Juan thank you, I am a corporate s-76 pilot in NYC and follow you channel we share the same passion for learning,and truth i have a few questions. has anyone found out if the pilot has any formal training at Flight Safety or simuflight 25 years ago when i started flying the 76 my initial training was 14 days and almost 20 hours in the simulator with recurrent training once a year which is 5 days of training and simulator time, this is the big iron of the helicopter world, very rare to see single pilot and an insurance company that would approve this type of operation with out special training for single pilot operations, i do know of some medevac and offshore company's that do it , IFR, airport to airport ( departure to approach ) not scud running in a 76, the noise alone would anger the neighborhoods AP's on ( auto pilot's on ) is part of the standard before take off check list in any 76, take your feet off the pedals and your fingers off the triggers and the helicopter would auto stabilize SAS stability augmentation system part of the auto pilot this truly is a tragedy my prayers to all involved
The fact that he was flying solo was definitely odd. Chatting with friends we all had the same thoughts. Kobe was a VIP worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Whenever we flew anyone that was a VIP, we never did it solo. Insurance companies do not want to pay out the type of money that can bankrupt them. Presidents of banks, VIPs, actors, athletes and your everyday rich people could not be flown single pilot. We'll never know what he was thinking but he obviously omitted the truth. The 1st time I listened to the audio I knew he was being less than truthful. He repeated the clearance but he didn't follow it. Ego, star struck, get there itis or his attention was on something else? Just sad all around.
@@frederickwhite6416 I rode in an S-76 and Bell 214 in Alaska several times in IFR operations and there were always two pilots, and in the S-76 the Auto pilot was used exclusively in IMC conditions. I seem to recall that single-pilot IFR was not approved in the S-76 for that 135 operation and even under part 91.
It's hard for me to understand why 76 people (as of February 8th) gave this video a thumbs down. Facts only and no opinions were presented. I appreciate that a knowledgeable person took the time to create it. Very well done!
I love the arm chair pilots here saying this pilot couldn't have made a mistake with all his experience. I've been working in telecom for 5 years and have worked in rain, snow, heavy winds and rain. I have all sorts of experience climbing poles and ladders. 2 months ago i fell off my ladder doing something that's become 2nd nature to me. Regardless of experience we are not pefect and we all fuck up and makes mistakes. Bad things happen to good people. That is what happened here. No kamikaze stuff or illuminati blood sacrafice here. Pilot made a bad decision. Period
Yes, if you, like me, watch all the videos about airplane crashes, the pilots almost always are highly experienced with thousands of flight hours yet still make fatal mistakes. Probably complacency and self-confidence contribute.
Robert Ellion, EXACTLY. Humans are flawed and always will be. A lot of people can't accept that its seemingly more and more likely that the pilot made an error that cost him and others there lives. So sad.
I work Avionics for a very large and well known Helicopter company. When I tell you a 76 is a handful to fly for even 2 pilots in vfr conditions......just imagine how hard it is for a single pilot in ifr conditions. The workload is overload. We don't fly our 76's ifr at all. And our customers insist we fly dual pilots, always, for added safety. Two heads are always better than one. There was no good reason to go iimc. This looks like a classic case of getthereitis, coupled with spatial distortion followed by loss of control.
An axiom that we lived by in my police department was, "In order to there first, you first have to get there." It's important that we review and critique incidents like this so we can increase of knowledge base and hopefully prevent future disasters of this type. Unfortunately, this pilot was obviously aware of the dangers involved flying in conditions that were present during the flight and continued to worsen as time went by. The helicopter driver you interviewed in a previous video expressed, at least in my view, the truth about this crash. Just because a helicopter pilot CAN fly in special VFR conditions doesn't mean they SHOULD. He was much closer than 100 feet from "making it." He was zero feet from making it as all he had to do is simply turn around when conditions began to worsen. Regardless of how much training pilots receive, no matter how much experience they have, and no matter how much avionics we stuff into an aircraft, there is no protection to to be had when a human being ignores their training, experience, and all of the bits of flight data they have processed, and dives headfirst into the stupid pool. Regardless of the profession, there's simply is no substitute for common sense. When that last line of defense fails, helicopters crash and police officers die.
@@heyinway apparently he hovered and circled in the area next door (Glendale) for 15 minutes, waiting for clearance so as to enter the Burbank area. Surely during this time he could have ascertained, or a ground controller could have mentioned extremely foggy conditions ahead of him? This is when he must have had a few reservations about this flight. I also think it was really bad luck that at this crucial time, as he was trying to rise up above the fog, that the ground controller he was in communication with, went off duty, and the new guy wasn't aware of the situation. Precious seconds lost.
@Melvin Walker I think many people have commented that he was going too fast as he turned West to follow Hwy 101. So, his decision to fly at a fast speed in SVFR with deteriorating conditions as he approached the mountain range (which he was very familiar with) was probably a very bad one for his experience level. I do feel sorry for him and his family, but sometimes we just make simple mistakes that begin a domino effect of more mistakes.
that's a great sentiment - but you can't train for, and can't prepare for pressure cooker type situations like this - i am willing to bet this pilot felt immense pressure to deliver for a VIP. And he probably had taken chances before and didn't get burned so he had a false sense of security. Monday morning QBing is easy.
