A Critique of Natural Moral Realism 

I honestly don't understand why he can't say this word. I thought at first I was just not hearing him correctly. I haven't heard a lisp in any of his other words. Only that one it seems.

Essical

yes

yes

Can you please share the link? I've searched and found it , but I want to be sure!

@@Nithin_sp there are atheist philosopher's who also disagree with Harris and basing his objective standard on wellbeing. No matter what side of religion I was on I'd still be confused.

@@hatersgotohell627 Exactly! If moral goodness was equal to well being , then it might as well be utilitarianism. I can point out several instances where it's morally wrong to do something , but it wouldn't affect the well being of any individuals

​​@@Nithin_sp actually... Alex OConner (an individual heavily disagree with) already covered the error of utilitarianism, using Crip's rash doctor dilemma And it goes... If doctors have the option to give a patient two serums to heal his patient 1.) Almost guaranteed to work, with slight draw backs 2.) A riskier serum with an astonishing lower success rate but will work instantly, for a slightly greater affect Should the doctor give the patient the 2nd serum?

​@@Nithin_spthis dilemma proves that ultimatums are not always prevalent to decision making

You can always find book free online, or if you're not a book guy there's plenty of audio books or RU-vid videos covering many topics

I did, see my channel.

"Is it logical to use logic for the sake of logic itself? If it is, why? If it isn't, why is it not?" And ultimately: "Is it (logically) cohherent to do (logically) coherent arguments? If yes, why? If no, why?"

"Moral goodness has no consequence outside itself", are we overlooking things such as betrayal from said good

1.) To be fair, what isn't a modal argument with ethics 2.) Naturalism is kinda redundant, especially in regards to ethics An example of this would alcoholism being genetic

Depends what playing, anything by Ariana Grande or Taylor Swift.. is just distasteful

A man named Aquinas might have some things to say about that, but I'm no expert

I was thinking the same thing. Saying God is good would be equivalent to saying "good is good and we should do it because it is good".

​​@@yourfutureself3392 that's because there are only types of evil Natural (natural disasters, droughts and plagues) And moral evil (any action committed by a mortal being) god created these for both man to live in nature, and for man to have free will (despite the risk the risk they bring)

It is also possible that they absolutely hate doing that thing, and regret doing it despite it being good. In that sense, it can be detrimental to the performer.

The question is, though, "why do they feel guilt and regret?" Where do guilt and regret come from for an action for which the performer does not see any personal benefit?

According to Naturalism Guilt and Regret are just a bunch of chemicals bouncing about, Since the ultimate goal is to remain in nature(Alive), the action is not beneficial to the performer.

@@JulioCaesarTM The fact that 'guilt' and 'regret' are a bunch of chemicals bouncing around doesn't deny that those chemicals will still affect it's host psychology and mental state.

@@martok2008 youre missing the point lol

Funny thing about this is a science-of-the-gaps fallacy.

Also I wanna see cosmic skeptic debunking his moral argument for god’s existence(I don’t think he will be able to)

Wait cosmic akeptic is a non cognitvist? Internally cannot understand what he is

Wait cosmic akeptic is a non cognitvist? Internally cannot understand what he is

Wait cosmic akeptic is a non cognitvist? Internally cannot understand what he is

Hey Max. I reply here because I don't think IP would respond to me. At 0:12 he says that the naturalist thinks that the _meaning_ of ethical claims can be expressed as natural, but most moral naturalist realists accept that "good" is semantically primitive. Structurally, reductionist types of moral naturalism and DCT are the same since they are both reductionist in that they are positing synthetic identities like water and H2O. In Robert Adam's early days he analytically reduced moral terms to nonmoral terms, just like IP is describing analytic naturalist as doing, but Adam's changed his mind following the work of Kripke and Putnam. The naturalist can do the same. There are also nonreductionist moral naturalists like the Cornell realists. I'm not sure why IP brought up Moore, because Moore's thought his OQA and Naturallistic fallacy apply just as well to the supernatural. Maybe IP is thinking that DCT is a nonnaturalist theory, but I wouldn't classify DCT as such. There are some (e.g. Robert Adams) that do classify DCT as nonnatural but I think most metaethicists would restrict moral nonnaturalism to the nonreductionist type of Moore. IP then brings up the is/ought problem and describes it as saying that we cannot derive oughts from facts about nature. I think it's more correct to say that we cannot derive moral facts from purely nonmoral facts. Described this way, it makes no reference to the natural and applies equally to all metaethical views. There is also a _logical_ gap between deriving nonmoral facts about God's commands to what we ought to do. I think David Brink has a decent reply to the is/ought gap for naturalists, even though I find moral realism to be ultimately unconvincing. Brink's idea is that we can accept the logical gap between an _is_ and _ought_; this just shows that we need a moral bridge principle (say, the golden rule) to make the inference formally valid. How do we know what the bridge principle is is a good question, and I find naturalistic epistemologies weak there. If there is a plausible form of moral realism, I think it's a Moorean nonnaturalism. I think DCT proponents are just as subject to Moore's arguments as reductionist naturalists are. By contrast, I think the naturalist Cornell realists, in being nonreductionist, can avoid Moorean criticisms.

