A Confederate General Criticizes Lee's Leadership at Gettysburg 

It’s over Anakin, I have the high ground :)

Absolutely... precisely! Especially in the person of General Dan Sickles! He had been ORDERED to RETREAT from the high ground at Chancellorsville just 6 weeks earlier... then he and his men had to endure hours of shelling from Confederate guns placed exactly on that high ground. Sickles refused to be a victim a 2nd time around; so he moved his III corps men AND ARTILLERY to "The Wheatfield" - where they exacted a terrible toll on Longstreet's attacking divisions on the afternoon of the 2nd. NO ONE WOULD EVER HAVE HEARD OF "the Peach Orchard," the Wheatfield, Devil's Den or THE SLAUGHTER PEN if Dan Sickles hadn't ADVANCED his men to those tactically strategic grounds and MADE the Rebs PAY to take them. So people CRITICIZE Sickles "HE GOT HIS CORPS ALL SHOT UP!" Well.... General REYNOLDS got I Corps SHOT UP the previous morning... and he is an acknowledged hero! YOU PUT ANY Union corps in front of a fresh Confederate corps on the attack at this point of the war, you are going to take heavy losses. REMEMBERING THE LESSON of Chancellorsville, NON- West Point, NON-professional soldier DAN SICKLES _personally_ led his men to ADVANTAGEOUS GROUND, and MADE THE REBS PAY to take it - the Union army at its finest

The north suffered early on with incompetent generals. Had McClellan actually USED the forces he was given, the war likely would've been shorter.

@@hawaiianonymous3917 From the Gettysburg movie: "... When our people get here Lee will have the high ground and there will be the Devil to pay! The high ground!"

. . . although 20 years after the fact, weakens its utility.

@@QED_ Haven't read all the comments but one wonders if his strategy had merit (20:20 hindsight).

@@louislemire6691 It's just a general principle of historical research: the more contemporary to events an eye-witness account is, the more accurate it's likely to be. But there are exceptions, of course, as with any generality . . .

@@QED_ I agree. Born 1814 that'd put him around 70+ yrs old. Contemporary reports are certainly most valuable.

Hope people learn from this because how on earth can people still support traitor trump. MAGA = CSA 2.0.

Stonewall Jackson wasn’t at Gettysburg with his unbelievable flanking maneuvers to save Robert E. Lee. Jackson’s soldiers were often called the “foot cavalry” because they marched so quickly that they often surprised Union forces by outflanking them as if they were riding horses.

@@picklerix6162 Stonewall Jackson was much more impressive in his Shenandoah campaign where he wore out a Union army by defending and retreating, taking light casualties while inflicting heavy casualties.

General Lee is possibly the most overrated Commander ever.

​@@picklerix6162General Jackson wasn't at Gettysburg because he was shot by his own troops. It's said that when God decided that Jackson had to go.😊 I think if you wage war for the express purpose of perpetuating human bondage, it is unlikely that God will smile upon your effort.

In a few words - Lee was desperate.

That was my first thought, did Law's strategy have merit (looking back).

Sometimes just like now leadership should listen to their field noncom and officer's. Cause they are in the field while leader is in the toc drinking tea

Plus Longstreet

It was a HUGE mistake, the Confederate high tide

Longstreet took two divisions to help Bragg in Tennessee. It was a disaster, because old Pete was pretty hopeless when not under Lee's command. McLaws was unfairly scapegoated and court-martialed as a result, but it didn't stick. Longstreet was an egotist who happened to work well with Lee. Each of them were out of their depth.

Longstreet di pretty well at Chickamauga under Bragg, who was definately up to Lee's caliber.@@neilpemberton5523

​@@neilpemberton5523You're blaming Longstreet for Bragg's decisions?

@roberthicks4923 No. I mean, when Bragg gave Longstreet assignments, he was hopeless at carrying them out.

@@neilpemberton5523 Agree -- Longstreet's Knoxville Campaign was a disaster.

The Union soldiers weren't shouting " Fredricksburg " for nothing.

Did Robert E Lee have a heart attack after the battle of Fredericksburg ? Was he having heart problems during the Gettysburg campaign ?

