I found the wide angle lens was a bit distracting in this video. Your hands were much nearer and appeared massive! Is it possible to move the camera back a bit and zoom in a bit? Great content though 😃.
RU-vid: Oh look, here's an Austrian dude talking about German psychology & methodology of warfare with a German professor. Rest of Europe: _Nervous laughter_
Would that have anything to do with Germany being a relatively new addition to the Austria- Hungarian Empire that was dissolved at the end of the Great War? Or, the end of the second reign of the Holy Roman Empire?
This is fascinating, especially since the points the Professor makes are ones I have not heard really discussed before, but they are clearly hugely important ones to think about when it comes to organizing a military, even if they aren't "sexy" like a squad's composition or tactics.
in fact there is a "service regulation for the publication of regulations" "Dienstvorschrift zur Herausgabe von Vorschriften" (DV Vorschriften) There is also the "DIN EN 45202" standard, that standardizes the standards (DIN = deutsche Industrienorm, german industry standard ; EN = Europäische Norm, european standard)
Bernhard Kast in suit and tie? And here I was wondering what those 2% female demographic you and Chieftain mentioned in a road stories video we’re watching, now we know
Yes. That was interesting. A few comments ... First off - I wouldn't ascribe the rethinking of the tactics and strategies of NATO as due to the defeat in Vietnam - so much as the end of the war in Vietnam. During the War in Vietnam - the NATO portion of the American Armed Forces had been somewhat neglected. We had been killing and dying in SE Asia and that took up a lot more of our attention than ... not ... killing and dying in Europe. Once the war was over though - then - people in the military started thinking more about Europe again. Another factor here - would be the boost our defeat in SE Asia gave to the Russians. They probably saw themselves as winning the Cold War at that point. So - here - to counter this rise in Soviet morale and planning - the Americans devoted more to Europe than they had been. My point though - is that this isn't because we lost in Vietnam - but because we weren't paying attention to that any more and went back to what we had been paying attention to before the war in Vietnam - when Europe was our top priority. One thing about keeping all those officers as the number of troops are reduced - is that - it takes 20 years to train a senior officer ... so ... if the possibility exists that you might end up increasing the size of the Army you have just been reducing in size - it make sense to retain that senior level of expertise. And finally - yeah - there is a big difference in the amount of petty bull shit in a peace time military as opposed to one that is actively at war. One of my High School buddies did a tour of duty at Pleiku in the Central Highlands of Vietnam - then was sent to Fort Gordon, Georgia. After a few months there having to put up with all the chicken shit of a State side base - he volunteered to go back to Vietnam and they sent him to Long Binh. Now - my buddy was a finance clerk ... so ... My point though is even in a nation at war the amount of petty bull shit that goes on in the rear areas is much, much greater than that which goes on closer to the front. .
It’s like Germany, if you need to expand a military 10-20fold, when downsizing keep the thicc bois, and idiot can be trained as a rifleman, not everyone can lead a division
Just a simple reminder, training soldiers takes 6 months roughly, training Staff takes a lot longer, so maybe that's a good reason to keep a healthy amount of high ranking officers. Maybe something to think about (concerning Bundeswehr and # of Generals)
"Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face"---Mike Tyson. I had a Gunny who told me we were going in following Plan B. I asked why? He said the enemy never seems to concern itself with what we put in Plan A.
Had the pleasure of studying under the professor last semester, very interesting bloke who clearly knows his stuff. Nice to see the two of you interacting!
In addition to a multitude of regulations for each branch of the US Military, there are MIL Standards for pretty much everything! The US *is* the paperwork Superpower!
In the American Army during training (and sometimes during war) we very rarely cross the line of departure with more than a warning order and get the full order somewhere along the way or maybe not at all. The paperwork as he calls it is a huge anchor around our necks and it gets worse and worse and worse the higher you go. Impossible to keep up with.
Ein ziemlich interessantes Thema. Das Buch hab ich gerade bestellt. Wenn es eine Chance gibt, würde ich auch gerne eine Vorlesung von Neitzel live hören.
A soldier goes where he is told does what he is told and keeps doing it until he is told to stop. The training is brutal he becomes de-sensitized he is trained to use his weapons. He doesn’t worry about WHY or who is wrong or write he just wants to know when he can sleep 😴 eat and stuff like that . He knows that he is already a dead man walking. He fights for and helps the friends around him and vice versa. All of the high flown ideas about serving the country and being patriotic means nothing to him. Civilians don’t understand. You have to experience it yourself.
