The BAD BOY of Operation Market Garden | General 'Boy' Browning 

Hey all! Time stamps 00:00 Intro 01:07 Browning's Life 12:44 Frustration 17:57 Market Garden 28:52 Criticisms of Browning 29:28 Criticism 1 31:06 Criticism 2 32:30 Criticism 3 33:33 Criticism 4 35:36 Criticism 5 38:24 Browning's Defence is Flawed 43:45 Decision Bibliography (Sources) Brereton, L. The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945. Kindle, 2014. John Frost, A Drop Too Many. 2009. Max Hastings, Armageddon. London, 2004. Robert J. Kershaw, It Never Snows in September. Surry, 2007. Mead, R. General Boy: The Life of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning. Kindle, 2010. Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-29 September. 2009. Robert Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944. UK, 2014. Poulussen, R.G. Lost at Nijmegen. 2011. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far. USA, 1974 Major General R E Urquhart, Arnhem. 1958. Major General S Sosabowski, Freely I Served. Great Britain, 1982.

To blame the poles who weren’t there until the battle was basically lost is ridiculous. It’s like having a platoon armed only with rifles attempt to stop an armored division and then blame the failure on them being lousy shots

Who was to blame for the failure of Market Garden? I'd wager the Germans had something to do with it.

i wrote my dissertation on 'Market Garden' at university 10 years ago! i am so pleased that many of the key points that i raised were bought up in this video especially that about Gavin and the 82nd prioritising the heights over the main bridge! i feel vindicated in my conclusion! fantastic video and i will be watching more of them!

It's scary how much people's personalities play in these conflicts.

I had two relatives in Market Garden, Major William Conran RE, a road construction expert seconded to XXX Corps staff for Comet and MG. The other was Major Brian Urquhart of Brownings Staff. I knew both growing up and keen as I was on a military career I badgered them both for advice and stories. Bill was British Army from birth, he like all regulars was a product of his class, times and the slaughter of WWI, the highest form of criticism he could make of a fellow officer was 'maybe there was another option'. Brian was a hostilities-only idealist, who later became an advocate for the UN, he thought the UN should hold all nuclear weapons and control its own army. He could criticise senior officers, but, and I respect him enormously, post war he had a few political axes to grind and his story needs to be seen through those goggles. Something I've heard from both (they were unknown to each other until the 70s) is the success of market garden, the genuine opinion of German Panzer reserves and real reason the operation was launched. Both told me independently, so it was well understood by anyone who could read a map - "If it was only a quick right turn from Arnhem to the Ruhr, then it was only a quick left turn from the Ruhr to Arnhem!" The Ruhr had to be host to the best reserves on the Western Front, possibly the whole of Germany. The 2-3 day time limit on getting to Arnhem was forced on XXX Corps by the proximity of those reserves nothing else. This is where your 1,000 tanks could come from, but a tad higher north, across two rivers, and a few days late. This could be where Brig Hackett got his belief, shared with his officers pre-launch, that Arnhem was an interesting way to commit suicide. Gen Gale summed up its chances as worthy of resignation. Anyone trained to read a map and work out train time tables would have laid poor odds on survival at Arnhem beyond 36hours, without need for intel, photos or ULTRA. The Panzer fear at Arnhem was understood, genuine and obvious, but the hope was XXX Corps could get there first. And in fairness the majority of the German armour wasn't present on day one or even two. On Day 1, the 1st Airborne was held up more by snipers from Krafts force and MGs around Den Brink and the hospital. Only 3 Para met one SP gun en-route to Arnhem. Hardly a significant threat. If Son and Nijmegen had been taken on time, its not unreasonable given XXX Corps timetable they could've made it. Certainly the medium artillery would have got to the 1st Airborne's perimeter before the King Tigers came from the Czech border on Blitztransport. Regarding Brian's famous Panzer photos, I remember him telling me straight, the film was rubbish: He didn't brief Browning direct; he didn't argue with Browning, Majors don't do that with Lt Generals. He laid out ALL the intelligence he COULD to the Chief of Staff, a Brigadier, this Brigadier took it to Browning, this Brigadier told Brian to stop with the Panzer scare stories. Brian also wasn't sent on leave prior to take-off, he was never going to fly in. The reason had nothing to do with politics, stress or his earlier injury. We wouldn't know this until well into the 80s but he was the Airborne Corps ULTRA officer and wouldn't be risked in the mission. He was always going to be following up in the sea tail. Not long after Market Garden Brian was promoted to Lt Col and given a plum intel job rounding up German scientists. Hardly a censure from the top brass. He claimed he had photos of tanks, but these pictures have remained elusive to researchers. I admit we never discussed this (his brother was MI6, his cousins (my grandfather and his brother) were both SOE and war office we didn't talk about details in our family) but I think he lied to Cornelius Ryan. He said he had photos. We now know he had ULTRA, in the late 50s he could not tell Ryan that. I think the photos were a cover story. It also means Brian couldn't tell the Brigadier, Johnny Frost or anyone else what he knew and how he came by it. This has always been one of the problems of really good intel; how to share it. Divisions and Convoys had been sacrificed to secure ULTRA before Arnhem. Now for the true purpose of Market Garden, and why Montgomery was given all those resources. The single biggest issue for the Western Allies in September 1944 was opening the port of Antwerp. For this the whole of the Southern Netherlands had to be taken. I can remember Bill hanging his fingers over a map, along the Rhine, Maas and Scheldt so they formed a grabbing motion over the Antwerp approaches. You had to clear each river as far as the Southern ramp of Arnhem to secure Antwerp. This was Eisenhowers plan. The Northern ramp of Arnhem was unnecessary for this objective. Montgomery wanted Arnhem because that was his springboard into Germany. His longed for narrow thrust. Eisenhower wanted Antwerp to supply his wide front. This was the root of the blazing row between the two just before this battle. Yet everything up to the island between Nijmegen and Arnhem HAD to be taken if the Allies were to advance anywhere, anyhow in 1944/45. So Market Garden did achieve vital aims for the loss of two light infantry brigades. This is not a disaster. Both Bill and Brian said that part of the operation HAD to take place and HAD to be successful. The losses were less than some of the positional battles around Caen, less than British attempts to hold Greece, take Sicily, breakout of Anzio or destroy Monte Casino. These were harsh times, casualties were to be expected, the transport planes rated higher among the brass than the idle airborne in the UK. But did they have to go so far, was it vanity to send the British over the Rhine? Bill grudgingly agreed there might have been a better option than the springboard into Germany through Arnhem idea. Thats British Army for Monty was wrong. Brian's post-war opinions on the mission are well recorded. Brownings alleged 'Bridge too far' quote might have its roots in this conflict of objectives and may account for his tussles with Brereton. It may also explain what he was doing flying in on day 1. If his part of the Airborne Army was going to be sacrificed in a temper tantrum between his bosses he would have wanted to go down with it. Given a plan from Britains pre-eminent Field Marshall, a differing mission from Europe's Supreme Commander and unworkable boundaries by his immediate superior. I'm not convinced Browning didn't fly in with the sure fire intent of getting killed in action. It was a shit detail and he was a solider, what was he supposed to do? And still had the 101st and 82nd done ALL their jobs on day 1, the crazy British plan may just have worked. But I would bet all the money in my pockets Eisenhower would have cut Monty's supplies as soon as XXX Corps made it to Arnhem: on day 2 or day 9.

