I'm not a naturalist, but science doesn't deal with "why" questions, they are not the same as the "how" questions, as you seem to consider. The fact that science can't explain it's laws doesn't change it's benefits.
5:10 The first symptoms of the Black Death was sneezing, so pope Gregory I recommended that if someone sneezes, we are to bid them God’s blessing. And it just sort of stuck.
4:48 “What tools will you use to explain the laws of nature if the laws of nature were the tools that you were using to explain everything else?” -Dr Tomas Bogardus
@@Фрэнк-ю4г That's too bad, my views are pretty interesting and...I explain how we have objective morality without positing the existence of a god no one seems to be able to describe with any authority.
@@geomicpri No. I have a point, but first need clarification...I took the quote: "“What tools will you use to explain the laws of nature if the laws of nature were the tools that you were using to explain everything else?”" to be a criticism of using the the laws of nature to explain the laws of nature. Was it? If not, then my point is moot.
Maybe I missed it and someone can point out the time stamp or whatever- but why would I hate naturalism when doing science? What are we supposed to use when doing science?
If I honestly believe myself to be purely physical and my conscience to be emergent, is there basically nothing left to discuss between myself and someone like Dr. Bogardus?
1:19:45 "yeah well i guess there's two things that might be meant there one is um you might think there is a reality out there but our scientific theories shouldn't be taken to be describing that reality accurately or don't even purport to describe that reality accurately reality itself is kind of unknowable to us and our theories are just approximations but you shouldn't you shouldn't take them at face value or take them as literally true if that's the view then um fine i think i'm just talking about the reality bit you know even if it's indescribable by us or unknowable to us like there is some fact of the matter out there um even if we can't know it and we can't describe it and if you have that sort of view then i think the arguments in this paper are still going to apply to you" First of all, thank you Cameron for that question. I think Tomas here doesn't address the question at all. He can't appeal to _"the reality bit"_ or the _"fact of the matter out there"_ if he is responding to an anti-realist. The premise of the question specifically rejects that there is a _"fact of the matter out there"_ (that's what being an anti-realist means). And the argument in the paper completely misses the target for anti-realists (as I have argued in my other comment). 1:20:36 "the alternative interpretation of that sort of thought is um no literally like science just never explains anything like uh i don't know what science is up to but it's definitely not in the business of explanation and i i guess i have had at least one person i think maybe two people have kind of given me that response in the face of this argument like well what if i just said science doesn't explain anything so that would be to actually deny premise 6 which wasn't on your slide premise 6 was what i encourage you to do in modus tollens science does explain stuff you could deny that and say no i don't think science explains anything um so just two thoughts come to mind in response like again that is a kind of interesting irony an interesting turn of events in this dialectic because it's usually the naturalist who is the champion of science and marching under the banner of science so it would be quite a surprising turn of events if the naturalist says you know what never mind [proceeds to laugh] science doesn't explain anything after all um but then also the second thing to say is come on science explains things let's let's be real here somehow we got these cell phones and computers you know um science understands things it has increased our understanding of the world at least some scientific explanations are true" Again here, I think Tomas is completely missing the point. What does he hope to achieve by telling an anti-realist : _"let's be real here"_ ? :D Tomas sets up an epistemic criterion for "explanation" that requires them to "give an understanding" and applies it to science. Therefore anyone who doesn't subscribe to his criterion could say that science doesn't necessarily "explains". What does Tomas answer to that ? He answers : _"come on science explains things let's let's be real here"_ ... That's not an argument. I don't know why he goes on mentioning cell phones computers or COVID, those things can just as well vindicate his epistemic criterion as much as the anti-realist's epistemic criterion... And I wish theists would stop the derogatory smugness and uncontrolled laughs towards a position that is endorsed by 18% of philosophers according to the philpapers survey 2020. I have recently discovered the philosopher Lance S. Bush. I encourage Tomas and Cameron to read his work on realism vs anti-realism. Maybe it will bring back some humility in the discussion.
So the symmetry breaker between Extended Brute Foundationalism and Teleological Foundationalism is that one has no further explanations and the other one requires no further explanations - in other words because of special pleading and question begging those two Foundationalisms differ from each other? Got it.
You aaaalmost got it. The difference between the two views is that, on Extended Brute Foundationalism, we end the chain with something that calls out for explanation but lacks one. This results in the whole structure being unexplained, as per premise 2. On Teleological Foundationalism, we end the chain with something that doesn't call out for further explanation. (And that allows for scientific explanation to be possible.) That's an important difference, so this isn't special pleading. And I can't see how I'm begging any questions; the stopping points here seem obviously necessarily true, whereas laws of nature seem obviously contingent.
@@tbogardus1 Laws of nature or descriptions of nature are only contingent to the extent of the existence of those things, which are supposed to be described by those laws of nature. Besides that, does the chain on the Extended Brute Foundationalism end with something, that is in itself calling out for an explanation but supposedly lacks one OR does the chain on Extended Brute Foundationalism end in something, which is calling out for an explanation but lacks one not by itself but *by specifically you?* Same question for Teleological Foundationalism: Does the chain on the Teleological Foundationalism end with something, that is in itself not calling out for an explanation OR does the chain on Teleological Foundationalism end in something, which is not calling out for an explanation not by itself but *by specifically you?* I know, according to you what that "something" is supposed to be on the end of the chain on the Teleological Foundationalism - "goodness", I guess. And according to you what is that "something" supposed to be at the end of the chain on the Extended Brute Foundationalism? Is that supposed to be a "brain in a vat"? I can only be so close to understand your special pleading and question begging as close you are letting me be. ;)
@Zsolt Nagy On Extended Brute Foundationalism, explanations (of natural regularities) end with a fundamental law of nature. Laws of biology are explained in terms of laws of chemistry, those in terms of laws of physics, and that's the end of the chain, on this view And these fundamental laws of physics are contingent. Do I myself think they're contingent? Yes, of course, that's why I said so. But many others do as well, including many Naturalists. Maybe you do too? What else can we do but believe what seems true to us? That's hardly special pleading...
@@tbogardus1 Nah, I do not believe in such contingencies. The laws of physics are basically only dependent on the existence of time, space and matter, fields or energy and some interactions between those things, which things are supposed to be described by those laws of nature. And on what are supposed to be the unpersonal time, space, matter, fields and energy being dependent? On a personal timeless, spaceless, matterless, fieldless and energyless being/deity?!?
@@zsoltnagy5654 It sounds like you want to say the laws of physics are not contingent. But, at the same time, you say they depend on the existence of time, space, fields, etc. I think there's a tension there. Do you think those things had to exist, in exactly the way they do exist? If not, then, if they had not existed or had existed differently, wouldn't the laws of nature have been different, on your view?
I haven't had much time to reflect on it fully, but it seems to me the quote about physics turbo-charges (in a rather significant and vital way) the five arguments. That is the credibility and persuasive power of the argument is almost like lock and key, as in a kind of unique symbiosis. Perhaps Josh can clear up the confusion, but is there a distinction between naturalism as method and naturalism as worldview? Or perhaps there is a distinction between naturalism (naturalism is helpful) and a kind of reductive naturalism (as in everything has to fit)? I'm guessing their definitions are slightly different, but perhaps not.
Im not Thomas, but I can say that Yes. There is a difference. Naturalism as method and part of science, such as Materialism, got us to the moon and gave us amazing medicine and planes, and so on. Is a useful tool. If it is a philosophy, however, it means that you, a priori, rected all explanation or line of inquiry that falls outside it. That's the difference. Hope it helps
EXCELLENT, NOW FOR SOME HISTORIC SUPPORT. HOBBES MADE THIS ARGUMENT IN THE LEVIATHAN. 1.God is actually incomprehensible (EXAMPLE, our own consciousness) 2. We can experience things which are unexplainable. 3. Taking 1and 2 together we can have APRORI experience (such as Kant's SPACE and TIME, both of which we are conscious of yet remain incomprehensible and unexplainable). 3. HOBBES then says the attributes of God don't actually explain what we comprehend, but rather function as HONORIFICS, explaining what we experience as a consciousness of God, in the same way that we honor the apriories of space-time in laws of magnitude, which are descriptive. 4. We cannot KNOW God aposteriori unless GOD IS MAN. Displaying a SUFFICIENT God function. 5. This GOD FUNCTION would be creation ex nihilo and resurrection which are a MANIFOLD like space-time. 6. If a man could precisely predict his own resurrection by supernatural means he demonstrates the APRORI of ex nihilo creation if he accomplished act, because the foundation of our experience of space and time is the arrow of entropy. 7. If entropy is in question, so are the first and third laws of thermodynamics. DOES IT PROFIT any sufficient understanding to doubt any of the above? Hence Jesus is the LOGOS because the resurrection proves the REASON for his existence within himself. THEREFORE HE IS ENTITLED TO ALL HONORIFICS THAT we presuppose as attributes.
Wasn't God was already sentient? Why would he need to create meat-based sentience on top? Can we infer that an infinite number of sentient beings have been created?
I have read Tomas Bogardus' paper. If I summarize and simplify the article, Tomas proposes a certain definition of what a _"successful explanation"_ is, that is encompassed in his second premise : _"Any explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves no element that calls out for explanation but lacks one."_ He presents various theories of knowledge in which explanations can be embedded (foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism), he then spends the better part of the second half of the article arguing that none of those theories of knowledge meet his epistemic criterion for _"successful explanations"_ except one : teleological foundationalism. On page 7, he explains what he means by teleological foundationalism : _"Within Foundationalism, there are two possibilities. When the chain of scientific explanation of our natural regularity R terminates, the final scientific explanation features a final regularity - call it ‘Rf’ - that has no further scientific explanation. But we might ask whether this final natural regularity Rf - the natural regularity that must feature in the final scientific explanation of R, according to premise 1 - has any further explanation at all. Such an explanation of Rf might take the form of an Aristotelian ‘final cause’, in terms of the good, or perhaps a personal explanation in the tradition of Plato’s dēmiourgos, from the Timaeus, the Divine Craftsman, the ‘maker and father of the universe’ (Timaeus 28c, Cooper (1997), 1235). That is, following Aristotle, we may immediately explain Rf in terms of the good, as the Primum Mobile moves for love of the Prime Mover, itself the ultimate good. Or, following Plato, we may explain Rf in terms of the plans and intentions of a Divine Craftsman, which are then, ultimately, explained in terms of the good.21 So that’s one possibility, on Foundationalism: the final scientific explanation of our regularity, R, has no further scientific explanation, but the natural regularity featuring in that final scientific explanation of R - Rf - has a further explanation nonetheless. As this explanation is ultimately teleological, we’ll call this option ‘Teleological Foundationalism’."_ So what is the link with naturalism you might ask, well, the core of his article, and the part that I contend with here, is found in his fourth premise, which basically claims that naturalism precludes teleological foundationalism. You can find the defense of the fourth premise in the last paragraph on page 8 : _"Well, we’ve defined Naturalism as a positive attitude toward the sciences, together with - on the propositional side - a somewhat vague association of the austere metaphysics of, for example, Quine and Armstrong, and a broadly empiricist epistemology.24 Naturalists, as Plantinga put it, don’t believe in God, or anything at all like God. Though Naturalism is vague, it clearly seems to rule out a Platonic view on which a Divine Craftsman (very much like God) not only exists, but figures into the explanation of natural regularities. Plantinga also thought it ruled out Aristotle’s Prime Mover, the non-physical Noûs that lies beneath and explains the physical world, and this seems right to me.25 Naturalism also finds it hard to square knowledge of these sorts of teleological explanations with empiricism, and the widely alleged banishment of final causes during the Scientific Revolution attests to this. If that’s right, then Teleological Foundationalism - either of the Aristotelian or the Platonic variety - is not available for the Naturalist. This leaves, then, either Simple Brute Foundationalism, Extended Brute Foundationalism, Infinitism, or Coherentism. When it comes to explaining natural regularities, those patterns are the only possibilities available to the Naturalist._ Notice here what seems to be a completely unjustified presupposition of a sort of epistemic realism that Tomas seems to confirm in the video at 1:05:36 when he says : _"I think that explanations are kind of independent of our minds"_ . Notice in the first excerpt that Tomas is restricting what the teleological foundation can be, in particular, he forces the teleological foundationalist to take some sort of ontological commitment, but remember, teleology doesn't have to be "real". One does not need to fall prey to the Kantian transcendental illusion and postulate the "Prime Mover" of Aristotle, Plato’s dēmiourgos, a divine Craftsman or any kind of _"teleology in nature"_ to account for teleology in our epistemic practices. *Teleology can just be in our minds.* Our minds produce teleological criteria for epistemic virtues, and these criteria adjudicate whether something _"calls out for an explanation"_ or not. Tomas talks about _"Rf which are then, ultimately, explained in terms of the good"_ , but that _"good"_ doesn't have to be found anywhere else than in our minds ! If we consider, utilizing his example with the position of Mars, one who takes it to be _"good"_ that one be able to predict the position of Mars (an instrumentalist, pragmatic take on science), then any explanation that is sufficiently accurate to predict the position of Mars to one's satisfaction would then meet the epistemic criterion of being _"good"_ , and therefore that explanation would NOT be _"calling out for an explanation"_ , and this would be consistent with naturalism (and science), refuting the 4th premise of his argument. The teleological foundation in this case, the criterion of _"good"_ , would simply be a personal preference of the individual. There is no necessity to be a realist about the teleology that we see in nature, or that we use in our epistemic practices. At page 3 Tomas writes : "Indeed, ultimately, teleology explains all natural phenomena" Indeed ! And teleology can be in our minds. Contrary to what Tomas claims : _"Naturalism also finds it hard to square knowledge of these sorts of teleological explanations with empiricism, and the widely alleged banishment of final causes during the Scientific Revolution attests to this."_ . Final causes were _"banished"_ not because they were teleological, they were _"banished"_ because they are perfect examples of transcendental illusions : the extrapolation of the maxims of human understanding to things in themselves. Naturalism has no problem squaring teleological criteria with empiricism... that's called instrumentalism... So here's why I think his argument fails : teleology in epistemology is consistent with naturalism (pragmatism, instrumentalism), and doesn't entail any sort of ontological commitment to anything that ressembles god contrary to what Tomas claims. 1:23:19 "I think that's an interesting irony and interesting turn of events in this dialectic because usually it's the naturalist who is the champion of science and marching under the banner of science, so it would be quite a surprising turn of events if the naturalist says : you know what nevermind [proceeds to laugh] science doesn't explain anything after all" Isn't he missing the point here ? If one defines explanations as required to give understanding, then a pragmatist would say that science doesn't explain anything, because for him, an explanation doesn't need to give understanding, it just needs to provide utility (however he defines it). As an example, I don't need to be given an _"understanding"_ of how/why my smartphone works in order to be given a _"successful explanation"_ on how to use it. In a similar fashion, I don't need to be given an _"understanding"_ of how/why Mars orbits the sun in orde to be given a _"successful explanation"_ that allows me to predict its position in the future.
