For all the debates about the failings of the plan, it's only correct to talk about some of the fallen. If you have enjoyed this show, please don't forget to click like, leave a comment for other viewers and if you have not done so already please SUSBSCRIBE so you don't miss our next streams. You can also become a member of this channel and support me financially here ru-vid.com/show-UCUC1nmJGHmiKtlkpA6SJMeA. Links to any books discussed, WW2TV merchandise, our social media pages and other WW2TV shows to watch can all be found in the full RU-vid description. Lastly, my own book Angels of Mercy is always available online - more info here www.ddayhistorian.com/angels-of-mercy.html
I listened to this in the car driving. Totally the correct thing to finish with. I too grew up with war comics, WW2 films, airfix, etc and saw these men as heroes, this confirms it decades later. Thank you.
Late to the party here, but appreciated Dilip’s passion very, very much. Spent 3 days in Oosterbeek and the surrounding Drop and Landing Zones with a Dutch historian last month; he related that when Gen Urquhart returned for the dedication of the British war cemetery in ‘46, he was unsure of the reaction of the Dutch people who suffered so grievously during and after the battle. Hearing of Urquhart would attend, the mayor of Arnhem peddled his bicycle to the site, sought out the general, and assured him that the Dutch welcomed not only their liberation, but the liberators as well. Thus began the annual international commemorations to the event, and the fallen.
Hunting Stugs with the Piat. Maybe even a tiger get close and hit it right. Bridge too far and pvt Ryan didn't do the bazooka right. Gavin know about these things?
Very meaningful series of programmes for myself, My mother was Dutch who met my Father upon Liberation, My experiences of the Dutch people are 99% positive regarding the relationship with the British. The missing 1% are from near the German border close to Aachen. When I spoke to my mother about the difference, she wasn't surprised.
It’s about the losses. The terrible cost of war. I’ve been to the war cemetery’s in Germany, Holland and the U.S. they are definitely hallowed ground. They can be emotionally moving. The graves can be from any century or any war or any country…all hallowed ground. Thank you guys for showing the cost of war.
Young lads lost in the prime of their lives , let us not forget everyone , whatever nationality they were , and be ever grateful for the sacrifices made.
This is a MUST see show; Dilip's dedication and passion for the lives of the young men who lost their lives in the battle for Arnhem is touching. Encouraging and yet, sad, show. Encouraging because it reminds all of us of the human cost of war, and that we must honor the gift of freedom which was paid, at a high price, for each of us, who today live and walk in freedom. Rock on and love one another well.
Paul...you may have a show as good as this in the future...but you'll never exceed this show. This was amazing! I don't know that I have watched any of the previous more than once but this may be the first. Absolutely brilliant!
Sorry, not Phillip but Dilip... as an aside... I am fascinated as to how this fellow landed a Punjabi name like my name Ravi. My mother is Catholic Irish. My father is Northern Indian. I wonder whether Dilip has a similar and as unlikely a bloodline as I do? Anyway, excellent podcast for a die hard WW2 tragic like me. Keep going Sir. Ravi from London in Australia
Top notch of the highest tier of content on RU-vid right now. Excellent show and week overall. Incredibly interesting to learn why and how it is so difficult to get modern day family information on Germans at Arnhem. Will be rearranging my reading list priorities for this book
Dilip does a fine job reminding us that war is an event that humans experience, and that has a cost involved that effects families for generations beyond the time of the loss of a loved one. When will we ever learn to do anything but fight one another? Tremendous episode and a fitting end to Arnhem week.
Pvt. (Pte.) Albert Willingham needs to be recognized as a larger acknowledgment of these sacrifices. Might want to get a veteran-champion MP to take it up as an issue. Go around the military roadblock.
