The Essence of Being: Philosophical Inquiries into Existence 

FEEDBACK: I'm still experimenting with different video lengths and formats, so let me know what you think of this video. That is, of scripted short-form content (with or without Persian cats for visual aid : ). Also, for those wanting an article length defense of the commonsense view of existence, see How to be an Analytic Existential Thomist by Turner Nevitt. For a more rigorous book length defense see The Fullness of Being by Barry Miller.

This was very high quality! Really, really impressive.

Oh man! You're tempting me to use my old RU-vid name with all of those cats haha

Great video. I find it kind of puzzling that analytic philosophers have a tendency to favour the view that existence is a second order property whilst also maintaining nominalism, the idea that categories are imposed onto the world rather than derived from it. If there are no genuine categories which have multiple instantiations in reality beyond mere resemblance, then prior to the existence of minds and languages to conceive of and express these categories, what would it actually mean for a category which does not yet exist conceptually to be instantiated?

I like these short, punchy works just as much as your longer videos. Free roaming conversations are nice but it's also good to have a clear explanation of certain principles that can then be referred to in those heavier episodes. Also I'm a big fan of cats.

Gosh I love this new type of content! This subject is also one of my favorite, so it's a good day haha. I also think that seeing essence as a constraint of existence solves much of the good objections that can be made (also making an awesome synthesis of neo-platonic and aristotelian thought). But I would love your thoughts especially on this : how do we ensure ourselves that the intellect has being in itself as its proper object? This, to me, seems necessary if we want to avoid Kantian or even Hegelian objections. It's also, I think, what permits us to pass from a worldview comparison approach to a truly mind-engaged-with-reality metaphysics. Gilson, and pretty much all the 20th century thomists seems to justify that with an analysis of the judgment of existence. Would you follow that?

This was great. I like this shoer form scripted content as well. Would love to see some more of these!

Comment for traction. The resident barry miller expert. Interesting

Not even through the full video, but I have to say this is coming across as very professional, right to the point, and still accessible. Really nice job! Maybe these shorts would be a good occasional supplement to the medium- and long-form videos, so that, say, one individual idea from the longer video can be nailed down.

I see you, Pat! Haha. Thanks for the video, brother. Miller's move is interesting. I'll leave my two cents below: it's worth $.01, and the comment will be too long to be worth reading. Worth noting, I haven't read Miller yet, and I am responding to the comments in this brief introduction. So, I anticipate either (a) Miller does elaborate on what follows or (b) what follows is stupid. I think Miller's move is going to work quite well with persons, and perhaps only with persons. This is because the so-called individuating element is vague. Does Miller mean essence, or does he mean form, or does he have a unique way of relating them? So, if we take the butter example, he wants to talk about the metaphysically non-empty, immaterial bounds that individuate the sliced pieces of butter. But it seems we already have a tool that does this: form. I think we would not want to say that any forms are logically prior to the act of existence unless we want to go "full Plato" (I think some theists *do this with the divine ideas). In the case of the butter slices, the matter itself looks sufficient to indiviuate this piece of butter from that piece (and where form gets us both the butter nature and its piece-ability). But this leads to: composition is necessary and sufficient for individuation. (1) If that's true, I'm sensing a problem with holding composition as logically prior to the element of existence. (2) When we split the butter, do the slices gain a new property (an existential property) not possessed by the uncut stick? Aristotle gives us no pushback for bringing new forms into existence, but new acts of existence (i.e., new properties) seem more difficult. It might be clear why animate things are easier to account for by Miller - there is a much clearer sense, bounded by conception and death, in which a living thing's "coming and going" is demarcated as though by mysteries respectively. Maintaining existence as a property is, I think, how theists want to get God's intentionality (as distinct from intentionality per se) into the story. But I think we alleviate most of these tensions if we treat God AS existence, with no additional non-God existential property. This property so-called is not a numerically distinct property, i.e., of individual items. If this property does not inhere in something, but is instead modified by the limitation imposed by bound (form), then it is the fundamental substance, the unchanging metaphysical ground (a canvas on which images can be made, if you will). I'm just going to want to say that on Miller's account, we don't need "inherence talk" to say of properties that, by definition, a property is something that is instanced (omniscience is a property with one instance); but Miller gives us no way of talking about differentiation on the basis of the property of existence between existing things. You can only differentiate boundaries on the "one thing": God. Again, I might be misinterpreting Miller big time. I saw that you mentioned a talk with Gaven soon, and if it strikes you, maybe you could bring some of this up. Really digging this new stuff, Pat. Best wishes.

The cat's nose was runny. I couldn't stop thinking about wanting to wipe the little nose.

😍 Cats.