Episode 19, Graham Oppy & Joe Schmid on Oppy vs Loke (debate review) 

Browsing through these comments in a meeting - this made me laugh so much!

hahaha

Lmao

you don’t have to psychoanalyze them lmao books are just a nice aesthetic when discussing intellectual topics

I do miss seeing his board game collection in the background though.

I like book shelves though

Nope. You have changed the subject, Wes. On Oppy’s theory ISOR *does in fact* begin to exist uncaused whilst other things do not. That is the problem which I am targeting.

Hi Andrew, Thanks for the quick response. Let me try to do a better job of explaining where I think we are in the dialectic. This isn’t just about Oppy or about ISOR. It’s about your own very general argument for certain propositions. You defend the claim that everything that begins to exist must have a cause (at least in the sense of having a causally necessary condition). And you hold that this is a metaphysically necessary truth - one to which there could be no exceptions. Now consider the following proposition: A. There is a property S such that: (i) there could be an ISOR that has property S; and (ii) anything having property S can have begun to exist uncaused. It follows from A that there could be an exception to the causal principle you are defending - viz., an ISOR having property P. Consequently, you need to show that there could be no property S such that A is true. My point is that you cannot accomplish this merely by arguing that it could not be that case that: B. An ISOR’s possession of S ‘makes it the case’ that it begins to exist. The reason is that A does not entail B. If I am wrong about this, then I’d like to see the derivation of B from A. Wes

@@wesleymorriston2191 Nope. You have changed the subject again, Wes. I did *not* defend the claim that everything that begins to exist *must have* a cause; but rather ‘everything that begins to exist has a cause’. I did not argue that there could be no exceptions, but rather there is no exception. This point is important because your subsequent comment is based on this misunderstanding e.g. you use the words ‘could’ ‘can’ which I did not use. Please read Chapter 5 of my book again and note that I am defending a modus Tollens argument which is different from Craig’s.

​@@andrewloke7 Thanks for the correction, Andrew. I have reread chapter 5 of your book with this correction in mind. However, I am still puzzled. If you don't mind, I'd like to ask a couple of questions. What do you think that the modal status of your causal principle is? Is it necessary or contingent? I am now looking at your argument, as outlined on p141: (a′) If the initial state of reality began to exist uncaused, then certain states of affairs would begin to exist uncaused at later moments of time. (b′) It is not the case that those states of affairs begin to exist uncaused at later moments of time. (c) Therefore, it is not the case that the initial state of reality began to exist uncaused. I have two more questions about it: 1. What, according to you, is the modal status of (c)? Are there possible worlds in which the initial state of reality begins to exist uncaused? 2. What, according to you, is the modal status of (a')? Are there possible worlds in which the initial state of reality begins to exist uncaused but no later states begin uncaused? As far as I can see, your argument for (a') is wholly a priori in character. So I'd have expected you to say (a') is metaphysically necessary, but perhaps I have that wrong.

@@wesleymorriston2191 Thank you Wes for your great question. I am defending a causal principle that is contingent i.e. true in the actual world rather than in all possible worlds.

Dang it I heard Alex notice it in the video right after I commented lol

56, to be precise. 😉

I think elephant philosophy and Craig had good videos how this argument fails

This isn't a contradiction because they are denying actual infinities and accepting potential infinities. It's not the same thing to say that an infinite amount of time has already passed as to say that it will pass

I think that's quite possible. Andrew is heavily invested in this argument. He also likes to have the last word.

I have written a response on this page's comment. Most of my responses are simply copy-and-pasted from my written discussion on Hugh Jidette's blog. hughjidiette.wordpress.com/2020/12/09/graham-oppy-vs-andrew-loke-on-the-kalam-my-critique-of-lokes-argument/ . Malpass, Schmid, and Oppy made references to this blog but they didn’t respond to a number of important responses which I made there, such as my response to Alex which he didn't reply to afterwards).

@@FoxintheKnow86 Oppy might be more heavily invested given that he has published more on the Kalam than I have. He has to try to rebut the Kalam because the Kalam refutes his naturalistic worldview. I like to make points which I think people have ignored. Most of my responses are simply copy-and-pasted from my written discussion on Hugh Jidette's blog. hughjidiette.wordpress.com/2020/12/09/graham-oppy-vs-andrew-loke-on-the-kalam-my-critique-of-lokes-argument/ . Malpass, Schmid, and Oppy made references to this blog but they didn’t respond to a number of important responses which I made there, such as my response to Alex which he didn't reply to afterwards).