@@heyinway I believe he was going too fast to do this. Personally, I believe he saw the first big hill top coming fast at him (where the 101 makes a sharp curve approx 45 degrees SW to go around this big hill.) If you look at the parallel road, Mureau Road, next to the 101, it dead ends perpendicular into Las Virgenes Rd. I believe he reacted to the hilltop popping in front if him by pulling up immediately and ascending. (I don't think he any choice.) So, once he did that maneuver, he is already headed into IMC/the clouds. Note: I asked this same question a couple of days after the accident, and basically was told he couldn't hover unless the heli had fixed points for hovering to work. This basically cant happen in IMC because of drift and other issues. (Pardon me if this is not technically accurate.) Hopefully a pilot can explain better. If he had been flying slower after passing Van Nuys, then it seems like he could have stayed within SVFR and seen the beginning of the mountain range approaching, then do as you said.
Brilliant and direct. I think you nailed it. As Dirty Harry put it , a man's got to know his limitations. Humility is merely intellectual honesty. And he honestly ought to have aborted. A sad and regrettable choice. I a sense, like so many other moments in all our lives, he failed by not being conservative enough and failing to respect the risk. Welcome to the human race. RIP.
We used to have to wait a year or more for the FAA report, while at the local airport, everyone knew what happened because they all talked about the technical details. Thank GOD for the Interwebs, now we are like jaw-boning with the guys at the airport who pretty much figured out what must have happened! Thanks Blancoliro, for sharing your world with us! We want to know!
Yes, point taken The report is gonna be really interesting. On top of all the other factors that have been discussed in detail,.I.think.Ara was.star.struck
Juan, nice job on this one. Been following your channel since the beginning and this crash on your channel since it happened. I was flying in to LAX on SWA when the crash happened and remembered noting how foggy it was. Sad situation especially hearing how close they came to breaking out.
There are 2 things that are hammered into every student pilot. 1. Trust your instruments 2. Altitude is your friend It seems like the pilot was aware of and attempting to gain altitude but, his mistake was not trusting his instruments. Every aircraft has a roll and bank indicator - a relatively simple instrument that shows the angle of the wings (rotors) relative to the horizon. Trusting that instrument alone will guarantee that you don't enter into an unwanted turn. His altimeter would have provided the information needed to determine whether he was climbing or descending and his air speed indicator would have shown him how fast he was traveling. These are all basic instruments that are in all aircraft. Conclusion - pilot error. And almost unforgivable based on his license ratings.
@@Born_Stellar No offense.. I am having a hard time accepting that a well qualified, recent checkride, 8000 hr CFII, made a pilot error thru an easy-peasy, 1500-2000 ft cloud layer, 4-5 minute, calm wind and air, STRAIGHT CLIMB, 500fpm cyclic climb-out! I am thinking no CFIT, but Medical (heart attack), Mechanical or vacuum gyro failure. I also find it hard to believe Spatial disorientation on a straight 4-5 min climb-out. Also, Why would he have to "fixate" on anything, other than AI and airspeed, in a short 4-5 minute climb? His climb airspeed was 125kts according to ADS-B data.I don't see a need for any autopilot or related issue. I think Juan said AP was not engaged. Anything is possible, but a 1500' cloud layer, calm wind, IMC climb-out is about as easy as it gets for 8000 hr CFII. Just trying to make sense of it all. RIP.
David AviationKnowledgeOrg I would tend to agree that something else happened. But then again that’s a pretty darn long 5 minutes of what was likely all 9 people in certain panic.
@@Debkghtulvkfjkjfxjjcj The 5 minutes was referring to the normal, straight 500fpm climb-out. I doubt if passengers were panicked during normal climb thru 1500-2000 ft cloud layer. They were probably panicked after inadvertent and unusual attitude, 4000fpm descending turn to left. According to NTSB and Juan above, what caused the turn is the question?
@@discodave1976 - There was one gentleman who was interviewed who said (based on his accounts), he heard the helicopter in the air, but could not see it; meaning if he was on the ground and due to the marine layer fog, it's a chance the pilot could not see well in front of him or even below him? Let's not discount we are talking about the fog in an elevated environment, we are not talking about height based off of sea level.
@@skatelife2013 what do you mean it's a hoax?? Are you trying to say Kobe his daughter and those 7 other people didn't die?? Or are you saying it's a hoax as in they did die just not like how the media is reporting it??
1000th like 👏your videos are very informative and I appreciate hearing your perspective. Thank you for keeping us educated and explaining things easily to those who don't understand all the ins and outs of aviation lingo.
I agree that he explains things very well. But The Flight Channel has come out with an excellent video too that recreates the trip on a simulator. I highly recommend watching it as an adjunct to this video.
If he was in a downward spiral due to spatial disorientation he would have hit the ground anyways. There is no way to recover from that at this point. He did not manage to get above the clouds in time, spatial disorientation hit him before he was able to do so, thats why the spiraling downwards .
Juan's comment that he almost made it is referring to breaking out of the clouds and not to the early reports of almost making it by almost clearing the peak which he made some clarification to in his first or second video.
