciousness exists and cannot be eliminated or reduced, and if substance dualism is false, then no other substance exists. Hence Monistic Idealism is true.
I cant help but feel that every time these philosophers don't know something they pray in god. Would it be so difficult for them to simply admit that they dont know?
+KlandalfCZ The period of time when these philosophers were studying were in within the parameters of accepting some sort of deity. They didn't have the access to research and cosmology as we do, so they argued with the best amount of information without succumbing to complete skepticism, and idea that can be dangerous for critical thought.
Perhaps what Peter failed to highlight that the fact ball A was moving would have required another entity E to have caused A to move. So this means that God would have allowed E to initiate movement. Man is therefore the cause not God.
Need help. In a theological framework, would Berkeley say that "evil" perceptions of things are merely secondary qualities caused by God or by the individual? Additionally, is causation direct in the sense that it is deliberately willful or rather is it passive in the sense of knowingness?
+HegelsBagels The Theistic Idealist would probably affirm _privatio boni_, meaning evil is merely the absence or lack of good. So it's like your perception of darkness. Darkness does not exist, you're just observing an environment that lacks light.
Berkeley's theory is certainly not gibberish; it makes more sense than realism, it is just not "common" sense: proclaiming "reality", is abstraction which negates itself due to the fact that it is itself ones thought and therefore not the reality beyond thought they claim with their own thought, non plus ultra, to exist. If thinking is the active mental process by which its antithesis, the static product of knowing, is to be achieved; how is it we only have what is known to put thoughts toward?
I really should understand this by now, but can someone please clarify: when Millican talks of Malebranche's causation as necessary connection and describes the motion of one billiard ball impacting another, he says we *can* conceive of the second ball not moving at all - that it is logically possible. What does he mean specifically? From my experience, I'd say we cannot conceive of the second ball not moving (obviously due to the transference of force). Is he just referring to the movement A and not the impact (I don't think so since he explicitly mentions the impact)? Is he just saying that we have the capacity to "imagine" the second ball not moving in the same way we can imagine any absurdity of physics, like dropping a coin to the ground and having the coin bounce back up into our hand? Is he referring to all of the contingent variables that could conceivably keep the second ball stationary? If it was made of lead for instance. Or if it were glued to the table. Or am I missing something else? This simple example is crucial for going further and I want to make sure I'm crystal clear.
You mention our tendency to restrict our imagination so as to comport with the "laws" of physics that we all assume, such as respecting momentum, mass, gravity, etc. These are not really laws. "Law" is just a metaphor we use to describe a pattern/regularity that always seems to be the case - but indeed need not be the case at all.
I do understand that concept. I guess maybe I got hung up on his phrasing. So, since I've not re-watched the video yet, are saying he's referring to the contingency of physical laws (regularities); ie. that these "laws" are the way they are (by our measurements and perceptions at any rate), but, since we know of no absolute guarantor for their necessary being, nor their particular values or configurations, they could at least conceivably be different, and we can imagine a universe (or a place/time in this universe with differing laws) in which a billiard ball hits another but no law exists which dictates that it too must move?
You might want to consider Leibniz, who allows you to perceive and do things. He emplyed Plato's alternate top-down singular cybernetic view vs Aristotle's impossible leaderlessc bottom up view IMHO all of the philosophers mentioned in this account immediately below seem to be devout believers in the naturalist or Aristotelian position that consciousness and nature follow bottom-up control. For example that intentions are products of the body and that the brain controls the mind. These all lead to the position that the self or ego is an abstraction. However, this view fails to recognize that the universe and everything in it must be cybernetic-- namely that the contents of the universe must be governed just as with any other kingdom of diverse individuals--by a single monarch (the One or Mind), who governs from the top down. As Leibniz clearly put it, according to a pre-established harmony. Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (retired, 2000). See my Leibniz site: rclough@verizon.academia.edu/RogerClough For personal messages use rclough@verizon.net
+Ellis Farrow Not trying to get into a debate, just wanted to show you this peer-reviewed academic article: Henkel, Jeremy E. (2012). "How to avoid solipsism while remaining an idealist: Lessons from Berkeley and Dharmakīrti". _Comparative Philosophy_ 3 (1):58-73
@MrAnthonyVance In fact I'd posit exactly the opposite from what you appear to be defending: materialism. There is no proof that matter, space and time can exist without a mind. What you call universe is only a perception. If human beings were born without sight, would color exist? There is no way to prove that it does. All we can do is start with what we're certain of: I have a mind, that mind percieves. Perception is there for the only thing we can be certain of.
Miguel Fonseca of course... But the two are virtually inseparable given what we now know about how it is that the world and universe actually work. Philosophy must either respect that or simply quit making any claims which are in anyway connected to FACTS.
facts have certain a priori pre-suppositions which it cant prove or even talk of. to call something a fact and leave it at ignores 1.what is necessary and sufficient to have these specific experiences 2. how theory laden facts are 3.how the sciences and their link to non empirical sciences like mathematics is possible
Quantum physics, since the 1920s, and ever more compellingly in recent experiments, such as the quantum eraser - has rendered materialism completely untenable. Game over. There is no objective physical matter. The quantum founders, Heisenber, Bohr, Schrodinger, knew this in the 1920s already.
I must say with respect to Berkeley's conception of material objects -- gibberish and hogwash! Berkeley makes his conception of the material universe sound more and more like a Twilight Zone episode penned by Rod Serling (entertaining but nonsense thinking with not a shred of proof to posit such an idea). Berkeley assumes the existence of God (bad idea) then goes on to explain God's method of creation and perception tricks (worse idea). Peter is doing an awesome job by the way. Thank you.