I don't buy the 1000 panzer argument. If they had really thought that there were 10 panzer divisions worth of armor in a small forrest, any sane commander would have leveled the forest with heavy bombing, as this would have represented a significant chunk of all tanks on the western front. And why they didn't scout it, I have no idea.

Wow. I didn't expect you to produce a 50-minute video so quickly. I thought your excellent Monday videos would be primarily 5-10 minute nuggets of history and enlightenment. Your ability to produce marvelous results so rapidly is Rommel-like. ;)

My Father was in 12th Devons 6th Airborne. He was a pegasus bridge and Arnham. He was one of A company who went in by glider to the bridge .He was injured at pegasus bridge in Ranville while recovering injuries, he qualified as a sniper a number one shot. He was then sent to Arnham. He told me that he was one of the men who laid the tape to the river when they withdrew. His name was Alfred Patrick Secker A company 12th Devons

I find both Gavin and Browning responsible for the Nijmegen cock-up. (which to my mind ultimately cost the succsess of Market Garden) However I do not think for a second they believed there were 1000 enemy vehicles near Nijmegen. They would have assumed the report grossly exaggerated. But even if it was a thenth of the reported vehicles, that would be 100 enemy AFV's, - A threat indeed. However as stated in the video, both of them (instigated by Gavin) neglected to carry out the crucial task of taking the bridge immediately.

A quick note - Browning may not have actually said 'I think we might be going a bridge too far' at all, which is why I said "supposedly". It is disputed, and apparently the evidence for it came after the battle, which is why it probably wasn't said. However, it is a cool phrase.

Have read many accounts of Market Garden and this by far the best explanation for its failure. Your conclusion about Gavin and Browning makes complete sense and how experienced commanders could really believe there were 1,000 Panzers parked in a forest at this stage of the war is inexplicable. It also baffles me how airborne troops could be expected to defend any area from any large force of German armour. That is not what airborne does, no matter how good the quality of the men and the American and UK airborne were some of the best troops of the whole conflict. Thank you very much for your analysis and taking the time to produce this history lesson.

Do not forget Brownibgs boss was an American.... entry about him from wiki Brereton, however, made key changes to the Linnet plan, first in restricting glider missions to "single-tows", that is, one tug aircraft towing one glider, whereas Linnet had contemplated a double-tow mission. A combination of poor weather, extensive resupply missions to the pursuing Allied armies, and anticipation of last-minute airborne drops cancelled virtually all training for IX TCC in August, as a consequence of which Brereton believed that untried and unpracticed double-tows were too hazardous. Brereton also decided that the operation, protected by massive air support from the RAF and the AAF, would take place in daylight, to avoid the dispersion experienced during both the British and American airborne landings in Normandy in June. His decision was finalized when weather and other delays pushed back D-Day for the operation to September 17, which was the dark moon. Finally, the shorter hours of daylight in September caused Brereton to refuse authorization for two lifts per day, and as a result of the limited number of troop carrier aircraft, the air movement of the Army required three consecutive days to complete.[63]

Saw this come in my notifications last night and was chuffed to have something to listen to on my way into work. Market Garden has taken its place in pop culture history and very often is used by many as an anglophobic stick with which to prop up American superiorism. Your documentaries have helped shine some light into the misconstrued reality surrounding the operation and fairly deals out criticism and blame. I have to ask, you often quote books, do you use sources from the Archives or elsewhere as well or just use off the shelf books such as biographies, memoirs etc?

I have been watching your video's for the last two weeks now. They are so clear and well brought that I would like to compliment you... They have become a must see for me! Keep up the good work. Greetings from the Netherlands.

A skilled, talented and passionate young modern historian / historiographer - who gets down in the dirt and does his research! Thank you!

sasobowski was more then just blamed he lost everything because of browning...it was criminal.

Back in the 1970s, I had a workmate who was a veteran of the British Parachute regiment who dropped on D-Day, Arnhem and across the Rhine. I didn't realise at the time but we had been paired-off so that I could act as his minder because of his PTSD. Something unknown to me back then. I had to drag him off a roof parapet once as he was about to jump off it - a drop of about fifty feet onto a concrete floor. He was bathed in sweat and trembling all over which scared me witless and left me confused. The root of his angst was that he had fought with distinction in three major battles, witnessed so many of his comrades killed and wounded while he escaped without so much as a scratch and lived to tell the tale. Survivor guilt? He never mentioned the war at all in the six months or so before he retired early on health grounds except once when he spotted me reading Cornelius Ryan's famous paperback account of Arnhem - then he let rip! He told me that his regiment feared that the war they had been training for incessantly for several months past would be over before they had a chance of a crack at "Gerry". The delay was beginning to affect unit morale and it was his firm belief that the Arnhem drop - a bridge too far - was specifically intended to let loose British Airborne against the Germans before unit discipline broke down completely. I am not expert in such fine military details though I do have an interest in military history, which is the reason why I am here, therefore, I cannot enter into any arguments defending my old long-departed workmate's personal belief and conviction that Arnhem was designed to fail to satisfy the vanities of the Allied top brass.

There is one criticism that this video does not discuss. There seems to be evidence Browning countermanded the last promising attack to take the bridge before it was too well reinforced. On the morning of the 18th (D+1) Gavin ordered all of the 508th, save one company to move on Nijmegen bridge. At 10:00 a regiment strength German counterattack struck that company, and Gavin ordered the entire 508th to rush back and charge the drop zone to prevent the afternoon reinforcement drops from being massacred. (At this point, Warren's battalion was recalled from its fighting in Nijmegen.) After the drop was complete (around 14:00) Gavin then moved to repeat his move from that morning. The 82nd's operations log then records the following. "At 1530, 18 September, General Gavin had a conference with General Browning at which General Browning asked for the plans for the ensuing 24 hours. General Gavin stated his plan for the night of 18-19 September was to seize the bridge North of Nijmegen using one battalion of the 504 and in conjunction with the 508 envelope the bridgehead from east and west. General browning approved the plan in general, but on giving more thought, in view of the situation with XXX Corps, he felt retention of the high ground South of Nijmegen was of greater importance, and directed that the primary mission should be to hold the high ground and retain its position west of the Maas-Waal Canal. Therefore, General Gavin assembled the regimental commanders and issued an order for the defense of position." The operations log is a contemporaneous account recorded by division staff. And it clearly suggests that Browning explicitly countermanded an attack on the bridge by four battalions the night of D+1. This was probably the last chance for lightly-armed paratroopers to take the town alone, before it was too well reinforced. Doesn't some blame accrue to Browning based on this?

