The other videos I mentioned: Idealizations ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-4l5Y_Vt7Vc8.html& Species concepts ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-0yKIUwUpuDU.html ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-6m6VohamMP4.html The evolutionary theory of rape: ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-mEE1hVeMU_U.html ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-48R3sh8I2T8.html
I follow the analogy, but in reality, good cactus roots are wide and shallow, not deep. They don't try finding deep water, they try catching as much surface rain and dew as possible.
A lecturer teaching kant used the example of jaundice to illustrate the copernican turn. A medical student stood up and corrected the lecturer by saying jaundice doesn't make what you see yellow, it just makes your eye look yellow. But everyone else got the point except that student
@@YM-cw8so Analogies that depend on blatant factual inaccuracies are lazy analogies. Why would I trust a teacher to know their own material if the material I have the background to fact-check is incorrect? The point of having a teacher is to be able to trust that they're teaching accurately. If the parts of their instruction that I already know are incorrect, why would that make me think the parts of their instruction I don't already know are any better?
Great lecture Kane, thank you very much! Are you planning lectures on normative ethics or political philosophy (for example, on versions of utilitarianism, or on communitarianism)?
Nice video! Have you ever considered doing a video for philosophy students about what job fields they can go into? I got a BA in philosophy and still don't really know, at the moment I'm thinking about journalism. Carneades is actually doing a series on it right now I really wish loving philosophy wouldn't be so painful on the economic level haha
Just: Proposition(p) 1: It is is morally good to act in ways that preserve naturally good humans. p2: A good human is not defective (blind, dumb, death, etc.) p3: Many traits that make humans defective are inheritable. Conclusion 1: It is good to prevent defective humans from reproducing with good humans.(Negative eugenics) p4: Some amount of good humans will die before giving birth. p5: A large population is more likely to preserve its traits. Conclusion 2: It is good for there to be a large population of good humans.(Positive Eugenics) p7: Humans require resources to increase there population. Conclusion 3: Good humans should have more resources. p8: Defective human require resources. p9: At any given time the total amount of resources is finite. Conclusion 4: It is good for defective humans to have less resources. Definition: Genocide Article II c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. (UN Convention on [...] Genocide) Conclusion 5: It is good to commit genocide on defective humans.
Am I being a naive armchair philosopher for thinking this is extremely dumb? "I'm human, therefore, the universe forces me somehow to be an average human"
The mistake is that you think it's a cosmic law that you should behave like an "average" human. Plus, what the video neglects is the scope of flourishing. What does it require for a human being to flourish qua human being. Then it follows more easily, although not necessarily, that you should have the resources to live a life that is characteristic of humans.
Not only is it problematic to try and cone up with necessary and sufficient conditions for a species, species do not suffer. Individuals suffer. There is often not a singular behavior for a species, and they will rotate behaviors for an optimal evolutionary strategy. Categorical morality will thus fail. Objective ethics must first concede that we all have individual desires and dislikes. Harm is whatever that individual's subjective preferences dictate.
Kaneeee, would you consider making more videos on logic and philosophy of language, those are the ones I find the most appealing. Some videos similar to for example the ones you did on Russell’s theory of descriptions would be great
I don't have any plans re Russell's theory of descriptions, but I am actually working on a couple of philosophy of logic videos... dunno when they'll be done though.
When it comes to the coherence of Aristotelian concepts when it comes to Biology and Evolution, have you seen Christopher Austin's book Essence in the Age of Evolution published in 2018 by Routledge? That to my mind is the best case offered for Aristotelianism more generally in light of current Biological Science.
Just because biologists use a variety of different concepts for carving up populations into species which do not classify all organisms in the same way doesn’t mean there is not an essential (or basic if u prefer that term) species. The essential property I share with every other human being is my capacity to conceptualize, to reason, a property necessary for being human. You’re not a member of the human species unless u have this essential biological property.
sounds like a view that wants its darwinian cake, but doesn't want to eat it excuse the bad comment, great video as always! also as always with morality, there seems to be no force behind this view either
Sometimes bridges between artificial ideas and the natural world are somewhat clear; for example, money is a "completely human invention", but it represents fungible value, which is probably not a human concept, and other organisms trade and examine goods when trading. Some ideas are harder yet to bridge, for example it's arguable whether our idea of religion has any faint analogy to something in the natural world (perhaps the closest thing I can think of is family ceremonies, like in elephant graveyards). Without saying morality is a natural property, could we only that it could be seen to originate *from* a natural property? We don't really know how animals feel about the "behavioural contrainsts/rules" of fighting and mating, except that they respect them, execute them to a ritualistic degree, and punish transgression. Human's sense of justice when others do not interact properly (according to the rules of engagement) could be something that any animal "feels" as simply the hardwired behavioural constraints imposed by hundreds of millions of years of evolved interactions. We have a tendency to think (at least it seems many people do) that we can simply do whatever we want. As a result, hardwired behaviour seems of a somewhat 'flimsier' nature than hardwired physiology, but this is a sort of bias.
Very interesting video and view. Are you going to do a video on metaethical humean constructivism, seeing that you already did one on kantian constructivism?
Yes, I'm planning on covering all the contemporary metaethical theories at some point. I don't know when I'll get around to it. I might do a separate video on Humean constructivism, or I might cover it on a video on contemporary metaethical relativism.
@@KaneB would you consider constructivism a kind of subjectivism, as all moral norms are ultimately grounded on the subject's preferences, or would you consider it a kind of moral naturalism, as moral facts are natural?
@@yourfutureself3392 I'd take Humean constructivism to be a type of subjectivism, since it denies that there are any attitude-independent moral facts. I suppose you could class this as a kind of naturalism broadly speaking, but "moral naturalism" usually refers specifically to naturalistic forms of realism. Humean constructivism is firmly on the antirealist side.
