Dr. Gavin Ortlund recently debated Dr. Ryan Mullins on divine simplicity. After, John DeRosa hosted Gavin and myself for a bit of a debrief and extended conversation on the topic. Here's the replay, from John's Classical Theism podcast.
Gavin is a hero. Even though he is Protestant, and I am not, he is really a master at holding what is, really, an unpopular opinion within the Protestant world view. The guy takes the time. And sure, I am a Catholic, but at the end of the day, how cool that he wants to retrieve this view in his own tradition.
Hoping to have an extended discussion with Gavin soon concerning our books for the existence of God. Stay tuned for that. In the meantime, be sure to check out his YT channel Truth United and John’s Classical Theism podcast on iTunes
@@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns Every theist creates their own, individual deity based on their interpretation of religious texts, religious teachings, and personal experiences. This is a version of that which might seem easier to sell to others by rolling it into the religious teachings like that debate.
This was an excellent conversation. I really do appreciate Gavin's mere Christianity arguments or his arguments for God's existence. I really related to the polygon and circle comparison. That was a great visual for understanding the parts of God.
I think Gavin did a good job and this topic is of paramount importance. The fact that Mullins doesn't even understand how something non-physical can be composite I think speaks volumes that he's not really engaging with scholastic metaphysics.
It's not just scholastics that maintain there can be non-physical parts. Quoting Pruss, "... philosophers have theorized about non-physical parts as well. Thus, Plato talks of three parts of an immaterial soul, and many dualists think that we have a physical body and an immaterial soul as parts. Works of literature appear to be abstract objects having parts such as chapters, paragraphs, or stanzas. David Lewis thinks that nonempty sets are wholes having singleton sets as parts. And an immaterial object existing in time could have temporal parts or time slices, even though these would not be physical." - from New Essays on the Metaphysics of God.
Pat, do a part 2 and, if possible, bring James Dolezal (I've listened to your prior videos w him, and they are tier 1, hence my request) Also, will we ever get an interview (rigorous interview) with either DBH or Feser? God bless
Hey Pat, excellent show. I always enjoy you and your contributions to these kinds of 'panels'. I want to be at 70 mph out of the gate. I had one concern about something you said here related to Barry Miller's limit cases. A Catholic friend of mine is also fond of this kind of argument. But it raises a concern for me when it comes to an argument like the one Aquinas makes in the de ente. If God is going to break out of the categories, like essence and existence, that have univocal significance in the series accessible to the human intellect posterior of the limit case, then how do we get intelligibility of an existence predicate that is merely analogous? It seems that in terms of existence, a relation of mere similarity is stretching what we want from intelligibility. To motivate that a little, I think it helps to consider how analogies function, i.e., functioning to express a logical relation between things in the world that are independently intelligible. Once we get to a predicate like existence, which is something we are going to want to use to quantify over the created order unrestrictedly, I don't see how analogy gets us across that boundary. For example, essence means something on this side of the line, if you will, and so does existence. The analogy is now supposed to get us to something where these predicates are actually not different, but identical. It seems like we are trying to get more work out of analogy than it's capable of. I would love to know how you deal with this issue. Thanks again for all of your hard work and thoughtful content.
I think it's fair to reframe Gavin's analogy. Social Trinitatianism in scholarship is relatively new just as Scotus and his views on simplicity is newer than previous tradition. It's fair to ask, is this newer framing of Divine Simplicity actually Divine Simplicity? Mullins gave great reasons for showing why other views would count as Divine Simplicity that are not Divine Simplicity if we went with Gavin's definition of Divine Simplicity. Likewise it is not uncommon at all for people to argue that social trinitarianism isn't trinitarianism on orthodox grounds. Gavin has no problem doing this when it comes to what a Christian is. There are plenty of people who identify as Christian and Gavin would affirm that there are those who are not affirming fundamental basics in order to be a Christian.
I noticed that this video does not articulate the actual doctrine of no real relations. There is even the suggestion that I don't understand it, and have not read the sources. I find this peculiar since I articulate the actual doctrine in multiple publications, in my debate with Gavin, and in my review of the debate. I'm curious why Pat and Gavin did not articulate the doctrine. The discussion focused more on why classical theists should not mention the doctrine. Also, I am still amazed at the accusation of caricature. If what I am saying is a caricature, then the following scholars are also engaged in caricature. Katherin Rogers, Jeff Brower, James Dolezal (who they endorse in the video), Jon McGinnis, just about every handbook entry on divine simplicity, and many more. If it is ok for Dolezal to say the things he does about divine simplicity, why is it a caricature when I say the exact same thing as Dolezal?
Ryan, not to prolong the debate, but I think the caricature concern can be clarified quite simply. DDS simply does not mean God has no contingent properties. For you to say it does require a denial of contingent properties is caricature because most proponents of the doctrine don't believe that. You are privileging a few statements over the majority of adherents of the doctrine, and even those few statements are questionable. Dolezal, for example, absolutely does not deny that God has Cambridge properties. He said that quite explicitly to me. His exact words: "I do think Cambridge properties can be responsibly predicated of God." You would be on safer ground if you said something like, "a few adherents of DDS deny that God has contingent properties, while most affirm that he does." Plucking out a few of the most radical statements at the expense of copious other expressions of the doctrine is a way to caricature. So it is with some of the other claims being made, like we cannot make conceptual distinctions of God. Sorry if that annoys, but I think this is pretty clear.
@@TruthUnites I am not plucking out a few radical statements from a few adherents. That is a remarkable claim not remotely grounded in anything I have published on the topic.
@TheReluctantTheologian As I was reading your comment I thought to myself, “this sounds like something Ryan Mullins would write.” And then I realized lol
A simple, immutable, timeless, and importantly, impassible God cannot incarnate to suffer for the sins of humanity-nor can it have two natures that are both distinct from each other. It's just an oxymoron. Christians would avoid using the language of addition and instead would resort to using 'assumption' as if that's not an addition to the son. It's just utter unintelligible nonsense.
@@rickbaker261 Go ahead then, make sense of it. How does a simple God have two natures that are distinct? How does an impassible God suffer for the sins of humanity? If the Son suffered qua humanity, but the Son just is the divine nature, then it follows the divine nature suffered qua humanity. Denying this would mean the Son is not identical to the divine nature, and is thus a composite of divine nature + something else. How does a timeless God accrue a nature in time to it without it being an addition? what does 'assumption' mean if it's not addition? It's utter oxymoron and the highest level of absurdity
@@wheatblue7592 Your very question assumes something other than what you are arguing against. You said “how does a simple God have two natures…” God doesn’t have two natures. The Son has two natures, divine and human. You are confusing/conflating the distinction between essence or being and person/hypostases or mode of being. If we assume (as you appear to be) that God is unilersonal then you would be correct. However, God is triune.
@@rickbaker261Are you trolling or intentionally being obtuse? The hypostasis of the Son is identical to the divine nature. The can be no distinction between the persons and essence. So if the essence is simple, the hypostasis of the Son is simple. But you deny the hypostasis is simple, thus you have clearest example of contradiction
@@wheatblue7592 the hypostasis is the manner of subsistence of the divine essence. The divine essence subsists in three modes or hypostases. This isn’t obtuse or trolling, it is historic confessional trinitarianism. The divine Son fully possesses the divine essence, as does the father and the Spirit. They are distinct persons. Distinct relations would be more technically precise.