This was a very comprehensive and enjoyable video - clearly a lot of hard work to produce - so thank you for creating and putting it here. In the search for a blame victim(s) I was reminded of the last scene in the film "The Charge of the Light Brigade" where the General staff do their appraisal - a battle that took place 90 years before Arnhem.

I said this after watching your detailed video on Market Garden. I know some commanders emphasized the importance, and insisted on, aggressive patrolling to gather information and capture prisoners for interrogation. This expedient and crucial step apparently was not taken. Given Gavin's his fear that there were 1,000 tanks in the forest it is gross negligence to not send patrols to assess the treat, if any.

"Success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan".

The treatment of Sosabowski is unforgivable. Browning and Monty thinking he was in the wrong for criticizing them? Sosabowski as you pointed out save 1st airborne from being annihilated. The 2,000 men they saved in Arnhem would've been captured or killed. Now my own view is while Browning is not the sole person to blame, he does share some of the blame for the failure.

I read the book on Browning-not bad. A word in defense of Gavin is needed. Data on the 1000 tanks came from US Intelligence. Gavin could not ignore that. Even if the 1000 tanks turned out to be 100 and even if they were just a mix of Panzer II, III IV tanks, that is a problem for an airborne unit. Allied intelligence was correct about SS Panzers in the Arnhem area. The report of tanks near Njimegen could also have been correct. Allied commanders had no way of knowing for sure until their troops were on the ground.

Everyone seems to forget about the small toll bridge. 30 corps had to request a special drop of enough nickels and dimes to cross. That money drop was delayed due to the banks closing early for their annual cricket match.

General Browning comes across like the US General McClellan. Very good at organizing and training soldiers but poor leadership in the field.

As to your final conclusion, I completely agree with you. Thank you very much for making huge complex questions plainly simple.

TIK, this is the best channel I’ve found on RU-vid. It’s always a pleasure.

It sounds to me like inter ally rivalry was very important. Browning was concerned about losing his job to Ridgeway and he positioned his HQ with an American unit so that his information was based upon American actions and what they were doing.

It doesn't matter it was a glorious defeat ...it doesn't matter that the armoured German SS battalion fighting the paras ( light troops ) treated them as equals and sharing doctors and medical orderlies etc etc...it doesn't matter that 6 of the 7 bridges which were the targets for market garden were taken and held ....what matters is that it tied up and focussed German attention which in itself shortened the war ....hail the paras , the American airborne and the guards armoured units amongst others !!!

I was born in Arnhem in 48. So I took an interest in the fighting there and why Frost could not hold the bridge for 48 hours more. Despite all de failures and delays at Nijmegen, the Arnhem bridge could have been held if the operation of the 1st Airborne had been better planned and executed. Read the book "Arnhem"written by the general Urquhart. First: the landing zones where 20 miles from Arnhem bridge. Nice space to land without losses, but undefendable. Second the radios did not work.Contact with England could not been made nor between the units an HQ of Urquhart. Third : with exeption of Frost, who went along the Rhine tot de Bridge, the rest had tot fight through a city. ( compare with the problem at Nijmegen for XXX corps). Urquhart could not get in contact with his units fighting in the outskirts of Arnhem. He went tot look for himself and was then surrounded by Germans and could not get back tot his HQ for two days. His second in command did'nt know what tot do. The main error was not tot land south of the bridge. They did not because of fear for heavy losses at the landing. So with exepcion of Frost, the entire division only got as far as Oosterbeek and never got tot Arnhem, and when driven back could not contact England for change in dropping zones. Nearly all supplies fell in German hands.. Conclusion. Yes there are errors made in Nijmegen which caused delay, but the real disaster was the bad preparation and execution of 1st Airborne division : Not the soldiers, but the general are to blame. Then they tried tot blame the Polish brigade. Well thanks tot te courage and skils of these man a lot of the 1st Airborne could escape over the Rhine. Personally knew a Polish soldier of the Polish Brigade who had fought in Arnhem and was after the war married with a Dutch women. He never talked about is, but when he died his son found his personal things from the war and the medal he got years after when finally the Polish where rehabilitated.

I know it's been a while now, but what was the reasoning given for 6th Airborne Division never being committed, or 17th Airborne Division as well? To me, Arnhem ought to have had two divisions there just based on the sheer level of importance overall.

Thanks Tik :) trying to catch up with all the market garden videos

A quick Googles will tell you just how formidable an obstacle the Groesbeek Heights would have been. It is a whopping 34 meters above sea level. As for Browning and the tanks, it's funny how a man who sees photographs of several tanks and other armored vehicles can dismiss them out of hand as "wrecks, unfit for duty" but buy wholeheartedly the "1,000 tanks" lurking in the woods past Groesbeek.

Your criticism of Mead is intetesting. Reminds me of Michael Senior's "Haking: A Dutiful Soldier" in which he defends one of the most incompetent men ever to wear a Lt General's badges, and does so poorly. I think some historians just think it is fun to defend clowns for the sake of being able to write provocative phrases on the book's cover: "a radical re-assessment", "correcting the record", "unfairly criticised".

I watched a Bridge to Far then started reading more and ended up here. An excellent analysis with more detail facts than I can absorb in one watching. One caution, as facts are obvious, in the pressure and fog of war, second guessing too much to assign blame, is fraught with risk. I would prefer to say mistakes were made from the first inception of the operation. Contention between Ike and Monty was no secret the fact that they essentially argued for 5 days over its' merit set the failure in motion. your attention to detail is however admirable. and the facts you present are an excellent resource.

Great stuff as always! I'd agree with you on the primary blame being on Gavin. It shouldn't really have been Browning's responsibility to tell him to...well... capture his objective as quickly as possible. However as the senior commander he really was quite "worthless" in the hour of need, and the treatment of the Poles is, well, just childish.