What's the difference? Sorry english is not my language so maybe I dont understand correctly but clearing the peak is the same as after that it would be a safe flight wouldnt it? Thanks!
I was flying at that time between Oxnard and Camarillo shooting instrument approaches. I reported tops to Mugu approach at 3,100 on my departure from KCMA. On my last approach of the day into KCMA which occurred right about when they would have arrived I was at 3,000ft with tops no more than 50ft below me. The tops were reported at 2,400ft over in the Burbank area but by the time they got to the pass at Las Virgines the tops would have been slightly higher so I don't think they were "within 100 feet" of breaking out. Lastly, during my last approach into KCMA I momentarily made contact with the 101 freeway at the Conejo Grade and it was socked in. It is also a very narrow pass with hills very close by on either side. No way they would have made it to KCMA VFR. I took photos while I was up that day of some of the peaks just sticking through the cloud layer towards the area of the crash. It was a bad time for VFR but a beautiful day above the layer.
Daniel Reyna This guy is good but, it’s nice to hear the perspective of a Southern Californian pilot such as yourself. While you were in the air that morning, I was on the road.
You confirmed my exact thoughts that the tops were likely not consistent at 2400' as they were well behind them in the valley. Typically different orographic conditions once you get into the climbing terrain in those hills and valleys that ultimately divide the "valley" from the ocean and marine environment conditions that persist to the west, & SW near Camarillo/ Oxnard.
@@raoulcruz4404, bases were reported at 1,500 and I estimated visibility at a mile and a half on the ground. Climbing out, by 500ft, the visibility dropped to about 1/2 mi, at most. By 800ft, you could only see the ground below an angle of about 45 degrees from the horizontal. By 1,000 I was solid IMC.
One of the former Island Express helicopter pilots has been on record saying that he didn't think Zobayan had any actual IMC flying experience. Even if he did have a token few minutes in actual IMC, the fact that Island Express was restricted to VMC means that during his tenure working there he would never have flown IFR, let alone in IMC. Just doing a few upset recovery maneuvers during training isn't the same thing as real world IMC spatial disorientation especially when the pilot has little to no actual IMC flying experience to begin with. My guess would be that the bulk of his "instrument flying experience" was gained during his training for his instrument rating which was over 20 years ago and almost certainly done with a hood.
First time I heard of this incident i knew pilot got spatially disoriented in IMC conditions flying under special VFR. No matter how trained you are, flying in soup basically blind does get you disoriented, without sensational feelings of gravity, orientation or coordination Sorry for lives lost and my deepest condolences to families
@@sean7854 It doesn't take long for special disorientation to kick in. It's no different than when someone looks down to check a text while driving and in that 3 seconds or so loses control and crashes their vehicle. An act as simple as looking down can cause special disorientation. So yes, in just a few seconds you can become disoriented and crash.
Great. It will be confusing at first. I got my written out of the way early. I read a book about half way through my training about a guy who flew a typical single pilot IFR flight including managing the radios and what to expect two moves ahead of time. One day it came together in an Ah Ha moment. At each Vor, it's turn, time, twist, throttle, talk. Each as needed.
He almost got there....very sad. But what explains the sharp left turn and the high rate of decent? Why didn't the pilot still follow the highway? Why would he lose control? Why the high rate of speed in basically a dive-like maneuver? I thought the pilot had the experience and training for this exact circumstance. Puzzling, many questions. This coming from a non-aviator. I'm aware of spatial disorientation and have experienced it in a non-flying event. I know it could have played a main role in this tragedy.
I'm wondering that too possibly a control jam or computer malfunction. There was a chinook crash in 1994 Ireland where the chopper had been turned sideways and was tilting. However this was due to 2 issues one of which grounded all at the time after a flawed fcu programming was found. It could cause one engine to rev up and lift, this was software. However there was also a mechanical jam that could occur in the controls. This flight experienced both at the same time. They found the odd angle of impact was due to swinging the tail out attempting to buy time to recover.
@SSIIPP Very possible, but that would more likely be the case with a less experienced, less trained pilot. He just took some extra training that was somewhat similar in nature. Pilot error perhaps, but maybe combined with electronics failure is what I'm leaning towards, even though the equipment had a recent inspection.
Somewhere in these answers is a post from a pilot who was actually flying that day. Burbank tops were at 2400 feet but he says the tops were higher to the west. So perhaps they weren't as close.
I am listening to this video and recalling an airborne conversation with my instrument instructor regarding cloud types along our practice instrument flight route. In the course of that exchange, we discussed the problems of VFR into IMC conditions and what course of action was the safest. I, then asked him about the possibility of climbing briefly through cloud to get on top and back into VFR conditions. He said that this particular cloud type might be referred to as "cumulogranite" and I'd be well advised not to try it. "If you're not assured of VFR flight conditions along your route, file!" He also trained me to have a current VFR sectional handy even when flying IFR for its general terrain information. He probably saved my posterior many times over the last few years and I consider myself blessed to have had such good instructors over the years.
William Swenson Ditto on the VFR sectional while IFR. Lack thereof is what killed Reba Macintyre’s band in an accident. I think that was near Van Nuys????