Very detailed and thoughtful reply. I have not read his article. I hope to hear a rebuttal and I think your comments warrant it. I found your comments interesting. Thank you
Thanks for your thoughtful comment. I'm not yet quite understanding this objection, though. Which premise would you say you're challenging, exactly? Each premise/assumption in my argument has the form of a conditional, so it should be easy to phrase your objection in the form of a counterexample. Which premise are you challenging, and what, exactly, is the counterexample you're proposing?
@@tbogardus1 I challenge the fourth premise. In your defense of that premise on page 8, you say : _"Teleological Foundationalism - either of the Aristotelian or the Platonic variety - is not available for the Naturalist. This leaves, then, either Simple Brute Foundationalism, Extended Brute Foundationalism, Infinitism, or Coherentism. When it comes to explaining natural regularities, those patterns are the only possibilities available to the Naturalist."_ This is specifically what I challenge. And my contention is that naturalism can indeed have teleological foundationalism, because, contrary to what you seem to claim in your article, teleological foundationalism isn't restricted to the _"Aristotelian or the Platonic variety"_ . Typically, a pragmatic theory of truth applied to science, which is instrumentalism, is precisely a teleological foundationalism in naturalism. Quoting from Wikipedia on instrumentalism : "the worth of an idea is based on how effective it is in explaining and predicting phenomena", that's a _telos_ ... The predictive power is _"the good"_ ... The "effectiveness" is the teleological foundation. Teleology in epistemology is consistent with naturalism, it's called instrumentalism. Aristotle and Plato were realists. But obviously one doesn't need to be a realist. In particular, one doesn't need to be a realist regarding the telos. In naturalism, the telos is not real, it is not stance-independent, it is not mind-independent. The telos is just one's personal preference. I have read your answers in the other comment threads, and you seem to be providing a defense of teleological foundationalism through an appeal to free will (that I haven't found in your article), if you accept that free will be a _"successful explanation"_ , meaning, following your second premise, that it doesn't call for further explanation, then surely you would agree that individual free will is a _"successful explanation"_ too. Therefore any naturalist who takes his own free choice as a teleological foundation would, in your own schema, have a _"successful explanation"_ . Therefore your fourth premise is false.
@MrGustave1er The fourth premise says: If naturalism is true, then every natural regularity calls out for explanation but lacks one. You seem to be suggesting this counterexample: Suppose Naturalism is true, and some fundamental regularity calls out for explanation. Possibly: it doesn't have an explanation in terms of a more fundamental regularity, but it *does* have an explanation. In terms of... something about our minds? But how will some fact about our minds explain why this fundamental law of nature is the way that it is? How did *we* make that happen? Surely that law was around long before we came on the scene, no? So, then, how did *we* make it to be how it is?
@@tbogardus1 *-"Possibly: it doesn't have an explanation in terms of a more fundamental regularity, but it does have an explanation. In terms of... something about our minds?"* Not exactly, that's another claim that you make in your paper regarding your adaptation of Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument, leading to your position that _"explanation 'drain away'"_ that I take issue with. But that would be another topic so let's leave that out for now. In the conclusion of your article, you write : _"For notice that, when it comes to so-called ‘personal’ explanations, which are as familiar and common as the air we breathe, it seems perfectly satisfactory to end an explanation with a necessary truth about the good. For example, I wrote this article in order to better know important truths, and I aim to know important truths because it’s good to do so. If, at the bottom of everything, reality is teleological, intentional, goal-oriented, then we should not be surprised to find a similar pattern of explanation underlying all natural phenomena. I believe that Aristotle and Plato were right: this is indeed what we do find. Without it, scientific explanation is impossible."_ Notice here what you are doing. You start by giving a personal, arguably mind-dependent example of a _"necessary truth about the good"_ (your desire to know important truths through the writing of the article), and then you extrapolate that to the _"bottom of everything"_ , _"reality"_ ... This is a textbook example of what Kant calls the transcendental illusion. Why do you do that ? Why do you bring your own telos, your mind-dependent personal preferences, to the things-in-themselves ? To the outside world ? To reality itself ? The fact that you think it is _"good to know important truths"_ doesn't necessitate that that be a mind-independent generalizable law... It can just as well be nothing more than your own personal preference. My suggestion to you is to drop the transcendental illusion and to stop at your first example, you give the example of writing this article _"in order to..."_ , that's it right there, doing something _"in order to"_ , doing something because of its utility, utility that is adjudicated by you and you alone (and nothing independent of your mind) is precisely what pragmatism is all about. This is perfectly consistent with science from within naturalism, and it is called instrumentalism. In your example of writing the article, the telos : _"to better know important truths"_ is _"the good"_ (it is _"good to do so"_ ), and in this case, there is no reason to postulate that that good is independent of your mind. There is no necessity to restrict teleological foundationalism to the sort of realism defended by Aristotle and Plato. If you accept that _"the good"_ is _"obvious in itself"_ , _"needs no further explanation"_ or _"self-explanatory"_ then that is also the case for an anti-real _"good"_ , a stance-dependent, mind-dependent _"good"_ , and that is the definition of instrumentalism : science doesn't necessarily "give understanding", science is, fundamentally, an epistemic practice whose purpose is to give us predictive power (the telos), the "understanding" that you point at in the video is just a possible happy byproduct, that arguably isn't always present : Feynman famously said that the predictive models in quantum mechanics are not understandable : "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics." Richard Feynman. And yet, they have predictive power. Like I said in my OP, I don't need to _"understand"_ why Mars is in orbit around the sun to have a _"successful explanation"_ that allows me to predict its position in the future (the telos). _"to paraphrase Socrates again, ‘it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything’."_ Yes, and it can be my mind, your mind, our minds. *-"But how will some fact about our minds explain why this fundamental law of nature is the way that it is?"* An anti-realist would say that the laws of nature are not real. So the laws of nature are the way they are precisely because they were invented by us, by our minds. If you want to talk, instead, about the regularities in nature, then it's the same, your question uses the verb _"to explain"_ , to explain is epistemology, and the entire epistemic endeavor that drove us to describe these laws (science) is predicated on a fundamental (or foundational) telos : our personal desire for predictive power (instrumentalism), therefore at the bottom of our knowledge of the regularities in nature, there is the telos, our personal preferences and desires, no need for any appeal to the kind of realism defended by Plato or Aristotle, no need for any ontological commitment about a final cause or a demiourgos, the only ontological commitment required in instrumentalism, is my own phenomenological experience. *-"Surely that law was around long before we came on the scene, no?"* Obviously an anti-realist would reject that. If laws are invented by us, then obviously no law was _"around before we came on the scene"_ .
It seems to me that the crux of the scientific enterprise is utilizing one phenomenon to explain another. For sake of discussion I'll call this scheme "PXP." For example, we explain the phenomenon of oceanic tides with the phenomenon of the Moon's gravitational pull on the Earth. Here, I would agree with Bogardus in that unless PXP terminates in some regularity (a phenomenon that appears constant), then we really haven't arrived at a proper (intellectually satisfying) explanation. Using the example I provided, on PXP we find that explaining the Moon's gravitational pull can only be explained by appealing to a regularity - in this case gravity. The question here is whether or not gravity itself cries out for explanation... and this I suspect is where Bogardus will probably find the most dispute, depending on whatever view of Naturalism is being offered or whether or not you think some regularity is contingent or not.
I am left with a big doubt, in his article Tomas says that science has often been successful in its explanations. What successful scientific explanation can he give as an example that fulfills the requirements he puts in his article? The premise 2 leaves me doubts because in his article he gives as an example the thesis that a giant stationary turtle holds the earth stationary, and says that it is a general example, of explanation to a phenomenon that asks for explanation and that is not successful for not having explanation in itself, but in reality it is not a general example, because that example has the particularity of imitating the effect that it pretends to explain, it is a duplication of phenomena more than the presentation of a cause or explanation for an effect in my opinion. I clarify that I am not a naturalist but I like to be very clear about the arguments of each side.
Hi Pablo. You ask, "What successful scientific explanation can he give as an example that fulfills the requirements he puts in his article?" I think science has explained a lot. I'd be happy with virtually any commonly-held example of something science has explained. Maybe, for example, how some sicknesses are caused by viruses, bacteria, and so on. If you ask *me* how this example fulfills the requirements I put forward in my article, I'm going to tell you about "Teleological Foundationalism," which I endorse. Ultimately, in this chain of deeper explanation, we'll end with something that does *not* call out for explanation while lacking one.
@@tbogardus1 Ok, under teleological foundationalism the requirements you state in the article will be met. But you say in the abstract that you think science has usually been successful, do you mean that it is successful on the basis of teleological foundationalism? I don't know of any theory or explanation that is currently proposed based on it. If you don't mean that then it is not currently successful in the sense your article states.
@@Pabloblob1 You asked, "But you say in the abstract that you think science has usually been successful, do you mean that it is successful on the basis of teleological foundationalism?" Yes, I think successful scientific explanation requires that teleological foundationalism be true. You say, "I don't know of any theory or explanation that is currently proposed based on it." Well, my claim isn't that a proposed scientific explanation can be successful only if the person proposing it *believes* teleological foundationalism. I claim only that successful scientific explanation requires that teleological foundationalism be *true*.