Really enjoy your videos. Great to be able to discuss these actions as there are so few of us who care to spend the time discussing. My issue is with the Reichswald..... if there were rumors of "1,000" armored vehicles hiding there... and this intelligence came from SHAEF... how could they allow Montgomery to move forward with the operation? I know SHAEF gave Montgomery the go ahead and the supplies... and then essentially washed their hands of the deal. Of course getting to those V2 sites was paramount, which is why I don't argue using the airborne corps to support Patton in getting over the Rhine. Patton's armor would have had much more in terms of attacking axis in getting to the airborne divisions. XXX Corps was in a tough and near impossible job from the start in asking the advance to go down a single road. The intelligence failures at the top as usual played the crucial part in the failures of an action... before the battle was even fought.

Monty. He conceived of the plan, and the political screws were applied to Ike to accept it. It was a Rube Goldberg contraption with too many moving parts.The failure of any would bring down the whole. The idea of advancing 60 mi along a ten-yard front, trailing 120 mi of flank, is just nuts. Staging five successful, simultaneous coups de main equally so. Monty was a bold, romantic dreamer; also a complete egotist who felt personally compelled to vault the Rhine and knock Jerry out of the war by Christmas. You need people like that, but you also need to rein them in. (Churchill's [not so] "soft underbelly of Europe" -- in two wars -- comes to mind; also Haig's "big push" to break through into open country where the cavalry can operate.) But once you've sold a monster plan, and mandated buy-in by all subordinates, those subordinates are confronted by all sorts of niggling realities -- and also a panicky desire not to be the one who screws everything else up. You have hard, inconvenient intelligence that is ignored, and rumors of enemy forces that are credited. You have planned resources that are really non-existent or cunningly withheld. You have sudden concerns about the fatigue of your men, and landing areas declared temporarily unsuitable. You have commanders who consume transport to be seen as commanding from (not quite) the front. You have CYA and you have grandstanders. And you always have the weather. If the plan was truly messed up by a momentary loss of focus and initiative by one (or two) commanders, why, Monty was uncharacteristically modest in claiming that it had been 90% successful! I'd give him 98%! At least! But any plan that fails even at 90% performance is a bad plan, too fragile for the real world -- let alone the real world of war.

Obviously, Gavin choosing to ignore the Bridge was critical but Browning being right with him left him no excuse for not commanding Gavin to take the bridge. I can not for the life of me figure out how the Poles can be blamed for the failure considering that by the time they arrived there was little chance of changing the course in the battle. As the battle was conducted not taking that Bridge becomes the last straw in many mistakes but the one they could not recover from.

A Bridge Too Far is my favourite movie and Operation Market Graden is one of my (I hesitate to use the word "favourite" for an event where people die in large numbers) battles that I am most interested in. I think the biggest thing the movie missed was the Groesbeek heights. That would have given a whole different flavour. Also, what do you think about the criticism if XXX corps? They seem to get accused of stopping and drinking tea and being generally incompetent. This seems to be the US depiction of British forces. In my opinion they did a pretty good job of pushing up one highway where they were being constantly ambushed and their supply lines overstretched. But they were forced to turn from a fast exploitation force into a force fighting heavily defended enemies in Nijmegen, a role for which they were not suited and which they wouldn't have had to fulfill had the Nijmegen Bridge been taken earlier.

I am English. I find it disgusting that free Polish Forces were ever thought as failures in official reports. Half their country was the first to be occupied in WW2. See Battle of Britain fighter squadron results, Cassino, etc. They fought the Nazis with a passion to help us, we betrayed them in 1945.

Thanks for this fascinating video touching real history, even at the risk of talking about British people. They won’t hear any of this in our schools. Personally I blame Richard Attenborough and dirk Bogarde and their obvious bias in favour of any critic of their country, ensuring that a fair hearing is almost impossible.

Great a new Video! I didn't get a notification so I just re-clicked the bell.

Very well done, but I still have to disagree with your conclusion. How does dropping 8 miles from Arnhem bridge not trump a few hours delay in Gavin sending troops to Nijmegen bridge as the critical error in this operation? Gavin was under Browning's direct supervision and had his approval. The 8 miles also allowed for the other critical issues to affect the probable success, such as the radios and 1st Airborne resupply. It's pretty much insane to drop paras that far from their objective. Even if there were only 50 tanks in the Reichwald, anybody commanding a partial, already spread out airborne division, would have to consider that a priority. Moreover, how was Gavin or Browning to know 10th SS was going to be sending significant forces down to that bridge straightaway? In a nutshell I would say the overriding problem with this operation was that, "there were too many chiefs and not enough Indians". Ike and Monty should have had a much more hands on role in this affair considering it was dealing with complex combined operations between two nations and several branches of the military. In the end when you expect XXX Corps, 101st Airborne and 82nd Airborne to have to stick their neck out in a big way to save 1st Airborne, it's probably not going to happen to the extent you hope. (Such as air commanders worrying about how tired their guys would be.) Commanders usually set not getting their unit wiped out or severely mauled as first priority. That would be my first priority. It takes an overall commander to set these bickering self-interests straight in an operation like this. If the plan was better, it would have worked. It almost did anyway, but I can't single out Gavin or Browning for this. In the end one could say Gavin put "his guys" first, and Browning didn't. They cut too many corners in the planning to assure victory.

Signals, the Dutch Telcom workers made available all of the telephone networks available to the allies. But the allies were just not interested. Instead of blowing up railway lines the railway workers went on strike. But apart from a boy looking out of the window, nothing else was mentioned of the Dutch underground. All that Sean Connery had to do in a Bridge too far was to make use of the telephone boot in the street. But I suppose it was not in the script.

Dirk Bogarde who played Frederick Browning in A Bridge Too Far said that Browning received a bad rap for his role in Operation Market-Garden. Bogarde in WW2 was actually part of the staff around Browning and knew the general.

Of the errors of this operation, thanks for the through analysis and presentation.

Thanks for an interesting and very informative video! It seems to me truly bizarre that Browning (and others) should dismiss well-founded intelligence regarding the Panzer divisions at Arnhem, yet obsess over a 'ghost' Army Group in the Reichswald. If such a formation had existed, with 1,000 serviceable tanks, the threat should have been enough to cancel the entire operation. After all, this would (I think) have been a stronger force than everything the Wehrmacht had thrown into the Normandy campaign. Prioritizing the capture of the Groesbeek Heights - by lightly armed paratroopers - would have had no effect whatsoever and the axis of advance would have been irrevocably cut. To me, this demonstrates severely muddled thinking. You cannot argue on the one hand that the advance is opposed only by scratch forces to justify its ambition, while on the other hand giving credence to a hug force threatening the right flank.

Great work, TIK.

EXCELLENT ,CONCISE AND VERY WELL PRESENTED.

Thank you. I thoroughly enjoy your videos and find your insight and arguments highly credible.