Idea for a video spawned from this video How long did it take the Bundeswehr to transform away from the Wehrmacht in terms of military conduct (how they actually fight), since it’s known the Bundeswehr when it was made was armed with post war German surplus
@@demonprinces17 In the 50s, pretty much all senior NCOs and most mid-grade officer, not to mention generals, were former Wehrmacht., and taught the trade accordingly.
Modern "regulations" (if by that term you include weapon manuals, etc.) also include many topics not required in say 1940. From memory the vehicle manual for the Leopard 1 in Australian service has sections on Laser Safety, Workplace Health and Safety, Radiation hazards, Environmental considerations, etc. so while say the 120 mm mortar may have been effectively the same weapon, the current documentation probably covers things that were never considered during the Second World War.
Any 'cold war turned hot' scenario would have the Warsaw Pact smash into West Germany first. The Bundeswehr was created in 1955 for exactly that reason. If anything the German military lost it's purpose when the wall came down.
In 1962 "der Spiegel" published a report on the combat preformance of the Bundeswehr which was tested in a training exercise. The NATO gave the Bundeswehr the rating "barely able to conduct defensive operations". It doesnt look like as if the situation had improved in the following decades. If the Warsaw Pact had marched into Germany, they would have quickly defeated the Bundeswehr. The current Bundeswehr is in a miserable state.
The article they published in 1962 led to a huge scandal, journalists were arrested and the publisher thrown into jail. In the end the German minister of defense had to resign.
This is way too short of a video. You could have went much much much deeper with more info. I see you do this a lot with subjects that people love but you keep the video and information so short. Why? People who follow you want to hear long lectures and good information . I would have wanted this to be at least 45 minutes to over an hour because we love the subject so much. I wish you would do much more in depth subject videos.
I actually like the shorter videos, I often don't have too much time in my day so shorter videos means I can actually finish them, rather than have to watch them every day.
@@vonkaiser6817 the problem with that is if you do the short a video you have way less information that is being given period and usually they don't do a second third or fourth video on the same subject. If they would do that then yeah that would be nice but even though the video is long my friend you can still break it up into segments to listen when we have time . I rather have more info and discussion
Interesting, thank you. By the way, an overlooked feature of the Wehrmacht was its lack of reserves, which was caused by the Versailles Treaty. A whole generation did produce little to no reservists, which eventually led to a problem in WW2 where the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and even Italy, had more reservists per capita, simply because they had 1918-1933 time to create a larger reservist base than the Reichswehr. The Versailles Treaty specifically limited the Reichswehr reserve. Therefore, I believe that it had an influence on the Wehrmacht build-up following 1933, right? All the sudden you were growing, growing, growing so fast within a few years. It must have had an influence on how you approach administration, paperwork, and generally, how you conduct exercises. The Reichswehr tried to overcome it prior to 1933 through some impressive covert operations, and also by granting German parties their own militias (that were essentially private armies), of which not the SA was the biggest, prior to 1933, but actually the SPD's Reichsbanner, KPD's Rotfrontkämpfer, or the Stahlhelm. Carl von Ossietzky revealed those Reichswehr rearmament tactics in 1931, if I recall correctly, for which he not only won a Nobel Peace Price in 1935 or 1936 but for which he went to prison where he died soon after. At least it shows how strange those times were in terms of organization and administration of both the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht, and how militant the German society was even before Hitler. Something we forget, having a big focus on Hitler.
The really interesting part of this video, besides the subject and input, was the fact that these guys have a better command of English than many people I know, including myself.
I believe that Germany in the War was rational but not pragmatic. The word here is pragmatism. And when I mean "rational", I mean in their own context. Because every rationality follows a context, follows the circumstances it is built on. Rationality is bound to the reality it is upon, you see? Pragmatism, on the other hand, is how you materialize this rationality. No offense to the Germans, but you guys aren't exactly a pragmatic people, not in the same sense the North Americans and Russians were. Ok, the USA had many good conditions, was a really strong power, this is true. But they also knew how to use their power.
@@hkl1459 if germany had the resources of the US its generals might not have chosen to support an Austrian corporal and join SS.... just saying that history causality is complex...