@@tbogardus1 Thank you for your response. But it is not clear to me whether you understand or doubt, the point is that if you say that science has been successful in the terms you demand in your article, and now you tell me that it will only be successful if teleological foundationalism is true, it seems to be presupposing then that it is. To someone not committed to that position then it will not seem self-evident that it will usually be "successful" in the terms demanded in your article, and then the rejection of naturalism would not follow for those who are content with the current state of science that does not necessarily speak of teleology. It does follow if we demand your premise 1 and 2 for its success, but not if we assume that current science as we know it , (in the absence of knowledge whether foundationalism is true or not) is successful as well.
This all discussion lies on a premise that "any explanation is better than no explanation". Which I personally think is very bad. For example in the "sneeze law" if you explained kindly that "people do that because when you sneeze your soul leaves your body for a split second leaving it exposed to demonic influence, we therefore use this exorcism to counteract that". This would be an explanation. But it would be actually be worse than "that's just what we do". Or even better "I don't know."
J(Ag): 11 minutes in. The only thing I disagree with (or unsure of) is 4. I don’t see why we couldn’t conclude that they are necessary. In the precise way that they are, there is no explanation. They just are as they are because it had to be something. Plus, there are those constants that are often brought up in the fine-tuning argument, which is why that thought occurs. Why not say the “generality” of the law exists necessarily, and the precise measurements of those laws exist because they had to collapse into something.
J(T): If the laws of physics are just generally there out of necessity, then would need to have further explanation for why they're at the strength that they are. In the fine tuning argument, we acknowledge that there is wiggle room. The value being if it were 10^(-60) higher or lower for the gravitational constant. Anything in that interval is possible for gravity to work. Why it is that it ended up as those values, and not some other? How could necessity of those forces bring about those constants?
J(Ag): In order to answer this we'd need to understand the universe. How did things begin? Why did things begin? Why is there something rather than nothing? Every law that we see is all coexistent, maybe they came in all at once, or maybe they came in one at time as the big bang happened. If it came in all at once, then maybe the constants we see are necessary as they could never have been different due to the deterministic nature of the laws of our universe. I don't think they could've come in all at once since that would suggest that things can come out of nothing. It must've began to exist when time began to exist. Or if time didn't begin, then it must've existed forever with time.
J(T): That wouldn't explain why they are those values. So they come in at the same time, there's not really a driver for what would make those values occur instead of others. Consider the case of God. God is a whole being who is conscious. He decides on what is to be formed because there's a goal in mind. That goal is achieved through creation. He may have parts but those parts would be the necessary bits for him to be able to create and form everything. He's also infinite so there's no needed explanation for the power level that he has.
J(Ag): I'm not sure if that is true, about the no need for explanation for the level of power he has. It's still level of power. One would also wonder how he even has such power. How could it be possible to have infinite power? And why infinite rather than something finite? It wouldn't be accurate to say that it doesn't need to be explained since if there's a need at all then there's still a need. There is no more or less important and have it be more truthful than the other. it's still "calling out" for explanation. God, or the conscious being we call God, there's no driver for why he needed to have infinite power. He could've been just a conscious mind roaming some empty void. Nothing to create. I don't see why God would be better than naturalism here.
Is there supposed to be a FINITE regress of natural laws before God? So the natural law right before God is completely arbitrary? Why isn't my mind just inside God's mind without a chain of laws? A chain of natural laws of some arbitrary length is not elegant.
This is a safe tack to take if one wants to maintain the illusion that there is reason to posit the supernatural and that positing it is informative or useful. Because no matter what the scientist discovers about anything, the question 'why?' will always be there. Ten thousand years from now, they may have discovered the multiverse, what caused the big bang, precisely why the constants are as they are and how the universe will evolve and end and someone can always ask 'why?' And any response that is candid and without certainty, will be viewed as an admission that we don't rrrreeeeeaaaaalllllllyyyyy know why. And this is proven by when all is said and done, the last resort is to say unless agency is involved there can never be a why. Which is true. I have always taken science to explain how, not why. Science is not interested in why, but does talk about purpose...NOT as in agency, but in function. The leaf of a plant, among other things, serves the purpose of converting sunlight to food. Science can't really tell you why a plant converts energy from the sun.
The question “why?” Is definitely overrated. The simple fact is that a god could show itself anytime. It doesn’t, so there is nothing compelling a search. It is the greatest game of hide and seek ever. In the book of Genesis, god walked with Adam and Eve. We assume it wanted a relationship with man based on this story. It doesn’t. Nothing prevents it from showing itself. Showing itself wouldn’t be miraculous, but people believing in a god that doesn’t show itself (not supposed “clues” of itself), now THAT is miraculous to believe. Superstition anyone?
@@singwithpowerinfo5815 Which leads to the second conclusion...belief that God exists seems pretty much academic. The hiddeness of God looks a lot like nonexistence, so unless there is more reliable info about what God is, what God wants, we may be as well off...or even better off living our lives as if God doesn't exist. It seems for all the world like he doesn't want to get involved or be bothered so...leave him be would be my motto.
@@singwithpowerinfo5815 Hey Sing, Thanks for the comment, On your first point: "why" is the central question and ambition of science. Seeking an answer to various "why's" is the entire point of doing science! You cannot defend science (of any stripe) by dismissing the enterprise that science is concerned with! This would be like trying to defend the existence of dictionaries by arguing that definitions are overrated! On the point of divine hiddenness.... I would first point out that this is a total red herring. It does not at all defend the possibility of scientific explanation on naturalism. That said, like many red herrings, it is a point that does deserve attention all on its own. That said, there are answers to this question. In my view the reason for divine hiddenness has to do with creating a morally meaningful environment for humans to live in. If God showed himself to everyone then humans would not do what was right because it was right, but rather just to avoid punishment. Also people often argue that if belief/faith is the goal, then God should reveal himself, but faith (at least on my view) is only morally significant or indeed relevant, if we have the ability to "suppress" our knowledge of God and not believe. Belief as such is irrelevant and meaningless, it is belief in a context where we are capable of disbelief that is morally meaningful. As for belief in God being a superstition, that would depend upon what evidence we have of it. If our evidence of God is really good then belief in God is not superstition. Yet the current argument that you appear to be rejecting is purported to be such evidence (as at the very beginning of the video Bogardus invites us to run the modus tollens on (5)). That makes your accusation of superstition circular. You reject evidence for God on the basis of belief in God being a superstition, all the while the only reason to take belief in God to be a superstition is that it lacks evidence. At any rate, thanks again, R
The platonic form or morphe of an explanation. HOBBES argues similarly concerning SUBSTANCE. Under-standing =sub-stance. The sub-stance of an understanding is a redundancy. Anyway this is why HOBBES calls God a substance and pokes fun at language such incorporeal bodies. It's actually a form of the ontological argument that knowledge is a substance and a being and taking all knowledge as the set OMNISCIENCE which must exist whether we know it or not.
Just watched a tiny amount. I looked forward to viewing all of the video. For me as an atheist in the south the anti-scientific views of fellow Christians at the time were vastly disheartening. Their viewpoints generated the first step in my deconstruction. I have a college degree. Not at any level of education in the south was I taught some basic pillars of science. This shadow ban still is an issue of frustration. I don’t think videos of apologists accurately reflect what’s happening in rural communities. They sugar coat the rejection of basic science.
I made a statement of a shadow ban. Here is an example. In 7th grade biology the textbook had a chapter on evolution. We skipped the chapter. To this day, this slight is frustrating. I remember being enthralled by the graphics and very excited to learn. Then we skipped the chapter. My town has the largest religious college in the state. The college is Church of Christ, very fundamental. I would love to get my hands on their textbooks So when I see videos about Christianity and science. It’s as if the creators of the videos are living in a fantasy land and not addressing real issues.
Can I suggest you to avoid considering southern evangelicals as a paradigm of the whole Christianity? I get it can be frustrating, but it's like pretending that all christians are Amish.
@@AWalkOnDirt Man, that sucks. And it’s sad because there’s no need to avoid that discussion whether they are Christian or not. But clearly that left a mark. Well, you needn’t leave that exploration as it was in 7th grade. Your teachers clearly weren’t confident or educated. The good news is you didn’t miss much … that level would surely have been superficial regardless of which worldview you end up in I know Christian geneticists and the head of the National DNA project is also a Christian. Materialism indeed is the dominant view among those who favor the validity of Darwinism. But it is clearly not all by any means and the data is interpreted largely by the world view they start with. Check out a statement called “Dissent from Darwinism” (I think that’s the name): signed by hundreds of PHD scientists who affirm (paraphrase) ‘we doubt the ability of descent from a common ancestor by random mutation and natural selection to account for biological reality as we know it’. Again that’s paraphrased. MD’s weren’t allowed to sign. And many more scientists surely would or would have (I know PHD geneticists who concur but haven’t signed it) Also explore the story of Dean Kenyon, former professor of biochemistry at USF who for years had the leading textbook on “Biochemical Predestination” which takes that theory back to where it would have to start… at the beginning…. And he was forced to change his view 180 degrees. You can also check out Dr Johnathan Wells who dispels with many Darwinism myths (though he DOES acknowledge a connection between humans and apes). Also Michael Behe (a molecular biologist) and Stephen Myer who explores the questions of the need to account for “origin of information” and “Cambrian explosion” (though he’s not a lab scientist, but he’s educated and bright PHD). Even the evolutionist Stephen J Gould (an atheist) had to seek alternate explanations that Darwinism can’t account for which is why he dabbled with a concept called punctuated equilibrium … reality is very different than the “slow gradual process” required by Darwin’s theory. Darwin never knew the nanotech machinery in cells, nor the amazing DNA computer like code language and info processing systems. Dive in. As a theist and a follower of Yeshua (as well as a scientist myself)… it’s sad that uneducated Christian’s are swayed. And then you can explore what many cosmologists have to say (not related to Darwin of course). Sorry your 7th grade experience was like that. But you needn’t stop there. I only need ruined a few of countless more scientific perspectives I could share. Good luck with your search. Don’t give up. It’s worth it. And never forget, followers of Jesus are no better and can often be “worse” people than non-believers by many criteria… but that isn’t what determines truth More than evolution, may I offer this for consideration: central is the question of needing to account for the historical figure we know as Jesus of Nazareth… who did He claim and show Himself to be… and did He really rise from the dead or not. That is central. If Jesus did NOT rise from the dead, the debating Darwinian theory is interesting but hardly if much lasting significance. God bless you and yours in your Journey.
Before watching: I suspect a lot of assertion without such having a shred of substantiation in what would seem to be something to undermine science given that God claims insofar as various scriptural depictions are failures with regard to what is understood via science. (Comment to be edited after watching.)