Thanks for including me in this response. Well, at 0:20 IP says "ethical terms can be reduced to natural properties", so I think he is aware that many moral naturalists reduce moral terms to nonmoral term. Now, as I am a proponent of DCT, so I'll respond on behalf of that view. To begin with your point about analytic reduction, I think a problem with this strategy - in general - is that it's hard to appeal to a primitive state of affairs in a convincing matter. I don't object to it in principle, but it should be a last resort. I would rather employ the strategy of synthetic identity, but I think there is an advantage the Cornell realist lacks, the DCT has. IP brings this objection up at 5:50. When we discovered that our water was composed of H2O, according to Searle, contra-Putnam, we could just say we analytically just re-defined "water" to fit with our best science, or we are just referring to its surface properties, and there . Now, if there was a Twin Earth, all we'd be doing is either talking past one another (making a particular definition trivial), or admitting there are two substances with the same surface properties. Now, posit a Moral Twin Earth where Earthlings there think the good is desire, while here the good is pleasure. We still both have the same feeling and conviction we would say that the inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth are using “good” in the same way as us, namely to commend, but with different beliefs and theories about what is good. But, like the case of water, all we'd be doing is either talking past one another (making a particular definition of trivial), or admitting there are two notions of the good with the same surface properties. DCT, unlike Cornell realism, would posit a necessary being which transcends all created worlds, hence the above objection would not apply because both worlds are pointing to something beyond them and necessary for the ontological structure of both worlds. So, if you were willing to say the Cornell realist can bypass the Moorean argument, why not say the DCT is able to, after all it's capable of being non-reductionist as well. Next, to the IS-Ought gap, since God’s command is just something we all, knowingly or not, value. It is the good which attracts us all. We ought to follow God’s call because for anything else we might seem to value, we have greater reason to value God’s call because it is the source for all other values. The philosopher John Hare likens God’s call and our values to a, "magnetic force…to an iron ring through other iron rings that are attracted to the original magnet. This is Plato’s image (Ion 536a): “Well, do you not see that the spectator is the last of the rings I spoke of, which receive their force from one another by virtue of the magnet? … But it is the deity who, through all the series, draws the spirit of men wherever he desires, transmitting the attractive force from one into another.” [5]" While there is no contradiction in rejecting the source of value while accepting contingent values, just like there is no contradiction like there was no contradiction in pre-modern scientists rejecting H2O as the source of water (on Putnam's view), it would be irrational to disentangle the two given the information known. Hope this was helpful.

I'm not following your point about analytic reduction and "appeal to a primitive state of affairs." My point is that many naturalists accept the OQA and think "good" is semantically primitive like "yellow" is. Cornell realists (this is especially clear with Sturgeon and Brink) don't accept that good is synthetically identical to some other natural property since they are nonreductionist. Since Cornell realists accept good is metaphysically irreducible and semantically primitive, they are in agreement with Moore. Their main disagreement is in moral epistemology. DCT, by contrast, accept an metaphysical but not semantic identity relation between the good and God's nature; so they are reductionist and the water = H2O analogy is apt there. An identity relation is a reduction. The problem with redefining water is that that means two people with two different definitions will talk past past each other. The point of Horgan and Timmons' Moral Twin Earth thought experiment was to say it's implausible that the two planets would be talking past each other like they would with water and twin-water; they would really be disagreeing. I think this gets into sticky issues with semantic externalism, but iirc Horgan and Timmons had a semantic internalist version of their argument as well. I recall Horgan and Timmons criticizing Boyd, and it wasn't clear to me that Boyd was a nonreductionist like his other Cornell realist fellows. As I understand you, you're saying that, contrary to Horgan and Timmons, they are really talking past each other? The Moral Twin Earth argument relied on some type of causal theory of reference so this issue is independent of any considerations to do with naturalism or theism. The MTE argument would apply to transcendent beings as well, as long as there are other earths where we can causally fix the reference of their terms to something other than God. Reference fixing here is an empirical matter. I'm not familiar with John Hare. I read your blog on it a while ago and I wanted to ask you some questions on it. I'm a little bit more familiar with R.M. Hare and his idea that the is-ought gap supported noncognitivism. I think you are interpreting the is-ought gap differently than I am. I take it to be purely a point about logic and validity and that fact that it's about ethics is besides the point. So, even if it were true that we all value God's commands, it's besides the point of the is-ought gap. It would be relevant from an epistemological standpoint if that's what you're saying, but I think that that point would be external to the actual is-ought gap as understood by people like Charles Pigden, Michael Huemer, A.N. Prior et al. I prefer to continue this thread on a private or public g+ thread, if you don't mind. I'd like to ask you more about John Hare.