In my view, Lee, in ordering the charge on July 3rd, was merely doing what he had successfully done before. On June 27th, 1862, his army had attacked the Federals directly on a two mile front at Gaine’s Mill and driven the Union Army from its position; also, only two months before Gettysburg, on May 3rd, 1863, Lee and Stuart (commanding Jackson’s Corps) had frontally assaulted superior Union forces behind breastworks at Chancellorsville and successfully broke the Union line. He and his army had done it before. Lee must be judged, to some degree, with this in mind. Longstreet’s advice to move around the right was not based in reality. To move an army that size, with casualties to care for and thousands of prisoners to tend to from the previous days fighting, with miles and miles of supply wagons, and with minimal knowledge of Federal forces positions south and southeast of town, it would have been reckless to order such a move. And, needless to say, the Federals had lookout positions and, observing such a movement, would have assaulted Lee’s army at its most vulnerable.

@@frankofva8803You make a good point here, however Lee himself would later say that the mistake was his.

Egads! You're right! I wouldn't have noticed that if you hadn't mentioned it.

6 degrees of Kevin Bacon is a thing!!!

I was going to say he looks a lot like Ethan Hawke, who also kind of looks like Kevin Bacon.

There is no U.S. history if not the civil war

And Jenkins Hall

Honest question here...even with better intelligence, what might Lee have done differently on the second day?

@@aaronfleming9426 Everyone assumes Lee had no intel, but that is not true. He had a decent idea of the Union situation on July 2 and his planned assaults might have won the day but for the complete disruption of the field by Sickle's move forward. We fail to understand that the move badly disrupted Lee's plan and Longstreet could not concentrate his attack as a result. The other unexpected twist was the successful defeat of Stuart to the east that prevented an assault on the Union rear.

@@jamesb4789 On the contrary, on every count. Lee had no idea that the Union line extended as far south as it did. If the attack had proceeded as originally conceived, Sickles would have been able to enfilade Longstreet's right as he moved up the Emmitsburg Road; that would have been just as disruptive, and a lot safer for Sickles. We understand that Sickles' move was unexpected, but we also understand that Sickles' move was idiotic: it stretched his line to 3x the length it could effectively cover, which got his corps ripped to shreds; furthermore, it put him a half mile in front of the rest of the line, which meant that reinforcements had to be rushed piecemeal into the fighting, leading to those formations being mauled as well. Meade certainly was not impressed by Sickles' move, and neither was Grant, who made sure Sickles never held a battlefield command again. We shouldn't be impressed by it either. The "unexpected" twist in the cavalry wasn't unexpected either. Meade had skillfully protected his flanks and rear with cavalry to prevent exactly that sort of maneuver, and those cavalry intercepted Stuart precisely as alert professional cavalry should. Stuart's exhausted troopers were predictably turned back by fresh troops, some of whom were armed with repeating Spencer rifles. Even if Stuart had managed to force back the Union cavalry, surprise had been lost and his troopers and horses would have been all the more exhausted and unable to make a strategically decisive attack on the Union rear.

The missing element, Stuart, is key.

I appreciate your contribution. But consider this. Gettysburg was not Lee’s chosen place of battle. Harrisburg was his focus and a full Corp was already well on its way there before things got sidetracked by overly ambitious troops. Those Harrisburg bound troops had to be recalled when the battle was already engaged. That corps was spread out over twenty miles of very hilly roads and the temperatures were mid-ninety (95). By the time the whole Corp retraced their routes and got back to where the battle was and got reformed, the day was long spent. The Union was entrenched by evening of that first day. Such are the fates that battles fall prey to.

@@fredhall5038 Yup, a very bad plan poorly executed. The further Lee got from Virginia, he got weaker. Nobody really knows what he was thinking. It was unlikely that the Union Army would do nothing as he marched into Pennsylvania. Even after Lee botched everything, he still could have slipped south from Gettysburg, threaten DC and forced a battle of maneuver, evening the odds. When he opted to continue a static fight, he really had no chance.

Gettysburg was different in many ways. Lee was used to having his Army concentrated for each battle. At Antietam and Gettysburg, he was strung out and vulnerable. I think he also realized after Day two at Gettysburg the Union was bringing in large reserves that he could not match and he would be very vulnerable if he pulled back. I have often wondered if Picket's Charge was an attempt to win the field and give him time to retreat. The Day two assaults on the flanks were near things. The attack on the Union right tied down reserves and would have let Longstreet punch through but of Sickle's unexpected move forward with delayed and broke up the Longstreet attack. If you walk the battlefield, you will notice that Cemetery Ridge is barely a bump when you get to the Round Tops and the line would have been broken. Sickle's move to the higher ground forward of he Ridge gave his men a better chance. And it broke up the concentrated punch Longstreet was supposed to deliver. Little Roundtop gets the attention, but it was the bloody fighting in the Wheat Field and Peach Orchard that won the day and bought the time for two Union Corps to move in and join the battle.