Right off the start I need to say that this argument belongs in a class of quasi-presuppositionalist arguments alongside Craig's argument from math. There are two objectionable premises in this argument. 4 is suspect and 2 is just ridiculous. Let's have some fun! "Premise 1 is the least controversial premise." It is the only good idea contained in both this video and this paper. Premise 2) This is the one that seems to be doing all the work in this argument. This premise had me rolling on the floor because I don't think Dr. Bogardus recognizes what he's committed himself to. He is forced to believe that we have made zero scientific progress just because there are certain open problems in science. I would start my own argument by adopting a very modest principle: a sufficient explanation is a successful explanation. Now, let's see an example of a sufficient explanation. Suppose that we have found some gene X that, when expressed in some location, activates a pathway that results in some phenotype P. There are countless examples of these. We find the gene, and when we express it in a different location, we find that it causes that pathway in the different location. This means that X is sufficient to induce P. The presence of X explains why we see P. Of course, if we're talking about genes, it makes perfect senes to ask where did X come from (as an example), but any facts about the history of X aren't doing any work to explain P. Obviously, the evolutionary history of X will explain X's function, but this is a tangential discussion because regardless of what may explain X having the functions that it does, it is the case that X is sufficient for P. They contextualize the whole system, sure, but once we find that X is a sufficient explanation for P, then by my principle we are successful. We could have zero knowledge whatsoever of X's history, and X would still be sufficient for P. If there are abnormalities about P, abnormalities about X serve as a potential explanation. That is a successful explanation of P. Biology is full of cases like these. You have some genes which function to produce some phenotype, and the presence of that gene (and possibly some GxE or GxG interactions) explain your phenotype. Then, we ask questions about where the gene comes from or what else it does. Without loss of generality, you can apply this reasoning to cases in any other field of science where a sufficient explanation for some phenomena opens up more unanswered questions. The original explanation is still successful. Dr. Bogardus' principle commits you to the idea that science has made no progress as I've said earlier. If explanations of phenomena in science call out for further explanation, and that lack of further explanation leaves us in a position where we don't understand the phenomenon in question, then in what sense have we made any scientific progress? If there are all these "explanations" of phenomena, like general relativity explaining the perihelion shift of Mercury, and yet general relativity "calls out for an explanation" which then "calls out for an explanation" which... lacks an explanation, then, assuming Bogardus' principle, we haven't actually made any progress in explaining the perihelion shift of Mercury. Yet we understand perihelion shift well enough to predict it in bodies orbiting close to black holes, which we have then found. At this point, just Moorean shift. Premise 4) This premise is less ridiculous but it will all boil down to competing views and intuitions. Theists think that laws have explanations, naturalists don't. I like Tim Maudlin's account of natural laws, which Dr. Bogardus brings up in his paper: the "fundamental laws of temporal evolution" are primitive and ground explanation and causation. I don't know how the things that ground explanations can require further explanations themselves. I also don't know how primitive things demand explanations and last I checked, they don't. Just because they may intuitively "call out for explanation" it doesn't mean that they have one. Anyone can string words together to form a question, but that doesn't mean the question has an answer. Regardless of that, there are even bigger problems for a teleological explanation in the vein that Bogardus wants to portray them. Explanations on his view are going to terminate in some necessary facts. But there are two problems here: 1) Saying "it's necessary" may force the buck to stop, but I don't see how necessity isn't the same as bruteness. In both cases, you have some not further explained element of a chain of explanations. 2) Necessary facts can't explain contingent facts. Remember that one of the questions that this argument is ultimately asking is "what explains the regularities of nature, given that they could have been otherwise." There's a collection of possible worlds, one of which is actual, each with a collection of natural regularities in need of explanations, right? But that's all going to terminate in a necessary fact which is true in all worlds, and then it's just necessarily the case that we have the natural regularities that we have. If you want to explain a difference in the natural regularities, then you're going to have to appeal to a difference in the ultimate explanation, in this case the teleological explanation. But that explanation is necessary, so there are no differences in the teleological explanation. Modal collapse. Ouch.
Thanks for these thoughts, and for reading the paper. About premise 2, you say it entails that "we have made zero scientific progress just because there are certain open problems in science." But, as you may have noticed in the paper (see endnote 15), when I say that something lacks an explanation, I don’t mean merely that we don’t *know* what the explanation for this element would be, or that it’s not available to us, or some such constraint on our epistemic access to an explanation. I mean that there is literally no explanation to be had. We talk about this in the video as well, when Cameron brings up a possible counterexample involving murder. So, no, the fact that there are "open problems in science"--i.e. phenomena for which we don't *know* the explanation--does not trigger premise 2 to entail that we've made no scientific progress. So, I plead 'not guilty' to this accusation. And, since you say "this is the [premise] that seems to be doing all the work in the argument," I guess it's still available to do all that work, and therefore the argument should be successful, by your own lights. (high five) About premise 4, you say you like Maudlin's primitivism about laws of nature. And, you say: "I also don't know how primitive things demand explanations and last I checked, they don't." To say that something is primitive is to say that it has no further explanation, no further analysis. But this is different from saying that it doesn't demand one, or call out for one. Suppose we're confronted by something truly mysterious: an anonymous ransom note or something. This seems to call out for explanation, no? But suppose I propose a theory on which this note is primitive, brute, and has no further explanation. Does this proposal of mine suddenly mean the note doesn't demand further explanation? Not at all. I think it just means I've proposed a bad theory. And that's what I'd say about a theory which says that the laws of nature have no further explanation. On this same topic, you say, "Just because they may intuitively 'call out for explanation' it doesn't mean that they have one." But I agree. I think you might be interested in endnote 16 of my paper, where I say this: "it’s consistent with our second premise that explanations commonly, even always, fail. If we lived in a world in which any proposed explanation crucially involved some element that called out for explanation but lacked one, the right thing to conclude, I would say, is that we live in a world in which, ultimately, nothing could be explained. We would live in a deeply and irredeemably mysterious world. As unsavory as that sounds, it is possible. In fact, I will argue, a committed Naturalist must accept that we actually inhabit such a deeply and irredeemably mysterious world, a world impervious to scientific investigation." About teleological foundationalism, you say: "I don't see how necessity isn't the same as bruteness." Well, if "bruteness" just means "has no further explanation," then the sort of necessary moral truths I pointed to as acceptable stopping points in the chain of explanation are brute. But the difference between teleological foundationalism and brute foundationalism is that, on the former, the stopping points don't call out for further explanation (because they're obviously necessary truths), while, on the latter, on brute foundationalism, the stopping points clearly DO call out for further explanation. Which means they're not going to allow for successful scientific explanation. That's the problem for the Naturalist. Finally, you say: "Necessary facts can't explain contingent facts." Well, in the case of a Platonic sort of teleological foundationalism, these necessary moral truths would serve to rationalize--and thereby explain--the free, contingent actions of a Divine Craftsman. So, yes, I guess I disagree that necessary facts can't explain contingent facts. Some necessary truths can rationalize--and thereby explain--the free choices of agents. They can be the truths in light of which one acts, and therefore explain why one acted in that way. Thanks again for the thoughtful comments.
@@tbogardus1 I don't know why I imagine Oppy saying, well, the universe is necessary (no further explanation needed, no brute facts, no infinitism) and the laws are just descriptions of what this universe is like.
*-"assuming Bogardus' principle, we haven't actually made any progress in explaining the perihelion shift of Mercury. Yet we understand perihelion shift well enough to predict it in bodies orbiting close to black holes, which we have then found."* Yes but be careful here. Notice that you say *"to predict..."* , but this is not the epistemic criterion that Tomas advocates for. An instrumentalist about science would agree with you that the entire purpose of science is to provide utility in the form of predictive power, but that take on science is not accepted by all. Furthermore, If you've read his paper, you saw that he advocates for a teleological foundationalist theory of knowledge, that would account for scientific progress in his worldview. I guess he would say that scientists are wrong to be naturalists, but that their failure to recognize the real reason why their scientific investigations are fruitful doesn't prevent them to actually investigate fruitfully. (This is the answer I got from Jay Dyer in my debate with him).
@@tbogardus1 (Made edits for some typos, so sorry!) Thanks for the thoughtful response. It means a lot. I think we know who Cameron is rooting for. Lol. Anyways, I probably didn't do a very good job explaining myself. I promise I do understand what you mean when you say a natural regularity lacks an explanation. My example with gene X and phenotype P was trying to illustrate that you don't need to demand anything else. If some fact is a sufficient explanation for some phenomena, then you should declare yourself victorious. I don't see how we would be losing any understanding of any phenomena in question if the explanation is ultimately brute. Just as a tame example: suppose there was no further explanation for gene X, so we're unsatisfied when we ask why X (rather than...). We would still, on the basis of our understanding of X's sufficiency P, be able to make a prediction about whether or not it is necessary for P. We would still be able to infer it as the culprit in some genetic disease if it looks like it's related to phenotype P. We would still be able to make predictions about what we would observe if it was ectopically expressed. Without loss of generality, run that line of reasoning with any phenomena and any natural regularity that sufficiently explains it. Premise 2 is saying that the entire endeavor of science fails if, at rock bottom, there are some natural regularities that don't have any further explanation. I am saying that this is wrong and that, supposing that there are some natural regularities that are not explained, that "deficiency" does not impede our understanding of reality. So with all of that said, I would just Moorean Shift. The talk of bruteness is going to tie into what I have to say about necessity, but I'll take things one thing at a time. As for your ransom note here, there doesn't seem to be an analogy. I'm not saying that it is fair game to pick any being and say "it's brute" and be done with it. Based on experience, we find that ransom notes are the kinds of things that have explanations. People write them, and people's motives explain why they write them. But we don't have that same experience with fundamental laws of temporal evolution, to use Maudlin's language. So whatever principle, whether it be a weak PSR or whatever, that you are using to suppose that laws call out for explanations, seems suspect. Positing a theory that has fundamental laws of temporal evolution not having an explanation seems almost completely innocuous given that they are nothing like the things that we typically associate with having explanations. As for you endnote, every internally consistent worldview is going to posit something mysterious or brute since necessity causes so many problems. Whatever bullets I have to bite by saying that laws of nature are unexplained are far more savory than positing that a necessary foundation caused contingent reality. That is like trying to explain experimental results by appealing to control variables. It is literally incoherent. Just as fundamental to scientific explanation as laws is the idea that differences in states of affairs are explained by differences in the systems that produce them. I see a difference in the Kd of my protein because I replaced isoleucine with tyrosine. I see a difference in gene expression in two domains because of the presence of some transcription factors which act as repressors in one of the domains. But there are no such differences that you could even appeal to in a necessary foundation. I think we would have a much greater mystery on our hands if we started seeing wildly different outcomes without any differences in experimental treatments. That is effectively what theism does. I would argue that a committed theist is forced to admit that whatever mysterious world a naturalist lives in, the one they live in is orders of magnitude more mysterious. And finally, "in the case of a platonic sort of teleological foundationalism, these necessary moral truths would serve to rationalize--and thereby explain--the free, contingent actions of a Divine Craftsman." I would question whether the actions of the "Divine Craftsman" actually were contingent. There are uncountably infinitely many configurations of natural regularities which would yield a universe with sentient life. If naturalism has to explain why one configuration and not others, then theism has to as well. For any chain of natural regularities C, how do necessary moral facts explain C1 obtaining over C2? In any world where either C1 or C2 obtain, those necessary moral truths would be the same. If God is supposed to deliberate on those reasons, in what sense do those necessary moral truths motivate God to choose to instantiate C1 when C2 would accomplish God's ends as well? The controls don't explain the differences in outcomes. So there has to be some difference in God which explains the difference in outcome. Now I get to ask what explains that difference in God. Can't be something necessary, or else you're right back where you started. It's going to end up being brute, yet you've stipulated that explanations which call out for explanations while lacking them are unsuccessful. Thank you, again, as well. Hope you've had a good Thursday. (And again, sorry for the typos!)
@@Tommy01_XO Thanks again for the reply. It's helping me think through these difficult issues. You said, "There are uncountably infinitely many configurations of natural regularities which would yield a universe with sentient life. If naturalism has to explain why one configuration and not others, then theism has to as well... there has to be some difference in God which explains the difference in outcome." Well, maybe it's like this. I could have chosen toast or granola for breakfast. Both are good, let's say. I reflected on the reasons in favor of each, and I chose granola. For those reasons. Is there anything left to explain? I don't think so. In a similar way, God could have chosen any of very many configurations of natural laws that would yield a life-permitting universe. All are good, let's say. God reflects on the reasons in favor of each, and God chooses this configuration we observe. For those reasons. Is there anything left to explain? I don't think so... So it seems to me agent causation has an advantage of Naturalism here.
At the end, “Why is sentient life good,” is indeed a valid question, and I think it was kind of dismissed. What measure or level of sentience are we considering? What kind of life are we considering? Science has its definitions of life, but Christians believe that life goes beyond the natural body. How are we defining and measuring good? I think if one were to flesh out those details, it may not be quite as self-evident that sentient life is good as the presenter makes it out to be.