@@raoulcruz4404 Hello, and thank you for your reply. I did have a real-world in-flight emergency where the open sectional came in handy. I was enroute to Maine and equidistant from Concord and Manchester, NH, when the a/c hung an exhaust valve in IMC. A quick glance at the already open sectional, told me that I had a low range of mountains across my flight path to cross if I elected to go to Manchester. Concord, turned out to be a better choice as with the one cylinder out of commission and the plane wracked by a truly awful vibration, I needed to get down fast and safely. I had always been encouraged by my instructors to declare an emergency, if I had one. Well, I did and had immediate help and radar vectors to Concord where I landed safely. A word with the local maintenance facility on the field and a rental car and I was back on my way to Maine for a seaplane fly-in. Listen, to the older and wiser heads. It will save you much skull sweat; and maybe, your life and the lives of you passengers. W
When your flying in marginal conditions like this, pilots should have the next two steps planned. He could do a 180 while still VFR. If you plan to fly into clouds know your plan of escape ahead of time. IPAD would show his position using Foreflight. Cruise speed was too fast for those conditions. It's usually not just one error but a string of errors adding up, that got him to the hillside
He had much better instruments on board than Foreflight is and more apropriate for task. But it is very easy to lose control and when this happen it is not easy to recover if you dont see horizon and you are only at instruments. Consider spatial disorientation and you can imagine how difficult it can be. This things progress very fast and at some point there isnt solution, if you overspeed Vne your craft disintegrate in the air...
Yeah I'm surprised he didn't (presumably) have the iPad given the conditions. In hindsight it's easy to see, but that's why they call em accidents I guess. Still, I can't help but think the pilot took some chances he wouldn't normally have taken if he didn't have 8 passengers with him. Whenever you're a pilot and anticipate trouble, getting on the ground safely should ALWAYS be your first and only priority. I'm sure Kobe and the passengers would've been disappointed, but would've understood had he chosen a less convenient path. RIP 💜💛💔
Thank you so much for this very informative report! It definitely clarified my suspicions of "Pilot Error"...without intention...just bad judgment!😢 May they all RIP 😇😇😇😇😇😇😇😇😇
Agree, he’s in a climb and the now he is in a decent, uncontrolled if we are to take the eyewitness account at 100% accuracy, while banking left, which would also makes sense why the blades are so far forward of the accident scene, I would imagine upon impact they cartwheel in that direction, had the helicopter done a belly crash, the blades would of broken of and gone in a 360 direction.
Juan, thank you for the updates on the Kobe accident. The tragedy has affected me in ways I would have never imagined (I have nightmares about it). Years ago my girlfriend who was a ballet teacher, in Irvine California had two of Kobe's daughters in her class (including GiGi). Also I used to work out at the same gym where Kobe did. I never actually met him (I didn't want to disturb him, figuring so many people would want to say hi etc.) or spoke to him but I saw him there and for some reason I felt a connection. I think I might have a little bit of additional information to shed on the incident. I am currently 70 years of age and in my early 20s I flew out of Van Nuys Airport at Golden West skyways, part 135 air taxi. I have intimate understanding of the dynamics of that environment, that could shed some light on what happened that dreadful day. Pilots flying part 135/air taxi have a very different dynamic then pilots flying part 121 regularly scheduled airlines. When flying part 135 air taxi, you want to get paid generally when you fly. Secondly, your passengers are not strangers (like in part 121) but generally their people you know. You get a lot of repeat business, and you want to please them and get them to their destination expediently and safely. Unfortunately there is an enormous amount of pressure (or at least during my day) to push the envelope. If conditions were marginal, and you set I'm not going to take the flight, there's always somebody there right behind you that will say okay I'll do it. I know myself that I have suscumbed to this pressure on occasion back then. What I really don't understand from the reports, is that the pilot, Ara, who according to the information I have was very experience north of 8000 hours, and not only instrument rated but instrument instructor etc. etc. Why did he choose to go VFR under the deck and then special VFR when conditions got marginal? I have read reports that I don't believe or understand, that the aircraft/chopper was not certified for IFR. Additionally I also heard reports that the charter company was not certified to fly IFR. I have never heard of such a thing! And to think that a helicopter that Kobe was in would not be certified IFR sounds ludicrous to me. Be that as it may, I put myself in Ara's position, (assuming that conditions were deteriorating, I want to get my clients to their destination with the least amount of delay as possible, I would've thought, okay I'll just bust through the clouds and get on top). I know the area and at that altitude it's highly highly unlikely that someone would be flying IFR in that area that I might collide with. So I believe that Ara made that choice. It is unbelievably hard to accept that he was within 100 feet of busting through the clouds and having complete clear visibility. You and I know as experienced pilots that someone of Ara's ratings and experience would highly unlikely get vertigo or experience disorientation and consequently make a steep left descending turn into the ground. Therefore, I believe that as Ara was climbing out that something happened to distract him from flying the aircraft (perhaps someone in the cabin had tapped him on the shoulder, wanted to ask a question, and Ara lost sight of the artificial horizon for a moment. Or perhaps he had something on his lap, that was important, and it slid off onto the floor of the chopper, and he bent down to retrieve it). In any case I still don't understand, if the aircraft was certified IFR and the charter company was certified IFR, why Ara just didn't ask for a IFR to VFR on top (from Orange County) and then as he comes into Camarillo, simply ask for an IFR approach. I know back when I was flying, just simply going under the clouds would have been faster. But today with GPS and considering the enormous amount of traffic in the LA basin, my guess is heading out from orange county over the ocean and heading straight for Camarillo would have been just as quick! I believe I've will be haunted with these questions for as long as I live. But, unfortunately what is done is done. We can't change it, which makes me so so sad. Thanks Juan, Tom Scott
In spatial disorientation your distance from terrain is a mystery - no one has a clue of what was about to happen. That hikers photo is telling in the report. This pic confirms they knew absolutely nothing because they only saw white. Sadly, then, lights out. Thx, Juan, just great, as always. Live Ready!
