Maybe some of the specific details of Hume's account would come across as crazy, but I'm not so sure about the general topic. I remember contemplating skeptical challenges to the existence of the external world when I was just a kid, long before I studied philosophy formally -- I would occasionally wonder to myself, "how do I know I'm not dreaming?" I think a lot of folks have similar thoughts, especially since the popularity of films like the Matrix, the rise of virtual reality, etc.
Excellent. Your channel is a treasure trove. I wish you all the success in life. You’re a wonderful teacher - who in the Indian Tradition has always been regarded as next to God. (Guru)
I could be completely wrong in thinking this argument originates with me (so correct me if I'm wrong). But I see another issue with positing an external world. There is nothing logically impossible in proposing a universe that doesn't have continuity but yet is still "mind independent external" and because of this if we iteratively move from that world to worlds gradually more and more like our own, it will never be on account of "continuity" that we progress toward a higher likelihood of an external world. Since "mind independent external" is a property that could belong to a world without continuity it must then be in virtue of something else other than continuity to which the feature "a mind independent external world" can be said to belong to a universe. The problem is any thing we are tempted to say motivates "mind independent external world" could be absent from a universe that is indeed "mind independent external" and because of this what temps us to believe in an external world can always be absent that external world. So we never escape empirical equivalency to mind only worlds, and of course the existence of "consciousness/seemings" is not motivated at all by this same metaphysical leap, so we seem to be making a pointless metaphysical claim that can never pass empirical muster and hits a dead end as soon as we propose our motivation for it, since every motivation we propose we can always subtract that motivating quality from a hypothetical universe and it still logically follows that it could be mind independent and external, thus defeating our motivation in the process.
I'm not sure why this is a problem. Presumably, the anti-skeptic will say that, if we did live in a world without the relevant continuities, there would be no justification for believing the external world hypothesis. But it's not clear why that would undermine the view that, if those continuities obtain, we are justified in believing in the EWH. By analogy, it's logically possible that a human might fail to exhibit any speech or sophisticated behaviour, yet still have a mind. Indeed, this isn't just logically possible, sometimes it actually occurs, as with people who have locked-in syndrome. Yet most people would still say that, if a human speaks and engages in other forms of sophisticated behaviour, we are justified in attributing mental states to them.
@@KaneB Maybe I wasn't clear. Your anti-skeptic is taking the position that without continuity an external world isn't justified. I'm making the case that their arguments begin to fail after their affirming the possibility of an external mind independent world that is devoid of continuity. Once this granted, I'm not sure how they say it is by virtue of continuity that it is more likely that they inhabit a mind independent world. I'm not sure from a stand point of pure logic how one doesn't grant that "mind independent" is a separable property from "has continuity". It is also interesting to note that the interpretation of quantum mechanics seemingly favorable to physicalists is the Everett multi-world view, which is highly suggestive of continuity-free universes that are mind independent actually being the case. So how is it they claim that continuity is the make or break factor, it seems like it must be in virtue of something else. I think it's an entirely different argument to talk about what psychologically motivates thinking we are in an external world and what justifies that. I just don't see how one can fail to imagine a universe devoid of continuity that persists absent mind, that seems obviously something that could have been or is currently the case.
@@KaneB To add to this, your second comment about locked in syndrome I think actually makes my case not the anti-skeptics. It is to say that movement and personality characteristics is a deficient criteria by which to asses if someone is conscious. Just like continuity is a deficient criteria to asses the probability of being in an external world.
@@KaneB One final point is that being justified in attributing mental states has to be in virtue of something. Clearly our base line for doing this can't be speech or sophisticated behavior or we exclude a class of people who have locked-in syndrome. If plants have mental states we'd exclude them by that same faulty criteria. I don't think whether people feel justified in their faulty criteria is interesting, I feel like it is interesting to show how it is a faulty criteria at bottom (if it is indeed faulty). I think the Locked-In Syndrome case is demonstrative of this and in opposition to the case that speech and sophisticated behavior are the proper means to asses that situation, I think it undermines it, doesn't seem to support it.
@@KaneB Haha sorry to keep going, but like necessary versus sufficient conditions. Once the person says "External Worlds without continuity" are possible they've already left the bounds of your locked-in analogy. Because it's sufficient that sophisticated behaviors entail mental states, but it is not necessary. My argument in the EWH case is precisely about what is necessary. It clearly isn't necessary for EWH to have continuity (unless we insist this which seems ridiculous). Which is why I'm trying to get to the bottom of what is actually necessary. But my hunch is there is no bottom to get to.
Would you be interested in making a video about an applied ethics topic (killing carnivorous animals)? Its pretty big of a deal in the vegan community right now. I would be interested in your analysis of that.
If you're asking for my own views, I don't have a lot to say about it. I don't take non-human animals to have moral standing, so there is no reason to do anything about wild animal suffering, to reduce predation, etc. Indeed, this would probably be a bad idea insofar as it would further damage ecosystems. I outline my general approach to the animals issue in this video: ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-yMmr5P8WLew.html I guess I could do a lecture on the topic outlining the debate, but this isn't a topic I'm that interested in, so I don't expect I'll do that anytime soon.
Humes wide ranging philosophical skepticism is self refuting as he himself recognised. It is circular and frustrating of any conclusions except it’s own starting point.
@@TheMahayanist yes the real world of observation and causation is against Hume. Hume on causality is a parlour game in a proper analysis. He was a sophisticated sophist, whose skepticism unfortunately became very popular. Hume is largely an anti papal teaser
Hume really is "the top dog in western philosophy" in my opinion. A lot of people say Wittgenstein is the greatest. I'll take Hume any day. Of westerners he seems bar none the sharpest mind.
No. He endorses skepticism of the external world when engaging in philosophical reflection, and then finds the vulgar belief irresistible at all other times. This may not be a satisfying position, but that's where he ends up.