@@tbogardus1 in a colloquial sense perhaps, but in reality science can never rule out some potentially better explanation, we cannot say due to science we've now determined viruses cause sickness and the door is closed to any future research to say otherwise. Just one reason for this stems from the problems posed by "affirmation of the consequent".
@@benjaminschooley3108 If you think science has explained anything, then you grant that premise in my argument. It sounds like you might be denying that, though. And it sounds like you're reasoning this way: Science can't deliver certainty of anything. Every scientific claim may be revised in light of future data. Therefore, no proposed scientific explanation is, strictly speaking, successful. But why think successful explanation requires that anyone be certain of the explanation? Suppose it's *true* that some diseases are caused by viruses, and that scientific investigation has disclosed this to us. Isn't that a successful explanation, even if *we* can't be *certain* that it's true?
But who gets to say when a claim is evident in itself? Surely one cannot, with any validity, simply assert that some unknown and unexplored AND UNEXPLORABLE thing is 'evident in itself.' If one can, then the naturalist can simply assert that something, some arrangement, some realm of or in the natural world is the explanation for the natural world. I mean the supernaturalist is claiming with no more basis that the 'supernatural' world is the explanation for the supernatural world ie an explanation for itself AND the natural world.
@@rizdekd3912 Exactly, this is just a very convoluted way of establishing that some things are assumed. I don't think the idea in any way helps us determine what is and is not valid to be accepted by assumption.
@@SojournerDidimus And it sure doesn't get to the question of why, which is what Dr Guth was asking. As far as I can tell, Dr Bogardus took Guth's comment...his lament at the state of science today or perhaps the limitations of humans doing science... and misinterpreted it. I won't say he did it intentionally, because I think Dr Bogardus really thinks that positing a different reality IS telling him why. But I doubt Dr Guth is going to be impressed or feel he has learned anything more or found a 'real' explanation by answering his question as Dr Bogardus proposes. And Dr Guth MAY even be a theist and believe in God. But that still leaves him with the question of why the world is the way it is...why this constant is as or what exactly happened as the universe emerged and expanded. IOW, positing a supernature doesn't answer why, no matter how long one's argument is.
@@rizdekd3912 I don't even think it is much different for the natural. You can simply always keep asking "why?" until the explainer gives up, Bogardus just formulated a very convoluted way of saying that it makes no sense to keep asking that. But isn't that still unsatisfactory in the mind of the questioner?
Sorry, you just lost me in that. You just end up with the brain in the jar thought experiment. and when you reach it you have two option, either you are in it and nothing matters, or you aren't and you should expect internal consistency, if there's internal consistency you should expect some form of regularity.
Is COVID not caused by a virus? Is it caused by... miasma? 🙂 I'm definitely not on the Fauci train, but I thought it was pretty well established that a virus was causing COVID. No?
It's pretty easy to dismiss the whole argument noticing that premise 2 is completely absurd. That premise ignores how gaining knowledge about the world is a progressive quest and asks for a virtually impossible scenario where we have to know everything in order to accept any explanation. Imagine we don't know how we can move and searching for an explanation we discover muscle contraction and how that makes bones move because joints allow movement. That's a clear and straightforward explanation but then this guy would say: "yeah, but how do muscles contract?" "If you can't explain how muscles contract I won't accept your previous explanation although I can see with my own eyes that muscles contracting are producing movement". That's insane. This only shows how even PhD's can every once in a while postulate crappy ideas.
You might be interested in footnote 15 of my article, where I address this concern. I also address it in this video. Here's the first bit of the footnote: 15. By ‘but lacks one’, I don’t mean merely that we don’t know what the explanation for this element would be, or that it’s not available to us, or some such constraint on our epistemic access to an explanation. I mean that there is literally no explanation to be had. ------------------ So, the claim is not that, for A to successfully explain B, we must KNOW the explanation of A. I agree with you: that would be absurd. What premise 2 actually says is, for A to successfully explain B, then A can't call out for explanation but LACK one. It better *have* an explanation, if it calls out for one. But WE needn't know what this explanation is, in order for A to *have* an explanation. Hope that clears things up. Thanks for the comment.
@@tbogardus1 I think I understand your point now but that raises a question. Why do you accept any scientific explanation at all (like diseases caused by viruses and bacteria)?. Those explanations call for an explanation so in your own terms they are not successful explanations. Besides I don't even think that should be the criteria to know if an explanation is successful or not. A good explanation is based on things we already know are true and can be demonstrated to be true empirically or appealing to the laws of logic.
Premise 2 as explained is faulty. Knowledge of the natural world can be discovered in components and systems (laws) but may not require full understanding of the whole to understand the parts. Also science revises itself when new understanding occurs (unlike Theism). The argument comes full-stop after this one (as most bad ones do)
This is just a stupefying example of cognitive bias. One watches an hour of rational (somewhat!) building of the case for brute facts being insufficient, unsatisfactory or even useless explanations to be presented a "teleological foundationalism" as a clear winner, which is the same efing thing! How is the principle "everything in the universe is explained by the love and good of god" any different from naturalistic brute facts? WTF?! Seriously, what is the difference there (apart from being totally silly)?
Because, as I say in the video and in my paper, on teleological foundationalism, explanations end with something that doesn't call out for explanation. So, that's better than what the Naturalist can offer.
@@ivanvnucko3056 Calling it a 'personal preference' sort if suggests it's arbitrary, not based on reasons. But in the paper and in this video, I give reasons. So, no, I wouldn't say it's just my personal preference.
@@tbogardus1 You wouldn't, and that's why I called it an example of cognitive bias :) Your reasons (from this video, I didn't read the paper) are no reasons I would accept, so for me it is arbitrary, or more precise - subjective. Why is the proposition "sentient life is good" somehow different from any other proposition in that it is a "proper stopping point" and "it doesn't need an explanation" is really beyond me. You seeing it as "obvious" is a tell-tale sign of cognitive dissonance.
What does it even mean...if you like science? I appreciate what scientists have figured out and how much better I think life is due to their discoveries....and BTW all without knowing WHY the laws exist as they do. For me, 'like' doesn't enter into the equation. And where did you, Dr B get your definition of naturalism? That may be someone's definition, but it's not what I see when I look it up. AFAIK, naturalism is the simply the philosophical belief that everything arises from natural properties and causes. That's it. NOTHING that I can see about requiring flow blown explanations of why this and why that. Oh, I could well believe it might be nice to know more about why this and why that...and maybe some day they'll figure out more. But it's not necessary to a) imagine naturalism is true and b) study science as we understand it. And with all due respect to Alan Guth and his declaration, excuse me if I'm not impressed. And I would doubt he'd be offended at this comment. Using his statement would be like someone using some ancient Greek's comment when he looks up at the sun and says, he doesn't know why it shines so brightly and he has NO way of finding out why. Or someone in the middle ages saying he doesn't know why people get sick and has no way of finding out why. Or someone in the 1500s saying he doesn't know why the tides do what they do and he has NO WAY of finding out why. But it is entirely possible Guth may be right and there are some things in the natural world humans...bound as we are in space/time and excluded as we are from observing things at the quantum level...will never be able to figure out. But that has naught to do with whether naturalism is true or whether science could be useful or satisfying regardless of the unknowns. Could someone....Maybe Dr Bogardus himself...summarize the supernatural explanation of why the laws are the way they are? I watched some...quite a bit and there was a lot of talk about what naturalism couldn't explain, but nothing that I saw that gave HIS explanation for why the laws are as they are. Surely it could be summarized in less than an hour and 25 minutes. And finally, if the supernatural influences what goes on in the natural world, that puts into question any and all scientific conclusions/discoveries. Everything any scientist has ever measured, counted, weighed, analyzed or studied is suspect and may be totally due to some supernatural beings arbitrary whim and influence. So not only does Dr Bogardus still not know (I suspect) WHY the laws as they are, he doesn't even know if there are any laws at all. If God exists, he could be holding it all together with his omnipotence at each moment, causing all the celestial bodies to move as they move, making it SEEM like they orbit due to gravity but it may just be due to an in finite number of angels making them move. All the atoms and particles in the universe may be moving due to angel's arbitrary influence and it just SEEMS like they follow natural laws. If supernaturalism is true we have no way of knowing of any natural laws....and we still don't know why.
Hey Rizdek, On the topic of what naturalism is, the real answer is that there is probably no perfect definition. This word, like most words, is vague and will rely upon other words and concepts that are equally vague. All that said, it hardly matters what the definition is. If you like some other definition, great, then just ask whether that definition gives us any unique or relevant insights into whether the argument succeeds. If it does, fine, then the argument fails against your definition of naturalism. If it does not, then fine again, and the argument works against that version of naturalism. But to be honest, most versions of naturalism aren't going to provide any unique insight into this arguments success - yours among them I think. The Alan Guth quote is interesting primarily as it sets up the motivation for the argument. It isn't being principally used as a defense of any specific premise and so the argument doesn't really rely upon it as such. It is secondarily interesting as an admission of authority who holds to the view (naturalism) and is very familiar with the topic at hand. As for your examples, I am afraid that I cannot see how any of these are similar. All of your examples are of people from long ago, whom we should have no expectation that they would have any relevant knowledge of the subject, in contrast Alan Guth is contemporary academic who happens to study the early universe! To compare him to "someone in the middle ages" is very silly. The Supernatural explanation is given less air time, but is discussed (for example at 56:05). The basic answer is two fold. 1) God is a necessary being, and therefore does not call out for explanation. 2) God's motivations are self-evident moral facts that likewise do not call out for explanation. The relevant premise is (4) I believe. The equivalent version of the argument turned against the Theist would be: "If Theism is true, then every natural regularity calls out for explanation but lacks one." That premise would be false if Bogardus's two points (listed above) are correct - and they are ostensibly very plausible. Okay so you claimed that "if the supernatural influences what goes on in the natural world, that puts into question any and all scientific conclusions/discoveries." This is just an assertion and would require an argument. That said you seem to have supplied an argument in the very next sentence and following: "Everything any scientist has ever measured, counted, weighed, analyzed or studied is suspect and may be totally due to some supernatural beings arbitrary whim and influence...." I suppose that this means that we cannot trust any natural explanation (on Theism) as there could be some supernatural explanation for that same thing. But if that is really a problem for Theism then Naturalism will suffer from a nearly identical problem - namely there can always be an alternative natural explanation. If an alternative supernatural explanation undermines the justification for a given natural explanation then an alternative natural explanation will do the same thing. And, in point of fact there are theoretically an infinite number of alternative natural explanations for any set of physical data. But obviously the existence of alternatives explanations does not on its own mean we are unjustified in a given explanation, so this argument (at least as I understand it) does not work. Anyways, let me know if I have misunderstood you on any point. Thanks, R
@@user-jy6yy2fl9y As to 'it's silly' to challenge the current thinking by referring to historical beliefs about the natural world that turned out to be false/inaccurate, maybe the examples I used don't qualify as cosmologically significant, but nevertheless, there have been and even have been relatively recently many things they are rethinking in real time. For over a thousand years, everyone just bought in to Aristotles (and his precrusors) description of the natural world as comprised of air, earth, fire and water. Folks took that as just the way things are. Later scientists found out it's more complicated that that. Then around the 1500s, the 'powers that be' were just quite sure that the earth was the center of the universe and were willing to threaten anyone seriously contending that worldview. Then about a hundred years ago, as I understand it, the physicists of the day thought pretty much everything was known about how the physical world works/worked and they thought they only had to refine the calculations and add a few decimal places to the outcomes and they'd be done. Then they discovered there was a lot about quantum mechanics that seems unintuitive. And the quote 'if you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don't understand quantum mechanics' comes to mind. Even Guth in a recent interview claimed they are rethinking the size of the universe from just 10 years ago and saying it may not be as big as they once thought it was. And I watched that video of Guth on cosmology and what we know now, I noted his quote at the end...'still lots to be done.' That rings true to what I said. ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-YQCGmBFXc5E.html So I don't think it's 'silly' to conclude there is a lot yet to learn and that what there IS to learn is going to or could change how we think about cosmology. And if they discover that the physical world actually has an eternal aspect, then I could conclude THAT would be the sufficient explanation for the world we see around us. As to the problem I mentioned about an interfering God or even a potentially interfering God putting into question if there are regular laws of nature. The problem is it precludes knowing NOT just what the descriptions of laws of nature are...which is the problem you seem to have raised with a purely physical explanation of the universe (ie there could be infinite explanations)...but whether there actually ARE any regular laws TO be explained. I think an argument would have to be made that there actually ARE regular laws of nature before I would feel the need to find an argument for there NOT being laws of nature considering the existence of an interfering God. Even if God is the sufficient explanation for the universe (premises 1 and 2), we'd still need to find an argument that shows there actually ARE regular laws of nature and not just God's continuous and...perhaps quite regular and even well intended...interference. IOW, agency comes into the picture with the existence of God and it doesn't with a natural universe without a potentially interfering God. Here's what the argument might look like. Laws of nature, ie regular ways in which matter/energy interact in time/space depend on them not being capable of being interfered with by some outside agency. IE if something can interfere, then we can't really support the premise or be confident that there ARE regular laws of nature. God is just such an outside influence. Therefore, it puts into question whether there are actually laws of nature and not just whims of God.
