@IC For Pascal's Wager to count as an argument against "I don't know", it would have to provide knowledge of God's existence. But I don't think even Pascal thought the wager could do _that_ . The Wager is not an attempt to give epistemic reasons to believe. It's an attempt to give pragmatic reasons to believe. Or perhaps more technically, pragmatic reasons to (try to) believe. My own view is that Pascal's Wager is effective for some people in some circumstances. It can be an important piece of an overall case for believing in God. But as a stand-alone argument it fails. FWIW, that's roughly my view of _all_ arguments for God. None of them individually offer conclusive proof or even full justification of God's existence. But taken together as a cumulative case, they can make belief in God rational.
My own view is that the cosmological argument is nothing near the smashing success some theists take it to be, nor the flaming failure some atheists take it to be. I find it at least _suggestive_ in the direction of theism. Because the existence of God might seem implausible, but the cosmological argument shows how the _denial_ of God leads to seeming implausible results, too. What do you think?
Thoughts on the cosmological arguments of Rasmussen, Feser, Hart? I know... huge question, especially given Rasmussen’s neoclassical theism and Hart and Feser’s classical theism. But still, would love to read your thoughts.
I looked into Rasmussen's work after seeing your comment, meow meow meow. Still working through it but I really like his approach. The main difficulty, in my view, is what Rasmussen (following William Rowe) calls Stage 2 of the argument: moving from the existence of necessary being to the conclusion of God. Still, I learned a thing or two that was new to me. In fact, I'd have made this video a bit differently had I read Rasmussen first. Guess I'll have to revisit the cosmological argument in a future video! 😄 Thanks for viewing.
@@LetsGetLogical Yeah, it’s quite hard to argue against the PSRs that Rasmussen and Pruss think up, but the variety of different necessary beings is a pain to go through systematically if you are going solely from a deduction. I think a Swinburne-type approach where first you define God as best you can and meticulously compare the prior probability of theism to naturalism, then get to the question of explanatory power after that you get a much better route to God vs a happy little wave function at the bottom of the universe. The most compelling arguments for God are those that take into account God’s intentions and desires, which is why I think WLC sometimes doesn’t have the success in his debates reaching out to young atheists as he should when he dismantles new atheist talking points.
Across the board in philosophy I prefer probabilistic or best explanation type arguments. But especially when dealing with God. We can baby-step our way toward more or less coherent views, weighing up the cost of any given belief, revising here and there, inching our way toward what might have more of a chance of being true. But claims to Proof have always struck me as too strong. And it's in this modest mode that I think the cosmological argument can be effective in a small way. (Then again, I'd say the same thing about the argument from evil!)
@LetsGetLogical At least some of the Cosmological Arguments are valid Deductive Arguments. And the premises used are true. Therefore it is impossible for their conclusions to be false. They are smashing success *in the sense* that it is impossible for their conclusions to be false, given that their deductive structure/forms are objectively valid and the premises used are objectively true.
Atheists say we here because of a cosmic accident. A couple perfect storm coincidences I can accept. But there sure SEEMS like a lot of "coincidences" needed to get in line for us to be here.
I think you missed a possibility here: let's assume that there are an infinite number of possible timelines, and that the probability that any given one of them will spawn a cosmos rather than just being an empty void is absolutely miniscule to the point of being almost, but not completely, impossible. Because of the law of large numbers, any probability whatsoever of a cosmos, multiplied by infinite possible opportunities for a cosmos to spawn, would mean a 100% chance of there being not just one, but an infinite number of timelines in which a cosmos exists. And because a cosmos must exist for humans to exist, there is necessarily a 100% chance that the timeline we happen to find ourselves in is one of the infinite possible timelines in which a cosmos exists, as the ones without a cosmos wouldn't contain any living beings capable of observing its absence.