@@andrewloke7 I'm also puzzled by your response (entirely possible I'm missing something, as is everyone else you have interacted with on that thread, as well as Joe and Graham- which should indicate a problem in communicating your point to a wide range of people no?) So perhaps you could clarify: do you think that there needs to be some preventative explanation for why ISOR and not B begin to exist uncaused prior to ISOR beginning to exist uncaused, such that any property of ISOR simply would not exist prior to being instantiated such that it could make a difference? I don't think this is what you could mean, since there is no state prior to ISOR such that any property would have to do any explaining work for why ISOR and not B. So I'm curious as to what 'too late' means here. If it just indicates a kind of priority or grounding, then as the property exists when ISOR begins to exist and there's no state prior to ISOR, I'm really curious what state or point you're referencing where that special property is lacking and so its possible that B, or other uncaused things could (or would) begin to exist uncaused. If this is just a general problem of properties being dependent upon their bearers its unclear how God avoids this objection. Again- apologies if like Hugh, Joe, Graham, Alex, Landon and others I'm just not getting this problem. But if you could try and articulate where we are all going wrong that would be great- without simply appealing to the video or the review or your book- rather restating it for clarity here or somewhere else would greatly help advance your position.

@@andrewloke7 yes I've read the blog, hence my questions. I don't think with respect, your points are being ignored. I think they are possibly being misunderstood, or that they are not doing the work you think they are. I take pause at the fact that Alex, Graham, Joe, Hugh, Landon, Wes and others seem to be in a similar boat. It's possible they are all ignoring something really crucial, but how likely is that? They seem a very charitable bunch and such disagreement is their bread and butter. I just don't think you'll make any headway with your critics if you just repeat what is in contention or refer to posts/your book which are complicit in the confusion/misunderstanding.

Maybe, but nothing can happen outside of space-time.

​@@Nick-Nastiyeah, it's just an "if". Personally I stop at Planck time too, I see everything beyond as speculation. Interesting though

That's a nice idea. The only thing in the pipeline is a chat with Fillipe Leon about the successive addition argument.

@@thoughtology7732 In Craig's exchange with Swinburne, Craig uses an Aristotelian whole-is-prior-to-parts view on time to get around Swinburne's objection that there are an infinity of events during the course of his sentence, but this is in conflict with the idea that the past is formed by successive addition. So, on the surface, it seems Craig's view is inconsistent. Is the past formed by successive addition or is the whole prior to the parts such that the parts are only conceptual divisions?

How can something be contingent and brute?

@@RebornLegacy it lacks an explanation or cause, but doesn't exist of necessity (I.e doesn't exist in all possible worlds).

@@FoxintheKnow86 Ah, thanks for clearing that up.

Not that it would happen all the time, but that it would happen at all, sometimes, once, any time. But it doesn't. Idk man, "it just so happens" as an argument for a property defying the laws of physics that is naturally caused is a bit dubious.

@@modesttriangle1022 what property defies the law of physics? Whatever the initial state is in Oppy's view, pr any naturalist, would ground the laws of physics. We wouldn't expect the ground of x to be governed by x given the ground is prior to it.

it depends on the context. Sometimes an objection is sufficient for saying that a certain view is wrong, and so, we should adopt something which is not that world view. the alternative does not necessarily need an answer for the problem, unless the problem applies equally. Here’s an example: the Ross argument from intentionality aims to show that matter as we understand it is incompatible with the property of intentionality which our minds possess. this is supposed to show that intentionality refuted materialism. it would be fallacious for a materialist to say: “well how does immaterial properties account for intentionality?” its fallacious because it hasn’t been demonstrated that there’s something incompatible with immaterialism and intentionality, whereas, the Ross argument shows that materialism cannot account for intentionality. However, in this case, i think that the tu quo que is not a fallacy because i think Oppy made a successesful case that this objection DOES apply to Theism. However, if it didn’t, and Oppy just wants an account as to how this happens under theism, then it’s fallacious.

Hey Andrew out of context but would you mind telling me if you are catholic or protestant (or any other denomination) and whats your view on Hell. furthermore if you dont mind I would like to include your answers in a graph with other Philosophers and Apologists which I asked the same question.

