So how'd it go? I've got to go to court the end of next month for not coming to a complete stop then I got a letter from the driver's license division saying they're going to pull my driver's license if I don't pay them $200 for not showing insurance and I already have a no insurance ticket so I'm paying no insurance twice I've been to every Law Office in courthouse in this town and no one can tell me why I have to do this please help!! I'm willing to fight just need to know how and if been studying I just don't have enough time and right now I'm about $1,000 in on tickets
According to federal law, it's called direct compensation. If you are not getting direct compensation, then you are not in commerce, the supplies to businesses as well. If you're delivering furniture and the delivery is free of charge incorporated into the price of the furniture, you are not getting direct compensation. If you are being paid 60 cents a mile to drive a truck, then you are getting direct compensation and must have a driver's license vehicle tags and vehicle insurance
But that's not true. If you post something as true, it’s your burden to support that claim with verifiable, credible evidence or legal authority. Your saying something doesn’t make it true, and no one has to believe you. If you don't support your statements with verifiable, credible evidence or legal authority, it's appropriate to reject your statements as untrue. So nothing you post is true. Among other things, courts explicitly sustain the regulation by States of the non-commercial operation of automobiles or other motor vehicles. See, for example: [A] State v. French, 77 Haw. 222 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) [1] at 230: "...Defendant argues that the traffic statutes involved only apply to businesses and "State vehicals [sic][,]" not to a "sovereign" individual like himself who utilizes his vehicle for "personal needs[.]" He further maintains that if the statutes do apply to him, they would violate his right to travel. In addressing Defendant's argument, we scrutinize the statutes, the authority for the statutes, and Defendant's right to travel. The statutes in issue do, in fact, apply to individuals who use their vehicles for 'personal needs.'...." [2] at 230-231: "...None of the provisions in HRS §§ 431:10C-104(b), 291-11.6, 286-25, and 286-102 limit their application to vehicles used for state or business purposes only. The statutes apply to persons and a "person" is defined, "[i]n general usage, [as] a human being (i.e. natural person)." Black's Law Dictionary 1142 (6th ed. 1990). And "[w]hoever" means "whatever person[.]" Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1351 (10th ed. 1993). As a result, on their faces, the statutes apply to Defendant. Having found that the statutes do apply to Defendant, we turn to the authority underlying these traffic laws. As part of the exercise of its police power, a state may, in the absence of national legislation, "rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles , - those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers. . . ." Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622, 35 S.Ct. 140, 142, 59 L.Ed. 385 (1914). Accord State v. Shak, 51 Haw. 612, 614, 466 P.2d 422, 424 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930, 91 S.Ct. 191, 27 L.Ed.2d 190 (1970). We have not found, nor has Defendant referred us to any federal legislation pre-empting the State's authority to regulate the operation of motor vehicles in connection with the offenses charged. It follows, then, that the State, here, may "rightfully prescribe uniform regulations . . . in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles . . . ." Hendrick, 235 U.S. at 622, 35 S.Ct. at 142...." [B] Armstrong v. City of Boaz, Case No.: 4:16-CV-1065-VEH (N.D. Ala. July 24, 2017), slip op at 29-30: "...Plaintiffs mistakenly believe that the laws of the road - here, Alabama's motor vehicle laws - do not apply to them. Plaintiffs dispute that they were operating a "motor vehicle " (doc. 64 at 6) and argue that they were not engaged in "commercial " activity, so Caption Hempel "misapplied the law intended for commercial traffic" when he stopped their truck. (Doc. 46 at 18). The Court disagrees. The constitutional rights upon which Plaintiffs rely do not come without limitations, including those restrictions imposed by state motor vehicle laws. The right to interstate travel ...For example, under Alabama law, "[e]very person, except those specifically exempted by statutory enactment, shall procure a driver's license before driving a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state." Ala. Code § 32-6-1. Alabama defines a "motor vehicle " as "[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled," and defines vehicle as "[e]very device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn[.]" Ala. Code. § 32-1.1 (32), (81). Plaintiffs' truck is clearly a motor vehicle , and Plaintiffs themselves are "persons" as defined by both state and federal law. See Ala. Code § 32-1-1.1(42) ("person" includes "natural persons"); 1 U.S.C. § 1 ("person" includes "individuals")...."