Good thought here, Andrew. The last part is a nice expression of the Anthropic Principle or selection bias. (Of course the cosmos exists. If it didn't, we wouldn't be here talking about it.) But I think the first part is based on a mistake. You mentioned possible timelines and the law of large numbers. But *possible* timelines are not *actual* timelines and merely *possible* things can't produce anything. Put differently, possible objects are _abstract_ objects and abstract objects do not have causal powers. So possible timelines cannot be the explanation of our cosmos (even if there are an infinite number of possible timelines). But you also said of the possible timelines that there is a small probability for them to "spawn a cosmos rather than just being an empty void". Here it seems you're not thinking of possible timelines but *actual* ones where they are just empty voids. But an empty void is not _nothing_ . It is _something_ . (Namely, an empty void.) So you'd be back to needing an explanation for all those empty voids.
@@LetsGetLogical I should have specified that i was assuming an interpretation of quantum mechanics in which multiple possible timelines can exist simultaneously, either in a quantum superposition as described by the Copenhagen interpretation or as parallel timelines as described in the Many Worlds interpretation.
Yes but that just kicks the can down the road. Now we have to start asking if the existence of the multiverse as a whole is Necessary, a Brute Fact or contingent on "God"?
To my mind, "Brute Fact" is just a thought terminating cliché rather than any kind of real explanation for anything, so that should be just be taken off the table regardless. Which, to my mind, leaves only the Necessary Cosmos or the Necessary "God".
P1: Existence is the totality of all distinctions or things that exist. P2: If Explanations exist, then they are part of the totality of all distinctions or things that exist. P3: If Explanations are part of the totality of all distinctions or things that exist, then they cannot fully explain the totality of all distinctions or things that exist. C1: Existence, i.e. the totality of all distinctions or things that exist, cannot be fully explained. There are no contingent things in reality
@CMVMic I'm not sure the argument can be refuted in the sense of _successfully defeated_ . It's a serious objection to cosmological-style arguments. But I think the theist could reply something like this: All explanations eventually bottom out in a fundamental explanation of some kind. For the theist, this will be God. For the atheist, this will be quantum fields or some other physical phenomenon. Either way gives us a different picture of the world. The question is: which is the better picture? If the world bottoms out in God, does this give us a more elegant, coherent, intellectually satisfying, live-able picture? Or is it the atheist's naturalistic picture that is overall more elegant, coherent, intellectually satisfying and live-able? What do you think of a reply along those lines? For my part, I find the theistic picture more attractive. But I recognize it's nothing like a knock-down argument for God.
@@LetsGetLogical yes, someone can respond like this but it doesnt seem to refute the argument or rebut any of the premises. Even if an explanation did bottom out, it would still be a brute fact. Self-referential explanations are ultimately circular. An infinite regress of explanations never bottom out. Thus, Agrippa's Trilemma has metaphysical applications. My argument shows that existence is ultimately and necessarily a brute fact. Now, explanations are epistemolgical. They require logical and linguistic relations but we cannot form these relations without prior causal relations. This is because these abstract objects arent made of a substance, they are functions. Thus, functionalism seems way more tenable than postulating a distinct substance that creates a distinct substance and is able to interact with it. Thus, the mind is the set of functions carried out by a separated substance in a specific configuration. I dont believe there is an objective fact regarding which view is better. I am a moral antirealist when it comes to metaethics and my epistemoligical position on it is pyrrhonian moral skepticism. However, i prefer the atheist position as it seems more convincing but it is all a matter of preference. So I hold to substance monism, existence pluralism, necessitarianism, functionalism, moral antirealism, and nominalism. I view change as emergent from the initial form of a substance and it persists as a self sustaining causal feedback loop. Re: cosmological arguments I see no reason to think substances emerge nor have beginnings. I see no reason to think theism is coherent given my philosophical position nor a reason to define existence as God.
