The Mary Argument Against Physicalism (Philosophy of Mind) 

However, Marry experiencing it in first-person is still a physical experience.

Thank you for the brief but clear explanation of Mary's Room Argument. My question is; how can the actual experience of redness be considered as non-physical one? Isn't it, although it's new to Mary, still merely an extension of, or confirmation of her knowledge of redness, so that it is still physical? I can agree that her experience is 'new,' but not necessarily non-physical.

This thought experiment is good because it forces people to at the very least really define closely what they mean by "physical" and "mental" and bite bullets where necessary.

Would the hypothetical procedure to correct her colorblindness be a physical one?

Hey Pastor Cooper! I appreciate the explanation of this argument. Although I believe the conclusions of this argument, I'm not sure that the argument itself holds up. We haven't proven the existence of knowledge that cannot be represented as a "brain-state". We have simply proven that Mary's brain entered a new state (which her brain had never been in while studying red) after she saw red. Or am I misunderstanding? God bless!

This is super helpful! I had a teacher who just didn't teach it correctly but you've made it sound so simple. Thanks!

The 3rd person knowledge becomes data to memory. The 1st person knowledge becomes data to memory. Two different sets of data completely even though they may be relatively linked to the same subject.

Jordan I recommend reading a brilliant/comprehensive book called the Divine Reality by Greek philosopher and convert Hamza Tzortzis.

There's a subjectivity to the way one would perceive colour which is due to the instruments we use to perceive colour, which are our eyes. Basically if our eyes returned a matrix of numerical values corresponding to the average wavelength of the signal perceived by each cell of our eye using just numbers, I think we would more inclined to say that the theory of vision is correct. If we saw just numbers day after day communicating us the colour of things, we would be more inclined to be objective about vision. Since we see colours in the particular way that we do, we attach meaning to the representation that our eyes give of an unbiased and objective signal which carries no inherent meaning or purpose. To sum it up, if all your life you saw just numbers instead of colours, you would be firmly convinced of the electromagnetic field theory.

Seems like the conclusion doesn't follow. You say "There is something about knowledge that cannot be gained through just physical events" However your had previously stated that the only way for Mary to get this knowledge was to have working eyes and see it for herself. Seems to me like that is requiring something physical - an organ - eyes in this case, in order to gain this knowledge. You conclude "Therefore reality itself and the mind is not purely physical" however what you have described as the necessary means of gaining this knowledge is working eyes - something physical.

The red wavelength can only be collected and identified by the eye which would then be stored as a pulse in her brain Failing to collect this wavelength would mean that marry doesn't have the full picture of the colour red as she is missing the information gained through sight, no?

The qualia are primary, and so intimately what our mind swim in that we forget it's there. All the knowledge Mary has about color is only known by her mind and because her mind has made a decision to exclude itself from the equation but still pretend the qualia she experiences are the actual physical underlying thing she pretends exists entirely independent of mind as such, though there is no evidence for that. It is through the qualia she learns anything. It's inherent in the scientific method that anything that does not affect directly the collectively imagined physical qualia will be excluded as evidence. And then people are surprised that this method does not find evidence of anything non-physical (except it kind of does when you actually take physical science seriously and study the interactions between consiousness and the phenomena we observe, but most science pretends this is not really affecting their field). We basically have a huge amount of faith that the qualia that we experience and can physically affect our other qualia, are correct and everlasting, while in reality they are entirely novel. Physical science tells us there is no difference between a rainbow and a rock, only different senses involved. And yet we can perfectly well accept that a rainbow does not exist without a mind that has the capability name it, while a rock we will not, for no particular reason other than faith that our mental images of rocks are not actually mental images.

"Knowledge about" != "Experience of" A person can know everything about cookery (for example) and tastes and the phusiology of tasting things and still be shocked when they first taste a strawberry. I dont see where the comfident assertion that 'qualia' must be non physical comes from. To say that all knowledge is of one kind or category doesn't work. It is quite possible that the experience and the analysis are seperate and you can learn one without the other. I'm not rejecting a non-physical aspect to consciousness or thought but I don't see this as convincing evidence for it.