@@rizdekd3912 Hello Rizdek, Thanks for the response. You said: "I don't think it's 'silly' to conclude there is a lot yet to learn and that what there IS to learn is going to or could change how we think about cosmology." I agree. There is a lot we have to learn in physics. My point was not that Alan Guth knows everything that could possibly be relevant, but that "To compare him to "someone in the middle ages" is very silly." Knowledge is not an all or nothing affair most of the time, and that is certainly true in this case. We know a lot more about physics than we did in the middle ages or Ancient Greece but we certainly have much left to learn. That said, most (if not all) of what we have left to learn will have zero bearing on the question at hand. Additionally, it is not as if we don't have a pretty good idea what all the options are. You actually list one of those options in the very next sentence. Namely: "And if they discover that the physical world actually has an eternal aspect, then I could conclude THAT would be the sufficient explanation for the world we see around us." This is a fascinating view and one with a very old history. Nonetheless, I don't personally think it is very likely. The infinite universe idea has a number of major problems. First, there are concerns that an actually infinite universe could not exist as we would never be able to reach the present. Forever is a very long time to wait, and plausibly it is an impossible amount of time to wait. Try counting to infinity. Even an immortal will never actually reach an infinite integer by listing these sequentially. Thus if the universe existed infinitely in the past, then it would never have reached the present. This William Lane Craig style objection is usually couched in an A-theory of time, but I don't actually think it needs to be. It is enough that subjects experience time sequentially. Therefore there could be a subject existing now that has always existed along with the universe. That person would have had to have (paradoxically) experienced an infinite sequence of time to get to the present. Maybe they were even counting from some time infinitely long in the past. If so then this subject would now have reached some infinite integer! But there is no infinite integer. Another big problem with the infinite universe idea is that it is basically just making the universe a brute thing. As such the universe is either a contingent brute thing, or else it is a necessary brute thing. The problem with the former is that it is intuitively impossible. Ex nihilo nihil fit as the old philosophers used to say. This idea may also be subtly mathematically impossible - at least I want to try to publish on that. The problem with the necessary universe idea is just that the universe looks very very contingent. (Personally in my opinion the best (and probably only real) option for literally everyone (atheists and naturalists included) is that there is some necessary entity. That could be a universe but it is likely something else that gave rise to the universe. As far as Bogardus' argument is concerned an eternal universe as a brute contingent is something that "calls out for" explanation but lacks it. Making the universe eternal, will not change this. If Bogardus is correct about this idea, and correct that this explanatory failure permeates upward, then his conclusion will still follow. Sorry that this response is getting so longwinded. On the natural regularities/laws topic I think that the point is only that nature generally acts in certain predictable ways. This is true independent of what is behind this regularity. Note that what physical laws even are is debated. So, I don't really see why God being behind the regularities/laws makes any difference. Things still fall when you drop them independent of why. I can sort of see why you might be concerned that there isn't something more immutable behind the laws (in the God case), but even for the naturalist there is no guarantee of immutability. In the end belief in regularities does not entail a belief in the permanence or necessity of those irregularities. As for your formulation: you said, "not being capable of being interfered with by some outside agency." But as for the regularities there are copious cases where nature can be interfered with, and is. As for laws, and I suppose you would mean the most fundamental laws or nature, we have no guarantee that these laws are not similarly conditional. The main point I have here is that you are adding, what I take to be, an artificial clause what it means for something to be a regularity or law. The no interference clause may be true, or it may be false, but it is something that we will have to discover about the laws of nature. It isn't something we stipulate, and as of yet, it isn't something we have discovered. Fun argument though. If you want to push back on me on this, feel free, though I apologize in advance that I may be slow to respond. Life.... Thanks anyways for the thought provoking conversation. R
@@user-jy6yy2fl9y Yes...I can get long winded too. I just find it fascinating to ponder these things. The issue of a god's ability to manipulate the natural world being something that precludes knowing there ARE laws of nature might just be something we don't see the same way. So be it. "First, there are concerns that an actually infinite universe could not exist as we would never be able to reach the present. " Yes, the problem of infinite regress. It is a possible dilemma for an eternal natural world, but I've not figured a way that God avoids this problem. Calling him 'eternal' doesn't seem to solve it any more than calling a natural background existence 'eternal.' God still DID something. The issue isn't time, it's sequences. Every indication from theists who contend God created the world contend he designed THEN/AND created the universe. If he truly did those in sequence, that connotates time...by definition. I follow this line of reasoning...does God have thoughts? What was God's first thought? COULD he have a first thought? Did he have those thoughts (design and create) in that one eternal moment in which he dwells? Even if those were his only two thoughts...they still had to occur and if there is no time, that pretty much means they happened at the very same moment and when (which is eternally) God exists. That leads to thinking that the universe also existed eternally since nothing intervened God's thought to create and actual 'creation.' But regardless, IF there is a solution for God being eternal and still being able to do things/think things in sequence or even do anything at all, and to 'created' a temporal world, then an eternal natural existence would have the same possibility because I don't see God's ability to do things in sequence as a matter of his omnipotence...just what reality allows in an eternal vs temporal existence. "But as for the regularities there are copious cases where nature can be interfered with, and is." But we don't think of those 'interference' sources as being outside of the natural world like a god would be. They are all still part of the laws of nature. And Yes, I know that 'defining' nature is difficult But I tend to use natural as opposed to physical or material as that which I am aware of in my daily life. Of course that might be arbitrarily placing God in nature because I could be sensing things from God and just unflatteringly attributing his actions to nature. "The problem with the necessary universe idea is just that the universe looks very very contingent." I think that could be because we live in an emerged time/space matter/energy version of the natural world and evolved from this matter/energy that existed in this temporal arrangement. So indeed THIS universe, this arrangement of nature should appear contingent. This admittedly invented 'natural existence' I'm thinking of would be totally different...it would NOT appear contingent. In fact it would not 'appear' to creatures like us at all.
Premise 4 is going to have to be false on everyone's view. Let's just apply transposition: 4'. If it's not the case that every natural regularity calls out for explanation but lacks one, then naturalism is false. 4''. If it is the case that for some natural regularity, it is not the case that it calls out for explanation but lacks one, then naturalism is false. (running the negation through the any quantifier). 4'''. If it is the case that for some natural regularity, either it does not call out for explanation or it does but doesn't lack an explanation if it does, then naturalism is false (DeMorgan's). We can split this up into two branches now, where one or the other could be true to carry the premise. A. If some regularity, R, doesn't call out for explanation, then naturalism is false. B. If some regularity, R, does call out for explanation and doesn't lack one, then naturalism is false. It's going to need to be explained why the existence of a single regularity that doesn't call out for explanation would brick Naturalism, if A is what carries the premise. It's going to need to be explained why the existence of a single regularity that calls out for explanation and is explained would brick Naturalism is B is what carries the premise. In the case of A, all a Naturalist has to say is that there are some regularities they're OK with being foundational to the way the world is, which wouldn't call out for explanation, and they're set. At that point they just declare a Moorean Shift against path A and call it a day. In the case of B, the hill is even harder to climb. Why would explaining a particular regularity that calls out for explanation be a problem for Naturalism? Again, if Naturalism is the idea that there are some autonomous set of regularities (see Disgupta) that explain all the other ones, and so we can take one that cries out for explanation and explain it until autonomous, then you're penalizing Naturalists for the only goal they think they need to do for their philosophy to be successful. Again, Moorean shift. And if both branches of the transposition aren't right, the original premise can't be right given the equivalence of their truth value. Edit: What's also interesting is that the only branch that isn't explicitly in A or B is the one that goes: C. If some regularity, R, does call out for explanation and lacks one if it does, ... I think the the guest would want to say that this too would signify the falsity of Naturalism (given the thrust of the rest of the argument). But note that A, B or C together are exhaustive since they cover all 4 cases of the disjunction (2 covered by A, B and C cover the rest). And so the premise as stated is transposed as: If tautology, then Naturalism is false. Well if that's a premise, then Naturalism is always false, whatever the tautology, since tautologies are always true, satisfying the antecedent. And at that point all the other premises in your argument are superfluous. Just start with 4, transpose it, note the missing C via the same explanatory principle, and you just conclude that Naturalism is always false from 4 and explanatory principle which brings in C. 4 is the hinge premise which mentions Naturalism outside the conclusion, so it carries a lot of weight. The other rabbit hole we could get bogged down in, is what "call for explanation" means in science. For example something "calls for explanation" in science if and only if it could be explained by any variable which isn't a control variable (or ceteris paribus variable). And that condition would knock out all necessary explanations immediately, i.e. "Regularities call for explanation if and only if there's something other than a necessary thing that can explain them".
Here are the transformations, as I see them, where “V” is the universal quantifier, “3” is the existential quantifier, “n” is the proposition that naturalism is true, “R” is the predicate “is a regularity,” “C” is the predicate “calls out for explanation,” “E” is the predicate “has an explanation,” “~” is negation, “&” is conjunction, and “-->” is the material conditional: 4a. n --> Vx(Rx --> (Cx & ~Ex)) 4b. ~Vx(Rx --> (Cx & ~Ex)) --> ~n 4c. 3x~(Rx --> (Cx & ~Ex)) --> ~n 4d. 3x(Rx & ~(Cx & ~Ex)) --> ~n 4e. 3x(Rx & (~Cx v Ex)) --> ~n (I skipped the double negation of "E" from 4d to 4e.) I have reservations about your use of “if it does” in your English rendition of what you called 4’’’. But, given what I’m calling 4e, I think you’re right that I’m committed to this: BOTH: A. If some regularity, R, doesn't call out for explanation, then naturalism is false. AND: B. If some regularity, R, does call out for explanation and doesn't lack one, then naturalism is false. And I think both of those are, in fact, true. That’s the point of a large part of my paper: trying to prove that those are both true. You’re skeptical, though. With regard to A, you say, “In the case of A, all a Naturalist has to say is that there are some regularities they're OK with being foundational to the way the world is, which wouldn't call out for explanation, and they're set.” I don’t think it would be enough for a Naturalist to merely *say* this, or even to believe it, or even to believe it contentedly. I think it would have to actually be *true* in order for the Naturalist to be safe here. And, as I argue in my paper, this isn’t true. Laws of nature are pretty obviously contingent, and pretty obviously call out for explanation. Why are they this way, rather than some other way? With regard to the second option, B, you say: “In the case of B, the hill is even harder to climb. Why would explaining a particular regularity that calls out for explanation be a problem for Naturalism?” I argue for this in my paper, by eliminating all the possible ways in which a Naturalist might try to explain a natural regularity/law of nature: brute foundationalism, infinitism, and coherentism. I argue that none of those will succeed in explaining any natural regularity. I think they’re all ultimately unexplained, if Naturalism is true. Ambitious, I know. But, I do attempt to prove it. In your edit, you say: “What's also interesting is that the only branch that isn't explicitly in A or B is the one that goes: C. If some regularity, R, does call out for explanation and lacks one if it does, ...” This I’m not seeing, and maybe your use of “if it does” has produced a problem here. This is what I had at the end of your proposed transformations: 4e. 3x(Rx & (~Cx v Ex)) --> ~n So I’d think, in order for this antecedent to be satisfied, there has to be some regularity, and this regularity EITHER doesn’t call out for explanation, OR it has an explanation, OR BOTH. I don’t think a regularity that calls out for explanation but lacks one would satisfy this antecedent. Neither of the disjuncts would be true, in that case. No? So I plead not guilty to claiming that a tautology disproves Naturalism, though that would be pretty cool if it did.
