Ernest Nagel discusses knowledge and cognitive meaning in a 1966 lecture given at Cooper Union. Note, the last minute of the lecture was cut off. #philosophy #epistemology #science
This transcript covers a lecture by Ernest Nagel on "Meaning and Knowledge". Here's a breakdown of the main points: 1. Introduction: Nagel starts by stating that knowledge is a fundamental human pursuit, but often claims to knowledge are unfounded. He connects the concept of meaning with knowledge: We need meaningful questions to pursue knowledge, and meaningful statements to express that knowledge. 2. Different Senses of Meaning: Nagel distinguishes three senses of "meaning": Signification: What an event or thing "signifies" (its consequences or causes). Purpose: What the purpose of a human action is. Cognitive Meaning: The meaning of linguistic expressions (phrases, statements). 3. Cognitive Meaning and Its Problems: Nagel focuses on "cognitive meaning" - the meaning of statements in a language. He argues that simply looking up dictionary definitions isn't always enough to understand meaning. He provides examples like Newton's "absolute time" and "absolute space", and the statement "I sleep more slowly than others", highlighting how seemingly meaningful expressions can be ambiguous or lack content. He discusses the problem of defining "God" and "God's existence" as examples of potentially meaningless statements. 4. Criteria for Meaningful Statements: Nagel reviews three proposed criteria for distinguishing meaningful statements from meaningless ones: Hume's Criterion: An idea is meaningful if it can be traced back to simple impressions derived from experience. Nagel argues this criterion is inadequate due to the complexity of human experience and the difficulty of reducing all concepts to simple impressions. Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim: The meaning of a statement lies in its practical consequences and effects on human behavior. Nagel finds this criterion too loose, as it relies on "conceivable" effects, which can be subjective. Operationalism (Bridgman): The meaning of a statement is defined by the operations used to verify it. Nagel points out that different operations can be used to verify the same concept, leading to an oversimplification of language. 5. Conclusion on Meaning: Nagel concludes that there is no universal, foolproof rule for determining if a statement is meaningful. He emphasizes the importance of context and the interconnectedness of statements within a larger system of knowledge. 6. Knowledge and Certainty: Nagel shifts to the problem of knowledge and certainty, focusing on knowledge of contingent facts (things that could be otherwise). He presents two traditional views on certainty: Aristotelian Rationalism: There are certain, self-evident first principles that can be known with absolute certainty, and all other knowledge can be derived from them. Nagel argues this view is flawed because many supposed self-evident truths have been proven false. Empiricism: Certainty can be found in immediate sensory experience. Nagel argues this view is also flawed because sensory experience can be deceptive and requires interpretation based on general propositions. 7. Conclusion on Knowledge: Nagel concludes that there is no absolute certainty about contingent facts. He suggests that "reliable" knowledge is the result of inquiry using specific methods and critically evaluating evidence. He highlights the importance of testing claims to knowledge against observation and experience. Overall, the lecture explores the complex relationship between meaning and knowledge, challenging us to consider the limitations of our language and the difficulties in achieving certainty about the world.
A lecture that is still relevant and interesting. One of the tasks of the philosophy of science is to continually question, in short, the basis on which science is done. Scientists need to be continually challenged when it comes to the fundamentals of science and the ground rules used to do research. Since much is based on intuition (even in mathematics and logic, consider the basis of axioms), it is important that critical questions be constantly asked in that context as well. In that critical attitude ultimately lies the progression for science as a whole.
In the case of analyzing infinity into simple ideas, it doesn't seem to me be that difficult. Infinity seems to the compound of finitude - which we see everyday as things come to an end or cease - and negation - which we also experience everyday whenever we say that something is not something else. You have the idea of things which end and the idea of things which are not other things, you combine them and get "a thing which doesn't end," without ever having had to experience infinity
Philosophy overdose- will you reupload a certain conversation on Heidegger? It begins with one speaker recounting an episode from the end of Homer's Odyssey, of Odysseus and his oar
Around the 33:00, could someone help me understand what is the confusing thing about dispositional properties? Why can't you just say that the property of solubility *is* the fact that when you put it on a solvent, it will dissolve. The dissolution causes a distinct impression on me, so there is no problem. I see that it is a bit more complicated because it is an "interaction" property, but I don't follow his claim that there is no available impression.
Consider an aspirin. You can see the aspirin. You can put the aspirin in a glass of water and see it dissolve. But when you look at the aspirin you do not see the solubility of the aspirin. You see the un-dissolved aspirin or, when you put the aspirin in water, you see the aspirin dissolve. But you don't perceive the disposition to dissolve, which the aspirin has even when it isn't being manifested.
@@HowardSankeythanks fpr the reply. I agree with most of what you say, except the part that the solubility is imperceptible. If it is soluble in water it is polar, and there are tests you could do that are not dissolving it, that would make it perceptible. I don't think you can get away with saying that you are not allowed to do any testing, otherwise you can come up with scenarios where even color or shape are not "perceptible".
@@Danyel615 Not sure what the tests are. If they involve instruments, then that will depart from perception, which would have been the Humean idea. I think maybe you're talking about the structural (or "categorical") basis for the disposition.
@@HowardSankey I think the instrumentation issue is a red herring so let me do a last try with an example. Think of an avocado, it is green inside and round. Those have clear associated impressions on me. Then, it also has the characteristic of being tasty--- I think that should be a dispositional property. I can taste it and verify it just like I can put the salt in water and see if it dissolves. I think Nagel would like to say that there are no impressions associated with the tastiness. I want to argue that that is not the case (and it is a true example). I'm good enough with the knife that just by how the avocado feels while I'm cutting it with the knife, I can tell if it will be a really tasty one or not. I'd say that's a clear impression about the dispositional property! It has to do with touch and not taste so it is fair. The reason I can do that is that of course how tasty it is depends on its constituent molecules, but its structural integrity also depends on the molecules, and the two go together. I never observe a single property in a vacuum, but that doesn't mean I never observe any properties! I think the analogy with the salt and how it is soluble in water is clear. The way the molecules constitute the salt make it soluble, but it also make it polar, and by those polarity impressions I can *know* that it will be soluble in water without having to toss it in the water.
@@Danyel615 I'll have one last crack at this. First, the Nagel comment comes at a point where he is talking about Hume. I take it he is talking about sense impressions, which are going to be of directly perceptible properties. Being white (the colour of the aspirin) or dissolving when actually placed in water will be perceptible in that sense. But the ability to dissolve, when that ability is not being manifested, wouldn't be perceptible in the relevant sense. Second, as to the example of the avocado, it's not clear that "being tasty" would be the disposition. What would be closer to the disposition would be being such that, if one were to bite into the avocado, it would taste good. I'm not certain about your wording. But it looks like there is an inference from the appearance of the avocado as visually presented to the belief that the avocado will taste good. If that's right, then the inference is adding something that would not be available to the sensory impression strictly construed.