"Change need not have a beginning" That's sounds weird since causation is change and in order for something to _begin_ it must go from having potential properties to having actual properties or the gaining or losing of properties. I think you mean _change need not have an origin_ . "all change requires is the existence of any entity" The mere existence of an entity (abstract or concrete) doesn't entail that it gains or loses properties. How would you distinguish between an unchangeable entity and a changeable entity if, _"all change requires is the existence of an entity"_ ? "It doesn't follow that the entity must have been changeless prior to the actualization of change" The issue is the origin of change. If each part of a series cannot account for origin of change within itself then no such series exist. If change is derived from other parts that presupposes an origin of derivation. To deny this entails a contradiction in the concept of _derivation_ . Causal power cannot be both locally derived and universally underived at the same time. That is basically Loke's capacity argument: _"Someone might object that, if the series itself is beginningless with each cause in the series having an actual infnite number of preced- ing causes, then it would not need (nor would it have) a beginningless First Cause. In reply, postulating a beginningless causal series would not resolve the problem of why the entities in the series begin to exist if each of the entities requires a cause. One might reply the reason is that each of the entities would have a cause in a beginningless series. However, given that each entity has a beginning and has no capacity to begin to exist without prior cause(s), a beginningless series with an actual infnite number of them would be of no use, because 0 + 0 + 0 … is still = 0. What is required is an entity which can exist uncaused, in other words a beginningless First Cause"_ (Loke, pg. 95) I would even go has far as saying causal finitism and other types of paradoxes reach the same conclusion.

@@LogosTheos I have to say, I really enjoy your challenges. Dogmatic but still thought provoking. So I have done an indepth analysis of Loke's book. I'll get to him in my next response. >Causation is change and in order for something to begin it must go from having potential properties to having actual properties or the gaining or losing of properties. I think you mean change need not have an origin. The operation of a cause on a thing is neither necessary nor sufficient for change in that thing. plato.stanford.edu/entries/change/#ChaCauTimMot. This does not violate the PSR, for the existence of an object can be an example of causa sui causation. Plato and Parmenides believed change is restricted to the appearances, thus a mode of thought. It was Aristotle who assumed that change is the actualizing of a potentiality of the subject. While I sympathise with your concern. I meant beginning in the sense, that it would be an arbitrary starting point based on an interval based theory of time which assumes the existence of multiple events. Now Loke defines beginning to exists as “x begins to exist at t (where ‘t’ could be instants or moments of non-zero finite duration) iff (i.) x exists at t, and the actual world includes no state of affairs in which x exists timelessly, (ii.) t is either the first time at which x exists or is separated from any t′< t at which x exists by an interval during which x does not exist However, I would submit that x exists timelessly. This is because existence itself is not time dependent, the emergence of time is grounded in the fundamentality of existence. By “X”, I would say X is the substance of reality. Furthermore, I sympathize with Spinoza’s substance monism and property monism, as it seems incoherent to postulate substance pluralism/nihilism and it solves the interaction problem for property pluralists. While Priority monism does not allow for more than one object but allows for proper parts. The nature of change having a beginning is incoherent, change cannot emerge from non-change, just as motion cannot emerge from non-motion. Hence, change and motion are absolutes. I also hold space is absolute as well, but time on the other hand is an emergent property to describe the interaction between objects in space. Now causation is transitive, iff we assume a realist perspective of events i.e. ontological dependence and linear causality. However, assuming an interval-based ontology for the gaining/loss of properties, ends up with one assuming that there is an event that follows from no previous event i.e. it is spontaneous. In other words, being emerging from nonbeing. I also hold necessitarianism as probably true, therefore, all change necessarily exists. Therefore, causality can be cyclical and ontologically independent. There is only one possible substance that necessarily exists. iep.utm.edu/spinoz-m/#SH3a This substance must have all attributes. Proof - The argument for The Impossibility of Substances with fewer than all Attributes - Spinoza’s Proposition 5. Della Rocca 2002 philpapers.org/archive/DELSSM.pdf. A necessary substance has more power to exist than any other substance since the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more power it has to exist. Something with lesser power to exist cannot exist if something with greater power to exist, cannot exist. piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2008/12/spinozas-ethics-part-1-proposition-v.html Therefore, Leibniz was wrong to assume substances can be created. A principal attribute/essence is something determinable, (i.e. the property of extension or the property of thought) and a mode/property is a determinate way of being extended or thought (for instance, square is a way of being extended and imagining a unicorn is a way of being thought). www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/principles/section7/ Absolute Motion/Space are modes of extension. Relative Motion/Space are modes of thought.

