You have no idea how happy I am that these exist. I study philosophy of science at an Ag school. No lectures on Kripke or Wittgenstein here. Thank you.
This is awesome! I've been reading Kripke for a Philosophy of Language course I have been taking this semester and I must say this was really helpful in getting a nice sketch of his view. Thanks!
In Lecture 3 of Naming and Necessity, Kripke mentions 'essence' without crediting Spinoza. He does mention Kant, Mill, Russell, Frege and a slew of his contemporaries. But he leaves out Spinoza, whose 'essence' is the lense grinder's property. So I am going to say it to Kripke's 'essence'.... Baruch Spinoza.
The Professor tells you at least that you are expected or intended to teach students, and that you are uniquely relevant of all professors in this context.
Thanks to Professor Bonevac, I have been falling down the Descartes/Frege/Russell/Quine/Carnap/Kripke rabbit hole for almost a week. I climbed out. It seems to me that Kripke's major contribution (and don't forget Putnam) was to point out that a lot of people spent a lot of time, in Austin's words, barking up the wrong gum tree. Let's go back to Nietzsche, whom one ignores at one's own peril. I quote What is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphism: in short, a sum of human relations which which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transformed, and embellished, and which after long usage, seem to people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions-they are metaphors that have become worn out and drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their image and are now only useful as metal.
In a sensory deprivation tank, would you even have a concept of what is separate? How could you even conceptualize numbers when there aren't any distinctions?
In a sensory deprivation tank you wouldn't name yourself simply because names are used to identify, you need more than 1 person to need an identifier. You can see the progress of this concept within languages as parents identify their children on a first name basis, surnames evolved when their were more than 1 person using the same name and so forth.
There is a major problem with the treatment of necessity in this lecture since it comes from the Aristotelian system of thought in opposition to the Megaric system, and it does not account for that. For the Megareans, anything that happened in the past must have happened because if some event occurred, it is not possible that it did not happen. The problems here enter with the assumption (one of Kripke) that "the past events happened but might not have happened", and that appears illogical to us at times at least, depending on the system we use. Brant (2019) has a chapter on this in Beyond Legal Minds as well as Hartmann (1937 & 1938). Depending on which system we use, many of the statements that are not necessary for Kripke are necessary for Diodoros and Philo the Logician, for instance. This lecture guides students into the Aristotelian system first, and then they evaluate Kripke's additions. However, such assumptions would never be made when the thinker uses the opposing system.
Question from the 33:20 mark on how the causal theory of meaning requires concepts because baptismal events need to pick out specific things and referring to one specific thing requires some concept of it; imagining a person in a deprivation chamber trying to name themselves. Isn't it the case that the descriptive theory runs into a similar problem at a certain point? We only know what one concept or name is in reference to other names, eg 'Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander the Great' well who was Alexander the great then? Quine and those who rejected epistemological functionalism could just say that this isn't a problem because these concepts support each other in a network with justification being non-linear. Couldn't you make the same move for the causal theory of meaning? That naming one thing in a baptismal event requires that we have already made other baptismal events and that as a whole they only make sense in relation to each other but not in isolation - or in an isolation sensory deprivation tank. You could then make the same move to a confirmation holism with networks of names getting their meaning through pragmatic consideration and individual names getting their meaning through baptismal events that depend on the meaning of other names. [Philosophy of language isn't my field but i loved your lecture +Daniel Bonevac ]
If you find something painful that isn't c-fiber firing then c-fiber firing was misidentified as pain. It means pain isn't what we thought it was not that pain is independent of material.
If a c-fiber firing isn't equivalent to pain itself as experience, why would a causal event be equivalent to reference to an object? Why can Kripke reduce concepts to a causal event? No matter what baptism event occurs, we can still hold an idea of things in our mind.A concept, that is. Nixon as a concept, is not equivalent to the event that caused us to call a person Nixon.
Does any one have a comment on the way patent and copyright laws operate in every possible world? Or is reality open source? How do names and identity work together? If my street name is "Fang DaWg" what kind of image would others have of me?
The dualist argument feels like a linguistic trick in that it's presuming what it sets out to prove. Is there a possible world where physical phenomenon C is not the same as mental state P? Maybe there is and maybe there isn't. Maybe the physical phenomenon is by definition necessary for the mental state. Maybe imagining P without C IS the same as imagining water without H20. How could we possibly know?
at 17:54 ish this professor goes a tad nutty, granted he just came out of having zero students denote a priori nor a posteriori "correctly" which may be a problem with him resorting to himself and historical figures. Opposed to "there are deep orbit satellites" in this instance and "I have to eat" in the other. When he speaks about Kripke's "nots," he points to alternative universes opposed to outrightly saying that there is another of plato's students who is greater than aristole but we cannot assert who. Or that Aristole was more than two people, like shakespeare was accused of being. This professor points to chronological "fact point" possibilities . The current king of france could be a boy with a cardboard crown where a father is telling his boy that he, the boy, IS the king of france. Not certain what to think, about this professor or his teaching style. Must be lots of pressure when teaching large curriculums in limited allotments of time.
Could you please make your point a bit clearer and more specific in what you're referring to in your sentences? Also, what was the purpose of a comment if not to communicate, and if so why not communicate in a way that is comprehensible?
@@woodsofchaos Because the point isn't to communicate, it's to whine, nitpick, and show us how smart he is. That's how it always is with "intellectual comments".
Is that supposed to make sense? The students are loud because the professor doesn't care about sound quality? How about we stick the blame on the loud people and not on the professor?
秀兰 C. geez, thanks for sharing your passionate defense of these RU-vid uploads. Oh my G, it's like really so ungrateful of people to like even complain and stuff about this amazing professor that we're lucky to even get hear at all. We should fucking hang ourselves.
At around 13:00 it is clear the students here don't know what experience means: they seem to think it means something like the experience you gain as you grow older; hence the claim that "without experience you can know that you are hungry", since even a small child who hasn't gained much of any experience can know that. But that of course does not make it á priori, because the students sense of experience is not the one relevant for discourse on á priori.
I still don't get how one is supposed to know what is possible and what isn't, how can you say that what happened in macro history could have happened in any other way ? How can you say that Nixon could've lost the election ? Is it because people could have voted differently? But what if they couldn't, what if what happened in the past is the only time and way such epoch could exist? You can't just ignore determinism and causation just for your philosophical paper to work, most actions have intentions behind them, there's no chance involved, only influence and context.
i might be wrong, but i see it as kripke arguing for parallel universes in another parallel universe nixon mightve lost, and hes saying that the use of "Nixon" as a definite description i.e. won the election in 1968 is an invalid definition of nixon as it may very well not be the case in another universe other than ours that is the name Nixon is not synonymous with its definite description and is not necessary (as it may not true in all other parallel universes)
Non sense , the doubt that student asked about mind being in the chamber , surely says that mind is nothing but memory matrix and the world is nothing but state of mind with respect to the waking , dreaming and deep sleep !
The meaning of a priory without the dream world is meaningless. Likewise MI and SI absent the dream world reshuffling everything, remain intellectual treatises .
Everything you just said is not necessarily true, was necessarily true, as evidenced by the fact that it actually happened. There is only one actually possible world. All other worlds are either imaginary or hypothetical.
@Bob Bobbertson there are moments in time when i could agree with that statement...and other moments when i remember how fish react when you throw crumbs of bread into the water...(...carrots and sticks...)
is it possible, .........that every single explanation, ..(......that you have posited so far...) . ........is nothing more than a figment, . (.......of your imagination...)