Here's a funny picture from here in Amiland: listening to a German and an Austrian discussing history, about which most of my Landsmaenner know nothing, in better English than so many of my fellow nitwitted Amis could possibly muster on a good day...wieso sind die aller staerksten und reichsten Leute zugleich auch die bloedsten? Was fuer eine Welt soll das?
What about german view on war in terms of... all the germans, or rather the cultural view on war? For example any common knowledge, wisdom or proverbs about the war?
As Neitzel tells in another video, in German schools when they tell about war, they don't tell about strategy. They tell about atrocities only. I guess it answers your question...
Don´t know how to ask about it but when the thing was in west Germany you have a legal claim to get at least your money back. Maybe not worth the effort to prove it because i would think the thing got lost in the war
Rigid = proscriptive? While winning individual battles is important Grand strategy is vital and what happens at home behind the front is key too. The Allies prior to 1917 had a partial grand strategy and waged total war; 1917 and 1918 they had evolved a formal grand strategy; the Germans much less. The allies also paid a lot of attention to the home front. The same happened in 1939-1945: Hitler had a grand strategy, but still was focused on a series of short battles and wars. His opponents took a different approach, look at the differences in political and economic co-operation or the German approach to logistics compared to the Western allies. Gobbels, I assume with Hitler's approval, publically declared "total war" only in 1943, their enemies from 1939 or 1941.
They could have had a view to win the war and not just a battle, but they had no fuel so it didn't matter. Anybody who talks about Germany in WWII and never mentions fuel has read to many books about WWII.
I wonder it you can call this discussion a bit too narrow, as after World War 2 we have two German Armys -the Bundeswehr in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Nationale Volksarmee in the German Democratic Republic. Maybe you can do a follow up?
You have to be an artist, a psychologist, a logistician, a mental acrobat, know when to scream and when to be calm. Your planning should be as uncomplicated as possible. Rules are important, improvisation can be even more important.
Are we sure the GERMAN MILITARY in general didn't just make more and more literature over time in general? Probably/possibly in part to the ease of creating that literature with newer tech and maybe more international trade /foreign tech to help produce it? Modern day, every truck (thinking HMMWV) has a log book and a full field manual. They're not small. I have found myself digging further into it when problems arose, and fixing issues myself, or learning to use some obscure feature I hadn't known about before as the need arises. That's the US military. Instead of guessing, the answer can be learned, so you learn a lot of correct information the more you use the equipment.
I have often used "No plan survives first contact with the enemy." Recently I discovered that I was missing "with the enemy main forces." "No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy forces. Only the layman believes that in the course of a campaign he sees the consistent implementation of an original thought that has been considered in advance in every detail and retained to the end." Von Moltke Which makes much more sense. As ex Sniper/Recce I should have realised that Contact and Commitment are different issues. That seeing the enemy's recce or forward elements can be/is just dipping the toe in a scalding bath........
An example of a weapon for a peace army and a war army : The MG3 (designed to be manhandled while hot) vs the MG5 (a taxi machine gun). `Nobody can compete with the Wehrmacht : An army where all officers were tecnical (with all that means) will work better than sombody who takes on anybody.
US Government agencies function much the same way. Bureaucracies feed rules and regulations which leads to expanded bureaucracies which in turn leads to greater paperwork required. It’s a never ending cycle.
How Ironic, he's from the University of Potsdam, the place where the Allied leaders, met to determine the future for post war Germany and Europe. And the very place where Japan was given the ultimatum of unconditional surrender.
Bernhard, and Bismark, are fantastic commentators on Germany military matters. And He reads and 'Hearts' so many comments - not that I'm looking for one:)
Is there an aspect of the German attitude to war that reflects the difference in character on a regional level? On the grossest level, the difference between Prussians and Bavarians for example. Is this something that has gone away as the regional differences have smoothed out?
You could sum it up as the fetishisation of the art of fighting or conducting war. Specifically on the tactical and operational level, ignoring the strategic and grand strategic level. In other words, the political dimension, which ironically contradicts Clausewitz. Both German Armies essentially failed to see war as a political instrument, which was to serve a political goal. Or lost sight of how their fighting was to serve that goal. Granted, that requires the politicians having a clear political goal beyond simply winning.
I apologize in advance for any Americans in the comments section that become incensed at Vietnam being called a defeat. It's unfortunately not a decided thing here culturally, even though it was definitely a defeat.
Yes. Perhaps with a comparison to other armies as well. One example would be the flat mess tins of the Americans and the deep soup bowl like tins of the Germans.