@@fiddletown2002 all you have to do is go to title 49 CFR section 390. 3T and within that you will see what direct compensation is. Federal law specifically States a vehicle is something that transports people are property in commerce. To meet the definition of commerce tells you it's direct compensation.
@@fiddletown2002 the information that you posted is misleading at best, and here is why. They keep talking about vehicles or motor vehicles, those two words are words under the law, so of course traffic codes would apply, because the word traffic is also a commercial term according to the law. If you are driving a vehicle, you are not traveling but engaged in commerce for direct compensation. I do not use a DMV tag nor a DMV driver's license. I travel under the common law under the United States Constitution under the Liberty freedom of movement. I've had cases dismissed before I even showed up the court for the no tags and license. It would seem you are unaware of the legal definitions of some words, which is supported by federal and State. Legally, a vehicle is not the same as an automobile.
@@dannybeauclair9587: Nope, 49 CFR 390.3 is irrelevant to matters relating to the regulation by the States of the non-commerical operation of automobiies or other motor vehicles. [I] 49 CFR 390.3 reads: "(a) The rules in subchapter B of this chapter are applicable to all employers, employees, and commercial motor vehicles that transport property or passengers in interstate commerce. (b) The rules in part 383 of this chapter, Commercial Driver's License Standards; Requirements and Penalties, are applicable to every person who operates a commercial motor vehicle, as defined in § 383.5 of this subchapter, in interstate or intrastate commerce and to all employers of such persons. (c) The rules in part 387 of this chapter, Minimum Levels of Financial Responsibility for Motor Carriers, are applicable to motor carriers as provided in §§ 387.3 or 387.27 of this chapter. (d) Additional requirements. Nothing in subchapter B of this chapter shall be construed to prohibit an employer from requiring and enforcing more stringent requirements relating to safety of operation and employee safety and health...." The "this chapter" referred to is Chapter III, Subtitle B, of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations sets out the regulations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration of the U. S. Department of Transportation. So 49 CFR 390.3 relates only to the federal regulaton of interstate commerce, and not the state regulation of the non-commercial operation of motor vehicles. [II] Every State has laws regulating the operation of automobiles and other motor vehicles on the public roads, including laws requiring driver's licenses, vehicle registration, and proof of financial responsibility (including the non-commercial use of automobiles or other motor vehicles on the public roads). Applicable definitions of "drive", "driver", or "motor vehicle" are found in state law, for example: [A] Alabama -- AL Code § 32-1-1.1(14): "DRIVER. Every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle." AL Code § 32-1-1.1(32): "MOTOR VEHICLE. Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except for electric personal assistive mobility devices." [B] Arizona -- ARS 28-101-21: " ' Drive' means to operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle." ARS 28-101-22: " 'Driver' means a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle." ARS 28-101-41: " 'Motor vehicle' : (a) Means either: (i) A self-propelled vehicle. (ii) For the purposes of the laws relating to the imposition of a tax on motor vehicle fuel, a vehicle that is operated on the highways of this state and that is propelled by the use of motor vehicle fuel." [C] Florida -- FL Stat § 322.01(16): " 'Drive' means to operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in any place open to the general public for purposes of vehicular traffic." FL Stat § 322.01(27): " 'Motor vehicle' means any self-propelled vehicle, including a motor vehicle combination, not operated upon rails or guideway, excluding vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, and motorized bicycles as defined in s. 316.003." [D] California -- Vehicle Code 305: " A “driver” is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. The term “driver” does not include the tillerman or other person who, in an auxiliary capacity, assists the driver in the steering or operation of any articulated firefighting apparatus." Vehicle Code 415: " (a) A “motor vehicle” is a vehicle that is self-propelled. (b) “Motor vehicle” does not include a self-propelled wheelchair, motorized tricycle, or motorized quadricycle, if operated by a person who, by reason of physical disability, is otherwise unable to move about as a pedestrian. (c) For purposes of Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 3000) of Division 2, “motor vehicle” includes a recreational vehicle as that term is defined in subdivision (a) of Section 18010 of the Health and Safety Code, but does not include a truck camper." [E] Nothing in any of those definitions limits driving to commercial activity. [F] Other States have similar, statutory definitions which would apply to the enforcement of the State's laws. Furthermore, there's a general rule in law that if a word is not otherwise defined, the word will be understood according to its common meaning. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (United States Supreme Court, 1979), at 42: “...A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning…”..