-September 3 1944, liberation of Brussels. -September 4, liberation of Antwerp. -September 5. Crazy Tuesday. Because of the above, the Nazis and collaborators were on the run in the Netherlands. -September 7. Because there was no Allied advance after Antwerp, the Nazis returned and fortified the Scheldt islands. -September 14, liberation of Maastricht, the first Dutch town to be liberated. -September 17, start of the failed Operation Market Garden. I understand that the 11th Armored Division was a far advanced unit in an elongated salient to Brussels and Antwerp. BUT ............ if Operation Market Garden had been canceled and everything had been focused on Antwerp with a Broad Front as Eisenhower wanted, the war could have ended much sooner. Market Garden did not ensure that the war was "over before Christmas", but through incorrect planning the war lasted six months longer and could only be continued at Remagen in March 1945...... Market Garden's biggest mistake was NOT exploiting the situation in Antwerp....
I thoroughly "enjoyed" the last of your Arnhem week offerings with that Philip MBE bloke. I am still playing catch up with your podcast. I have a lot to watch. I thought you chose the Right and most respectful angle for the last episode. I learnt much. Nice one. Ravi from London in Australia
What was the biggest Market Garden mistake? A. The whole operation B. General Browning underestimating the Germans C. Ignoring Dutch intelligence 9th and 10th SS panzer D. Too few airplanes E. Landing zones too far from target F. 1st division landing in several days G. Not capturing Son/Best bridges H. Not capturing Nijmegen bridge when it was possible I. Slow advance XXX corps J. Blaming the Poles to hide own mistakes
A. The whole operation - what do you suggest, NOT trying to win the war as soon as possible? B. General Browning underestimating the Germans - false, what is the evidence? C. Ignoring Dutch intelligence 9th and 10th SS panzer - false - what is the evidence? D. Too few airplanes - American and British factories producing as many as possible, what do you expect? E. Landing zones too far from target - do you know of closer ones that are not a bad idea? F. 1st division landing in several days - see item D. G. Not capturing Son/Best bridges - they were on a defence line prepared for demolition, what did you expect - the Germans to be asleep at 1 pm? H. Not capturing Nijmegen bridge when it was possible - that identifies the correct point of failure - you score maximaum points, well done! I. Slow advance XXX corps - not true, they were on schedule until Nijmegen and stopped by point H. J. Blaming the Poles to hide own mistakes - no evidence for that, so please enlighten us!
Also, XXX corps was behind schedule for the start. They caught right back up with the timing again, until they got to the Nijmegan area of the operation. Which was a whole tale unto itself. But still, you're not wrong.
@@davemac1197 hi there Dave! Hope you're doing well. I haven't as of yet, I picked up a few GPR books, Robert F. Ashby and Louis Hagens. I think I had said to you I picked up 'Remember Arnhem' by John Fairley, I stopped researching for a little while as I had found my grandfather had been interviewed for that book. In his own words he talks about what happened in the action where he'd been shot as well as afterwards and eventually becoming a pow. Finding that out of the blue left me a bit stunned and I'd stopped reading up on Arnhem for a while.
82nd Airborne historian Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th PIR in WW2 - Put Us Down In Hell (2012), and American historian John C McManus' September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012), both make clear that Gavin instructed Colonel Lindquist to commit his 1st Battalion to the Nijmegen highway bridge as soon as practical after landing and securing his initial objectives on the Groesbeek ridge. This corroborates Gavin's 17 July 1945 letter to US Army Historical Officer Captain Westover, although Gavin didn't seem to mention this to journalist Cornelius Ryan in his 1967 interview for A Bridge Too Far (1974), hence the lack of public awareness. The failure to send 1st Battalion 508th to the bridge as instructed, while the city was deserted and the bridge reported by Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees guarded by just 18 Germans, was clearly the fault of Colonel Lindquist. From Nordyke's earlier chapters on Normandy it is clear that Lindquist was not a good field commander, but Gavin was responsible for drawing up his divisional plan and assigning the critical Nijmegen mission to the 508th instead of the more experienced and aggressive 505th. The delay allowed 10.SS-Panzer-Division to reinforce Nijmegen and its bridges and impose a fatal 36-hour delay to XXX Corps in its drive to Arnhem. This sealed the fate of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem, who were unable to hold the highway bridge for more than the four days Browning had promised to Montgomery. Gavin and Lindquist are at the centre of the failure of MARKET GARDEN. I don't see how you can claim that Gavin had "nothing to do with the failed operation".