@@LogosTheos Loke makes many assumptions. Such as: 1. Time is real, and not illusory. See Max Tegmark - Events and the Nature of Time @5:32 - 6:11 2. The nature of time is dependent on mind independent events. 3. The topology of time is linear, not cyclical Loke holds to a relational/reductionist theory of time, where time is defined as the necessary connected changes (gain/loss of a property eg. temporal part/perdurantism) of causal relata/entities (i.e. events with boundaries/beginnings and/or endings, substances, facts, states of affairs) ordered by ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’ relations. Under a conceptual theory of time, temporal parts (under perdurantism) are arbitrary mind dependent, conceptual divisions of motion i.e. motionless instances. An event is defined as instantiations (time intervals) of properties in objects. The question then should be are events even real? If so, are events measured by time? Or is time created by the sequences of events, thus emergent? ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-rXJBbreLspA.html. Under Relationalism, motion is relative, whereas, under substantivalism, motion is absolute. Perdurantists assume temporal parts to solve the problem of change but I’m afraid it doesn’t. For if they cannot accept motion as an absolute, they will have to assume that change emerges from non-change i.e. being from nonbeing. An Operational Definition of Time is also relevant Under Relationalism to establish what an event is. Roger Penrose addresses how the scale of time can become non-existant, thereby, rendering the notion of an event as meaningless. ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-8wnUowsCaJo.html This is because the essence of a temporal part (perdurantism) is based on a time-interval based model of time i.e. the boundaries among things and events. General relativity does not address the nature of time for extremely small intervals where quantum mechanics holds. At this time, there is no generally accepted theory of quantum general relativity. While an operational definition of time does not address the nature of time, relationalism merely presupposes that time, or change for that matter, is dependent on events. A way of investigating whether time is independent of events include asking whether all of the physical processes that happen could happen at a faster or slower rate, and asking whether all events could have happened slightly earlier or later. After all, if every physical process could suddenly happen twice as fast, or if every event could take place slightly earlier or later in time, then it follows that in some important sense time can remain the same even if the way that events are distributed in time changes wholesale. A metaphysical foundationalism that accepts reductionism as the nature of time is arbitrary and speculative, if one claims space cannot be absolute based on unobservable states of affairs (i.e. due to the inability to pinpoint inertial frames). Hence, in the realm of metaphysical possibility, this possibility should not be dismissed. There can be no proof that space is not absolute, because there exists a viable theory of gravity where space is absolute, and what looks like curvature is simply caused by distortion of clocks and rulers by the ether. see arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0205035 for the details, but published in a peer-reviewed journal, and this theory has the Einstein equations of General Relativity as a natural limit, while the Einstein Equivalence Principle is derived there and holds exactly. Now while we experience time as psychologically real, time may not be fundamentally real. At the deepest foundations of nature, time is not a primitive, irreducible element or concept required to construct reality. The idea that time is not real seems counterintuitive but logically possible. Postulating that time is real assumes events are not strictly mind dependent. Loke also assumes that Time can begin even if there is no first extension-less instant. An example to support this assertion is his claim that removing an instant from an hour still leaves an hour. However, this assumes a hour is infinitely divisable. While, one can deductively and conceptually divide infinitely, it cannot be shown metaphysically that an hour is made of infinitely many instants. For this assumption to hold, one must first accept a conceptual theory of time. If you look at where Loke tries to criticize Stephen Puryear you would see where he fails to accomplish what he set out to do. On p. 65, the problem is obvious and really tells you something about the quality of this book. The thing is supposed to be in motion from Ta -Tb and at rest from Tc - Td. But then he says that Tb = Tc, from which it follows that the thing is simultaneously in motion and at rest, which is contradictory. (The only way to avoid this is to say that the intervals Ta - Tb and Tc - Td are open intervals, i.e., not including the endpoints, but then you have to say that at Tb/Tc the thing is neither in motion nor at rest, which is absurd.) He also writes: In reply, it should be noted that Puryear (2014, p. 625) accepts the view that events are changes, saying that it is ‘the most intuitively plausible of the theories philosophers have defended.’ It is evident that more than one change has occurred in the history of the Universe…..Thus the conceptualist view that the past is one simple event that we divide in thought is not plausible. (66-67) This is simply question-begging. What is the argument for why the "changes" his paper underwent were not a single change (until we divided that change in thought)? Again, what is the argument for why the "changes" one's conceptual activity undergoes are not a single change? It may be said, that the act of mentally dividing an event must itself be an event with a starting and ending point. So on pain of circularity, it must be admitted that mental division events are divided by nature and not merely in thought. But this can be denied. It may be that, just as the scene appearing in one's visual field can be understood to be, in nature, a single, qualitatively heterogeneous expanse that is divided into parts only in thought, the history of one's consciousness is a single qualitatively heterogenous event that is divided into parts only in thought. That qualitative heterogeneity could explain why mental division takes place at some times and not others, without having to suppose that there are distinct acts of mental division within one's consciousness. Loke also goes on to say that.. “Moreover, even if the past consists of only one simple event that we divide in thought, it still remains the case (as I argue below) that, if time is beginningless, then it would be the case that a causal series which has members being generated one after another as long as time exists would arrived at an actual infinite of generations of members at a particular time. The metaphysically impossibility of the consequent-which proponents of KCA will argue for-would still imply the metaphysically impossibility of the antecedent (a beginningless past). Thus, the conceptualist view of time does not block the fnitist’s argument against an eternal past in any case. (p. 67)” This is also a question-begging response. It purports to show that time could not be beginningless because then there would be "a causal series which has members being generated one after another as long as time exists", which would be actually infinite. But this just assumed that the conceptualist view is false and that a cyclical generation is also false. If it's true, then beginningless time would not entail a causal series, or at least not an infinite one.