With regard to the high number of generals that the bundeswehr has , apart from the argument the professor put forth , I think it can also be attributed to the potential need for the army to enlarge in the unlikely but possible eventuality of armed conflict.
The thing is that current war technology is increasingly less reliant upon numbers of men and more dependent on the infrastructure itself and its weapons. And with the number of generals, I think the professor’s point made complete sense
Very interesting discussion. I am far from a scholar in this area. My father was in the US 15th Air Force in Italy. In any case the common wisdom that I grew up with was that the American Army was effective because as a citizen army the command structure was less rigid and the commanders at the company and platoon levels felt more freedom to improvise and adjust as the tactical situation presented itself. The German army whether Heer or SS had a more rigid command structure with less freedom to stretch its boundaries. Dr. Nietzel seems to be describing quite the opposite. In any case it’s nice to see Bernard engaging the academics in this format. Plus he cleans up pretty good!
In my opinion the loss we experienced in Vietnam was a failure of National and Theater level strategy not an operational or tactical failure. The adoption of Air Land battle was perhaps an inflated view of Wehrmacht success.
I'm wondering if the warping of the German (and really, it starts with Prussian) way of war was being run over by Napoleon for about 10 years running. What I mean is that most of the "Coalition wars" basically went, Le Grande Arme comes racing up, extra large and with shaky supply lines. It ties the slower old-style armies in knots, and forces an unfavorable fight on them which they lose.. At which point Napoleon signs a favorable treaty and dances off after the next enemy. Works fine when you are facing mostly feudal domains that can lose a few provinces (and take years to get an army together). Eventually, someone doesn't sign that treaty, and pretty soon you are in way over your head.
He started with Moltke, but isn't it Clausewitz idea that "War is the realm of uncertainty" and that planning is kinda possible only in preparation and then everything is just too messy?
I wouldn't be surprised if that quote doesn't go further back, the main difference between Clausewitz and Moltke is, that the second was a practitioner, the first was mostly a theoretician. Also Neitzel's book is from 1870 to about 2020, so Moltke is also more fitting in that context.
Back then when I did the interviews I asked him afterwards and he noted something might be in the works or something, but I did not hear anything else about it. So I would assume "not yet".
I can't wait to read Neitzel's book (auf Englisch bitte). The explosion of regulation and policy can not be underestimated (lawfare). Imagine you're a soldier in the US Army, using an M110 SASS in a squad. The amount of lawfare needed for the Army to propose the need for the weapon system, draw a request for proposal, host a competition between manufacturers (twice, generally), achieve contract selection, create training and qualifications for soldiers, maintain stock and maintenance numbers, AND source ammunition contracts AS WELL as shipping the equipment to the AOR is astounding. All to meet the need of engaging man-sized targets from 300-800m.
Professor Neitzel says that the Whermacht was good at winning individual battles but not the overall war. For Germany, achieving what specific goal would have constituted winning the overall war?
Nice suit Bernard. I can see why you wore it, with a guest and all. But in a future video with just us, throw everyone for a loop and wear something unexpected. Like an American 'bro-veteran' shirt and hat. Haha.
The idea that the German way of war was rigid and predictable is prejudiced, offensive, and plain wrong. The Prussian officer tradition produced highly trained and flexible officers who could respond to the chaos of events. Of course individual commanders could be more or less predictable, Paulus' use of combined arms in the offensive became so predictable that it was one thing that enabled Soviet victory at Stalingrad. German flexibility and responsiveness enabled victory in the Franco-Prussian War and allowed them to learn just as fast as the British and French in WW1. It was only in WW2 and its build up where the scale of expansion overwhelmed the ability to train new officers that we see problems developing, in my view it is the lack of capacity to train officers that is responsible for small staffs, i.e. there is no point in having a staff if they can't do the job required, and is one cause of the failures in effectiveness of logistics and other non combat functions we see in WW2. Contrasting German and other central powers in WW1 is also instructive.
Consider the German army was ahead of its time with in battle communications and taking mechanized warfare to the next level. So before a battle starts it’s all about training and tactics. Taking the initiative, Germany was able to pack quite a few punches. I think when battles don’t go as planned, things start to collapse. Add retrieval to that and things really start to hurt. Interesting interview 👍🏻 interesting topics no one is talking about is the number of foreign soldiers that came from occupied territories. Quite shocking to see how few joined Napoleon to fight his wars as compared to the numbers that joined Germany in WW2.