@@tbogardus1 Thanks for the reply! Looking at this: "And I think both of those are, in fact, true. That’s the point of a large part of my paper: trying to prove that those are both true." OK I think we both agree up to this point which is good. My use of "if it does" could be substituted with (just in case someone is looking for an explanation) as reminder text, and I think we'd be set there. "I don’t think it would be enough for a Naturalist to merely say this, or even to believe it, or even to believe it contentedly. I think it would have to actually be true in order for the Naturalist to be safe here. And, as I argue in my paper, this isn’t true. Laws of nature are pretty obviously contingent, and pretty obviously call out for explanation. Why are they this way, rather than some other way?" This is where it's going to get technical I suppose. When I think of "ists" or "isms" I think of normative goal oriented projects and I don't think that "true and false" apply to them so easily. For example, what sense does it make to say that "environmentalism is false" or "feminism is false"? You could disagree with the aims of those normative projects, but it's hard to see the truth maker for such normative categorizations. Now we could say that naturalism is true just in case one believes that they ought commit to describing nature purely in terms of natural regularities and scientific descriptions involving those things (paraphrasing your quotes) and then we could say that naturalism is false just in case that belief is false. But to make the ought belief false, you'd want to show that it conflicts with some other oughts that naturalists are committed to. So when I see a premise that says "If X then naturalism is false" I take it to mean "If X then there is a conflict in your oughts caused by naturalism which is solved by your dropping the belief in naturalism." So now the question becomes, if there is at least one regularity that doesn't cry out for an explanation, what beliefs are in conflict for the naturalist? NOTE: we can't appeal to science yet, because that discussion is in the first 3 premises which haven't yet fed into 4, so justifying 4 in terms of the first 3 would mean the first 3 were implicit in 4 (and should be made explicit) and possibly superfluous earlier in the argument. Looking at your explanation here for clues, let's approach this two ways. 1. Does contingency mean that something ALWAYS cries out for explanation? It's not clear that it does. Take your example of the gravitational constant. Let's suppose there's some world where it's off by some really small value and yet the world is life permitting. If you're in that world, you have G' instead of G. Now in this world, you ask "Why do I have G instead of G'?" But if you were in the other world, you'd ask "Why do I have G' instead of G?" Clearly G and G' are contingent values, but even supposing some modal situation in which worlds exist which instantiate both, such knowledge doesn't really alleviate the contingency of our having either one. Continued skepticism of this contingent value of G, then, is just tantamount to asking "Why am I born in this possible world, rather than some other one?" But if it's just a contingent reality that you're in the world you're in (God or no God, even if Theistic Modal Realism is true, say) then we have a regularity (some fundamental rules observed, juxtaposed with the fact that you only consciously observe one set of rules) that at this point really shouldn't cry out for explanation. And since the reasoning that this shouldn't cry out for explanation works even if theism is true, I think it's an example of some regularity that we can be comfortable with, without any need for further explanation. 2. Supposing this line of reasoning wasn't persuasive, let's consider Oppy's dilemma. Let's just suppose that God ostensibly explains G. Note that if "life is good" is the base fact here, we still have a whole life permitting interval of G (with an uncountably infinite number of possible values). If the real crux of the issue is "Why this G rather than some other one?" then this issue isn't resolved if we just ask "Why G and not some other G on its life permitting interval?" The "Why X and not Y?" structure of the question still survives theism on top of naturalism, and thus if the "Why X and not Y?" structure is sufficient to bring naturalism down, it proves too much. Theism goes down with it. This is formalized in Oppy's dilemma during his conversation with Craig wrt. Wigner: Is it possible that God could have chosen some other value of G? If no, then G is necessary, in which case it's just going to be ontologically simpler for the naturalist to directly posit necessity rather than invoking God on top. If yes, then we still haven't answered why G and not some other value? Shrunk the options, perhaps, but so does the Weak Anthropic Principle anyway, given that we'd never observe a non LPU to ask why the non LPU is non LPU instead of LPU. Thus again a simpler principle works in the naturalist's favor. 3. Finally let's consider that, post Pruss's comments in his Blackwell Companion article, asking for contrastive explanations is pretty taboo. If we're allowed to ask such contrastive questions, then "Why did God choose X rather than Y?" is a perfectly good question we could ask in kind. Thus asking why G and not G' is tantamount to asking "Why did God choose G and not G'?" There's either a necessary answer to satisfy our cry for explanation, or there is not. If there is not, this is an opportunity for the theist and naturalist to shake hands and agree to a ceasefire. If there is, modal collapse is imminent. If we all agree to the "contrastive explanations aren't needed" rule, then just explaining why the universe has the things it has, will suffice. That it has the value of G that it does explains why it doesn't have G' (just as God choosing G explains why he didn't choose G'). For Oppy, we live in a reality created by an initial state which "just has these values" (if they were different, we'd just live in the other reality instead). And the autonomous fact (see Disgupta) that we're in the reality with the initial state that was, does a lot of future explanatory work. "I argue for this in my paper, by eliminating all the possible ways in which a Naturalist might try to explain a natural regularity/law of nature: brute foundationalism, infinitism, and coherentism. I argue that none of those will succeed in explaining any natural regularity. I think they’re all ultimately unexplained, if Naturalism is true. Ambitious, I know. But, I do attempt to prove it." I guess what was confusing me is that I took this branch to mean "if a naturalist succeeds at it, then naturalism is false anyway" which is kind of weird. But what I think you're saying is that if it could be done, then it's impossible that it was done by naturalism, which is fair. I think naturalists will probably have to argue that the whole implication for A is false, and that the antecedent for B is false (i.e. that you can come up with a satisfactory explanation to your standards, probably citing Oppy's dilemma). I'd probably have to agree. Trying to find an ultimate explanation for some possible world runs a massive risk of modal collapse, (I recall Rasmussen agreeing with my concerns when we streamed last month, but I'll have to watch the video to make sure I'm representing him correctly). And just as an extra challenge to see how hard this is, let's think of a thought experiment. Let's suppose, for sake of argument, that modal realism is true (theistic or otherwise). Suppose that for every possible value of G, there's a corresponding possible world. Well the Weak Anthropic principle tells us we aren't in the life permitting values of G, so that addresses that. But given that all these values of G are actually instantiated, one each, in every possible world, how would your contrastive question ever be resolved? At this point it really would just be "why am I in this possible world rather than some other?" and any satisfactory answer to that question would just remove all the other worlds as options, resulting in modal collapse. That's the way I see it anyway. Now modal realism may not be true, but I think the principle still remains when trying to ask "why" of the autonomous facts that identify the possible world we're in. For the tautology thing, think of it like this: ~Cx v Ex has 4 different paths: i. Cx & Ex ii. Cx & ~EX iii. ~Cx & Ex iv. ~Cx & ~Ex Branch A is just looking at: ~Cx -> ~n So branch A includes both iii and iv (~Cx & Y is a subset of ~Cx). Branch B is i. The only branch left to talk about is ii, which is covered by C. And having a regularity cry out for explanation but lack one seems to be the real reason why naturalism is in trouble to begin with wrt science, so ii -> ~n seems to be something you'd accept. And if that is so then all iv of the exhaustive branches of the antecedent in 4''' imply ~n, which means you don't really need to spend the rest of the argument talking about science. You'd have a full on exhaustive disjunction implying Q, and so Q is just true. Not super important to my commentary since it just means you can prune the premises about science. But on the flip side, if you did that, this argument kind of collapses into most the other kind of LCA type arguments. I think that might be good actually, since I think scientific explanations preclude necessary ones, given that necessary things are the ultimate control variable (true in every possible world / experimental state) and thus can't be explanatory variables.
@@logos8312 You say that *"~Cx v Ex has 4 different paths"* , but an OR operator with 2 variables only has 3 paths to truth doesn't it ? The last one is false (ii in your case). Regarding your question *"Why did God choose X rather than Y?"* , have you read the response that he gave to Tommy S (other comment thread) ?
@@MrGustavier Yes, an or has 3 paths normally. If the conditional holds for the fourth, that's what makes the antecedent a tautology. And yes I read his response to Tommy. It doesn't really address the issue.
@@logos8312 You say *"having a regularity cry out for explanation but lack one seems to be the real reason why naturalism is in trouble to begin with"* . But his 4th premise is _"If Naturalism is true, then every natural regularity calls out for explanation but lacks one."_ So that's no trouble at all, indeed it is what he expects if naturalism is true. So I don't see why he would accept ii. -> ~n You see what I mean ? What am I not getting ? You say at the end *"I think that might be good actually, since I think scientific explanations preclude necessary ones, given that necessary things are the ultimate control variable (true in every possible world / experimental state) and thus can't be explanatory variables."* But that seems very similar to what Tommy S was saying when he said _"Necessary facts can't explain contingent facts"_ wouldn't you agree ? Tomas answered that (albeit maybe unsatisfactorily). He said : _"in the case of a Platonic sort of teleological foundationalism, these necessary moral truths would serve to rationalize--and thereby explain--the free, contingent actions of a Divine Craftsman. So, yes, I guess I disagree that necessary facts can't explain contingent facts. Some necessary truths can rationalize--and thereby explain--the free choices of agents. They can be the truths in light of which one acts, and therefore explain why one acted in that way."_ What are your thoughts on that ?
Theism just adds another layer of uncertainty. Not only do we STILL not know WHY the laws of nature are as they are because even if we assert that they are as a god defines them, we still don't know why he defined them that way instead of another way. But NOW, we have the question of what is god like and why is he the way he is. Sure, we can assert various attributes and characteristics about god, but we can't really KNOW for sure if our assertions are right...and since said god is believed to be able to modify the natural world and our thinking at will, we can never be certain that anything we are thinking/concluding/desiring is due to our own desires or due to god's manipulating things for his own mysterious purposes. The existence of god does nothing to answer the basic questions of existence and it introduces many more problems.
@@tbogardus1 Taken collectively, that seems to be the gist. And it might cut both ways, but then what value does tacking on a god actually deliver? By my lights nothing, but I'm open to being wrong.
Nice talk, I think it ultimately fails, premises 2 and 4 are problematic and in my opinion the principle for a successful explanation is not successful, there are several posts in the comments showing why. I think once again it comes down to whether the necessary explains the contingent, in my opinion classical theism has fail to show this, and without that there is not much ground to hold classical theism For naturalism, there are paths in neccesitariam views, brute contingency, infinite regress of contingent things or from necessary existent to indeterminate process to contingent. I'm not saying that they are necessarily successful, but it is a lot more plausible to ground naturalism than classical theism
Hello Diego, On your second sentence, I would point out that as there is nothing unintuitive about a necessary cause of something contingent, the burden of proof is upon the one who wishes to claim that there is something impossible in that. Impossibility is a very demanding claim and will require a compelling bit of reasoning indeed. In lieu of such reasoning we should be open to the possibility and that is all the Theist needs to get off the ground. On your last point, why? Again, you need to actually give a reason for the above assertion. Without such an argument the theist has no problem grounding contingent things. The other views you reference are extremely problematic. On the current topic brute contingency seems to be incompatible with scientific explanation as it leaves the ultimate why blank and that explanatory failure permeates upwards according to Bogardus. (You could disagree with him but again you would have to offer an argument otherwise no one will know why you are disagreeing). And while Bogardus did not explain it in the video, he also seems to think that the infinite regress is incompatible with scientific explanation (for, I suspect the same reason that "its turtles all the way down" was never a satisfactory explanation for the fixture of the Earth!). You could check his paper and see if I am wrong! The option of a necessary (natural) ground for contingent things is the best bet for the naturalist in my mind. If I were a naturalist I would go that route I think. However, it cannot be that claiming a view (i.e. naturalism) on which such an entity is entirely unexpected and mysterious is better off than a view (i.e. Theism) that posits such an entity as its central claim about reality, in positing such an entity. That would be totally nuts!