@@LogosTheos >The mere existence of an entity (abstract or concrete) doesn't entail that it gains or loses properties.” I never said it did but for there to be change there must be an entity that changes. Also, the change within the totality of existence doesn’t imply a gain/loss of properties. That would imply being from nonbeing and vice versa which would violate the logical intuition of ex nihilo nihil fit. The totality of existence by definition has all properties, it cannot lose what it is nor gain what does not exist. >How would you distinguish between an unchangeable entity and a changeable entity if, "all change requires is the existence of an entity" ? An unchangeable entity, if it possesses the capacity to change it is not an unchangeable entity, it is merely an unchanging entity. Therefore, an unchangeable entity cannot change, where a changeable entity can. The issue here is that change is ontologically dependent on the existence of an entity/substance. I don’t accept change had an origin since I don’t believe time is real. It is a mind dependent illusion based on a conceptual theory of time for eg. like the moving spotlight theory of time due to entropy i.e. the cyclical process of order to disorder and disorder to order. There are differences in way objects and events relate to space and time. Ordinary objects are supposed to have relatively crisp spatial boundaries and vague temporal boundaries; events, by contrast, would have relatively vague spatial boundaries and crisp temporal boundaries. Objects are said to be invidiously located in space-they occupy their spatial location; events tolerate co-location much more easily (Quinton 1979; Hacker 1982b). Objects can move; events cannot (Dretske 1967). Finally, objects are standardly construed as enduring continuants-they are in time and persist through time by being wholly present at every time at which they exist; events are perduring occurrents-they take up time and persist by having different parts or “stages” at different times (Johnson 1921; Mellor 1980; Simons 2000). plato.stanford.edu/entries/events/#EveVsObj >If each part of a series cannot account for origin of change within itself then no such series exist. If change is derived from other parts that presupposes an origin of derivation. To deny this entails a contradiction in the concept of derivation. Causal power cannot be both locally derived and universally underived at the same time. That is basically Loke's capacity argument: _" given that each entity has a beginning and has no capacity to begin to exist without prior cause(s), a beginningless series with an actual infnite number of them would be of no use, because 0 + 0 + 0 … is still = 0. What is required is an entity which can exist uncaused, in other words a beginningless First Cause"_ (Loke, pg. 95) I do not accept that entities/objects have beginnings, the label we grant them do, since they are made of the same substance. Also, Loke’s metaphysics holds to the ontological dependence and transitivity of causality but I hold that the chain of mind dependent events are ontologically independent and causality need not be transitive. It may be a type of metaphysical coherentism, however, if you are a metaphysical foundationalist you would disagree with this. Loke is a metaphysical foundationalist, hence, his foundational assumptions are just as question begging as much as any other metaphysical position. >I would even go has far as saying causal finitism and other types of paradoxes reach the same conclusion. What do you mean by causal finitism? A cyclical causal chain can be made up of a finite number of events. I also believe logical possibilities are finite, however, I admit this cannot be justified. Nothing can be justified without assuming one of the horn’s of Agrippa’s trilemma.