I am a physicist and I will explain why scientific knowledge refutes the idea that brain processes alone can generate consciouness; this leads us to conclude that our mental experiences cannot be purely physical/biological. The brain operates in a fragmentary manner, with many separate processes happening simultaneously. I prove that such fragmentary structure implies that brain processes are not a sufficient condition for the existence of consciousness; therefore, something else must be involved-something indivisible and non-physical, which we often refer to as the soul. (in my youtube channel you can find a video with more detailed explanations). Emergent properties are often thought of as arising from complex systems (like the brain). However, I argue that these properties are subjective cognitive constructs that depend on the level of abstraction we choose to analyze and describe the system. Since these descriptions are mind-dependent, consciousness, being implied by these cognitive contructs, cannot itself be an emergent property. Preliminary considerations: the concept of set refers to something that has an intrinsically conceptual and subjective nature and implies the arbitrary choice of determining which elements are to be included in the set; what can exist objectively are only the individual elements. Defining a set is like drawing an imaginary line to separate some elements from others. This line doesn't exist physically; it’s a mental construct. The same applies to sequences of processes-they are abstract concepts created by our minds. Mental experiences are necessary for the existence of subjectivity/arbitrariness and cognitive constructs; Therefore, mental experience itself cannot be just a cognitive construct. Obviously we can conceive the concept of consciousness, but the concept of consciousness is not actual consciousness; We can talk about consciousness or about pain, but merely talking about it isn’t the same as experiencing it. (With the word consciousness I do not refer to self-awareness, but to the property of being conscious= having a mental experiences such as sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories and even dreams) From the above considerations it follows that only indivisible elements may exist objectively and independently of consciousness, and consequently the only logically coherent and significant statement is that consciousness exists as a property of an indivisible element. Furthermore, this indivisible entity must interact globally with brain processes because there is a well-known correlation between brain processes and consciousness. However, this indivisible entity cannot be physical, since according to the laws of physics, there is no physical entity with such properties. The soul is the missing element that interprets globally the distinct elementary physical processes occurring at separate points in the brain as a unified mental experience. Clarifications The brain itself doesn't exist as a completely mind-independent entity. The concept of the brain is based on separating a group of quantum particles from everything else, which is a subjective process, not dictated purely by the laws of physics. Actually there is a continuous exchange of molecules with the blood and when and how such molecules start and stop being part of the brain is decided arbitrarily. An example may clarify this point: the concept of nation. Nation is not a physical entity and does not refer to a mind-independent entity because it is just a set of arbitrarily chosen people. The same goes for the brain. Brain processes consist of many parallel sequences of ordinary elementary physical processes occurring at separate points. There is no direct connection between the separate points in the brain and such connections are just a subjective abstractions used to approximately describe sequences of many distinct physical processes. Indeed, considering consciousness as a property of an entire sequence of elementary processes implies the arbitrary definition of the entire sequence; the entire sequence as a whole (and therefore every function/property/capacity attributed to the brain) is a subjective abstraction that does not refer to any mind-independendent reality. Physicalism/naturalism is based on the belief that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. However, an emergent property is defined as a property that is possessed by a set of elements that its individual components do not possess; my arguments prove that this definition implies that emergent properties are only subjective cognitive constructs and therefore, consciousness cannot be an emergent property. Actually, emergent properties are just simplified and approximate descriptions or subjective classifications of underlying physical processes or properties, which are described directly by the fundamental laws of physics alone, without involving any emergent properties (arbitrariness/subjectivity is involved when more than one option/description is possible). An approximate description is only an abstract idea, and no actual entity exists per se corresponding to that approximate description, simply because an actual entity is exactly what it is and not an approximation of itself. What physically exists are the underlying physical processes. Emergence is nothing more than a cognitive construct that is applied to physical phenomena, and cognition itself can only come from a mind; thus emergence can never explain mental experience as, by itself, it implies mental experience. Conclusions My approach is based on scientific knowledge of the brain's physical processes. My arguments show that physicalism is incompatible with the very foundations of scientific knowledge because current scientific understanding excludes the possibility that brain processes alone can account for the existence of consciousness. An indivisible non-physical element must exist as a necessary condition for the existence of consciousness because mental experiences are linked to many distinct physical processes occurring at different points; it is therefore necessary for all these distinct processes to be interpreted collectively by a mind-independent element, and a mind-independent element can only be intrinsically indivisible because it cannot depend on subjectivity. This indivisible element cannot be physical because the laws of physics do not describe any physical entity with the required properties. Marco Biagini

Why is sensory knowledge/information not physical knowledge? The physical phenomenon of stimulating red cones in the eyes of Mary is physical knowledge that must be included in the knowledge given to her while she was in the room as part of the “total knowledge”. To withhold that knowledge and simultaneously claim that she had total knowledge is absurd.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding something, but can't Mary's seeing of the color red be counted as a "physical event"? Her not being able to see the color red means she does not actually know all their is to know, physically, about the color red. Correct me if I'm misunderstanding something about the argument.