In my opinion, it looks like they may have been able to see the ground just before impact. Only 1 or 2 seconds considering the aircraft was moving rapidly
@@Fair-to-Middling Sharp left begun when he start losing control. It was unattended left turn and this results in the fast height loss and increase of speed.
TeaTime maybe he thought the mountain was straight in front of him so he turned left? I personally think he had a stroke or heart attack or something medically because no one can really explain why he went up and left so fast for seemingly no reason at all.
The IFR flight check he got months before meant he was not getting any actual IFR flight experience and probably not for the last 10 years he was with this VFR 135 operation. He was just doing the minimum necessary to retain the rating. Based on the data, he hit at 168, descending at up to 5,000fpm and made a 100-degree change in heading in just the last second or two. That is the definition of ‘out of control’.
Thanks again for the professional input, Juan. Although at times unavoidably technical in nature, I believe that you perform a vital service for the traveling public and the aviation industry alike.
I know from experience that when breaking through the top of a layer of clouds that the sun begins to illuminate several hundred feet below the tops and becomes brighter and brighter as you ascend. It is a steady beacon during a climb and the one steady reference. At 945am in January it is very low in the southeast sky. If he was climbing upward on a southerly heading, and kept the sun forward and above him, as is natural to do, he would turn and go into a spiral, exactly as shown by the flight path.
@@naheedarshad6806 he could have misinterpreted the time of day and therefore the position of the sun in the beginning and when he entered the graveyard spiral it could have been too late even if he realized what is happening. (take with a grain of salt, this is just an uneducated observation)
Damn.... I've been obsessed with all details in this crash for about the last 48 hours. I am not a pilot, I have no education in aviation, but I am an engineer by education and also inquisitive regarding physics/aerodynamics etc. I was also a military aircraft mechanic for several years, but I know that doesn't really qualify me to form opinions in this matter, except for a very basic understanding of flight characteristics such as collective/cyclic pitch, roll, yaw etc. After viewing the treasure trove of comments and information regarding this situation for the past 2 days, I am greatly appreciative for your comment: it is literally the first mention I have read about how he may have been using the sunlight as a reference, and exactly as you mentioned, would have actually been a detriment in this situation had he not taken into consideration the time of day and day of the year.... which he is most certainly to have disregarded in a fast stressful moment. If he was indeed still trying to fly by sight (which is probably the case), it would most certainly explain his decision to take this course, if he had not already lost control of the aircraft. Thank you for your post... I am looking forward to NTSB's final report. Obviously I never want people to perish while flying. I do however think that all aircraft should require black boxes and I also think that whatever caused this fatal occurrence, the pilot is 100% liable because he should have never placed this aircraft in such a dangerous predicament. I get the feeling that he had been doing this "scud running" for quite a while and it finally caught up with him, ultimately taking the lives of 8 other people.
From my previous comment elsewhere: My initial assessment (from day one, based on early photos of the scene) was that the aircraft came in (at least in transition to) inverted. (though at first I thought the inversion may have been due to a minor preceding CFIT impact) You can see how close the simulation (linked below) comes to showing that attitude. Because, if you were descending in low-visibility conditions in that terrain, it would make no sense to descend rapidly. Seems more likely that he was trying to climb, became disoriented, then transitioned to partial if not complete inversion. Viola! You are now descending rapidly, rolling towards inverted, trying to maintain positive g-force in the seat. ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-BCLNJLjitSs.html
@Tor Finn: Eyewitnesses. (strike one) In fog. (strike two) Had a split-second glimpse of the aircraft before it impacted. (strike three) Look at pic #5, and see if the fog looks 300-500 feet above point of impact at this time, and note that the ceiling had probably risen a little since the time of the crash: www.11alive.com/gallery/sports/kobe-bryant-crash-site-pictures/85-0fcc171d-908b-48de-8149-208677c5558b There is EVERY indication he attempted to climb; he maxed out at 2300 feet before the sudden descent began. And climbing would be the safest option in zero visibility. Note that I never said he was trying to slow down. And there is NO WAY a helicopter can make a sharp, 160-knot turn while "flying upright", i.e., with rotors level. Inadvertent roll to the left while attempting to climb would do it. Of course, this is all guesswork... but I stand by the possibility, "eyewitnesses" notwithstanding...
@@transformer889 Exactly. Something happened on the easy-peasy (for an 8000 hr CFII), a STRAIGHT, 500fpm, 125kts, 4-5 minute cyclic climb-out, thru a 1500-2000 ft, CALM WIND, cloud layer. I am thinking vacuum failure, or instrument failure, not CFIT.