@@CMVMic I understand you have criticisms against Loke's conception of time in his chapter trying to argue against actual infinites as Craig does. Philosophy of time is very a controversial topic and because there are many plausible metaphysical theses in the table one can go endlessly back and forth about why their theory of time is more parsimonious, has more explanatory power and is supported scientifically. I don't want to get into that and it doesn't effect Loke's later argument which is independent of one's pet theory of time. The focus is on causal dependency.

Are you a THEIST? 🤔 If so, what are the reasons for your BELIEF in God? 🤓

@@TheWorldTeacher reason itself that I interact with people and use the laws of logic and see the laws of universe is a reason for me because laws are a social construct but a necessity that we use. But if you argue from a naturalist point of view then we are determined to follow these laws and therefore break free will as an illusion and ultimately truth holds no bars.

@@JoshuaMSOG7, kindly provide an example of law being a “SOCIAL CONSTRUCT”. 🤔

@@TheWorldTeacher No I indeed deny they can’t! Athiest can’t argue otherwise.

@@JoshuaMSOG7 🐟 07. GOD (OR NOT): There has never been, nor will there ever be, even the slightest shred of evidence for the existence of the Godhead, that is, a Supreme Person, for the notion of an omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent Deity is both profoundly illogical and extremely incongruous, to put it mildly. The English word “PERSON” literally means “for sound”, originating from the Latin/Greek “persona/prósōpa”, referring to the masks worn by actors in ancient European theatrical plays, which featured a mouth hole to enable the actors to speak through. Theists, by definition, believe that there is a Supreme Deity which incorporates anthropomorphic characteristics such as corporeal form (even if that form is a “spiritual” body, whatever that may connote), with a face (hence the term “person”), and certain personality traits such as unique preferences and aversions. Common sense dictates that Ultimate Reality must necessarily transcend all dualistic concepts, including personality and even impersonality. However, only an excruciatingly minute number of humans have ever grasped this complete understanding and realization. There are at least FOUR possible reasons why many persons are convinced of the existence of a Personal God (i.e the Supreme [Male] Deity): 1. Because it is natural for any sensible person to believe that humans may not be the pinnacle of existence, and that there must be a higher power or ultimate creative force (an intelligent designer). However, because they cannot conceive of this designer being non-personal, they automatically suspect it must be a man (God) or a woman (The Goddess) with personal attributes. One who is truly awakened and/or enlightened understands that the Universal Self is the creator of all experiences and that he IS that (“tat tvam asi”, in Sanskrit). 2. Because they may have experienced some kind of mystical phenomenon or miracle, which they mistakenly attribute to “God's grace”, but which can be more logically explicated by another means. As explained, all such phenomena are produced by the TRUE Self of all selves (“Paramātman”, in Sanskrit). I, the author of this Holy Scripture, have personally experienced very powerful, miraculous, mystical phenomena, which I formerly ascribed to the personal conception of God (since I was a Theist), but now know to be caused, ultimately, by the Real Self. 3. Because they may have witnessed the deeds or read the words of an individual who seems to be a perfect person - in other words an incarnation of the Divine Principle (“Avatāra”, in Sanskrit). To be sure, such persons do exist, but that does not necessarily prove that the Supreme Truth is inherently PERSONAL. An Avatar is a man who was born fully enlightened, with all noble qualities, but not necessarily perfect in every possible way. For example, very few (if any) of the recognized Avatars in human history taught or practiced veganism. 4. Because they may have been CONDITIONED by their family, society and/or religious organization over many years or decades. Unfortunately, we humans are very gullible. Due to low intelligence and lack of critical analytical skills, the typical person believes almost anything they read or hear from virtually any source, no matter how unreliable. During a visit to one's local place of worship on any given weekend, one will notice a congregation of sheepish individuals nodding in agreement with practically every nonsensical, inane word spouted by their deluded so-called “priest”, imam, mullah, rabbi, guru, monk, or preacher. The phrase “The blind leading the blind” is appropriate in this regards. Even the current World Teacher, despite his genius intellect, was once a thoroughly-indoctrinated religious fundamentalist, before he awoke to a definitive understanding of life, and subsequently composed this Holy Scripture. Having stated the above, the worship of the Personal Deity (“bhakti yoga”, in Sanskrit), is a legitimate spiritual path for the masses. However, the most ACCURATE understanding is monistic or non-dual (“advaita”, in Sanskrit). If one wishes to be even more pedantic, the ultimate understanding is beyond even the concept of nonduality, as the famous South Indian sage, Śri Ramana Maharishi, once so rightly proclaimed. As an aside or adjunct, it seems that virtually every religious organization, particularly those originating in Bhārata (India), claims to have been founded by an Avatar, but that’s simply wishful thinking on the part of their congregations. Only a great sage or World Teacher can POSSIBLY recognize an enlightened being, what to speak of an Incarnation of the Divine. The typical spiritual aspirant, even one who may seem to be a highly-exalted practitioner, has very little idea of what constitutes actual holiness. Frankly speaking, many famous (infamous?) religious leaders were some of the most vile and contemptible characters in human history, particularly in this Epoch of Darkness (“Kali Yuga”, in Sanskrit). “God is greater than God.” ************* “Where there is Isness, there God is. Creation is the giving of isness from God. That is why God becomes where any creature expresses God.” ************* “Theologians may quarrel, but the mystics of the world speak the same language.” ************* “There is something in the soul that is so akin to God that it is one with Him... It has nothing in common with anything created.” ************* “The knower and the known are one. Simple people imagine that they should see God as if he stood there and they here. This is not so. God and I, we are one in knowledge.” ************* “The eye through which I see God is the same eye through which God sees me; my eye and God's eye are one eye, one seeing, one knowing, one love.” Eckhart von Hochheim O.P. (AKA Meister Eckhart), German Roman Catholic Priest. “God is merely one of man's concepts, a symbol used for pointing the way, to the Ultimate Reality, which has been mistaken for the Reality itself. The map has been mistaken for the actual territory.” ************* “Worshippers may derive some sort of satisfaction or peace of mind, through worship of a concept such as God (created by themselves), but it is a futile process, from the viewpoint of experiencing one's true nature.” Ramesh Balsekar, Indian Spiritual Teacher.