It’s not really an either or thing. Strategy, logistics and goals in any Army are very centralized, by necessity, because if they are not the smaller elimants have a tendency to go off after what some twenty year old Lieutenant thinks are the priorities and tear up/expend resources that are then not available to larger more strategically important operations. I don’t think the Bundeswehr was any less adaptable, because they had been taught to form an American Task Force to deal with an emergency, instead of a Kampfgoup. Kampfgroups tend to have assets not necessary to the task, but moving and engaging, simply because they boost numbers. The Germans got in some great victories against the allied peace time army, but rarely managed to achieve the Strategic, logistical and tactical vision necessary to fight the war efficiently. A professional military fought this war with no plan to disrupt or cancel out America’s industrial might or cause divisions in the Soviet Union that would have dissipated the manpower strength they had. Despite all the great books by the German Generals were better at battles that wasted men and resources than accomplishing war winning strategic goals. The Bundewehr just has better adult leadership that due to the limits placed on the interwar Reichswehr Officer Corps. Failure to achieve a war winning strategy against any major opponents Great Britain, America or the Soviet Union while crushing small or corrupted countries think France or Denmark is indicative of inability to grasp the Strategic issue, but able to grasp and execute the sergeant’s and Lieutenant’s war. Basically the Bundeswehr was built by Generals like the Imperial Army, while the Wehrmacht was very much the product of a Corporal and a bunch of so called Generals and Staffs that were educated in an Army forbidden large staffs and Professional development. If the Bundeswehr fought the Wehrmacht with equal resources the Wehrmacht would cause a lot of casualties, lots of destruction, but in the end as the war got longer the Bundeswehr would destroy the Wehrmacht with logistics, strategic vision and not grinding it’s formations to pieces taking stuff they did not have to take. The Bundeswehr of the Cold War is just a more adult formation.
but but but i have one question ww1 orientated , german trenches where seen as better and german high know that this would be a defence if war for long time and planned accourdingly (?) or atleast what i read about it and see through documentaires, and you see cleary the beginnings of mission tactics from ncos and lower officer ranks for example rommels adventures in italy (ww1) so is it not possible that situations demanded different plans and or planning and that eventuly came to higher up? (people get promoted etc) and that afther the war only ncos and or capable officers and or traint to comand or control a level above them. that is someway preparing youre amry or atleast youre mentality for a new war. is that not also a way it changed or influence it to great degree? i hope it is readible, and understandable :) Greetings from history enthusiast.
the concepts of regulations and doctrine are parallel but unrelated. Regulations tell us how to process a supply form or leave request. All militaries are centralized in this respect. But, you are discussing doctrine and tactics. These exist in all militaries whether anyone writes them down or not. It is important to note that doctrine drives acquisition and tactical lessons drive doctrine. A lack of coherent doctrine leads to a military unable to replace the JU 87, for example.
This is a fascinating topic that I have often pondered! Is this book available in English? Can you recommend any books in English that address this topic?
Would be interesting to see more videos with Professor Neitzel about Germany and the wars, guilt, controversities and so on, to show his (German point of view) to a larger audience. Another highly interesting topic would be: What do German history students learn about the Second World War at universities? Is there a broader angle or is it just as narrow like German history books at school? Is it worth it to study German Modern History (from the Napoleonic wars onwards) being German?
Some background: I personally was totally disilusioned from German History classes once we got to the interesting chapters. I recall the general reaction of my class mates. It was the most boring topic. I'm from Thuringia, our teachers were yet socialistic comunistic briefed and trained teachers - although Germany was already reunified. However teachers were the same. The show must go on! It could have been the most interesting part of History at all, however it was a never ending story of guilt indoctination, memorizing what the book said. If students wanted to contribute with experience of our grandfathers' and great grandfathers testimonies our teacher asked "Oh, so your grandpa also studied history!" I think it was in the 7th grade. However, since in East Germany students usually don't have classes in philosophy, we didn't learn to argue nor to question the teacher and his way of smashing of certain discussions. The only thing in Thuringia we learnt (in the 90's) was Ethics, during 8 years! The most boring part of Philosophy. In the military service I learnt that in West Germany students had philosophy classes, politics. Well in the end it was a frustrating class. We all hated it, only repeating the book's version. Any further comments in test meant 6 (the lowest German qualification). It was horrible. So at least I would have never studied History at university! Why, pure lies or point of views written in books. I loved to read Schiller about Netherland's independence, I read it here in Mexico where I live. It was Schiller who introduced to the History a focus on the main actors. In relationship to the 2nd World War this means a strong focus on Stalin, Churchill, the foreign policy amongst these countries. I would have loved this point of view. So, what has a History student to expect if he wants to study part of his career at a German university (as a German and as an International student)?
