The fact that Beatty didn't send even basic information was borderline dereliction of duty. Jellicoe was forced to guess which way to arrange his fleet and luckily he made the correct choice. But Jutland could have turned out much much worse for the Royal Navy and Beatty deserves considerable blame for leaving things to chance.
The communications issues at the Front Line during WWI have been, in my opinion, almost criminally neglected in the Historiography, its nice to see some historians seriously looking at an issue that I believe was one of the major problem Generals of WWI faced, poor communications and control regarding the Front Line units. All too often I see or hear people going on about 'oh, it took general Such and Such 8 hours to respond to success A, and 6 hours to respond to failure B, thus the General failed in his responsibilities.' Problem I have with statements like that is all too often it took 6 - 8 hours, sometimes longer, for the information to actually REACH General Such and Such in the first place. Last time I looked it is kind of impossible to react to a fluid situation if you have no idea of what is actually happening. While devolving more freedom to the Officers actually at the Front helped somewhat, it still did not help when it came to reinforcing or resupplying an Infantry Battalion that had captured most of its objectives, or to push follow on waves through any gap created in a timely matter, or indeed whether to cease an operation on one area of the battlefield that has failed in order to more completely support an operation elsewhere that has either succeeded or may yet succeed if more resources are made available.... I think the availability of modern, instantaneous communication anywhere in the world at any time we enjoy in the modern world has blinded people to the difficulties of communications with Front Line troops in WWI. Hell, I think more modern communications have coloured some Historians assessments since the 1960's. They all too often forgot that no, even in 1918 a platoon commander could not in fact get onto platoon radio to request fire support, reinforcements or resupply, the just did not have the technology available to them..... Great presentation highlighting those very real, and all o often ignored communications difficulties
Bravo!! Excellent lecture! Dr Faulkner must certainly be pleased with his protege. Leaving enough time for comments but giving thorough coverage takes high executive function. I got a diagnosis of Influenza B today. My symptoms are mild thank goodness. From here on I’ll be practicing the only thing all Great War historians agree on according to Mike Neiberg “Get a Flu Shot!” My nurse said that here in Liberty influenza B is exploding.
Wireless intercepts on the Eastern Front were also critical in 1914. Quoting Max Hastings, Catastrophe, page 275: "At Marienburg, less than 24 hours after Hindenburg assumed command, two enemy plain language signals were intercepted." These led directly to the German victory over Samsonov's Russian army (Tannenburg). Very interesting talk, learned heaps thank you.
Starting about the time of the civil war, armies became too large for commanders to control their troops effectively without assistance? So 560,000 soldiers at Waterloo could hear Napoleon yelling? Seems like quite the assertion… otherwise, good discussion.
