I hate that. It’s like some people assume nothing bad can ever happen, only good things can happen and everything not in line with that view is not realistic but rather pessinistic
@@BrianScalabrineMVP I hate that too. People with insufficient mental bandwidth to realize that anything can happen to anybody at any time anywhere. Drives me nuts.
There's a difference in the way the word pessimism is used in ordinary language and in philosophy. In philosophy it refers to a tradition of thinking that thinks there's something unacceptably bad about existence
Man these callers are some of the least thought-out human beings on the planet trying to philosophically wrestle with someone LEAGUES ahead of them. Understand truth, understand evidence, understand biology, culture, and the evolution of both, then maybe you can try to test the logic of Benatar's antinatalist argument. Or like most of us who have thought deeply for more than 10 seconds you'll realize.. There really aren't any fallacies presented in it.
Honestly the more i hear david benatar the more i think he is right, as an artist i seen the both of beauty and ugly in the world, yet beauty can be as huge as someone can imagine but the ugly will eventually take all the picture. I agree totally with him life is more suffering than pleasure in everyway
@@mrblonde7688 I think Buddhism completes your metaphor, Buddhism overlaps with Benatar a lot (there’s a great book about the overlap ‘Buddha to Benatar’). Anyway Buddha concluded that even if someone had a life where pleasure outweighed pain, it is still inescapably empty. In fact, a life filled with pleasure tended to make someone less motivated to discover a true , unbiased description of the actual nature of life, let alone be sufficiently motivated to act on that discovery.
I respect David Benatar for his excellent book, I in fact agree entirely with his ideas, and the thing that he chose you to live a life in almost 100% privacy from the public eye, says a lot to me. Especially in our times, where people of all kinds would love to appear on tv and become rich, this thinker chose and preferred to remain unknown because, Id like to think that, he knows that that is valuable and what makes really a great man. David is one of a kind compared to most of the other so-called thinkers and speakers. Respect and also for his way of presenting his ideas, always a pleasure to listen to a calm, normal, non-screaming voice.
I appreciate the interview. 29:15, 29:30, the human predicament 34:50... inflammation point by caller (no comment) 35:00 36:00, 38:20...why bother?.. 41:39... 41:50... 42:20... summary 51:40... Summary
It's a great read and also it's well thought out as a predicament for many people, irrespective of what the future holds for us as a species - just like Thomas Ligotti's Conspiracy Against Humans. There is no real need to argue, in favor or against what David Benatar is suggesting.
This is why the Asymmetry Argument doesn't hold up: What are you? You could say that "You" are what a brain is doing right now: the sensation of "I"/Self. If this brain was altered enough, then we could actually alter it to the point that "you" would no longer exist, because this brain would be doing a completely different "I" with completely different behaviors, a different personality, and even different memories. So, a brain was born:🧠 and it started doing consciousness. Now, here's a short thought experiment that should convey what will happen after you cease to exist after death (if we do infact cease to exist at death). Imagine a universe that's completely devoid of all sentient life - so there isn't any consciousness anywhere. There aren't any brains doing consciousness anywhere. But then, through natural processes, a sentient organism eventually comes to exist. So now there's a brain, and it's doing consciousness. But now I will reveal to you that this brain is actually doing the conscious experience that is you. So what if that brain was never born, but instead some *other* brain was born, and it started doing consciousness? Would you be in some sort of "peaceful oblivion" or "endless nothingness"? No. The only experience there'd be is the one being done by this one and only brain. So, even if the brain that was doing "you" never came to exist; because this *other* brain was born instead, there'd still be an "I" experience, but it'd just be a different "I" experience from the one that would have done the "you" experience... You will understand this when you switch out the words "I" and "you" for "Self". Because that's what you are: a "Self". In this thought experiment, no matter which brain was born, there is still "Self" experience. So after death, we shouldn't conclude that death will be followed by "nothingness", or "a black void", but instead, if you really will cease to exist, then that end will be followed by consciousness that's being done by one of the (living) brains that are doing consciousness. In the very same way that your lack of existence was followed by consciousness due to the birth of a brain. So your death-just like "before birth" was-will also be followed by yet another individual consciousness. That consciousness could be any of the consciousness that's being done by any brain that exists in the universe...