Love how you revise history. Are you by chance related to Monty? Is that why you try to place the failure on Market Garden at everyone else feet? Here are a few facts for you. 1: Always have 3 to one odds in your favor in the attack. They received intel that they would not have those odds at Arnhem and in fact that the British and Polish airborne troops, not at all armed to fight tanks were sent in anyway. You can blame the failure on Ike. He not only should have refused to allow Market Garden to proceed IMO he should have sacked Monty in France. IMO Monty insisted on this attack for 2 reasons. 1st was people were questioning his actions. Complaining that he was too timid. Was he trying to erase that criticism? 2nd was like Patton he just loved seeing his name in the news! For the most part Monty was a brilliant planner. Once the battle was joined he lacked the ability to be flexible to changing situations. That is what set Rommel apart from the crowd. Once the battle was joined he could react to changing situations in the blink of an eye. Patton was good at that too. Ike should have had Monty in charge of his G2 (planning staff). Heck with Monty in charge of G2 and Patton in command of the ground forces they could have conquered the world!Now one should keep in mind that Monty being as timid as he was wasn't really his fault. Churchill was having commanders relieved for losing battles they couldn't have won not matter what. Once relieved they were done. Monty was driven to succeed. Failure was not an option. So he spent more time making sure he wasn't going to be beaten than he did on winning.Most folks miss the fighting done by the Russians. But Monty nor Stalin won WWII. Neither did Patton or Ike. WWII was won on the US factory floors. While Germany at their best was producing 12,000 tanks or aircraft a year the US was producing 12,000 a MONTH! The battle of the Atlantic wasn't won when the convoys could avoid the wolf packs. It was won when American ship yards started producing ships faster than the Germans could sink them! It was won when America could build combat ships fast enough that Jeep carriers could roam the Atlantic in hunter killer groups while others provided coverage for the convoys. The hunter killer groups were to late to make much of a dent in the German Uboat fleet. But production had reached a point that those ships could be used in such missions. Heck because US factories/ship yards were not under attack the US was able to support landings in Normandy, the allies launch a summer offensive in Italy, land in the Marianas and invade southern France all in the space of 3 months. Lets not forget that both the US and British forces were still engaged in the China Burma area all during that time too. I don't care how many men you have. If you can't provide them with the tools of war they can't fight. Neither Russia nor England had the ability to produce enough to win. While the US only used about 45% of it's industrial ability to supply the war effort.Kinda like today. US citizens claiming that corporate greed moved jobs offshore. What really happened was after WWII was over only one industrial nation could provide the goods the world needed and wanted. The US. Sometime in the mid 70's most of the waring nations had recovered to the point where they could start exporting again. All of a sudden US manufacturers had competition. Competition that did not have US minimum wage laws. Got cheaper to import goods than producing them ourselves. Simple greed did the rest. I want, I want it now, and I want it at low enough prices that I can afford something else!Rick

You, Good Sir, possess the extraordinary combination of great talent as a military historian and an engrossing video story teller. BRAVO! -- a thumb's up and new subscriber here. It's been a happy day for me discovering you. To borrow a line from Charles Dickens, I say, "Please, sir, I want some more."

Thank you for this... Its nice to see someone at last studied the facts therefore able to share the truth behind this operation. It is so easy for armchair generals who fight the war on Monday do not have the full facts of the battle. As stated during his planning, Gen Gavin (82nd Airborne Div) was concerned with the German Armour in the Reichwald area, therefore putting his main effort onto the high ground over taking Nijmegen Bridge. Hence the hold up of 30 Corps advance to Arnhem. Gen Brereton was being influenced by his transport commander (Williams) concern with fatiguing the pilots with doing a one day lift. A personality clash with Generals was so evident in this Operation.

If they truly thought there might be a heavy number of tanks in the Nijmegan area. The operation should have been scrubbed. If those tanks were real they would have destroyed the airborne and kicked 30 corps right back to their starting point. So the logic is truly flawed.

I have a question, and it may be a stupid question. In every video I've watched on the failure of Market Garden, the bad intelligence about a large number of tanks located in the forest around Osterbeek heights is mentioned as a contributing factor. TIK, you make mention of it several times and say that both Gavin and Browning should've known better. That, it wasn't realistic to believe the Germans had a tank force that size in late 1944. But Im curious if it's possible that the size of the tank force was exaggerated. But not the existence of a large tank force itself. And there is only one reason I ask this question, the battle of the bulge. The sources I have found claim Hitler gave the official order to begin preparations for the offensive on September 16th, 44. Just one day before operation Market Garden. I've also read a couple of sources that claim some of the tank forces had already been told to begin repositioning before the official order to prepare was given. So, is it possible that a large tank force had been located in the forest outside the Osterbeek heights before being given orders to reposition in accordance with upcoming offensive preparations? We know about 1400 tanks, and assault guns took part in the battle of the bulge. With tanks alone totaling about 1000. So, maybe there weren't 1000 tanks in the forest surrounding Osterbeek. But is it possible there was a fairly large tank force, none the less?

I thought it was Montgomery who many (including Eisenhower) believed that led to Market Garden's failure. After all he did suggest to Eisenhower that Belgium was only being defended by reserve units, young boys and old men which should finish the war by Christmas. And his plans for MG led to many resources going to other generals (including Patton and Bradley) to be diverted for Monty's plan. It was huge and drastic failure for the Allies and unknown if its true, but Eisenhower was believe to have never once listen to Monty's ideas again due to the failure of Market Garden's objectives.

But wasn't Major General S Sosabowski the scapegoat of the operation?

Hello! I was considering subscribing to your channel as I noticed that the number of your subscribers jumped in the last month from 10000 to 15000, which could have been a bit frightening... So I decided to wait for a while. 🙂 But that would certainly not stop me to continue watching your videos. They are great! Greetings from Romania! 🇷🇴 By the way, I think that both Browning and Gavin are to be blamed. Defending against tanks would have been easier from the town of Nijmegen and capturing the bridge should have been a priority. I find it difficult to imagine what were they thinking.