//I'm not following your point about analytic reduction and "appeal to a primitive state of affairs." // Simple, analytic reduction is workable, but not convincing. It's like the ontological argument, even if it were sound and valid, it still wouldn't convince people. /// My point is that many naturalists accept the OQA and think "good" is semantically primitive like "yellow" is. Cornell realists (this is especially clear with Sturgeon and Brink) don't accept that good is synthetically identical to some other natural property since they are nonreductionist. Since Cornell realists accept good is metaphysically irreducible and semantically primitive, they are in agreement with Moore. They're main disagreement is in moral epistemology. DCT, by contrast, accept an metaphysical but not semantic identity relation between the good and God's nature; so they are reductionist and the water = H2O analogy is apt there. An identity relation is a reduction./// I see, yeah this strategy just reminds me of Hare's, except for him, moral facts supervene on supernatural properties and not natural properties. Hare is not a straight up DCT, but a Prescriptive Realist. In any case, I still think the Twin Earth example is still apt for reasons I will get into. ///The problem with redefining water is that that means two people with two different definitions will talk past past each other. The point of Horgan and Timmons' Moral Twin Earth thought experiment was to say it's implausible that the two planets would be talking past each other like they would with water and twin-water; they would really be disagreeing. /// Correct. But this would introduce a problem with people who believe that some good would be either identical with, or supervenes on natural properties, it turns what is good into an empirical claim, and would be an open question, open to disagreement with Earth 1 and 2. //. I recall Horgan and Timmons criticizing Boyd, and it wasn't clear to me that Boyd was a nonreductionist like his other Cornell realist fellows. As I understand you, you're saying that, contrary to Horgan and Timmons, they are really talking past each other? // Either that, or they both have discovered two different types of good - like there are 2 types of water, earth water is H2O and twin earth is XYZ - like for Earth 1, it might be that pleasure is good (or is supervened primarily upon by the good), while on Earth 2 it might be that altruism is good (or is supervened primarily upon by the good). ///The Moral Twin Earth argument relied on some type of causal theory of reference so this issue is independent of any considerations to do with naturalism or theism. The MTE argument would apply to transcendent beings as well, as long as there are other earths where we can causally fix the reference of their terms to something other than God. Reference fixing here is an empirical matter./// But ultimately, they're causal operation would have to terminate at none other than God, from which all things derive. This comes with God's position as having aseity. There could be no other earth whose creation does not come from God, and whose good cannot be fixed on any other but God first. ///I think you are interpreting the is-ought gap differently than I am. I take it to be purely a point about logic and validity and that fact that it's about ethics is besides the point./// In that case, Hare would be implementing the same strategy as the Cornell realists and say that oughts of obeying God's commands are not reducible to the Is that God did command it, but it still remains as a point of fact we ought to obey said command. I offered another method whereby we try to bridge the gap. For all x that the skeptic happens to value (as even the skeptic has some implicit value), then a fortiori he would have greater reason to value to obey God as for any reason he would have to value x, God can give him greater reason to obey him. Consider, if I'm a pedophile and I value sex with minors because of the pleasure I get, then given my justification, I should follow God and not have sex with minors as I would be offered more long term and fulfilling pleasure. Thanks for this discussion, I think you offered me more insight into my own understanding. Tag my Maximus Confesses account on G+ for that private convo.

I sent a G+ message.

You must be careful to avoid the conclusion that one's silence on an issue and another's non-silence on the same issue is a contradiction. Unfortunately, many, many of these supposed contradictions are arguments from silence and pose only a problem in the minds of these poor individuals. The number of women at the tomb is a prime example of such (which, btw, consisted of at least 5 women).

One can be psychological benefited bjt not doing the good. It is beneficial that I kill non-nazis for the sake of popularity or psychological benefits. There instances in World war 2 as he point where people saved their enemies. Well this is psychologically non-beneficiary. For if you go to war agaibst nazis and kill nazis, You would be cherished by your own team and may have social benefits and hence psy.ben. Not all moral duties are for the sake of psy.ben

Psychology from person to person isn't objective

Just start with one book on a subject you are interested in. If it is non-fiction - particularly philosophy - they WILL reference other authors with whom they agree and disagree, then follow them down the rabbit hole. If you really want the classical education check out both the Oxford or Harvard cannons and start with a subject you're interested in. Pick other peoples brains who share the same interests. Start and keep a list of recommended books. Hopefully you'll have more books on your list than you can ever read in your entire lifetime, then you can pick out the ones that satisfy your curiosity. There is a great website called Good Reads where readers evaluate the books and maybe you can read the comments to see which books appeal to you. Step one is always read something that challenges you. Step two, don't stop.

check out Ken samples course: Learning Skills 101. he speaks about how to read books and which ones, and also logic.

