Aristotelian versus Modern Science 

Certainly, the idea of tools (and experiments) is an entire other dimension of difference, though one that is perhaps less philosophically central. (I'm sure some philosophers would disagree with that claim.)

Who knows... but it's not really my area.

This is a great question. So, Aristotle might say that if you were to look at the constituents of humans, you of course find bone and blood and such; but if you delve down more deeply, you find the four elements. Knowing about the four elements will even allow you to explain a limited set of facts about humans; for instance, we fall down because we contain more earth and water than air and fire. However, this type of explanation is extremely limited for Aristotle. Knowing about the four elements is NOT going to allow you to understand how human beings act and develop. You need human beings as a fundamental entity -- that is, an entity that is at the basis of explanation. Earth, air, water, and fire are also fundamental in that sense, but it is only in the 17th century that science becomes really invested in the idea that knowing about the fundamental particles will allow us to explain everything. (By the way, I think this is a mistake. Reductionism does not work across the board.)

@@VictorGijsbers So for the Aristotelian no ontological priority is given to either some part or the whole, whereas science after Descartes took up the idea that the whole is nothing more than the sum of the parts. I agree reductionism fails to account for at least some of the high-level features/phenomena. Thank you for the explanation!

For Descartes, mind and matter are both fundamental. That is why he is called a substance dualist.

Mind is an independent substance for Descartes, just as fundamental as matter. However, only matter is the subject of science, which is why I restrict myself to that part of his ontology here.

@@MichaelJimenez416 ty for the answer. And how does he found his materialist ontology ? I mean, I read somewhere the part on cogito and got his point on why cogito is fundamental. But where does he talk about matter ?

The Meditations have a long section on matter, although insight into the cogito comes first. You can check out especially Meditations 5 and 6.

I don't think Aristotelian ideas are very prominent in experimental psychology, but I think elements of it are very prominent indeed in all forms of clinical psychology. As soon as you try to make someone healthy, you need a distinction between a healthy state and an unhealthy state, and this is a distinction that has *no* place in the metaphysics of modern natural science. It requires the idea that physical systems like the body and the brain are intrinsically normative, that is, being the system they are comes with certain ways that the system ought to be -- a deeply Aristotelian way of thinking. The only alternative would be to say that 'healthy' and 'unhealthy' are merely subjective, but then why would any scientist care about them? So I think we are more Aristotelian than we tend to think. (Although of course that doesn't mean that we accept all or even most of his ideas; I'm only talking about certain very general elements of his overall metaphysics here.) So I'm certainly not linking this to any kind of new age or fringe theorising, but to the very idea of a science that *cures*.

@@VictorGijsbers You could say the same of physical health and general practitioners, but the reality is that treatments look for physical rationales. I write this from a hospital ward myself; I have been in some considerable pain for which I get morphine at night. There is no suggestion of subjectivity or a concept of a norm involved and the action of opiate drugs are well understood. The source of my pain is not understood, so further physical investigations are planned. Possibly identification of the origins of mental maladies can be more of a challenge and perhaps there is more variation from country to country, but these days I think it more usual for physically identifiable indicators. I have had several blood tests lately, alongside my results the normal range is also indicated. Although physicians may well compare to these 'norms', I do not think there is anything Aristotelian about these statistically derived parameters. That said medicine has taken longer than the sciences to catch up and I guess that treatment of mental disorders was even slower, so Aristotelian approaches (which I indeed tend to dismiss as fringe or new age) may persist in some quarters.. Nor would I compare this to palliative care: there are conditions we know we are powerless to remedy, the treatment of symptoms does rely on a scientific understanding (e.g. action of opiates) of the care involved.