Having seen your video on Market Garden, including this one, must say that they are informative, entertaining and educational. Not having done research as you have and not having before me detailed maps of the landscape nor the first hand reports of the disposition of all the units and only having your graphics for reference and constantly questioning how many of the historian-writers had any military service, if any, and as a veteran who flew helicopters in the US Army and had military experience and experienced how many officers were not very bright, which has all ways amazed me that we won any war, and having worked with topographic maps in the USA and in school studying geology which I feel makes me knowledgeable, if not an expert, in using the maps, leads me to the point of questioning how this operation was planned by the field grade commanders and questioning everyone's competence. It boggles my mind that the natural terrain was not used to isolate enemy troops to make them ineffective or less of a threat to or to nullify their ability to re-enforce engaged units. From your graphics, it appears that the area was crossed by many rivers which would have made capturing bridges or crossing points imperative. Generally know that the land was low land reclaimed from the sea and had marshes which impeded tanks and troop movements. It appears that the first objectives would have been to secure or destroy all bridges and to force enemy units to have to cross marshes and swamps if any in the area. Why was Gavin instructed to take the high ground when his sole objective should have been to take the bridge from the very beginning? Even with a thousand Panzer in the area, if they were isolated across a river or confronted by a marsh, what good would they have been? To dismiss the intelligence, was gross incompetence. Even if wrong, why couldn't precautions have been in place treated as if such a battle would occur? Then there is the issue of the RAF's concern about AA fire. Understand the concern but weren't there fighter planes to contest the AA? Didn't the RAF encounter substantial AA flack on air raids over Germany? It again appears that the large scale of the operation was more an expression of insecure generals trying to prove their brass rather than military planning. Why couldn't smaller operations have been planned to secure points to isolate German units using natural terrain? All this would've made re-enforcing and re-supplying easier and less dangerous. A final point, all this is not hindsight but could've been deducessed at the time if competent men were planning the operation. Rather than deciding that taking the bridges be the primary objective, it might have been wiser to engage the German units directly is small battles while sending Allied units to take the bridges. As I said, without the documents and maps in front of me, it is difficult to comprehend the challenges involved but the idea that it could have been done in a better way is proven by the disastrous failure that occurred. From what I've learned, all the commanders were at fault and all were trying to avoid taking the blame for their incompetence and failures to save their careers.

Operation Order WO171/366: QUOTE "US 82nd Airborne Division - will seize and hold hold bridges at NIJMEGEN and GRAVE with the same object in view. The capture and retention of the high ground between NIJMEGEN and GROSSBEEK is imperative in order to accomplish the Division's task"

The real fault of Market Garden was not clearing the river to Antwerp. Regardless of the success or otherwise of Market Garden, the Allied armies still needed the supplies that only Antwerp could provide to go anywhere.

Having listened to your superb documentary & read different books the first thing that came to mind was how did John Frost not get a VC for his leadership at Arnhem bridge 🤔. As for the operation I don’t think so much could have gone so wrong with the whole plan. The allies did not have one bit of luck, that coupled with some breathtaking incompetence led to so many deaths.

This is some quality work, TIK ^w^ good show that man ;3 In terms of initial planing and strategic conception, I'd say Montgomery and Brereton did the most to keep victory from being achieved with an overambitious plan that by their own SHAEF intelligence estimates and gathering effots placed a LOT more armoured units, disorganised or no but still capable and with veterans a plenty and heavy armour, within easy reach of the most vulnerable areas of the drop zone. The whole single road of advance and logistic smacks so much of an "eggs in one basket" ploy that it is sadly hilarious. Browning can cop it rightly for ignoring the presence of the panzers at this stage. However I'd say the politics between all of the key figures, including Sosabowski, can take a hit here at some stage for national bias trying to trump actual combat effectivity and the operation's success. When it comes to the logistics side of things Ridgeway can eat a bag or three of dicks for basically guaranteeing that the very tip of the spear was kept blunt. However we also have to remember that the weather was not always on the side of the drops, pilot fatigue and skittishness was a genuine concern, Husky and Overlord had shown that, and German flak was indeed heavy closer to the bridges around Arnhem. Indeed the Poles got cut to pieces when they finally made their drop. Flakvierlings and mg42s are not kind to helpless slowly falling paras floating sedately to the ground. There should be mention of the radios here too, have heard a LOT of contradictory reports on that, from missing and faulty batteries to something about the local soil being iron rich? Yet this last bit didn't seem to affect German radios, so... *shrug* In terms of the more tactical in-theater level, Gavin definitely cops it hard for failing to take his objective when he had the chance, however someone else commenting on this video rightly points out that the 82nd would have been hard pressed to keep the bridge from an armoured SS column. Once things have played out I can't really blame Browning that much as so much was outwith his own ability to change. He couldn't prevent Hell's Highway being cut multiple times by German counterattack, nor could he clearup Nijmegen for 30 Corps. Really by Day three of Market Garden it was a case of making the best of what you could from day to day as the operational plan was out the window at this point. In terms of the aftermath, Browning, Montgomery and various others can rightly be blamed for hanging the Poles and Sossabowski out to dry. What could a relatively inexperienced and underequipped unit do, bravely as the Poles may have fought, in the situation in which they got tossed into? There was no realistic way of saving 1st Para's bacon, as much as it was sticking to the operational conception, it was also a fairly desperate move.

In my career as a specialist in Emergency Medicine Intensive care and Anaesthesia, I was aware of well-trained doctors faced with a number of severely injured patients who would focus on a small irrelevant injury. I would arrive to find the doctor carefully sewing up a minor injury while the patient bled out from a major injury elsewhere. These officers would have died for their men but also for their reputation and their prejudice. Too many American and British generals failed their men by focusing on the minor things never seeing that they were only minor players in a vast drama, missing what was essential and important. Yet their political commanders were no better. In the end, they got the job done, I do not judge them, they were all heroes, and I shall remember them! (so not guilty but culpable)

EXCELLENT Video ! . . . I like both your "Information, as well as its Delivery" !.

Thank you for the historical background context which explains so much of Market Garden.

Good afternoon ,Please let me know which book by Mead are you quoting in this youtube presentation ?

"Highest point in the Netherlands" that still isn't very high. It's like saying it's the hottest part of Scotland or the driest part of the Amazon Rainforest. The Netherlands is notorious of how low lying it is. It's not a particularly hilly part of the world.

I’m accally a direct relative of fredrick. This is a interesting video for me. Thankyou

One of the huge difficulties faced by all commanders during the invasion of Europe was the need to work with their allies. The major two being, of course, the UK and the USA. The tensions between these two had been the cause of problems in North Africa, Sicily and Italy so there was no reason to expect any massive improvement once the troops hit Europe. Eisenhower seems to have done a reasonable job of containing those tensions but naturally couldn't dispose of them. Generals are often arrogant egomaniacs, I guess it's almost a job requirement, and certainly the commanders of the American and British forces in WW2 were often of this type. Your videos are excellent. I have read extensively on WW2 and have found few books that show the wealth of research, or the unbiased, logical conclusions drawn from that research, that your videos display. If you were one of my students I would sit down and let you do the lecturing. However, I do wonder if you give the relationship problems between the USA and the UK militaries the prominence in your thinking that I would, respectfully, suggest they deserve. That the alliance worked as well as it did was little short of miraculous but I suspect the real blame for Market Garden, and many other failings of the Allies had a lot more to do with the nature of the problems between them than the individual commanders. That said, there was no excuse for the failure of the 82nd to take the bridge on day one, and that fault must lie with their commander. Keep up the good work.