Agreed about how little has been written about him. Law dwells in the shadows of Hood and Longstreet. I'm working on a profile of him for the next issue of the magazine.

I am of that school that believes that Lee was in ill health by the time of this campaign. By the very appearance of the man, he had suffered considerably since 1861, And it seems that earlier in the year he has suffered a heart attack. Living in the field was hard for any man his age. Grant thought he was too old. Certainly he did not have the physical resilience of Grant who was walking wounded when he showed up in Chattanooga. but immediately restored the confidence of the army by his swift actions.

@@lifeonthecivilwarresearchtrail Had a relation in the 4th Alabama. My favorite regiment. THANK YOU for giving Law a day in the sun.

Maybe, had Longstreet not dragged his feet until late afternoon on the 2nd, Lee's battle plan would've been proven a winner. Remember, the Federal troops only occupied Little Round Top at the last minute. Had the attack commenced on schedule, it would have still been bare and wholly vulnerable, as would the entire Union flank.

​@@Former11BRAVO Bad history. Longstreet did not delay. And the difficulty of getting all troops into position such that the attack commenced at 4 pm had zero impact on the outcome. Jackson's long flanking maneuvers at Chancellorsville delayed the attack until 5 pm. Gettysburg Day 2 was a similar plan, but it failed because of more difficult terrain, and the Union Army fought better.

Thank-you. I wondered about a Corp in reserve behind LRT, or at least one arriving late to the battle. What are your feelings concerning Pickett if he had been available on the second day to re-enforce Hood’s people in a sweeping movement to the right? If that 6th Corp were spread out along the road, and if Hood and Pickett were able to unite in attack? One can but wonder.

Lee hoped that the cannonade before Picket’s change would do far more damage than it did. But like the bombardment of Iwo Jima, it came too late to avoid mass casualties. From Japanese sources, we now know that if the fleet had arrives a few days early, then they would have been much less prepared. Timing is everything.

Lee’s campaign plan was defiantly not ruined after July 1.

…”had no alternative but to either attack or abandon the campaign in total failure.” Why would he have to abandon the field in failure? Lee repeatedly, and successfully, moved around enemy positions.

@@Sodbusterrod I don't understand the assertion that Lee couldn't move away after the first day of fighting, but don't agree with the idea that Lee could have moved around the Union left at Gettysburg. The question is, "How? By what road? And what makes us think the Union wouldn't have been alert to the movement - which would have taken hours - and wouldn't have adjusted to the movement?" The Army of the Potomac had almost always fought very well on the defensive. It was especially sharp at Gettysburg. I just don't see any way that Lee get's around the left...strategic withdrawal was his only way to salvage the operation: Claim victory for the first day's battle, be grateful for the opportunity to gather abundant supplies in Pennsylvania, and savor the brief respite from defending Virginia. Would have saved Lee almost 20,000 casualties.

@@Sodbusterrod Reagan's memoirs show clearly enough that the strategic objective of the campaign (decided between Lee and the Confederate political leadership at Richmond in mid- May) was to gain enough of a success to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg (when Vicksburg was placed under siege, this became achieving enough of a success to force the Union to lift the siege of Vicksburg). Ideas to assist Vicksburg originally involved transferring formations from the AoNV to assist. Lee argued against this, telling Seddon in early April that the surest way to assist Johnston (C- in- C of the Western Department) was for the AoNV to advance into Maryland. The operational objective of the campaign was to take the war away from Virginia and forage off of Union territory to restock the AoNVs supply train because the AoNV was starving in its position along the Rappahannock. Lee's plan of campaign was to entice the AotP to attack the AoNV and defeat that attack (from Lee's after- action report and Longstreet's memoirs). To accomplish this, Lee needed information on the strength and location of the AotP. Lee assigned this task to Stuart. By the time that Lee began moving north, Vicksburg had already been placed under siege so time was critical. Lee was late getting into Pennsylvania because he erred in giving his infantry formations (known for their tendency to straggle) two objectives for one force- namely, to forage and get northward in good time. He wrote Davis during the move north that the necessity to forage was retarding his movement. He erred again when he likewise gave Stuart two objectives for one force by instructing him to gather both information and provisions. These two objectives were both contradictory and coincided in time. Gathering information required mobility which gathering provisions would only impede (which is what happened). Moreover, Stuart lacked the available force to accomplish both simultaneously or the time to accomplish first one and then the other. He attempted to accomplish both and predictably failed. Lack of information on the strength and location of the AotP led directly to the unexpected meeting engagement of 1 July. This engagement ruined Lee's plan of campaign because although he had originally intended to maneuver the AotP into attacking him, he assumed the tactical offensive himself to gain a minor victory. Having been repulsed at Fredericksburg and stunned at Chancellorsville- and with a new commanding general at the helm- there was no realistic chance that the AotP would go over to the offensive. This left Lee stuck. The clock was ticking at Vicksburg (under siege for approximately six weeks), he had so far done nothing to assist them, he couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3- 5 days because he was foraging (he hadn't foraged since his concentration order of 29 June), he couldn't forage in the immediate presence of the AotP, and the tactical initiative which he had not wanted was his. He had to either attack or abandon the campaign. His tactics during the battle were a variant of the Napoleonic strategic battle- strike both flanks so as to draw local reserves from the center, and then attack the center. Meade recognized this, telling Gibbon on the evening of 2 July that if Lee attacked on the 3rd, it would be on Gibbon's front. Pickett's attack on 3 July failed for a number of reasons- not the least of which was that Meade saw the attack coming and had approximately 20,000 reinforcements move toward the Union center to defeat it.