@Ψ ‘Infinitely and temporally in the past’ and ‘timeless states’ are distinct but they share a point of commonality, viz. both are beginningless i.e. not having any limit in the earlier than direction. That is what is necessary for my point to work, given which Aguirre’s point is relevant even though he is arguing against a particular model, namely, the Emergent Universe Scenario. Of course there are experts who disagree with him, but I’ve not seen his argument refuted. In any case I’m not citing him as ‘argument from authority’ (hence not cherry picking) and neither is my own argument dependent on his, rather I cite him merely to introduce and illustrate a problem and I then go on and make an argument on my own which is not dependent on the current state of cosmology but is based on the analysis of the necessary conditions for an event to begin from a beginningless and initially changeless First Cause.

Dr. Oppy rejects your premise 7, (41:38 - 42:00 of the original debate) “Whatever begins to exist has a cause”. He explained in the debate with you “everything that occurs has an explanation, and everything that exists has an explanation, not a cause.”. Later, he says “everything else, aside from what’s happening at t=0, is explained causally”. The “begins to” part in your premise 7 seems to me to be redundant. Dr. Oppy’s principle is just as plausible and the argument should have just ended there. Dr. Oppy’s theory, in my opinion, surely is more virtuous in terms of the trade-off between complexity and explanatory power.

@@andrewloke7 Hello Sir Do you Watch Anime ?

Hi Andrew. I would be happy to have a conversation with you as an episode. It would be easier to discuss directly rather than writing responses like this I think.

@@thoughtology7732 Hi Alex, thanks for the invitation. Cameron is trying to schedule a follow up discussion between Oppy and myself, and since my original discussion was with him I would like to continue my discussion with him first. If after my discussion with him you would like to have a follow up discussion with me we can plan for that.