@@dannybeauclair9587: And still, nothing you post is true. You claim, "...I do not use a DMV tag nor a DMV driver's license. I travel under the common law under the United States Constitution under the Liberty freedom of movement. I've had cases dismissed before I even showed up the court for the no tags and license....", but if you can't prove it with verifiable, credible evidence, it's not true.
But courts explicitly sustain the regulation by States of the non-commercial operation of automobiles or other motor vehicles. See, for example: [A] State v. French, 77 Haw. 222 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) [1] at 230: "...Defendant argues that the traffic statutes involved only apply to businesses and "State vehicals [sic][,]" not to a "sovereign" individual like himself who utilizes his vehicle for "personal needs[.]" He further maintains that if the statutes do apply to him, they would violate his right to travel. In addressing Defendant's argument, we scrutinize the statutes, the authority for the statutes, and Defendant's right to travel. The statutes in issue do, in fact, apply to individuals who use their vehicles for 'personal needs.'...." [2] at 230-231: "...None of the provisions in HRS §§ 431:10C-104(b), 291-11.6, 286-25, and 286-102 limit their application to vehicles used for state or business purposes only. The statutes apply to persons and a "person" is defined, "[i]n general usage, [as] a human being (i.e. natural person)." Black's Law Dictionary 1142 (6th ed. 1990). And "[w]hoever" means "whatever person[.]" Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1351 (10th ed. 1993). As a result, on their faces, the statutes apply to Defendant. Having found that the statutes do apply to Defendant, we turn to the authority underlying these traffic laws. As part of the exercise of its police power, a state may, in the absence of national legislation, "rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles , - those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers. . . ." Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622, 35 S.Ct. 140, 142, 59 L.Ed. 385 (1914). Accord State v. Shak, 51 Haw. 612, 614, 466 P.2d 422, 424 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930, 91 S.Ct. 191, 27 L.Ed.2d 190 (1970). We have not found, nor has Defendant referred us to any federal legislation pre-empting the State's authority to regulate the operation of motor vehicles in connection with the offenses charged. It follows, then, that the State, here, may "rightfully prescribe uniform regulations . . . in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles . . . ." Hendrick, 235 U.S. at 622, 35 S.Ct. at 142...." [B] Armstrong v. City of Boaz, Case No.: 4:16-CV-1065-VEH (N.D. Ala. July 24, 2017), slip op at 29-30: "...Plaintiffs mistakenly believe that the laws of the road - here, Alabama's motor vehicle laws - do not apply to them. Plaintiffs dispute that they were operating a "motor vehicle " (doc. 64 at 6) and argue that they were not engaged in "commercial " activity, so Caption Hempel "misapplied the law intended for commercial traffic" when he stopped their truck. (Doc. 46 at 18). The Court disagrees. The constitutional rights upon which Plaintiffs rely do not come without limitations, including those restrictions imposed by state motor vehicle laws. The right to interstate travel ...For example, under Alabama law, "[e]very person, except those specifically exempted by statutory enactment, shall procure a driver's license before driving a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state." Ala. Code § 32-6-1. Alabama defines a "motor vehicle " as "[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled," and defines vehicle as "[e]very device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn[.]" Ala. Code. § 32-1.1 (32), (81). Plaintiffs' truck is clearly a motor vehicle , and Plaintiffs themselves are "persons" as defined by both state and federal law. See Ala. Code § 32-1-1.1(42) ("person" includes "natural persons"); 1 U.S.C. § 1 ("person" includes "individuals")...."