Generals clash for prestige, glory, and honor while the regular combat soldiers die. Damn shame.

After watching both this and your first video, I finally understood, "grasped" what you say about Gavin being responsible for the operation's failure to achieve its major objective, i.e., given all other issues, the operation stiil would have a good chance to succeed if Gavin's troop had seized the bridge in Niejmegen in time, and they could have done it.

I have to agree that Gavin and Browning were responsible, the worst thing of all is that the only thing that happened to General Browning was that he was reassigned to the South East Asia command afterwards.

Agreed on the blame. Well put.

@TIK The Groesbeek heights, are a raised forrested plain, its raised on average 5 meters above the surrounding area, with small hill features about +-50 meters in places. However because this is about 100 meters above sealevel, its technically one of the highest terrain in the Netherlands, hence there can be some confusion about this bumpy forrest. To the West u have a heather Moor, and to the east between the Reichwald and Groesbeek Heights is farmland. Despite what the 82nd was told, this was sparsely hilly forrest. IF they wanted to secure the north-south road in depth again armor, they would have to and did use alot of manpower that was crucial in nijmegen.

Well done. Really enjoyed it.

"Unless the parachute divisions took and held the bridges, Market Garden would fail. That was true at Eindhoven, Zon, Grave and Arnhem - and was no less true at Nijmegen. General Brereton’s orders were quite specific on this point: the airborne divisions were to take the bridges _‘with thunderclap surprise’._ *In neglecting to do so Gavin not only departed from his orders, he also forgot one of the basic principles of war - the selection and maintenance of the aim.* Why Gavin, urged on and abetted by Browning, elected to ignore this prime requirement and substitute the Groesbeek heights as the 82nd’s prime objective - and why Brereton let them get away with it - remains a mystery." - Neillands

Hi TIK, Recently I've come to love your video's! As a Dutchman, and knowing you take an interest in correct pronunciation, I'd like to inform you Poulussen is pronounced as the German general Paulus + en.

Question, since there was a lack of aircraft to perform the drops on day 1. To maximize the effect on day 1 , shouldn't 101st be the one left for day 2. As it seems their bridges were of less importance ( could be bailey bridged ) . And now all those aircraft can be used to more closely airlift the British and 82nd. To accomplish the bridges needed. And 101st used to then help with reinforcing where needed, as 30 Corp comes up the road.

Market Garden was so complex that everything had to go right for it to succeed. In the end so much went wrong. Browning and Gavin failed at a tactical level, the dismissal of hard evidence of panzers in the area but accepting phantom panzer, but so did Montgomery at a strategic level to think a single Corp on a single road could turn the whole German front. A lot of egos, including the ongoing conflict with Patton.

I still don't understand why Ike didn't release more ground attack aircraft to deal with the supposed heavy antiaircraft guns. Additionally, having served 12 yrs in airborne units, how could any commander believe 3 days of drops could give this operation a decent chance of success. Surprise mass and maneuver are lost.

I have watched all of your videos of Market-Garden. I have had an interest in this campaign even since before I saw "A Bridge Too Far" years ago. I agree with the idea that there was enough blame to go around; that everyone involved made mistakes. I think the idea of trying to blame any one individual more than the rest may be an impossible and misleading task. An airline pilot friend of mine told me that when they investigate plane crashes, they often find multiple causes. No one mistake, error, or equipment failure is completely at fault, any one thing just by itself and the plane might not have crashed, but it is the cascade effect of everything together that results in disaster. For example: If 1st Airborne Division had not landed miles away from Arnhem bridge, had instead landed south of the bridge and immediately seized it, the 10th SS Panzer Division elements would not have been able to cross the bridge and drive to Nijmegan just in time to prevent Gavin's, admittedly tardy, 82nd Division from capturing that vital bridge. One mistake or the other alone, and Market-Garden might still have succeeded, but the two together meant failure. I would like to suggest the REAL culprit for the failure of Market-Garden. In a way, Market-Garden was doomed to failure years before it was ever conceived, as far back as 1940 when the British and Americans first started developing their own Airborne units in response to Germany's use of them. Eventually the Americans and British had, counting actual divisions and smaller independent units, some 7 to 9 Airborne division equivalents in the European area of operations. Unfortunately, they never aquired sufficient numbers of transport aircraft to deploy more than two full strength divisions at any one time, in one operation, in one airlift. A good part of the failure of Market-Garden was that all three of the Airborne division commanders were trying to obtain multiple objectives, with less than their full strength, while at the same time having to guard landing zones for later arriving drops. Imagine if there were enough transport planes, gliders, etc, that all three divisions and the Polish brigade had landed at full strength all at once on the first day. All the other flaws in the plan and mistakes would not have had the impact they did, and Market-Garden may very well have succeeded. The decisions made years earlier as to how many resources to commit to building transports, to creating multiple Airborne units without the comparable planes needed to deploy them, doomed Market-Garden. Even for Operation Varsity, the Airborne operation supporting the crossing of the Rhine six months later, the Americans and British still only had sufficient transport planes to carry two divisions. A third division planned to participate had to be cut because there were too few planes. In contrast, by 1944-45 in the Pacific theater of operations, the Americans had created six Marine divisions, and had other Infantry division involved with landing operations as well, and there were ample enough troop transport ships, landing craft, amphibious tractors, etc to move multiple divisions into battle at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Airborne warfare really only existed and was practiced between 1940-45 in a major way. It was still evolving, it's commanders were still learning and developing it's doctines. In hindsight, the World War 2 Airborne warfare success rate and usefulness was at best questionable and mixed.

Awesome work!

Another good one,thank you.

Fixing blame for Arnhem at any point further south is a question of timing. XXX Corps linked up with the Poles near Arnhem three days late on Day 6. Is that delay the reason the Rhine could not be crossed? I don't think so. During Market Garden planning, did Montgomery believe that a three day delay in XXX Corps reaching Arnhem would result in the annihilation of 1st Airborne? Dozens of factors including stiffer than expected German resistance, weather, multiple drops, the narrow road, bridges being destroyed before capture, and poor decisions by field commanders could (and did) easily result in this type of delay. I haven't seen any records on this, but I expect he felt a division could hold a bridge for a week. If not, he was taking a huge risk with 10K elite soldiers. The problem was that the bulk of the division never got to the bridge. The heroic actions of Frost's 2nd Battalion in Arnhem created a several day window where Market Garden might still have been successful despite this failure. That's why the delay at Nijmegen was so critical and the criticism of Gavin decision justified. However, if Frost hadn't found a way into Arnhem before the German line solidified, it would be obvious that the blame for Market Garden's failure falls to Urquhart and his inability to get 1st Airborne to the Arnhem bridge.