"How can anyone communicate the idea of color by means of words since the ear does not hear colors but only sounds?"

I don't see how this could defeat physicalism in any way. So Mary never had this input from her eyes, and now she does, which changes her brain activity. Nothing but physical events involved here. Formulated as is, the whole knowledge and qualia thing looks like shifting the goalpost.

What kind of camera do you use?

Another way of approaching the argument is does Mary know whether her brain shows the neural correlates of seeing the colour red & if not why?

Yes, dr Dennett is right - there is no such a thing as mind! Dennett himself is the Proof - you can have a brain without mind!

Very interesting thought experiment, I'm new to all of philosophy and this thought experiment, but I'm curious... If Mary knows everything about the color red would that not mean that she has seen red? To know everything about the color would also be to know what it looks like.

Isn't that simply Empiricism vs Rationalism?

this is a great introduction to the knowledge argument! the original argument, in jackson's paper 'epiphenomenal qualia', is also very readable, even for nonphilosophers. a more broad overview of the controversy between physicalism & other views is given in this video, which i'd recommend: ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-Z80Jxj98dzI.html (papineau: physicalist; goff: panpsychist)

I agree with those who argue that the Mary Argument is not valid. Red does not exist in the world; there are just photons that have a particular frequency. When the eye detects photons of that frequency, it informs the brain. The brain then presents that information to us as the color red. In other words, the information about the photon has been coded into color, which exists only in the brain. If Mary has never seen red, it means that either her eyes cannot distinguish the frequency of those photons from others, or the brain does not process those photons separately from other frequencies. So either her eye or her brain doesn't process the photon correctly. If suddenly she can see red, it's because her eyes and/or brain have been fixed so the photons we see as red can be detected and processed correctly. Hence Mary's brain now conducts processes it has never processed before - different brain states. Mary may well know about these brain processes/states, but her brain has never done them until now. I think all arguments against the physical approach are just "God of the Gaps" arguments. Do not look for God in the gaps in scientific knowledge because those gaps get filled over time and God must retreat. Belief in God is an article of faith. You either believe or you don't. There is no proof.

Knowing everything about travel to Paris != going to Paris ... We will not teleport to Paris just because we have read enough about it. point: first person experience is irreducible to third person description...

Gaining knowledge is an additional brain state. A new wiring. Our model has a model for this.

There's no problem from a physical point of view to explain what happened. When Mary learns *about* the color red that information is processed and stored in one part of the brain. When Mary sees red, that is registered in another part of the brain. Mary can tell the difference, so it is a new form of knowledge, but with a pure physical implementation. It's similar to the idea that you can't learn to ride a bike by reading books about it. You have to go out and practice.

People who don't believe the mind is physical should become professional boxers.

What do you think about german Idealism? Is it biblical?

I’m not convinced of dualism or materialism at this point, but I’m still really disappointed by this argument. Your argument commits a huge non-sequitur fallacy and is also begging the question-It doesnt matter at all whether Mary had a different experience or not when she experienced color vs when she studied its physical processes. A dual reality is only a reasonable conclusion if the processes that underly her reactions in either scenario cannot be explained by observable physical processes. If her reaction to seeing the color red is different than her studying the color red, but if neuroscience can explain why the reaction is different (which it almost certainly can), then your entire premise is absurd and begged from a pre-assumed premise that is bunk.

If the mind wasn't part of the brain thoughts wouldn't be affected by chemicals.

This thought experiment is "begging the question". In its premises it assumes that Mary knows everything there is to know about the color red. And in this, suggests that she has knowledge of what its like to experience it. If this were really true, she wouldn't have been surprised at all when she left the room. Or to put it another way, if she TRULY knew everything about color, she would be able to recreate that state in her brain and be able to experience it without there being red. Even if it was something new to her, it doesn't prove dualism, it only proves that knowledge about something doesn't change one's brain state. And experiencing something does.

Blah blah you can't prove it's a process argument and all these old people when I'm 70.