Laws conclusion that only a general assault had a chance of success, but that that success would have left the army much weakened. Certainly the Union Army’s very skillful defense that day suggests he is probably right. Only Union mistakes could have given them victory and their generals did not make enough of them.

@@johnschuh8616 Typical of the war... even if the CSA won the field, little was gained, and the chance they could hold the gain was low.

The echelon was carried out by Wilcox and Wright's brigades. They captured batteries but couldn't carry them off for lack of support. Contrary to what the NPS plaque states, Wright's brigade made it to the crest of Cemetery Ridge but lack of support forced them to retreat back down to the woods from where they started.

In addition, I believe that day it was a humid, 90 fing degrees

I understood that Sickles redeployment messed up Lee's plan, as it was based on Union troop disposition in the morning as surveyed by Lee's aide Johnson. I also understood that Hood, who favored a wider sweep on the right, then diverted into Devils Den and toward LRT based on the alteration of the plan caused by Sickles forward deployment. His attack was hampered by this more difficult terrain.

He certainly was not in good health.

Jackson's death played no role in the conduct of the actual campaign. Lee was much more confident in Longstreet's ability (and I'm no idol of Longstreet). Jackson completely failed Lee during the Seven Days' Battles (primarily because of his religious zealotry), he once said that he never ate pepper with his food because it made his left leg weak, and he suggested a pre- dawn assault in the early morning after the final Union repulse at Fredericksburg. To differentiate between Union and Confederate, he recommended that their troops strip naked- in the dead of winter. Jackson was a talented but erratic corps commander whose relations with his own subordinates were unusually poor. Lee saw to it that when Longstreet and Jackson were elevated to corps command, Longstreet had one days' seniority. The defensive as the stronger form of war was still new in 1863 even though rifling the conoidal bullet had been around many decades, and the vast majority of Civil War generals were tyros in their profession. Few graduates of West Point had ever commanded anything larger than a regiment. Lee was all but out of time by 1 July. He was late getting into Pennsylvania, his army hadn't foraged since his concentration order of 29 June (he couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3- 5 days), and the clock was ticking at Vicksburg (placed under siege before Lee's campaign even began).

@@manilajohn0182 We cannot know what didn’t happen, but Jackson might have have been more aggressive on the first day and denied the Federals the high ground. However, Meade already had a place to fall back upon if Lee had driven his forces back. So probably the fight should simply taken place further south. And our guesses about that one would be the purest of speculations. All I will say that I think Meade would have handled things pretty well. Always have thought he has never received the credit owing him. He was like Nimitz after he took over at Pearl Harbor, although he lacked Nimitz’s personal touch.

@@johnschuh8616 I said that Jackson played no role in the conduct of the actual campaign. What he might have done if he had been there is an open question, but it's 50/50 either way at best.

@@johnschuh8616 And I agree- Meade did extremely well all things considered.

The problem with Longstreet's idea is that there wasn't really any way to "quickly swing around the Union army". Meade covered all the interior lines of communication...I can't see on a map how Lee would have done that, unless Meade and his cavalry were just sitting around doing nothing, which obviously wasn't the case in this campaign.