​​​​​​​​​@@VictorGijsbers I agree. In natural sciences, from physical chemistry to ethology, we calculate and speak of state penalties of molecules (As if God or State was punishing them for not being energetically favorable), species have native or natural environments, proteins have native states and orientations and multiple deviations or aberrations , tissues and organs have particular and multiple functions and deviations from them, the whole of pathology is describing "abnormal" tissues incompatible with life, the cephalopods release ink with the clear goal or intention to escape the predator, the purpose of breathing reflex is to keep us alive as it is sensitive to any decrease in blood oxygen level, attachment to other humans, regular sleep and emotions all have their roles for "normal" development and so on. Even bones and muscles tend to degenerate and decompose if we are not using them for locomotion or exercise (not fulfilling their function). So yes, I would say that Aristotelianism is pretty much alive, and almost common-sense or automatic in describing emergent and/or normative properties concerning behaviour and health of humans and other animals. As someone that got interested in the metaphysics only in the recent years, I'd say that it takes learning the history of metaphysics to see how little we think today and how great thinkers and events literally own thoughts we find in our heads.

On my understanding of Aristotle, the four causes form an indissoluble whole. The formal cause and the teleological cause are not two different things, but more two ways of viewing a single essence. The efficient cause too is part of this; the efficient cause of a human must be another human, because the efficient cause in such a case is a propagation of form. Now, obviously, I didn't talk about any of this. I think that's defensible in a short video on the difference between Aristotle and modern science. But I'm not yet convinced I misrepresented his system. (And, just to be clear, the 'ought' here is not an ethical ought! It's precisely a difference between the Aristotelian and the 'modern' world view that there can be natural oughts with no direct ethical significance in the Aristotelian world view.)

@@VictorGijsbers Thank you for being the efficient cause of this video. Given that this is an insightful, short, and non technical video on one big question - call that the form of the video - I, for one, won't take you task in the comments for failing to cover every related subtopic nor for, say, not including quotations in the original Greek. Then again, some might argue that the final cause of RU-vid videos is not conveying a concept in a lively manner, nor entertainment, but, something like generating the "creativity" in the comments section. Anyway you look at it, it's a win.

@@VictorGijsbers Thank you for your thoughtful reply, and I agree with much of what you say. Having rewatched your video twice, I still believe that this video simplifies too much in your effort to make the point. For example, you omitted Aristotle's "Unmoved Mover," which is the initial cause for all motion and change in the universe. This aspect of his metaphysics ultimately explains why individual entities may exhibit exceptional qualities deviating from their normative formal causes. In other words, the causes are not the final word in Aristotle's science, and the Unmoved Mover constitutes, in effect, a fundamental law of nature. Similarly, Descartes (still) relies on God's eternal perfection for proof of mental and physical substances. Further, he requires innate knowledge of God for his proofs. One could argue that in this regard, along with the importance he placed on mathematics (as opposed to Aristotle's biological focus), Descartes is actually stepping back from Aristotle toward Plato's theory of forms. It is true that Galileo removed the formal and final causes in his mechanics, thereby distancing science from previous philosophy and, particularly, metaphysics. But Descartes clearly felt the need to reexamine and restate metaphysics in the new scientific age. He certainly did not dispense with it. The primary difference between Aristotelian science and modern science, as far as I can see it, is that the latter called into question the reliability of our own sensory experience in gaining knowledge of the world. (Zeno, anyone?) Famously, this is the fundamental position of Descartes as he begins the philosophical endeavor of his Meditations. Responding to Descartes, Locke sought to reaffirm our experiential knowledge, which is clearly necessary for modern science, by relocating cause to the object of an uncertain, experiencing subject. As for the notion that modern science dispensed with "norms" or "standards" or "oughts" or "propers," it was and still is concerned with determining normative forms, no matter how much Galileo or Newton might protest. This is the very goal of the scientific process of induction, the subject of an excellent video you made a few years ago, as I recall. The difference is that they have moved the explanatory power of Aristotle's causes, rooted in the Unmoved Mover, and Descartes's God to a largely unspecified, ignored, and tacit metaphysical system that takes many, if not most, norms as givens.