JVT_RedBaron speaks "God and Cosmos" by David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls is a great book critiquing the best of natural moral realists theories and it's proponents. You might want to get that too: global.oup.com/academic/product/god-and-cosmos-9780199931217?lang=en&cc=us

LogosTheos Thanks for the recommendation, an Oxford press book too. I shall put it on my book wish list.

JVT_RedBaron speaks It's cheaper on Amazon I think.

owchywawa Is this natural law theory? I been reading a bit about it from Feser and Lawrence Hill.

LogosTheos Yes. If you’re looking for more books on the topic, look up Moral Theory, and Applied Ethics by David Oderberg. I just started reading them, and they are pretty great so far. They have good arguments against abortion, moral relativism, etc.

So according to you God isn't the good but rather the abstraction of maximal happiness is the good? Maybe you can clarify, but as a theist, that instantly makes me not interested in natural law theory. But perhaps you're not a theist so it doesn't matter for you? Anyway, assuming you are a theist, this would just be a view which makes God less than He actually is. The idea that morality isn't based on God, but on a mere abstraction of maximal happiness, seems very problematic for Christian theism. Again, maybe I misunderstood so you can perhaps clarify.

@@x-popone6817 Happiness is defined as the rest in the possession of what we seek/desire. God is the good because He is the ultimate thing we are seeking to find rest in. The possession of the beatific vision is perfect happiness.

@@Tdisputations So God is still the good, but he only is that because He is the ultimate thing we are seeking to find rest in? Wouldn't that mean that His goodness is contingent upon us having that desire to find rest in Him? This means God isn't the absolute good. It also means part of Him is contingent. With all due respect, this seems absolutely incompatible with perfect being theism, hence, it seems problematic for Christianity. Now, I'm trying to be open-minded here because many theists have been proponents of natural law theory, so there is no way they all overlook this point, right? So do you really mean God's goodness is contingent?

TheBabyDerp Have you checked out his Leibniz argument?

Ed Feser's "Five Proofs of the Existence of God" (and Ed's blog) is an excellent starting point.

Well he just proved more universalism is the answer Honestly I'd say something like Abiogenesis being a bold claim, but each there own

Is the education in particular something which would have a financially good job waiting for you afterwards (engineering, medical, business, etc)? If the answer to this question is "no" then the answer to your question, regardless of what age you are, is "no". Presuming the answer to my first question was "yes" then the answer to "is it a good idea to pursue higher education at age 20." depends on your circumstances.

@@LawlessNate you can make a shit ton of money in almost any field if you've got what it takes, I have a degree in both stem and languages and both of them brought me skills that helped me go for the career I want

What kind of moral realism though? This is moral realism as well but reduces down to objectives that are subjectively chosen as good.

Revenge is an instinct. It usually manifests “morally” or legally through the concept of justice.

Esaú Ponce The problem is with it is that it isn't really objective or universal in a grand sense. Politicians and rich people in general are above the social contract and can bypass it and when you think about it everyone in a different country agrees to a different contract meaning it's still really only relative but instead of personal opinion but to location

Esaú Ponce For example the social contract would tell us that we have obligations and duties inherent in us to each other that is above our opinion but take a guy like Bill Gates. He can buy his way out of any obligation he has to people and can act as immorally as he wants

DManCAWMaster Yeah, I was thinking simillarly on that. ¿Have you watched the movie "Kingsman: The Secret Service"? If you haven't, watch it and then tell me if the plan that Samuel Jackson (the antagonist of the movie) cleverly elaborates is inmoral or not haha. By the""social contract" theory, he wouldn't be inmoral actually, I think. But anyone who watches that movie knows that his plan was immensely evil, but clever.

Esaú Ponce Yes. Precisely. A social contract faces the same problem a lot of contracts do and that is loopholes and when your trying to do objective moral values and duties the last thing you want is loopholes. Like it wouldn't be valid and binding to someone who extends past the contract such as rich people and if evolution tells us anything the contract changes a lot and you can never be sure which contract you've signed into

Heaven is no a place we go to, it is the resurrection on earth. So who will we rule over?

InspiringPhilosophy Huh, I was unaware of that, I really need to finish my bible. Well anyways, that article basically asks why God allows animal suffering. Since animals didn't do what Adam and Eve did and are innocent, why do animals suffer? Will they be resurrected after death, if so what about plants, amoebas, our cells, etc? What if I want my living bacteria or cells to get a "vacation", the article states? On the other side, if animals don't get resurrected (which you don't believe, I think), then why do they suffer, even though they didn't do anything wrong? That's all for that, thank you.

We don't know because we cannot communicate with animals to know what they feel compared to us.