Thank you SO much for your report! Clear, concise, and very informative! I didn't personally know anyone aboard this flight. But I am terribly hurt by it! Your reports help to give me closure. Thank you.
Your videos are always timely, thorough and have some of the best information available Juan. MUCH appreciated. To those who are a bit "foggy" (deep apologies for the pun) about why the loss of control..... there's a huge difference between controlling an aircraft with visual references and while in IFR (no visual references, using just the instruments to control the aircraft). To control an aircraft well in IFR conditions, the pilot must have extensive additional training and receive ongoing re-training + checkrides with qualified instructors to keep the skills from deteriorating. It appears that, even though this pilot had received a checkride for IFR flight about 9 months prior to the accident, he still became disoriented after being in IFR conditions for a short time. It also appears the helicopter was in slow forward flight prior to the rapid descent, and my understanding (I am not rotorwing rated) is that helicopters become increasingly difficult to control as the forward speed decreases. Juan points out that the aircraft was a mere 100 feet from cloud tops, which means that if the pilot could have retained control of the aircraft for only a few seconds more (assuming he was ascending at, say 300-500 feet per minute), he would have popped out of clouds and been able to immediately have full control of the helicopter. RIP to all those on board, and prayers for the families involved.
Thanks Juan! Appreciate what you're doing for keeping everyone informed. The best way to prevent accidents is to learn from those that happen. Such a tragic series of events.
Sounds to me like he anticipated the top of the clouds, left the instruments and started looking through the windshield which set up spatial disorientation resulting in a descending turn to the left.
After having to trade seats with a non-pilot in the right seat at night in a Piper Cherokee so I could land the plane, I vowed to never let that happen again. He was flying as a single pilot and I'll bet whoever was in the left seat (it being a helicopter) wasn't a pilot who would have recognized any signs of something going wrong.
From my previous comment elsewhere: My initial assessment (from day one, based on early photos of the scene) was that the aircraft came in (at least in transition to) inverted. (though at first I thought the inversion may have been due to a minor preceding CFIT impact) You can see how close the simulation (linked below) comes to showing that attitude. Because, if you were descending in low-visibility conditions in that terrain, it would make no sense to descend rapidly. Seems more likely that he was trying to climb, became disoriented, then transitioned to partial if not complete inversion. Viola! You are now descending rapidly, rolling towards inverted, trying to maintain positive g-force in the seat. ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-BCLNJLjitSs.html
This isn't the only close-but-still-not-enough crash. Back in 1976 I climbed several mountains in New York state's Adirondack Mountains. Just shy of the top of Wright Peak we saw the wreckage from the crash of a B-47E in January of 1962. Here's one description. "The plane had apparently veered about 30 miles off course on its return trip to Plattsburgh due to inclement weather and high winds, and ventured into the High Peaks. Again, due to a lack of both radio and radar contact with the bomber, it was impossible for the ground crew to know that the plane was off course, let alone warn the pilots. Wright is the 16th tallest mountain in the Adirondacks, at 4580 feet. The bomber was heading in a southwest direction when it just clipped the top of the peak, mere feet from the summit. One might think "if only they were a bit higher..." Unfortunately, had the plane continued on its course, it would have soon come across Mt. Marcy, the tallest mountain in New York State, and nearly one thousand feet taller than Wright. There would have been no escape." adirondack-park.net/history/b47.wright.html
sometimes families just need to know what happened, no matter how technical or sad the conclusions. so sad. so heartbroken that such innocent people had to take a flight on this day..
Thanks for these videos, very informative. What a sad situation, this report built upon what we had already thought and makes it even more heartbreaking.
A possibility in the accident is spatial disorientation. When you lose visual reference to the ground in IMC and start a climb, or a climb with a turn, the somatogravic Illusion is that you are climbing too aggressively and your reaction is to push the cyclic forward and or apply more power. Unfortunately, both reactions will increase the sensation of climbing and therefore motivate the pilot to increase the rate that the aircraft nose is lowered. In my opinion, the sad part is not that they were 100' from VFR on top, but the pilot's decision (contrary to company Operating Specifications) to enter IMC in the first place. The pilot could have chosen the, safe and legal option to turn back to the Van Nuys airport (13 miles), or to land at the LA County Fire Department Station helipad (on Las Virgenes Rd (just 1100' north of Las Virgenes and the 101 intersection), or continued on another 1.4 miles and landed at the much larger and better marked Lost Hills Sheriff helipad (982' south of the 101). Both helipads are marked on the West LA Helicopter Route Chart. Both helipads are approximately a mile from the crash site.
I see a lot of comments saying “well he was IFR and CFII rated so it should be impossible for him to become disoriented”. Chances are high you have never inadvertently flown into IMC. Just because he is rated such and proficient at it as of last spring, doesn’t mean he flys IFR all the time. Idk what else could have happened. NTSB has already proven that an engine failure doesn’t seem the case. Just because he was in IMC for a short period doesn’t mean anything. Spatial disorientation takes seconds. His own company is VFR only. Helicopters typically fly in VFR weather. I believe it was also released that all the victims died of blunt force trauma which means a medical situation seems unlikely. The descent was steep yes, but once he reached the top of his climb he must’ve though he wasn’t gaining altitude quick enough and inadvertently descended banking left thinking he was banking right to less terrain.