That "state national" business is nonsense. Let's see what courts actually say in real life in the real world -- [I] United States v. My Doctor Suggests LLC, No. 2:20-cv-00279-DBB (D. Utah Feb. 19, 2021), slip op at 4: "...Both of Pedersen's arguments and all his various contentions center around his claimed status as an American National. He asserts that as an American National the government does not have jurisdiction over him. That an individual rejects being defined as a United States citizen does not excuse that individual from the jurisdiction of the United States courts. "[A]n individual's belief that [their] status as a 'sovereign citizen' puts [them] beyond the jurisdiction of the courts 'has no conceivable validity in American law.'" Theories about lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign citizenry should be rejected summarily. These types of jurisdictional arguments are "patently frivolous." Both of Pedersen's arguments are jurisdictional arguments arising out of his claimed American National status. They are thus without merit. ..." [II] United States v. Hansen, 929 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2019), at 1246: "...Mr. Hansen responded with a stream of jurisdictional statements related to his earlier filings. See, e.g. , id. ("I am not a U.S. citizen, I’m not a citizen of the United States, I’m an American State National."). The judge warned Mr. Hansen that these jurisdictional arguments were frivolous, that they had been rejected by the courts of appeals, and that he was facing the risk of a term of imprisonment...." [III] United States v. Barry, No. 21-3372 (3d Cir. Nov. 3, 2022) [A] footnote 6: "...Barry repeatedly asserts that he is not a U.S. citizen, and instead identifies himself in various ways, including as an "unincorporated American National," an "American National State Citizen," an "unincorporated natural man," and a 'New Jerseyan.'..." [B] slip op at 8: "...we will affirm Barry's convictions...." [IV] United States v. Williams, 994 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2021) [A] at 1177: "...In 2014, after a jury found Williams guilty of ten counts of tax-evasion and fraud offenses, the district judge sentenced him to seventy-one months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. Williams began the five-years’ supervision on August 22, 2018, and was set to end it on August 21, 2023. But he lasted under supervision only a year. On August 27, 2019, a probation officer filed a Petition for Summons on Person Under Supervision, alleging three violations of Williams's supervision. All three violations allegedly stemmed from Williams's asserted belief that he is an American National and is not subject to the same legal system as United States citizens...." [B] at 1179: "...After Williams reentered the courtroom and repeated his arguments about being an American National, the district judge issued the sentence. Though the court agreed that it "ma[de] no sense to reimpose a sentence of supervised release," id. at 45, it found eleven months’ imprisonment insufficient, ... ... The court ordered a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, with credit for time served. On appeal, Williams challenges this sentence...." [C] at 1180: "...We have reviewed the district court's explanation for the sentence it imposed and discern no abuse of discretion....." [D] In other words, William's assertion that he was an American National and not a citizen got him nowhere. [V] Lanzon v. Unadilla Twp. Police Dep't, No. 18-12819 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 4, 2018) [A] Lanzon sued the Unadilla Twp. Police Department and others claiming that she, slip op at 4: "...'...was unlawfully detain[ed] for 28 days.' Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Magistrate Sherwood 'unlawfully & extrajudicially' arraigned him and that Defendants 'refused to recognize my status as a Non-US-Citizen American National and State Citizen.' Id. Plaintiff contends that he was falsely imprisoned for 31 days. Plaintiff seeks damages, 'all charges dismissed with prejudice, and my private property returned in the condition it was taken. Id...." [B] Throwing out her complaint the court ruled: "...Plaintiff's claim is based upon his alleged status as a 'Non-US-Citizen American National, and State Citizen' or 'State Citizen of the republic,' which is "completely without merit, patently frivolous, and will be rejected without expending any more of this Court's resources on [its] discussion.' United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992). See also United States v. Mundt, 29 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting argument that the plaintiff was 'solely a resident of the state of Michigan and not a resident of any 'federal zone' and therefore not subject to federal income tax laws' as "completely without merit and patently frivolous'); Payne v. Kilda, 2016 WL 491847 at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2016)...." [VI] Miller v. Sec'y of Treasury for the United States, No. 21-14224 (11th Cir. May 24, 2022) [A] slip op at 1-2" "...Miller identified himself in the caption of his 14-page complaint as a "Pre-1933 Private American National: Citizen of the United States Republic." He discussed various government powers, individual rights, and his beliefs about birth certificates. ... Miller requested that ... the district court '[a]rrange for [him] to be listed in all government database as Private American National Citizen' and to '[p]rovid[e] all protection, whether federal or state, including but not limited to, licenses . . . [and] identification documents.'..." [B] The court of appeal affirmed dismissal of Miller's complaint, at 3: "...The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Miller's complaint as frivolous. A complaint is frivolous "if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Miller, 541 F.3d at 1100 (internal quotation marks omitted). Miller's complaint, as the district court stated, is "incomprehensible and replete with 'the legal-sounding but meaningless verbiage commonly used by adherents to the so-called sovereign citizen movement.'" Miller claimed special citizenship as an individual "foreign" to the United States with various, unclear property rights in equity. Miller's complaint was patently frivolous...."