The article actually covers that, we know animals feel pain. The article states, "Professor Bernard Rollin disagrees, and facetiously recommends that anyone who denies animals feel pain should test their hypothesis by using a pair of vice grips to squeeze the balls of a large doberman. While animals can’t tell us directly that they feel pain, it can be inferred by their similar reactions to it. If you’ve ever accidentally stepped on a dog’s toes or tail, you know they respond to pain. Animals vocalize their pain, they withdraw from it, and they will even change their behavior to avoid it. Animals can also experience the opposite of pain, like a dog who enjoys having his belly rubbed. We can also infer that animals suffer pain because they share much of the same anatomy and neurological makeup as humans, and they even respond positively to the same pain relievers we use. These similarities make it obvious that animals do feel pain, and there are numerous peer-reviewed studies that have reached the same conclusion. Speaking from personal experience, I once witnessed a dog get run over by a car. He laid there in the street, yowling in agony for several minutes (in much the same way a human would). I can’t imagine looking at this dog and saying, “That dog didn’t really experience pain because he has no soul!” or “That would’ve been significantly more painful had he been self-aware!” No matter the degree, that dog was clearly capable of suffering. And for all we know, not being self-aware may even make painmore confusing and stressful."

He addressed this in the last section of this paper: www.commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Goetz-The-Argument-from-Evil.pdf "Beasts and the Problem of Evil"

Since 'desirable' and 'repugnant' are subjective, which set of people decide which one is moral and the other not? And who was the arbiter who decided that feeling comes into morality in the first place? Why isn't feeling accidental, rather than central, to morality? There are so many presuppositions.

Preferences are totally subjective. How can that be a basis for objective morality? What if someone is suicidal but also a coward, would it be right to kill him? I don't see how this shows morality reduces to natural means.

I don't say those facts to argue we ought to do certain things. They come with theological implications tied to them.

InspiringPhilosophy And what these implications are? Are they prescriptive?

Yeah, and they are tied together, not that one is reduced to the other.

So you admit that in theology, ought (prescriptive statement) is an implication of is (descriptive statement). Can you explain how any implication of this kind can be derived? Does being "tied together" solve the problem - if so, how? (I know the solution, I'm just curious whether you can solve the problem yourself.)

Yeah, just like as a non-natural moral realize, oughts are about what we do in the physical world. The oughts are not just derived from physical arrangments. The same logic applies here. What is your solution?

They do not have different moral intuitions, but different metaphysical views which skew their moral views, as I explained: ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-zjkgD4w9w1k.html

Willy T Yes you're right. Many writers on the Moral Argument, like William Lane Craig and C.S Lewis, acknowledge that we do have some kind of "herd instinct" directed towards certian goods, most likely put into us by something like society or evolution. The arguments they make are not about how we come to hold moral beliefs, but what roots them and makes them objectively true

Philip Paul I suggest you look up Hugh Ross

Thomist natural law and ethical naturalism are not the same things technically.

@@InspiringPhilosophy thank you that was I thought...

That might explain why we do something but not what morals are. We cannot confuse moral epistemology with moral ontology.

​@@InspiringPhilosophy Are moral properties intrinsically action guiding or motivating on your view?

The difference is I am not trying to explain the moral status of something natural, like pain. I am saying badness is not reducible. The ethical naturalist wants to say it is, but cannot reduce such a concept without creating a meaningless tautology.

InspiringPhilosophy Why ought we not do something that is bad?

Because it is bad, pure in simple. We do not murder because it is wrong to murder (moral law).

Ok, let’s suppose I accept that these categorical morals exist. Now, I have the option to rob a bank and I know I can get away with it. I know it is categorically wrong to rob a bank, however I also know that if I want to be happy, I should rob a bank. I have two conflicting oughts here. I want to be happy, so I ought to rob the bank, and I ought not rob the bank because it is a categorical imperative. Surely, I would be a fool not to rob the bank, if the acting immorally will only have a positive effect on my happiness. I may know I am a bad person, but as long as I am happy, why should I care?

If what you care about is pragmatic value, then yes. But you even acknowledge being happy is distinct from being good or bad. Good and bad are non-natural categorical imperatives, not natural imperatives.

Signal 20 Suppose we do have a system in us that wishes to do good, isn’t this different from knowing you ought to do good? Or knowing that you ought to obey the system?Altruism makes me feel fuzzy because of the dopamine effect, however ought I obey this? Dopamine is released for several reasons, morality seems to tell us, ( if this altruistic system does exist) that we should discriminate against the other forms that give us dopamine in substitute for this system, suppose my dopamine is released by hurting and bullying people for dominance, someone could say well you ought to obey the altruistic dopamine system that’s already in us. Knowing that you ought to obey the system is different than the system itself right? Any thoughts man, cause when I think about it seems having an altruistic system isn’t morality itself, because moral prescriptions are what you ought to do, and morality seems to tell us that if we do have this system, that we ought to obey it in favor of our other instincts that are in competition with it. So it seems to be something separate, I think it was C.S Lewis who wrote instincts are like keys on a piano, and morality is the tune we have to play. m.ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-Lgcd6jvsCFs.html Also wouldn’t the evolutionary moral claim end up looking something like X appears moral in us, because X helps us survive. So what helps us survive is moral? That could be a whole array of immoral things. This might be a genuine straw man if it is let me know, it’s just how I’m seeing it currently as a laymen to the topic.

