Afterthought. Perhaps a later, milder Nietzsche would have been civilized by his success a little bit (just remember: he wrote almost everything into a nonresponsive world) and see that it was a little awkward to condemn successful (!) slave-ethics as being anti-life. That is in effect, to strangely define the expressions of the interests of the living masses as being anti-life. Or the obvious inconsistency that he had to condemn them on the ground of being untrue and illusory (!). In the posthumous work he sometimes himself considers if anti-life programs like Christianity should not be considered as valid life-forms in the usual deceitful struggle for power. But that would have rendered much of his polemics a bit ridiculous. The outcome would have been a more mature, evolutionary outlook, to view EVERY social phenomenon (even the ascetic, even the anarchist, even life turning against itself) as being a more or less successful life-utterance. Also: Obviously the born or becoming aristocrat ONLY becomes a creative, value-setting and generating genius when under pressure of the less successful (a thought that N. would despise). Sometimes I think that had N. known more of the world, he could have become a lesser Hegel. To cut short: I view Nietzsche as a kind of specialist in the necessary defense of values against morals (Stirner did it more efficiently with just one book). He was making good (amoral) points, but exaggerated them to a degree where they became almost meaningless. To end on a positive note: What did he help to do, in effect? He encouraged a lot of adolescents, artists and (N. would have spat out) entrepreneurs to go pursuit their own way, which is a rather good thing.
Can you elaborate on what you mean by a “lesser Hegel?” Also, as someone who hasn’t read Stirner) what makes his work more efficient? The popular culture leaves me with the impression he just called them spooks.
17:47 The statement that Nietzsche did not view his stuff as a political program almost threw me off my chair. As if N. was only keen on Goethe and Beethoven (and as if their art had not also have a strong political undercurrent). He made it very clear that the Borgias and Bonapartes were his political heros and he admired them exactly for their determined lack of regard towards the masses. How can Leiter, a person with a generally good grasp of N.s views utter such absurdities? It is like saying Marx only wanted to understand economics. Nietzsches aristocratism was of course eminently political, he commented on all political currents of his time extensively from this viewpoint (interestingly, but often ignorantly). One practical application he suggested was to crossbreed a new Herrenrasse for Europe (Prussian-Polish militaries and Jews, no Germans to see here) and he literally gave them a suitable Herren-ethics. He wanted to see huge conflicts and millions to die for causes they do not even understand, because he viewed that readiness to sacrifice (others and self) as an affirmation of life itself (horrible as it is).
Honestly I don't understand why philosophers feel a need to defend moral equalitarianism. Practically speaking, I don't see how the refusal of it wouldn't result in something like a society with a horrible system of castes, widespread slavery or outright mass concentration camps. Because that's really what a refusal of moral equalitarianism means, both at a formal and practical level. Do we really need to know more about it? I'd say the burden of proof is evidently on those who support something like that. After all, we don't feel a need to justify why exterminating the jews was a very bad idea by the Nazi.
For starters, why should we believe one peculiar "hierarchy of humans" is the right one compared to infinite alternative hierarchies? There is no way to know. Anyone could come out with a different set of criteria to assess the "moral status" of persons. That's a major indication there's something wrong with the theory. That fact is that any set of criteria would be arbitrary: that's why moral equalitarianism is the sensible starting point, in the absence of a strong countervailing argument.
Re: using citizenship as a basis for equal rights. See Hannah Arendt's discussion of stateless persons & nation-states near the end of "The Origins of Totalitarianism."