@@thoughtology7732 You're lucky you have a PhD in the ReLeVaNt DiScIpLiNe ;)

@Ψ Thanks for your comments. You should also read Chapters 1 and 2 of my book where I pointed out the problems of underdetermination of scientific theories and the lack of a well-established theory of quantum gravity, given which it is not the case (contrary to what you wrote) that Huggett, Wuthrich, Oriti et al have shown that it is ‘perfectly possible’ for the universe to be changeless/timeless. On the contrary, they all admit that their views are tentative (e.g. Oriti ‘the ongoing, tentative work of theoretical physicists on models that, most likely, will turn out to be incorrect or only partially understood in the future’). Moreover, their views concerns the measurement of time (‘metric’) which should be distinguished from time itself. More importantly, I do not see them address the issue of a beginningless and initially changeless/eventless state as it is defined in the context of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA). In other words, they are actually addressing a different problem which does not block the conclusion that follows from the premises of the KCA. And you are also using a different definition of change as seen by your remarks concerning fluctuation and changelessness. For example, Carroll’s argument using the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics is an attempt to show the lack of dynamical quantum fluctuation in the de Sitter space. However, Carroll notes that ‘Vacuum fluctuations, of course, are a feature of all quantum systems’ which ‘ultimately arise as a consequence of the uncertainty principle’, even though such fluctuations are not ‘dynamical’ because they exist even in ‘stationary states’, nevertheless they ‘give rise to phenomena such as the Lamb shift or Casimir effect’ (it should also be noted that in the so-called ‘stationary state’ the wavefunction itself is not stationary but continually changes). What this implies is that there is still a gaining/losing of properties which is how change is defined in the context of KCA, and which is what I’m referring to when I discuss Hawking’s model. To rebut the KCA one has to rebut the premises rather than dodging the argument by defining ‘change’ and ‘changelessness’ in a different way and hence missing the point of the argument.

@@andrewloke7 Hello sir Do you Watch Anime?

Can you explain what "flow" means here? Is it something causal?

@@DarwinsGreatestHits Like 'come out of'.

Yeah what do you mean by necessarily flow? How is that remotely informative (you're trying to explain why this feature is not contingent, you can't well say "it wouldn't be contingent if it necessarily flows from an unlimited foundation")

@@FoxintheKnow86 If it necessarily flows, then it doesn't contingently flow.

@@DryApologist yes, that's trivial. But it's not much of a response to "why isn't the fact that God is a trinity contingent?" To answer with "his trinityness flows of necessity" (whatever flows from means).

@UC52LqkFqRFW5Bw3GRe2K_MQ that just seems like a total confusion of either the classical theist argument, or how to measure complexity. The classical theist posits God, and gets the physical universe, humans, the laws of nature, etc, as a consequence. The naturalist posits the universe, humans, the laws of nature, etc, and gets the universe, humans, the laws of nature as a consequence. Thus the theist has a model that makes predictions that are testable, and the naturalist just asserts the universe. If you want to claim that the ontological differences in what you're committing to are "simpler" under naturalism (which I just reject for the unexplained examples in my first post), I think you're playing a really stupid game to avoid the brunt of the argument the theist makes. Thank you for the clarification, but I remain unimpressed by the point.

I would assume an all powerful being is seen as more complex in Oppy's eyes.

@@anglozombie2485 but that, again, would be a misunderstanding of how to measure complexity of the theory. Josh Rasmussen argument would be a useful start in understanding why. But assuming the universe to get the universe is a much more complex model than assuming God to get the universe.

@Oners82 "Oppy's is simpler because the theist invokes a more extravagant ontology (the supernatural)." That's why I say that "ontological simplicity" is not the way you actually measure the complexity of a model (and is entirely misleading). For by that logic, the solipsist would have the simplest ontology, because he posits less minds, and I definitely don't want to say that the solipsist's model is "simpler", because there are things that it doesn't explain. So when measuring model complexity, you should measure the axioms it has, and what those axioms explain. On that understanding of simplicity, a perfect, simple (i.e., not comprised of any parts) God whose essence is His existence is the simplest axioms that actually explain all of the data, and I don't see a compelling case on the side of the atheist. "HOW does god explain consciousness, natural laws and so-called miracles?" I don't know what this question is even asking. Are you asking how a Being whose essence is existence and gives existence to other essences explains these essences? Because that's just by definition. You're going to have to explain how naturalism accounts for any of those things, at all, because God quite clearly and trivially accounts for these things. "That is so obviously not true it is quite amazing to me that you said it! " How is it not true? Oppy's model has, at the very least, billions (if not numbers so large they don't have names, like 10^60) simples. God is the only simple on the theistic model. How are you claiming that the model with (roughly) infinite simples is more simple than the model with one? That's incoherent.

​@@VACatholic But the theist also believes in, for example, atoms. I don't understand how atoms + a god is more simple than atoms.