@@user-jy6yy2fl9y Hi First thing to notice is that I'm talking about explanation and not causation. Second, it's not intuitive how necessary things explain the existence of contingencies, note that the relationship cannot be symmetric, but the inference argument that is normally given may actually be asymmetric in favor of contingent, so it is not enough to say that it is possible, there is an "explanation" to be given. In the case of causality, only affirming possibility will be problematic for a necessary being that is also not divisible, because you will have to explain what change in the necessary being for you to have a result or another. So I don't agree with the idea that all theism requires is to affirm possibility. Also, there are quite a few arguments for each of the options I point to, and Bogardus didn't even go near them, now I did not say that they were successful, but in my lights obviously there are more options in naturalism. Now, the claim that brute force is incompatible with science is unjustified, for the simple reason that scientific explanation does not necessarily seek fundamental entities, quite the opposite in many cosmological theories reality is eternal and there is no explanation for that and let's not forget that God himself is a brute fact. The same applies for infinite regress. I am not going to write articles in a comment section, but there are already many published in the literature.
@@diegonicucs6954 Hey Diego, On the first point you made, sure, the topic is explanation not causation, regardless I don't see why explanation should be a concerning hurtle if the entity in question has the requisite casual powers. On that point however, Bogardus has argued for the motivational component of the explanation in the case that the necessary entity is God. Again, maybe you know of some other problem but as that isn't obvious you would need to present that. The burden of proof is still on the person who wishes to claim that there is a problem if no obvious problem exists. On your second point I disagree. There is no intuitive problem with having necessary entities explain contingent things. The reverse sure, but all that is meant by necessity is that it cannot fail to exist - that tells me nothing as such about whether that thing will be able to explain contingencies. Of course there will be things we could conjoin to necessity to create problems, but that would be a problem of necessity & X. And it would be up to you (or whoever) to show that for all (or at least most) X explanation (or causation) is impossible or at least problematic. Also I think I may have misled you in my usage of "impossible." "Problematic" was the word you used and was the one I should have used for clarity. So to rephrase: The burden of proof is on the person who wishes to argue that there is something problematic about necessary entities causing (or explaining) contingent things as there is nothing unintuitive about them doing so. As for an example of how a necessary entity could cause a contingent entity, here is a very rough sketch. If the necessary entity is God, and God has the requisite causal powers, libertarian freewill and a motivation to create then God's creation seems explained. For myself, I have a lot less trouble imagining something coming from something than something coming from nothing. The latter is intuitively impossible. Sorry this is such a long response... In your second paragraph you said: "Now, the claim that brute force is incompatible with science is unjustified, for the simple reason that scientific explanation does not necessarily seek fundamental entities, quite the opposite in many cosmological theories reality is eternal and there is no explanation for that and let's not forget that God himself is a brute fact." So the fact that a theory is offered as science is irrelevant to whether that theory is compatible with science. Thus I totally disagree with your "simple reason". Specifically, if an infinite regress of causes or an eternal universe are explanatorily bankrupt as Bogardus argues, then it makes no difference whether it has been proposed as science. Also the specific deal with God, is not whether His existence is brute, but whether His existence calls out for explanation. According to Bogardus it does not on the assumption that God is a necessary entity. Thus it is not bruteness itself that is relevant but bruteness combined with contingency. Let me know what you think and if I misunderstood you on anything, I have limited time to respond unfortunately and so I might have missed something. R
@@user-jy6yy2fl9y Hi So you are moving away from the argument, as I say in my opening comment, premises 2 and 4 are problematic, I did not go into details because as I said, there are enough comments in this video already explaining the problem with those 2 premises, and, in my opinion, these comments provide successful reasons for rejecting those premises. The one making the argument is Bogardus, all I have to do is raise objections. I can give you one, I reject his principle for a successful explanation, because it doesn't succeed, there are brute facts in science, eg radioactive decay, there is no explanation why they decay at t and not before or after t, not even God explains it, so if that principle were true then there is nothing to explain anything (even WLC accepts brute facts). Again, there are enough comments on this video that include more details, there's no point in repeating it here. Now, having causal power does not imply that it will be used to cause anything, so it is far from being enough. Secondly god does not meet his principle for a successful explanation. The idea of "call for an explanation" is poorly presented, the turtle is not different from god, It is enough for me to say that this cosmic turtle is necessary, done. But not only that, the whole premise is based on the idea that "all natural things require an explanation", why? it's enough for me to reject that, he's the one responsible for making a convincing argument for it, not me. Also he quotes ‘One ordinarily thinks of an explanation as something that provides understanding’ then he only state that the turtle fails as an explanation, but no, it does give us understanding, it could be wrong, but it is perfectly fine in the same way that we understand that the table holds the glass, what holds the table? that's a different question, which may also have an answer, but whatever that answer is, it doesn't change that the table is holding the glass. This idea that in naturalism you cannot sustain brute facts, or necessary things, but if you are in teleological foundationalism then you can, is unjustified, He quotes Oppy, but he doesn't quote Oppy when Oppy says that if theism can have necessary things, then naturalism can too. "There is no intuitive problem with having necessary entities explain contingent things. The reverse sure, but all that is meant by necessity is that it cannot fail to exist - that tells me nothing as such about whether that thing will be able to explain contingencies" exactly!, it doesn't tell you anything, so it's not enough to support the principle of successful explanation, it doesn't give you understanding, as Bogardus quote from Woodward (2019) "For myself, I have a lot less trouble imagining something coming from something than something coming from nothing. The latter is intuitively impossible." Unless it doesn't "come from" as God, or as an eternal entity, or as a necessary natural thing as Oppy advocates, as I say, naturalism has a lot more options, Naturalism does not necessarily imply that something comes out of nothing, and this has been refuted several times in the literature. "So the fact that a theory is offered as science is irrelevant to whether that theory is compatible with science" if you want to claim that it is incompatible, provide an argument. But it follows from what Bogardus says, so at least he agrees with me on this, and we're discussing his argument. "Also the specific deal with God, is not whether His existence is brute, but whether His existence calls out for explanation. According to Bogardus it does not on the assumption that God is a necessary entity. Thus it is not bruteness itself that is relevant but bruteness combined with contingency" contingency has nothing to do here, neither the necessary nor the brute implies a contingent existence, so sure, Bogardus claims that God does not call for an explanation, but that is irrelevant to whether God himself is an explanation and gives us understanding, and for this Bogardus does not offer much, and therefore without much I can simply reject
I'm having a hard time wrapping my head around this. Is he basically saying naturalism can't answer all things so therefore the supernatural does (god). How is this convincing? What evidence do we have for the supernatural? This seems like typical theist nonsense, define things a certain way and make a bunch of assumptions and BAM! You have a theistic argument. The problem is, how do you test this? How do you prove it?
A slide titled "The Main Argument" is displayed a few times over the course of our conversation. I'd say that's the basic idea. And the argument concludes that Naturalism is false, so the argument is meant to be evidence for supernaturalism.
If what makes it a "satisfying" answer is merely that it is an answer, then any answer is a satisfying answer. In reality, you need to understand how something works to confirm the truth.
There is a difference between an argument that supports a conclusion, and an argument that convinces. If you’ve decided before hand nothing will convince you of something, then no sound argument will ever convince you otherwise. This is at bottom the stubbornness of the atheist worldview.
I think I finally get it. You have faith that in some way shape or form, some 'other than natural' existence/realm/being/thingamabob HAS the explanation for its own existence...and that's fine. I mean almost by definition something has to be its own explanation or nothing would exist unless something came from nothing and that does seem unlikely. But it seems you've put exploring it out of the realm of possibility seemingly by definition so in that regard you're just like Guth. You're no better off explaining why than he is. And YOU used the word why because he did. But of course just because God, for example, is defined as that which is ontologically sufficient doesn't explain WHY things in the natural world are as they are. Perhaps why wasn't the best choice of words. What you don't realize is the naturalist...like me...can also have faith that in some way, shape or form the natural world has the explanation for its own existence. I imagine the title..."If You Like Science, You Should Hate Naturalism" reflects the common belief that naturalists/atheists detest faith. They may detest the word, faith, but they have it nonetheless. They are satisfied (have faith) that the natural world provides sufficient explanation for its own existence. That is how a naturalist can happily go about her day studying science. And the naturalist has the added advantage that it is at least plausible that somehow, there MAY be an explanation because they haven't put it out of reach BY DEFINITION.
What would the explanation for the universe's existence look like if naturalism is true? Would it have any parts, or contingent facts? If so, what would explain those parts and facts?
@@barry.anderberg I don't know what it would 'look' like. Perhaps you mean 'look like' in a general descriptive sense and NOT in a 'what would we see if we looked at it with our eyes' sense. It probably would not be 'visible' to our eyes which are formed of matter/energy and evolved functionally to see light waves from/reflected off material objects. The underlying existence wouldn't be anything like the expanding matter/energy temporal world we see that began expanding billions of years ago. That 'universe' is what would've formed from a background existence. It may have parts or it may not. It/they would not be contingent by definition.
@@rizdekd3912 Yes I mean conceptually what would it look like. I don't see how you escape Thomas's charge - that a naturalist has to eventually appeal to brute fact.
@@barry.anderberg I am not sure why it's termed a 'charge.' Is there a problem assuming some brute facts? I can't find all the posts I've made in this discussion, but I don't think I ever claimed to not be making assumptions or not appealing to brute facts. I agree one must assume some brute facts to make sense of the world. I am perfectly comfortable doing so because AFAIK, the same thing goes for anyone trying to explain things like the origin of the universe...and that includes the theist. The theist seems to have to posit the brute fact, first of all, that god exists and then assign god the features/characteristics/capabilities pretty much ad hoc just so 'he' CAN be the explanation, not only for the physical universe but also himself. It may be true....there may be a god and he might be that explanation, but how could we know? It's convenient, but is it true? I'm not even sure a god CAN exist...a disembodied eternal mind with unlimited power and knowledge...that really seems made up to me.
@@rizdekd3912 Thomas's entire point is that if you have to appeal to brute fact then you don't really have any explanation. That's the whole idea of a brute fact. It is literally inexplicable. As to God I think we can reason to something like God and if God is a necessary being, he is not a brute fact any more than the existence of the number 2 is a brute fact. The number 2 exists necessarily. The arguments for necessary existence and why that existence is something like God are far beyond what can be expressed in a RU-vid post. I would highly recommend for a lay person's introduction Josh Rasmussen's book How Reason Can Lead To God. My sister was an atheist and that book changed her mind.
This title is clickbait nonsense. There is no scientific theory, conclusion or test that is improved by adding in anything that is not natural. Nothing.
@@MrGustavier Sure, I can expand on the idea for consideration. The definition of natural I'm using here is unconscious patterns that operate independent of choice and the definition of purpose is a chosen change to introduce to the physical world through actions. Therefore, purpose is "above" the natural order and is thus supernatural. Consciousness choosing to change the natural cause and effect pattern in the physical world is a miracle.
@@coryharasha Right. Do you think a naturalist would agree with your definitions ? Do you think you are using the definitions that are commonly used in the philosophy ?
@@piercemchugh4509 Don’t be a sad Jawa ! Go out in the real world away from your device and do something to help other people then I bet you won’t feel so sad and angry. Of course. Picking up Droid parts might also help. I hope you feel better Jawa.
Mad? No Sad? Yes. This video is the result of poor science education. Just listen to them talk about the laws of nature at about 6:30. The scientific illiteracy of these two is astounding.