I studied in Austria and from 2001 to 2008; so some of that might apply to Germany, some might not even apply to Austria anymore. In university classes are highly dependent on what the different professors offer, at least for History at the University of Salzburg. I also studied Computer Science (CS). There was a huge difference, in CS I think about 90+ % of the courses were regular ones the content would change a bit depending on the professor / lecturer. Whereas in History the courses / classes were categories: Austrian History, Modern History, Ancient History, Contemporary History, Cultural History and Economic / Social History. E.g., I took a class Cultural History of Water, where I also mentioned Power Projection Doctrine in the exam. Besides from a few classes they subject changed all the time. I think some lecturers reused their stuff, but some made a new class every time if I am not mistaken. In short school had little to do with university, from what I know the difference is more and more eroded, which I find terrible since I was never a particular fan of schools, but of universities. School for me was: I was told what and how to do it. University for me is: You need to provide a result, how you do it is up to you as long the methodology is sound enough and you properly argue etc.
Thanks for the insides. Sounds pretty much the same to the German Magister Artium back in those days where you basically picked certain subjects to cover. As you say some were mandatory with little or no changes at all, others were held just once and in the next semester it wasn't offered anymore depending on the articles our professors had to publish, giving insides into their studies and working with students - rather to get a feedback or to get fed with new ideas. Sure, studying at universities is totally different. Maybe with the bachelor degrees it became a continuation of the school system. Were there topics where professors said "Sorry, I won't touch this topic, hot stuff!" ? I studied Germanistik and roman languages and of course besides studying the history of your own language (Old High German, Middle High German, Gothic, Old English etc.) and exchanges abroad you start to love your own language. Just as Goethe said: “Anyone that doesn't know foreign languages knows nothing of his own.” And being abroad, and with our German school system background WWII basically became a book with 7 seals, a topic you better don't talk about or avoid. And first time abroad, people were more open in relation to German History and they even asked "Is it right, better not ask a German about WWII?" Imagine, Germans better shall not know, and foreigners better do not ask! 🤔 So better never talk about it. I personally didn't talk that much about it. However I realized that people abroad sometimes knew more about it than I did. And surprisingly they asked the same questions as us, as teenangers at school wanting to know more about it. At the same time I remembered what my grandparents and great grand parents said about it. It wasn't that much either. My great grandfather who was 8 years in Russia as POW never talked about it. My grandma fleeing from Sudetia being a 6 years old child saw Dresden burning, and found it beautiful, the lights they used, like Christmas. I have heard other similar comments, children who also didn't understand what was happening there. And then you realize how this all worked for my generation, seeing it from outside. As said, I'm from the former GDR (socialistic part of German, "East Germany", with GDR teachers but West German education system) but to see this from outside, from a different point of view, and if not even Germans are interested in their History who of course have the chance to understand the language, a source most other countries are lacking of, who else can be interested in this field? So, again, to not forget: were there topics which professors tried to avoid? I heard in one of those discussions among historians that German Historians rather depend on foreign historians to bring up certain topics, otherwise they could risk their job. Or do you think it is indeed as open as studying languages or computer science - there is no political correctness in the end and everything is an open book.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Power projection doctrine! Thanks, sounds really interesting. I'm personally glad not having studied History, a mine field and later on I always considered "History as the politicians' bitch", and they do whatever they want with her. But in the end, it's up to you historians to figure out where the truth is. Often somewhere in between. Cheers!
The differences between career (professional, standing, peacetime) armies vs wartime are significant. Interesting topic with much to consider and understand.
A peace time army vs a war time army can be best illustrated by what Gen. Marshall did right before the US entry in WWII. He got rid of a hell of a lot of field grade and general officers who he felt were not aggressive enough to lead troops into battle.
How bad was the bureaucracy in the Reichwehr during the Weimarer Republic? I cant imagine that it was really that bad. It was an army that was trained to lead a larger army in the future.