Loss of control in IMC. So hard to believe that the intentional maneuver of an experienced pilot to climb through roughly 1500 feet of overcast would result in lost of control. Shocking, sad , and something to learn from. Until now it looked like an inadvertent entry into IMC. Thanks for the update so well done Juan.
beatlemyn, It is fortunate no one else hiking or mountain biking within that general area was struck or killed. On Sunday mornings there a lots of people on the trails.
So it becomes a case of spatial disorientation. What I can't get it is why he reacts like that suddenly. I mean, he trained for that just several monthes before and he initiated the climb perfectly. He was at 100ft to breach. Why did he suddenly decided not to trust and follow his instruments and continue on his straight climb ? Why did he initiated that turn ?
@Fact Check The problem is not that he lost his senses, the problem is he has them and continued to trust them instead of throwing them out and trust his instruments. And he was not hovering, where did that come from?
IMO the NTSB calling it inadvertent flight into IFR conditions is inaccurate. The pilot made the decision to leave visual reference to the ground and bust up through the clouds. The rapid climb without ground reference, flying by the seat of his pants, as his airspeed bleeds off near 2300 ft, it is natural to move the cyclic aft to maintain the physiological perception of a continued climb. At this point he is so far behind the helicopter has totally lost situational awareness (he has not lost control) the helicopter is responding to pilot inputs, helicopter banks to the left and descends the pilot still thinks he is climbing, unintentional controlled flight (at an unusual attitude) into the ground. Scott said it well more training, proficiency, instrument flying is a perishable skill. Clint Eastwood said it well too "Man's got to know his limitations"
The decision-making process in challenging environments holds true even for the most experienced. You have to relinquish your ego and admit life over death even in the face of ridicule. For example, I love hiking and was in good shape when I was challenged one day in the White Mountains of New Hampshire. As so often happens there, the weather can turn on a dime. It was November and warnings are always given for hikes in what may be snow and ice conditions at any given time. There came a point during my ascent where the ground was in ice, visibility was low and very few options to proceed further. At this point, I was very close to making it to the top but stopped to assess conditions around me....I looked around and thought "If I only could get above this next part of the climb, I could make it". As I looked below me I realized that if I slipped and fell, I would be dead today....I was so thankful to not be stupid and turned back. At base camp at the Joe Dodge Lodge there is a wooden chart on the wall for all to see with names of those who died in the Whites for making the wrong decision. Despite that, there are deaths that occur every year.
good description via Wikipedia on SD "Effects of disorientation Once an aircraft enters conditions under which the pilot cannot see a distinct visual horizon, the drift in the inner ear continues uncorrected. Errors in the perceived rate of turn about any axis can build up at a rate of 0.2 to 0.3 degrees per second[citation needed]. If the pilot is not proficient in the use of gyroscopic flight instruments, these errors will build up to a point that control of the aircraft is lost, usually in a steep, diving turn known as a graveyard spiral. During the entire time, leading up to and well into the maneuver, the pilot remains unaware that he is turning, believing that he is maintaining straight flight. One of the most famous mishaps in aviation history involving the graveyard spiral is the crash involving John F. Kennedy Jr. in 1999."
The pilot got special VFR, but looks like once he got into the mountains he hit unsafe conditions so he pulled the chopper up to safety, but got disorientated on the assent through the tall thick clouds. Super sad.
9:22 - "Radar service is terminated". Question: What else did ATC say? Answer: "Remain that Squawk" 9:55 - "Was not aware as radar services terminated".... Again -- "Remain that Squawk" from prior. 10:00 - What I'm not hearing you read is that the controller said, "You're following a 1200 code, do you want Flight Following".. Note: This was not in the Preliminary Report. Question: Why is that we're not focusing on, aside from weather, the fact that he also had a "head-in-the-cockpit" distraction with Squawk Codes? "Radar service is terminated". "Remain that squawk". "We're currently at 1400' and we have 0235". - that's was his Squawk code from prior Helicopter 72EX, yeah, you're following a 1200 code. So, you're requesting flight following? So... if he wanted radar services, he would want to put "head-in-cockpit" and resolve that. Note: What he's likely resolving is that when he originally heard "Radar service is terminated", he pressed the reset button to 1200.. Looked up and.... didn't know he was already in zero visibility. Would be great to know from NTSB if they could resolve what his transponder was finally set to.
Human Factors with Paul Garth Good points. There are a lot of human factors and procedral issues for the NTSB to look at. Doesn't change the basic understanding of the accident though.
Disorientation, the left turn fooling the inner ear as to gravity ( witness saw belly of craft) thought he was straight and level and climbing instead of spiraling down. centrifugal force instead of actual gravity effect in absence of visual reference. Just a thought that most would succumb to with anything less than the training astronauts go through, a lot of drivers get disoriented on a roundabout. So sorry for the loss, love and condolences to family's. Thanks Juan for the tough job you have taken on, buisier on this topic than you would want to be. Time for another road trip to clear the cobwebs out.