I challenged Dr Richard Carrier (neo-Aristotelian naturalist) on this on Derek Missedvision's channel, and he didn't Answer my question. They just smuggle in normativity.
It is a false dilemma to try to force a person to pick one of the two in the question, “Which concept [ecology or biology] do we use for determining the Aristotelian categoricals?” We use none (in the understanding of Aristotle). My understanding is that (1) Aristotle would say species is the whole essence of the subject (e.g. “rational animal” is the species of man). Moreover, (2) his understanding of species are-properly speaking-one of the many predicables, not categories. The concern of biology species or ecology species misses the point, even granted the definitions of species from biology or ecology-go with Aristotle’s definition instead! If one is not satisfied with Aristotle definition of species, make up another name for the meaning but just use the same meaning of, “whole essence of the subject.”
I think you’re rig guy that ideal-gas-talk isn’t normative, but I don’t think the normative interpretation is bizarre. It is not bizarre to think of ideality as normative. It is not bizarre to think of usefulness as normative.
I don't think there's anything bizarre about taking usefulness to be normative. What's bizarre would be the inference that because it's useful to model hydrogen as an ideal gas in some circumstances, therefore this hydrogen somehow objectively (i.e. independent of human desires and concerns) "ought to be" an ideal gas, or is "aiming towards" the ideal gas, or that it is objectively better for hydrogen to be more like an ideal gas.
@@KaneB I am inclined toward Jesse Kyle's response. I think you are strawmanning Foot's position. She seems to make the inference that, because it is useful to model hydrogen as an ideal gas, the ideal gas serves as a normative standard by which we can make normative claims. She does not seem to say that it is objectively better for hydrogen to be more like an ideal gas.
@@suzettedarrow8739 Foot doesn't say anything about idealization or hydrogen, as far as I'm aware. I'm suggesting idealization, of which the ideal gas law is an example, as an alternative interpretation of what Foot calls the "Aristotelian categoricals" concerning biological organisms. >> She does not seem to say that it is objectively better for hydrogen to be more like an ideal gas This concedes the point of the objection. Foot thinks that Aristotelian categoricals do commit us to attributing objective goodness or defects to organisms. I'm saying: these Aristotelian categoricals can alternatively be taken as idealizations, and idealizations don't seem to commit us to objective normativity.
Well yeah. It's an introduction. I wasn't trying to cover everything. So I selected an influential contemporary defense of the position and some of the standard objections. That's how my introductory videos work.
@@KaneB saying that after fact seems just like a dodge. The title of the video is clearly Metaethics - Aristotelian Naturalism yet you went over one of the weakest arguments yet painted it as if it is the most contemporary.
seems like the use of the word "goodness" is just a rhetorical tactic to smuggle in some kind of attribution of value to life--this value statement made about life is still being attributed subjectively. I reject the use of the word "goodness" here altogether.
I have to say, this seems like an intelligent view for someone living 2000 years ago... maybe. It seems absolutely ridiculous to me today. Your points about species indeterminacy and multiple kind overlap just totally wrecks this view. I feel like the individual would have to asset the *ultimate kind* without any real justification.
@@jessekyle6998 natural goodness, in which one of the main functions of life being examined is the ability to reproduce, and the ability to live, is literally being couched under the word GOODNESS. How are you missing this??? It's at the top of heirarchy of concepts being examined. I can't think of anything more Normative than calling things good and bad. There is clearly some kind of outside over-morality functioning with a system like this. Good according to what? Good according to who? Nature? The subjective? What a load of crap.
Luckily, no one cares whether you agree - Aristotle simply wrote down how people do in fact live and think according to morality. Morality is not a theoretical or even philosophical question. Your (and others', you're not alone in this overintellectualization) problems with 'smuggling in normativity' is solved in anthropological practice by people in fact 'smuggling in' normativity in this way, this being the meaning/use (meaning and use correspond; Wittgenstein) of words like 'good'/'bad'.
Why some people seems can't give up moral objectivity?! Reading some of them, it seems to me that many want the same think: a way to humanity live in peace, a way all disagreements can be solved, the end of war, the end of conflict. Moral objectivity would gives all of us the same rules, it would give us all the answers to disagreements, would give order to the world. But if there's no way(100% shore) to have completely peace?! The best we can do if we want peace is reduce conflict, reduce war or maybe someday we can create rules that gives us completely peace, but we can't be sure if this is possible(I would bet only rules can't do that, we would need to change or biology and environment, maybe completely peace is possible with some rules to some beings in some places, but completely peace is possible with others rules to other beings to other places...We did not evolve to be peaceful because we didn't born in a peaceful world.). Here I think are many moral Subjevists. I can't help to think that all moral talk is about trying to achieve completely peace or maximum peace. Amoralist here would be the ones that don't care about peace and Caligulas the ones that want war. If we achieve completely peace we would achieve completely happiness?!
@@noah5291 If the what's best for your well-being become what's the best for well-being of others and if the best for well-being of others become what's best to your well-being, we would achieve peace and happiness for all in a environment that can provide the means easily to maximum well-being of all. Do that will be level expert.
The word "objective" in itself is meaningless, referring to nothing. I suggest it comes from old Carthusian dogma which proposes existence of two metaphysicaly different introspective subject and external objective worlds. If we accept that there are no external(obj) and internal(subj) worlds, but only just ordinary world without any Carthusian metaphysics, then in sense moral naturalism suggest itself as a true it will be true. For some reason, modern philosophers have forgotten the criticism of skepticism by Moore, the philosophy of ordinary language, Wittgenstein's theses about what language is, and have returned to the old Cartesian dogmas, trying to find and talk about things which cannot be expressed by natural human language.