He felt the plan to take little round top wasn't bad but that the commanders on the ground did a poor job of implementing his plan. He felt had they done a better job coordinating the attack the plan would have worked. The assault of little round to itself was more piecemeal. Never enough to ovewhelm the defenders and overcome their advantage of the high ground. The stiff resistence of the north at Devil's Den had taken a big toll.

Lee initially took responsibility for the defeat at Gettysburg. Later Lee blamed his subordinates.

@@robertfreitag7328 Who, Longstreet?

@@JamesWatheist I think Rockhound is the person you want to question. It was not my comment. But I think Rockhound was referring to Lee!

He does have a “Law” degree though

It's fascinating to me that Meade held a council of war, in which he included John Gibbon, who (iirc) was in temporary command of a corps. I'd love to study this more, but my hypothesis is that Lee's command style - very small staff, few corps commanders, and few councils of war - ultimately stunted the development of up-and-coming generals. Do you have any thoughts on that matter?

My feeling is that the relative success of the confederates on 1st July obliged Lee to press on during the next two days in circumstances that make it hard to see how he could have won.

@@redemptivepete I think you've got a valid point there. I think he still deserves censure for the abysmal intelligence gathering, but with the information he did have, the attacks of the second day make more sense.

Lee should have called in air support.

You mean right into the Army of the Potomac???

​@@jamesb4789This is exactly what would have happened. Union forces were SOUTH of Gettysburg on July 1. Had Lee tried to break off and head for Washington, he would have blundered directly into the Army of the Potomac. As the PBS documentary "The Civil War" says about the run-up to Gettysburg, "If Meade didn't know where Lee was heading, Lee didn't know where Meade even WAS."

.I appreciate the work you are doing on this channel and on this topic. I taught Civil War Advance Placement too for 20 years. I hope my donation to you helps your work. J. Hugh Craft 1 April 2024

I tend to agree, but we're missing context in this case. Jubal Early spent years after the war defaming General Longstreet. Longstreet was forced to publicly himself. This account was given in support of Longstreet to counter Jubal Early's lies and ignorance. Also, it's considered a primary source because the writer is giving a firsthand account. 🤠✌️

The Sons and Daughters of the Confederacy made it their mission to ensure that history books were written to provide a favorable view of the South. This is a documented fact. They did this decades after the war. Southerners have been educated to believe their cause was honorable and that Lee was practically a god. If any source should be believed, it's a man who was there rather than a group with an agenda. It's not surprising that his report is missing since it was critical of Lee. It seems to be consistent with the strategy of Southerners who wanted to paint the Confederacy in a positive light. A recent article published about an Alabama unit that fought for the Union revealed that a well known Southern historian had hidden information about it.

It's still a primary source, although the context matters. Primary sources can be crap, and need to be assessed, but it is still statements by a witness.

@@dmbeaster I was questioning the number of years... Can you record what you did twenty years ago with any accuracy? He is remembering what he did and more than likely only the better parts of that. Memory is not history. Yes I know all primary sources are to be taken with a grain of salt.

@@GhostOfHowardsRightArm I agree with you

Sounds like a "fun" tour

What an excellent idea! But you must be wonderful walkers because just the defensive line of the Union (the fishhook) is six miles long! I too I have visited Gettysburg but did so by car…. I am rather lazy. But this is definitely the way to introduce your children to history. Might I also suggest Shilo in the Western theatre. On a misty early foggy morning it is almost as if the ghosts of the past walk with you. Good tripping.

But Longstreet did it first at second Manassas .

@@lorrainedixon4440 Not really. That's a pretty different tactical situation. It was brilliant, to be sure - Lee's best battle, in my opinion.

Jackson had the fortune of attacking weak commanders and green troops.

Exactly describe the actual horrors and evilness of slavery instead of glorifying slaveholders ❤

They did in a movie called "Roots".

Agreed 👍

I've heard from more than one quarter that Lee may have suffered a heart attack or stroke on the first day of the battle, which clouded his judgement over the next couple of days.

@@Gwaithmir I have read he was in poor heath earlier in the Spring. but he felt that the invasion was essential and that he had to lead it.

I do not believe Lee had an inflated ego, most likely he had an over confidence in the ability of his army and his commanders with good reason being mostly successful but Gettysburg just did not turnout good for the south it was close but not a win and Meade was unwilling to make alot of mistakes that Lee could take advantage of. I do believe with Jackson this would be a different battle , where was A.P hill and Ewell was just off to the sidelines Lee's only dependable corp commander was Longstreet his old war horse.