@@ShaneJoshua1980 the pilot was goind really fast before the turn, now imagine turning left, like when a MotoGP rider turns left he goes low and sideways using the "centrifugal force" to not fall off, the pilot was doing the same, but he though he was turning at a constant altitude, he didnt feel he was going down because the "centrifugal force" made him believe he was doing the right thing.
Thank you Juan for your report on this crash. As for me I would not have flown at that time. Safety comes first not the ball game. May you and yours have a blessed day. Shabbat Shalom
So sad a bad decision can be fatal that 9 people suffered with their lives. Cant blame anyone at this point because no one will come back. But, it is a lesson for the rest of us, especially pilots. May God be with Pilots and any passengers with them.
@@davehughesfarm7983 Dont mock what I said, I just think many mistakes are preventable but not that some will even if we try. Getting things out of contexts doesn't teach anyone a thing.
Sounds to me that it was a good helicopter flown by a competent pilot who just got into a bad situation, got disoriented, lost SITNESS and ended up simply making a small error in managing attitude which then led to the over bank which in a helo VERY quickly erodes into loss of control. In this case he didn't have room to recover. Most pilots, if they're honest will tell you that they were "lucky" to get out of situations in which they were caught "flat footed" at times. In the magazine "Flying" there's a very long running "I learned about flying from...." segment in which pilots who've escaped those type of situations re-count them and give an HONEST assessment of their own short comings, or poor preparation but who ended up living through it. THIS is one of those instances where they were "that close" to being able to write the same story...RIP to all. All in the helo. All in the families and All of the witnesses. I've witnessed a helo crash (Sideflare 56) in which 5 friends were killed and it's something you just don't forget...
From my previous comment elsewhere (you stated the same with fewer words!): My initial assessment (from day one, based on early photos of the scene) was that the aircraft came in (at least in transition to) inverted. (though at first I thought the inversion may have been due to a minor preceding CFIT impact) You can see how close the simulation (linked below) comes to showing that attitude. Because, if you were descending in low-visibility conditions in that terrain, it would make no sense to descend rapidly. Seems more likely that he was trying to climb, became disoriented, then transitioned to partial if not complete inversion. Viola! You are now descending rapidly, rolling towards inverted, trying to maintain positive g-force in the seat. ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-BCLNJLjitSs.html
I'm not a pilot but this is a very interesting point to me. So I suppose you're suggesting that if the aircraft was tilted as it spiraled down the pilot (and anyone on board) wouldn't have been able to feel the descent? Is that right? Because it makes it all make more sense.
Kevin Hamilton I only used to fly ultralights here in Oz but I think what Michael is pointing out is that the increased positive G from the left turn will be countered by the negative G from the descent so you only sense a normal 1G.
Correct. Neither the descent nor the turn is perceived. It feels like straight and level. The turn and the descent must be increased to maintain sensation of straight and level .
@George Martin yeah, Kobe called a ref a "faggot" and then he grew from that situation, apologized, and became an advocate for the LGBT community and active spoke out against that kind of language. Obviously you know that already but chose to omit that from your post in an attempt to smear him. His rape accuser had semen samples in her underwear from several other men that was taken in her rape kit. She would have gotten destroyed in court. She refused to testify against him.
I think that's only a small factor though. If I'm transporting a high value client, i want him to arrive safely every time to keep my business cash flowing. But the lack of guts to turn around earlier in the flight, despite potential time delays is worth noting. Communicating the issue to said client could have prompted Kobe called ahead to advise the Mamba sports facility of his time constraints. Thus removing any added pressure to continue the mission despite the increased risk.
@@thomashimes644 I agree completely! He could have advised Kobe of the bad weather ahead and told him that he'd have to land. He could have told him to make arrangements to be transported by car the rest of the way. So senseless that these precious lives were lost!
I think "mission fixation" was a big factor in this accident. Otherwise he would have aborted the "mission" at, lets say, Van Nuys airport and get his passenger to the destination by ground travel.
Juan, Your reporting is very detailed, much appreciated, but apparently not preliminary conclusion from NTSB or from you. From the way you described his climbing to get through the clouds, almost broke through then descending powered left hook and crash, it sounds like the pilot lost his orientation in the clouds. Does that seem likely considering his IFR rating?
If the witness on the ground saw the choppers belly just prior to impact that means the occupants may have known their fate just before they died.. oh my God how horrible!!!
This latest detail....especially with the ATC communications and ADS-B data (I know it’s not new, but some of it was to me even though I’ve been fallowing this closely) really sheds some new light and paints a much better picture. I hadn’t heard ALL of this data until now. Once again, great video and thanks for sharing Juan...your the man.
mrloop Maybe emphasizing the danger of detail in this manner was cliché, but there was no need to express original thought in something so blatantly obvious. Is mentioning a cliché disparagingly cliché in itself?
Aiming to climb up through the top of the cloud cover at 2400 feet ... then having to find a hole in the cloud cover to eventually descend and either relocate special VFR flying conditions or land someplace. Out of the frying pan and into the fire. It's no wonder the state police suspended helicopter operations that day.
I'm not a flight engineer or pilot or anything remotely connected to aviation. However, I feel like I got an education unfortunately for such a tragic loss. Thank you for taking the time to explain in regular person terms and given us an understanding of this event.