In my view, you're making the same mistake that theists make when they are over-confident about how powerful the argument is. Look, we're talking about the fundamental ground of all reality. We're talking about the origins of all existence and the ultimate nature of Being. And we're doing it simply by _thinking about it._ We can't expect much confidence or precision. That's okay because that's the way it goes in philosophy. (And I love philosophy so much I decided to make a living doing it.) But it's too much, in my view, to say you have _shown_ "that existence is ultimately and necessarily a brute fact." If I may put it in a light-hearted way, it's odd to think that a mere human can show the ultimate nature of the Cosmos merely by sitting at a keyboard and typing on RU-vid. So I the word "shown" is too strong. You've made an interesting argument for it. One that I have conceded is quite a serious objection for theists to consider. It's just that I think theists have interesting replies. (And that's how philosophy goes.) Thats all from me, but thanks for commenting. It's good to see philosophically-informed people dropping in to the channel. 👊🏼
let's identify 6 basic types of existence (existence 1) vs (non-existence 1) [nothingness] vs [somethingness] (existence 2) vs (non-existence 2) [consistency] vs [paradoxical-ness] (existence 3) vs (non-existence 3) [formal-system-ness] vs [non-formal-system-ness] (existence 4) vs (non-existence 4) [physical-ness] vs [non-physical-ness] (existence 5) vs (non-existence 5) [idea-in-your-head-ness] vs [non-idea-in-your-head-ness] (existence 6) vs (non-existence 6) [true idea] vs [false idea] notice how each successive existence/non-existence pair exists INSIDE the previous layer's "EXISTENCE" category. So.... except for pure nothingness, everything exists.... just not in the same way. The question "why is there something rather than nothing" assumes that previous events cause future events. This is not the case. The physical universe is caused by the laws of physics, which exists in an eternal timeless mathematical (axiomatic) realm. The human-centered intuition that time is a fundamental aspect of reality is nothing but a very persistent illusion. Time is not the most basic thing. The most basic thing is... well, that really is nothingness. But nothing-ness is not just a thing in itself... it's a pair of things.... the thing itself is the bottom layer of existence, the something-ness vs nothing-ness dichotomy. Neither can exist without the other. It's only by relation to nothing-ness that something-ness gets its identity, and vice versa. In the bottom layer of existence, the positive side is filled with something I call: the Latent Spectrum. It doesn't exist exactly... and it doesn't exactly not-exist. It's the most basic kind of existence... it's basically like a thinkerless thought, a possible structure. Latent, eternal, a spectrum of infinities within infinities within infinities, and so it goes on and on and on and on. We're a part of that. A small part, sure. But to us, that small part is very important.
Chalmers in his book _Reality+_ discusses several variations of what we might mean by _reality_ , i.e., different types of reality. Your list reminds me a bit of that (to the extent _existence_ is related to _reality_). Except some of yours strike me as epistemic categories rather than metaphysical ones. In any case, thanks for dropping in and for the thoughtful comment.
@@LetsGetLogical yes, I understand what you mean by epistemic categories vs metaphysical categories. that is to say... Some of these distinctions between existence and non-existence seem to require a subjective judgement by a conscious observer, which makes it seem arbitrary. However, if you think about those distinctions with the perspective of not "some arbitrary subject" but instead "all possible sentient beings with sufficient intelligence", then, the distinctions seem to become less arbitrary. Personally I would say 1) Nothingness vs somethingness 2) Coherent somethings vs non-coherent somethings 3) Formal systems vs non-formal systems 4) Physical formal systems vs non-physical formal systems These would be the metaphysical categories. The epistemic categories of... 5) Baryonic matter vs non-baryonic matter 6)Living matter vs dead matter 7) Intelligent life vs brainless life 8) Ideas vs physical objects 9) True ideas vs False ideas.... We could keep going.... 10) relevant true ideas vs irrelevant true ideas 11) applied true ideas vs not applied true relavant ideas 12) influential applied vs non-influential applied 13) observed outcomes vs unobserved outcomes I don't think I can bifurcate it further.... All these levels are epistemic categories... They only matter from a human's point of view. While the first four levels... Well, they (should) matter from any possible sentient being with sufficient intelligence's point of view.