I always visit military cemeteries and which hurts the most is seeing names of the missing and headstones that say Unknown Soldier. Really tears your heart out. This was a great discussion, and heart felt stories, thank you both
This was a presentation of the highest class, a very impressive telling of history from a personal, human perspective. War never ends really, it continues to be felt through generations of people in one way or another. Total respect for this channel, love the work you do.
I've read a lot and studied this battle. And I have come to some conclusions. It basically was a operation that was doomed to failure from the beginning. And should never have been allowed to happen. It was based on everything working to a perfect time table, for a flawed plan. And never took into the saying that no plans survive contact with the enemy. And to attempt to run a operation on a time table is completely insane. And the dismissal of intelligence of armored forces in the area was criminal in my opinion. And expecting to be able to capture all of the bridges intact was unrealistic to begin with. And was totally unrealistic to begin with. Plus no one wanted to upset General Montgomery. And disregarding information by the Dutch underground was another flaw added to a series of flaws added to a basically flawed plan. And to attempt to run a battle on a time table is totally insane. But to ignore your own reconnaissance information so as not to upset command was pure madness. And it wasn't just British mistakes that doomed this operation to failure. And the Miss drop of the paratroopers was just another nail in the failure of command to plan for things to get completely out of hand. And there is enough blame to spread all around. And the treatment of the Polish airborne unit was just awful if not criminal. And the heroism of the men involved can and must never be forgotten. And any who do forget be damned to hell for all eternity. Because these men both who lubed and died as all who served during the entire war in Europe to destroy a evil empire. With no redeeming qualities what so ever. A purely evil and rutless empire.
@@WW2TV I would like to sit down and discuss the entire operation with you. I'm certain your research was more in depth than mind. And to fully discuss the entire operation. And to be clear there's enough blame to cover everone reguardless of what army they served with. And the Polish airborne Brigade was the most unfortunate unit of the entire operation.
I dont know what you mean by nobody wanted to upset Montgomery. Eisenhower already upset him by not going with Montgomerys narrow thrust and instead choosing his own broad front strategy. Brereton informed Montgomery that his alternative plan to Market Garden (Walcheren Island drop to clear the Scheldt) wasn't feasible so Brereton rejected it. Had everything been done for Market Garden, especially more transport planes, then it may have been successful. The drops were too dispersed over days and too far from the objectives. The Dutch underground was infiltrated by the Germans so could not be 100% trusted. Regardless, the German reinforcements, especially armour, actually came in from Germany in the following days and these units were not identified by either Dutch or allied intelligence because they were not in the Netherlands before the drops. Why would you say the Poles were the most unfortunate as well? They suffered less than 100 fatalities. British 1st Airborne suffered nearly 1,500 fatalities.
Also, Montgomery sent an emissary to Brereton to argue for double missions flown on the first day, but Brereton stood his ground and refused. So clearly, Brereton wasn't worried about upsetting Montgomery. Brereton flat out rejected Montgomery on at least a couple of occasions, and Eisenhower did it many times.
Montgomery lied right to IKE's face when he told him that the Air Marshalls had agreed with him regarding the operation to get IKE to Acquiesce .Nothing of the sort happened even Gale said he would have resigned had it been pinned on him like it was Urquhart - who had no airborne experience. Bernard planned the whole thing - IKE and everyone else wanted Antwerp open. Monty Garden was unrealistically ambitious and just too many variables factoring in for things to go wrong. Ambition over reaching capability. Ike knowingly kept the British relevant in order to keep them in the alliance so that American soldiers would not have to shoulder the entire casualty burden on the Western Front. --D-Day had 30 miles flights across the Channel. Monty Garden had 300 mile flights to NE Netherlands --D-Day had 900 flights.Monty Garden had 1600 Flights --D-Day was June 6th.Monty Garden was September 17th And had over 2 hrs less daylight to do all that in --So there were 700 MORE FLIGHTS than D-Day. They were 300 miles away in North East Netherlands not 30 miles across a channel. Oh there was over 2 hrs less daylight to do it in. SMDH