Subjectively, what is the difference between feeling that your life is meaningful and actually having a meaningful life? It seems like a difference that makes no difference.
Seen 'Les Mesirables'? Witnessed a woman in travail, and a baby at "the place of the breaking forth of children"? (Hos. 13:13 b) Read Obituaries lately? Latest bad news?
I have viewed this video and the one here (ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-YGL2r8PNb8c.html). Prof. Benatar's asymmetry argument fails for the following reasons. In scenario A, where you are comparing (i) a person brought into existence and leads a life of mostly suffering vs. (ii) a potential person never brought into existence, Prof. Benatar claims that (ii) is good, or comparatively better than (i). But the key question is: better for whom? Because it is clearly not better from the standpoint of the nonexistent potential person who has no moral agency or consciousness, and thus has no say in the value judgment one way or the other. So when we agree (ii) is "better", this makes sense only if we derive this value judgment by considering someone other than the nonexistent person. For example, it would make sense to say that (ii) is better than (i) by virtue of the fact that (i) is "bad" as evaluated from the standpoint of the person who was actually born and is mostly suffering. Alternatively, one could reach the same conclusion by comparing the overall aggregate level of net pleasure vs. net pain in the society under (i) vs. the that of the society under (ii); in this case, we are essentially comparing two worlds, which is an apples-to-apples comparison, and if we were using the metric of aggregate pleasure/pain, we could conclude objectively that the world in (ii) is better. But now note scenario B, where we have (i) a person brought into existence and leads a life of mostly pleasure and happiness vs. (ii) a potential person never brought into existence. Benatar claims that (ii) would be "no worse" than (i). But again, no worse for whom? Benatar seems to say that it is no worse for the nonexistent person. But this is nonsensical for the same reason it would've been nonsensical to say that scenario A(ii) is better from the standpoint of the nonexistent person. In both scenarios, the nonexistent person has no consciousness and is in no position to offer value judgments of any kind. So here, too, we must take into consideration someone other than the nonexistent person -- e.g. the existing person who is experiencing mostly pleasure, and/or the society as a whole whose aggregate level of pleasure has been enhanced by virtue of the person in existence as compared with the world without that person (we're assuming crucially here, that the existing person does not contribute to greater suffering upon the world as a whole). And via either of these metrics, we can objectively say that scenario B(i) is better than B(ii). Hence, the asymmetry argument fails. The biggest error, as I see it, with the asymmetry argument is that it tries to compare apples to oranges in scenario B, while not attempting the same in scenario A. It's a bait-and-switch of sorts. In order for the comparison to be valid in both scenarios, we have to compare either two worlds -- one with the person and one without that person -- or we have to compare the level of pleasure vs. pain for the person who is actually experiencing them. We cannot compare an existing person with an nonexistent person in order to derive a value judgment of "better" or "worse" -- in both scenarios, the nonexistent person is not a person, and can have no say either way . When we engage in a consistent comparison, we see that the asymmetry argument just does not stand up to scrutiny.
Suppose X is a young woman currently stuck in an abusive relationship with low financial certainty and other difficult circumstances. However, X really wants to have a child, but she knows that if she has a child at the moment, that child will be born into very dangerous and uncertain circumstances and will likely suffer greatly, so X abstains from having a child. One year passes, and during that year, X leaves her abusive relationship, gets a good paying job, and finds a new partner who is stable, reliable, and loving. X then has a child with her new partner. All of X's friends say that it was good that X abstained from having a child when she was in her bad relationship and that the child she has now will be far better off than any theoretical child that she may have had with her abusive partner. (i) Are X's friends correct or mistaken? (ii) Can X's friends be correct while also denying Benatar's asymmetry? (I'm pretty sure this is a setup from Benatar himself.)
@Valerio0214 yes. Jesus's tomb was empty, hundreds of people so him resurrected and his body has never been found. Those are historical facts. www.catholic.com/encyclopedia/resurrection