@@lifewasgiventous1614 - The clip provided seems to make a lot of inaccurate inferences and falls prey to the same faults as this video about the mechanisms of subjective morality. It infers a lot of slippery slope clauses like espousing one set of ideals would indefinitely result in the Holocaust or some other travesty. When that's just not the case. Let's take the example of the representativeness heuristic. The innate mental bias the underpins group selection. "Since you look like me, we must be similar". And CS Lewis suggests that this innate feeling has lead to events like the Holocaust due to Nazism. That's cherry picking. He discounts all the other times it hasn't done so and even has underpinned the basis of our society. Like border control, the liberation of women, fair labour laws, trade unions, etc. The idea of moral patients. The takeaway is that our societies are formed more from our biology than one would think. And the moral code is not some objective thing out there but a collection of subjective forces in synergy. We are more alike than different, so our feelings of what's wrong or right are more similar than different. In our society, what is morally right for you is probably a 99% match to what's morally right for your neighbour. The discord comes in with how we implement those moral values. The health of individuals is important but is free healthcare justified and how would it be accomplished. Your question is quite broad so I'm not sure where to focus my answer or if I adequately answered it. If not please tell me where I can improve.

Signal 20 I’m a bit confused on the first paragraph, how is morality a mechanism? Morality is what I ought to do, if I have this mechanism, ought I obey it? You can ask the question prior to invoking the mechanism. To say yes you should, would be a moral prescription about the moral authenticity of the mechanism. Which would really look like. Yes you should obey the mechanism, why because the mechanism is moral. Yes you should be moral, why because being moral is moral. He addressed this with the football analogy, the point of playing football isn’t to score goals, because that’s the game itself, all your really saying is football is football which is true just hardly not worth saying. Likewise I don’t think the refutation you provided is accurate in the second paragraph to what he is actually saying, he addressed in the very beginning, “correct thinking won’t make good men out of bad ones, but a false philosophy may remove ordinary checks to evil. “Since you look like me, we must be similar, and C.S Lewis suggest this has led to the holocaust, I really and genuinely have no idea where you get this from, he doesn’t say this or suggest this at all, break it down for me if you can, because he quite literally says for anyone to be right about a moral claim he has to believe there is some over arching standard that encompasses Germans, Russians, and the Japanese alike. If anything that is supportive of what your describing. You look like me, you must be similar, you also must know about this morality that I feel. If you don’t think what you prescribe as moral is separate than you, then you can hardly say what the nazis did was wrong, because if it doesn’t have to be separate from you and it can remain your own subjective truth why does it have to be separate for anyone else? On a side note how could you distinguish an objective morality from a biological morality? If we have biological programming to tell us when we are in the wrong, and everyone has this? How is that not an objective thing? For instance if this biological moral mechanism says rape is wrong, does that mean someone who thinks it okay is actually wrong?

@@lifewasgiventous1614 - The biological imperatives can not be trusted to make correct moral judgements. The example of the representativeness heuristic was used to explain this. We have a special attraction to individuals as we've been hardwired to do so by evolution. We're less capable of making the same connection with groups of people for the very same innate reasoning. So if you cared for a small girl and would make moral claims on her. Protecting her from harm would be ethically sound. But given the choice to protect the girl you know or some group, the representativeness heuristic would incline you to protect the girl over the group. But ethically, the lives of many are more important than the lives of few. It would be unethical to favour of the life of the individual over the group, especially if that group included the girl in question. And there in also lay the contradiction to the slippery slope in the Holocaust example. Just because we see people who are like us, it doesn't mean we choose the group of those people over another. The heuristic is not used that way and therefore invalidates that clause in CS Lewis's argument that people identity with one another individually and could equally identify with a group of said individuals. Another thing is the circular logic of the statement, "because being moral is moral". It begs the question and doesn't answer why morality is good. You assume it to be moral because of the biological mechanism but morality isn't synonymous with biological processes, as addressed above. Your choice to act a certain way is indeed independent of any moral claim that can be made on the act. Choice to play the game verses the rules of the game itself. But the reason to play is because of the benefits of playing, the purpose, if you will. The purpose of following laws, is so we can have order in society. And seeking order and a fortiori, eliminating chaos, is the very reason why society was created. Purpose give the meaning to epistemic claims and ethical claim are a form of epistemic claim. Being moral serves a purpose. Not because it's moral to be moral.