I spent 3 years at the NATO Air Supreme Command in Brunssum, Netherlands. As a retired U S Marine Officer, we would post the colors in my classroom of 6th graders each morning, do the American Flag Salute and sing 3-4 songs before settling down to our regular routine. Now I had students in my class from 15 different countries besides my American students. We had a full U S Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps flags and of course the USA flag. Kids loved this and fought over who got to hold the flags each morning. Well my Canadian and British kids who loved this told their parents and soon after I was called into the Directors Office and met a 2 star British Officer and a 2 Star Canadian General. I was forced to read a ":Letter of Censure" as they felt I was proselytizing their kids to become little Americans. I thought this was a joke and said "We have a great statue in New York Harbor that says>>Bring me your tired, your poor, your downtrodden> We are always looking for a few good FUTURE Americans. They didn't think this was funny. I refused to sign the little of censure and pointed down the road of Margraten Cemetery where 13,000 Americans were buried. Most of them killed during Operation Market Garden and I looked at the British General and said>>>Killed due to the incompetency of a British General. They were not amused. Security was sent to my classroom and they confiscated my flags and told me to take my trumpet back to my home and NO MORE American Flag Salutes. I said, why not give me a British and a Canadian flag and those students can do whatever Brits and Canucks do in their classrooms. No, that was not to be. I was given back my flags a few days before I was transferred 3 years later to AFRICOM/EUCOM, Marine Special Ops Command in Stuttgart Germany. I was happy to leave NATO and get back on to a regular U S Military base.

Compelling - and very informative: 15/10

As in any major battle I think you can look at a number of mistakes being made. The failure doesn't just land at the door of Browning or anyone else, but i think the biggest oversight which ultimately doomed the mission was the failure to recognise the Driel Ferry as a viable backup crossing and potential place for a Bailey Bridge. The British controlled the crossing, without realising it, for the entire battle and nothing during the battle would have changed that. This is because the German armour would always have had to break through the pocket and that never happened, the German infantry on the West side of the pocket was of insufficient strength to have broken through. Had the British taken control of the Ferry they would, at least for some of the battle, have had a means of getting troops (including Jeeps, 6lbers etc. - as it was a Vehicle ferry) across, and thus as soon as the battle in Arnhem became bogged down on Day 2 a decision could have been made to cross at Driel and attempt an attack on the south side of the Arnhem bridge, from the south. It would also have made things much easier for the Polish to support the British and once XXX Corps crossed the Waal they may well have chosen to support Driel either as the only objective, or as a second objective - thus potentially meaning they would use the more favourable Westerly route overlooked in the battle. With the Ferry as a backup plan, the British may also have given up battling to the Bridge earlier, thus saving troops and ammunition. Despite all the mistakes at Nijmegen, if the British had been able to take the south side of the Bridge, which is plausible given the tattered state of the 9th SS Recon battalion, by approaching from Driel, then the battle could have been won. Also the Polish would have been able to drop at DZ K rather than Driel. If there had been communication with Browning then conceivably a backup plan could also have been concocted to send the Polish South to take the Waal bridge from the North.

Brilliant video. Thank you. It will be interesting to see what Anthony Beevor says in his new book: Arnhem, The battle for the Bridges. I just got a copy of it today.

Really interesting and appears to have done a lot of research, however I'm curious, where was Ultra information on this? Was there any? Especially if it was thought there were 1000 tanks lying in wait? Certainly the Allied high command would have had access. Moreover, if the underground had intellegence of SS Divisions in the area wouldn't command have consulted Ultra information? Perhaps I'm placing too much emphasis on Ultra... Whatever the reasons, it apprears there was too much hubris and many loss there lives for it. As usual, any level of decision making should remember, "there is no right way to do a wrong thing..."

Very interesting and informative video! So when one really gets down to study the whole affair by researching sources and documents most people never get to read, there are substantial facts pertaining to questionable decisions in the planning of Market-Garden that seem to vindicate Browning, such as the priority given to Air Force requirements over those of the Army, i.e. Airborne, supported by Brereton, himself an Air Force officer. It would seem that Browning had many decisions forced on him that he, had he been in command of the Allied Airborne Army, would never have accepted or condoned. As it was, he was also just a subordinate to the Realpolitik of the war - the Americans had more troops in Europe and supplied most of the resources and equipment, so their commanders got the top jobs and the British came second, and had to obey orders whether they liked them or not.

"The 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shields Warren, was charged with taking the road bridge over the Waal *at Nijmegen: a prime task of Operation Market was being entrusted here to just one battalion from an entire division.* According to the US Official History, there was some dispute over exactly when the 1st Battalion should go for the bridge. General Gavin was to claim later that the battalion was to ‘go for the bridge without delay’. However, Colonel Lindquist, the 508th Regimental commander, understood that *Warren’s battalion was not to go for the bridge until the other regimental objectives - securing the Groesbeek Ridge and the nearby glider LZs, had been achieved: General Gavin’s operational orders confirm Warren’s version.* Warren’s initial objective was ground near De Ploeg, a suburb of Nijmegen, which he was to take and organise for defence: only then was he to ‘prepare to go into Nijmegen later’ and these initial tasks took Lieutenant Colonel Warren most of the day. It was not until *1830hrs* that he was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio - say *forty men."* - Neillands This was all on D-Day. Browning was expecting the bridge to have been taken immediately. So, Browning was guilty of believing Gavin about the 1,000 tanks, but not in failing to seize the bridge on the 1st day.

The reason why it was deemed OK for the Poles to come in close on day three was aircraft. Given the concern over flak over Arnhem, then it made no sense (so it seemed) to commit and potentially lose lots of aircraft on day 1 - the Poles couldn't have then come on day three due to lack of aircraft. By day 3 it was hoped that the flak would be suppressed, and so a close-in drop would then have been possible.

It is not for me to assign blame. Given your well presented video I feel better prepared to discuss the topic, and I thank you for that.

The failure of Market-Garden is Browning = 60%, Gavin 40%, since Browning was the overall ground commander, and command has the responsibility for the operations failure.

Yet another great vid :-)

Is Mead a biographer or a military historian? If the former, his comments on any battle must be taken with a huge amount of salt. And the title of his book would tend to imply that he is not a military historian.

So Browning being in command, when he seen that their was no attempt to take a bridge, should have relieved Gavin on the spot and taken charge. He was the commander on the ground and deserves the top blame. It says a lot about how they over estimated their troops abilities. If a battalion of two could hold off 10 panzer divisions, why not just attack with the airborne troops. The war would have been over in days. Of course that would have been why Browning ignored just a couple SS division in Arnhem.