take your time and look up any government application and you will see non-citizen national as an option. that has dismissed any of your "case" law which is legal yet has no jurisdiction over anyone who is NOT inside the jurisdiction of the US corporation. before you dismiss, do your research.
@@trini2daboni: But none of that is true. For example: [I] Neither citizenship, national status, nor nationality has anything to do with jurisdiction. See what the Supreme Court says. [A] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (U. S. Supreme Court,1877), at 722 (emphasis added): "... The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is, that EVERY STATE POSSESS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AND SOVEREIGNTY OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY WITHIN ITS TERRITORY...." [B] International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), at 316 (emphasis added): "....Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence, his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 95 U. S. 733. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, DUE PROCESS REQUIRES ONLY THAT, IN ORDER TO SUBJECT A DEFENDANT TO A JUDGMENT in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, HE HAVE CERTAIN MINIMUM CONTACTS with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 311 U. S. 463. See Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 243 U. S. 91. Compare Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313, 318 U. S. 316, 318 U. S. 319. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352; Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253...." [II] Only, "...persons born in "an outlying possession of the United States" or born of a parent or parents who are non-citizen nationals who meet certain physical presence or residence requirements are eligible to be non-citizen U.S.nationals. The term “outlying possessions of the United States” is defined in Section 101(a)(29) of the INA as American Samoa and Swains Island....", or, "...certain inhabitants of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, who became United States citizens by virtue of Article III of the Covenant,…" A search of the U. S. Government website for "U. S. National application" finds that "...As defined by the INA, all U.S. citizens are U.S. nationals but only a relatively small number of persons acquire U.S. nationality without becoming U.S. citizens. Section 101(a)(21) of the INA defines the term “national” as “a person owing permanent allegiance to a state.” Section 101(a)(22) of the INA provides that the term “national of the United States” includes all U.S. citizens as well as persons who, though not citizens of the United States, owe permanent allegiance to the United States (non-citizen nationals). Section 308 of the INA confers U.S. nationality but not U.S. citizenship, on persons born in "an outlying possession of the United States" or born of a parent or parents who are non-citizen nationals who meet certain physical presence or residence requirements. The term “outlying possessions of the United States” is defined in Section 101(a)(29) of the INA as American Samoa and Swains Island. No other statutes define any other territories or any of the states as outlying possessions. In addition to Section 308 of the INA, Section 302 of Public Law 94 - 241 provides for certain inhabitants of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, who became United States citizens by virtue of Article III of the Covenant, to opt for non-citizen national status. (See requirements of Section 302)...." [III] The United States is not a corporation. If you contend that it is, prove it with verifiable, credible evidence.
@@fiddletown2002 lol save the long explanation for someone else. the proof is in the pudding. Go read your Code of Federal Regulation and other laws. BYEEEE
@@trini2daboni: Thank you for confirming that you have nothing to contribute to a serious discussion of law. Nothing you post is true. There’s no reason to believe you or take you seriously.
@@trini2daboni: And the CFR has 50 Titles, including subjects like agriculture and navigable water, and has thousands of pages. Exactly what in the CFR is relevant to this subject. You don’t know, do you?