Psy Fi I’m currently writing an essay on this topic for school and I’m new to this specific domain of inquiry, but I have considered myself a moral realist and looking more into it, I stand my ground. My response to the “feelings are subjective” is that it’s true in the sense that the same stimulus can cause different emotional reactions on an individual basis. But, it isn’t in that we all experience them, and there are patterns of how people feel towards thing

Yes: ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-Cp9Nl6OUEJ0.html

What does the supernatural mean though?

So you are suggesting earlier beliefs that rape and slavery of people of a different race were equally good?

- "If I say I have value, then I have to say that by that same giver of value, the other person has the same value as I do." 1: How much value you claim yourself to have is entirely subjective. Some people think they are more valuable an others whereas some people feel completely worthless. Basing your idea of ethics on this would automatically make it entirely subjective and thereby not objective or true. You're trying to base the claim "Murder is objectively wrong." on the entirely subjective, not objective, claim of how much value you think you possess. 2: Maybe you're just not wording your argument properly? I see no reason why you'd be required to put as much value into other people's lives as your own just because you think of yourself as having value. There are plenty of people who think of their own lives as more valuable than the lives of other people. There are a few people who think of their lives as having less value than the lives of other people. I don't see how "Thereby other people's lives must have value" follows from "I think of myself as having value.".

LawlessNate if I have no objective value, neither do you. If I value my own happiness, I must realize I have no more value than another and thus the happiness of another is of equal value to my own

You've certainly made your argument more clear, but it's still not logical. I see what you're trying to get at, but whether you value other people's happiness as much as your own is still just an opinion on your part. A more selfless person could value the happiness of others over himself and a more selfish person could value their own happiness over others'. There is no objective reason why you must value other peoples' happiness as much as your own; how much other peoples' happiness relates to your own is up to personal opinion. This would be the case not despite everyone having no objective value but especially because of it. If your happiness is equally as meaningless as the happiness of other people then you having happiness at the expense of other peoples' sorrow would equally as meaningless as everyone having happiness but at no one's expense. If you are meaningless and therefore all of your emotions are meaningless then it doesn't matter if you've been a Mother Teresa spreading happiness to others or and Adolf Hitler spreading sorrow considering how meaningless it is in the end one way or the other.

LawlessNate well what I’m giving is my best understanding of Aquinas which to me has seemed to be the most true as I could never really find a dismantling argument of it. A couple things. First, I’d like to point out that everyone is constantly searching for happiness in any given situation. There is no moral action I’ve ever heard of that does not effect ones ability to be happy. Now let’s be clear, when I say happiness, I mean true complete happiness. This kind of happiness by default would lead one away from Vice and towards Virtue. Especially on the eternal scale of the after life, these sins are truly deadly. Imagine always needing another woman to pressure you, your lust ever growing. Imagine needing more and more wealth or falling further or further into addiction. On the other hand, imagine practicing chastity and saving yourself and having that order you towards marriage and a family which gives you great joy all your life. Imagine denying your greed and instead giving to the homeless, an action that you can feel good about all your life because that homeless person was shown love that he himself will never forget. Deny yourself addictions and you will continue to be happy. Vices are self destructive because they only give short term pleasure while virtue gives lasting happiness. This was the idea of Aristotle. St. Thomas Aquinas goes further to say that any earthly happiness is failing, finite, and imperfect. The only time we can be truly happy for always (think about how when you experience something good you never want it to end) is with God in Heaven. Knowing someone else is happy is often both a result of doing something that will make us in turn more completely happy. Love, charity, mercy, etc I think all share this property. In addition when we realize that we’re all searching for happiness, we must respect the lives of others doing the same while not allowing them to disrespect the lives of others and do things which do not order themselves towards the good of us all. Even Hilter thought he was doing something for everyone’s benefit. However, he defied this logical principle of all people being equal in objective value which we recognize as wrong, and did things which ultimately did not order himself or others towards lasting or eternal happiness. I’m pretty sure that from there Aquinas goes into Natural Law, which basically says that our human nature is the basis for our happiness (doing things that help us as humans specifically like education, praising God, etc). Also I’d like to point out that one would likely not take a bullet for someone who’s immune to bullets. Meaning that even when we do greatly selfless things, we do it because our loss is rationally less than what the other gains. Realizing that we are equal seems to be the corner stone of noble actions. Anyway, just my thoughts. Please keep discussing with me because I genuinely want to know the truth about morality and would love if it was necessary to attribute it directly to God

Thing is there is nothing that you are basing that on. Meaning it is subjective and falls into the camp of relativism. If the number 1 decided it was 2. Would we use it any differently? Objectivity requires an observer and your consciousness only seems to have one-- yourself. Unless you hypothesize or believe in god. This is a very complex problem that is extremely contemporary in the philosophy of reasoning because it implies a few paradoxes.

Could you provide an example? War, for example, is inherent in our nature, but I wouldn't call war a good thing.

If something conforms to its nature determining good or evil only applies if it is conforming to God's moral nature. For an animal to go against its nature is irrelevant to good or evil. If I teach a dog to walk, and walking is against a dog's nature, does that make it evil? "Facts are inherently value-laden." According to whom and according to what basis? Sounds just like an empty assertion.

"We can tell if something is good or evil by whether it conforms to its inherent nature" Note that this is arbitrary, and therefore is not an answer to anything. So arbitrary, in fact, that the opposite could be stated with the same authority, namely, "We *cannot* tell if something is good or evil by whether it conforms to its inherent nature," and be equally true. Making the argument self-defeating. Or, put another way, why doesn't noncomformance to inherent nature equal good, for example? Who is the arbiter here? In addition, naturalism precludes this 'prototypical' view of 'inherent nature.' There isn't a 'should be like this' (nature) of any kind of entity. Everything 'just is.' "Facts are inherently value-laden" 'Value' is an abstract concept only existent in a mind capable of assembling truths and collating them around into other concepts. It's interesting that you place 'mind' at the begining and origin of all existence: since 'value' is something proper to minds and nothing else ('a rock being on the beach' doesn't 'mean' or 'have value' outside that which can designate or appreciate value).

Let me provide an example: if I drew a triangle with the squiggly lines, would that be an example of a bad triangle?

Ghost of Buckley. Good and Bad both have multiple definitions just like the word "run" i.e. you have a run in your stockings vs let's go for a morning run... When you say a drawing of a triangle is bad, you are saying it is not accurate or correct. You are not making a moral judgement about the triangle. Let's not equivocate on what we are talking about here by switching out definitional contexts.

No, I am not saying this at all. Death is not always bad. Each moral case will have its own circumstances and there will always be an objective right decision to make and objective wrong choices that could be made. Second, a naturalistic fallacy is saying something is natural therefore it is good. GE Moore was the one who came up with this in attacking ethical naturalism. No one is saying because something naturally happens it is good. That is actually an argument against ethical naturalism since it shows something natural is not necessarily good.

I believe content of an idea is more important than it's origin. Yes, it is true that term naturalistic fallacy was coined by GE Moore, but so what? David Hume's is-ought problem is virtually the same idea and he as an atheist certainly had no such agenda. You brought up a story of a man who saved his jailer as an example of a good deed, that can't be explained by natural moral realism. I am telling you that you don't actually know whether it is it is a good deed. You can't use your own moral philosophy, because that would only prove those two philosophies are different. It would not tell us which one is true. You also can't say that stories like this happen and have emotional effect on us therefore the deed is good, that would be naturalistic fallacy. If something happens naturally and we have natural inclination to respond in a certain way, it does not mean it is good. You are going straight from is to ought. It does not follow. The way we expect to solve the is-ought problem is to bridge it with some link in the middle. You can infer what is possible from what is. This is not the induction Hume was after, but we know abductive reasoning is good enough, that's how science works. Then you choose the right option. This will of course require some fundamental dichotomy of right and wrong to weigh you options, which is a minimalistic subjective assumption, but bulk of a information that is factoring into your decision is very real. When somebody is picking an option that does not even exist they are objectively wrong. In the last step you deduce what are the necessary steps to make that potential future into a reality and you get your ought.

I do because I can argue like Thomas Nagel it is intuitively good for such an act to happen. I don't argue from emotional effects. I never committed a naturalistic fallacy by arguing something is natural therefore it is good. Inferring what is possible still doesn't give you an ought. Potential futures also do not tell you what ought to be done.

You could argue that way if you were making your own proposition, but if you want to critique specific idea you have to work with what you are given. You can't smuggle in your own assumptions only to tear them down. That would be a straw man. Intuitions are natural in naturalistic world view, so making a moral argument form moral intuition is indistinguishable from naturalistic fallacy. You could have made an argument that naive consequentialism like reducing suffering would necessarily have rather dystopian outcome with militant antinatalism, widespread drugs use and euthanasia, because nothing is more effective at reducing suffering. It not clear whether naturalists want to prescribe you should rescue your captor, but it is pretty safe to assume they don't want to live in a dystopia or drive human race at the bring of extinction. I have not said that the bridge between is and ought is perfect. I said oughts can be minimised in our assumptions so that moral decisions are informed mostly by is. Also I don't think subjective and real are mutually exclusive properties. You could make some pretty absurd arguments if that were the case. For example if you are in a submarine and you are running out of air, time it will take it for you to suffocate depends on your subjective experience. If you panic and freak out you will suffocate sooner. Does that mean that suffocation is subjective and therefore not real? I don't think so. Suffocation is determined mostly by real physiological processes and so we consider it real.

"in naturalistic world view" - that is assuming your conclusion of naturalism, which is circular reasoning. "informed mostly by is" - is just re-enforcing the is/ought problem. An "is" just offers information, but does not give an ought. Oughts are derived from reasoning about what is taking place, not in the natural state itself.