I was at the commemoration last September in Armhem. It was sad to see only one veteran left alive who fought there. Geoff Roberts from Peterborough. He was 19 at the time and now nearly 99. I had the privilige of meeting him outside the hartenstein museum. He fought with the Kings Own Scottish Borders
I feel sad watching any WW2 documentary, knowing every man, woman & many children I see in the film has passed away now. Such great people who faced such incredible challenges & uncertainty. God bless them all. RIP 🫡 🇺🇸
@@DC-gy1zw I remember this happening around the year 2000 with the ww1 vets. They were bringing out documentaries about the last vets. The last tommy who fought in the war, who fought in Ypres, died in 2012. 2 years before the start of the Great War. I think we still have another 20 years of allied soldiers and maybe 30 years of axis soldiers left. But the numbers in that time will be in the tens, if not single digits
For everyone that doesn't know. The bridge in Arnhem that the allies weren't able to catch, is (since 1978 ) named the John Frost bridge, as a reminder of the sacrifice of the allied forces. The people of The Netherlands are still thankful for everything the allies did to liberate not only our country but the whole continent.
Its my understanding that after the war local school children adopted a grave of a fallen ally. They still carry out that duty today, and I understand that some have passed that onto their grandchildren as well.
@@anthonycollingridge970 Yes, that is still taking place. To be clear, we are talking about multiple graves/soldiers. Not just one grave adopted by all school children.
@@anthonycollingridge970 The same thing took place in Dieppe following the 1942 Canadian Army raid that ended in absolute disaster. My dad was there, an American serving with the Essex Scottish Division that hit Red Beach. Like other divisions, dad and the men with him never got off Red Beach. The end of the battle left a horrible number of dead. They were interned in a cemetery just outside of Dieppe and school children from that area care for those graves to this very day. As for dad, his war ended on this day. He did live. But he was marched off to a POW Camp along with the other survivors and would spend the rest of the war in confinement.
just a pity that the Allies were all nations controlled by the Khazarian financial mafia we know today as the WEF globalists that have a plan to destry civilization and exterminate humans as per the Talmud and the space aliens they worship. Not much of a liberation was it?
I've met these people: they were my father's buddies. They couldn't imagine doing it, either. But, they did. But, you DO. But, one DOES. ALWAYS remember that.
The censoring of comments is even more irritating, Imagine I write a post, sign out, and it's dissappeared . What a cess pit of a society we have now.🤬
@@michael7324 Annoying and sensless when you think you saw many of these productions on television many years ago, when not only could one query most veterans first hand but there was, NO CENSORSHIP. Its ridiculous being censored at seventy from images you saw when you were eighteen or younger, especialy as the censors were not even born.
A quote from Pericles best sums up the battle "I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies designs".The blunders made, the intelligence ignored makes me wonder how this didn't come at an even higher cost.
Agreed. with the Blunders. Although is Easy to CRITISIS most any General I am really tired Of EVERY BLOODY DOC. on WW2 and how Monty was the right hand man to Jesus himself when MARKET GARDEN one of, if not the worst plan of WW2 caused the slaughter of SO MANY, CANADIANS and BRITS.. LEFT IN OPEN FIELDS the Germans simply opend a few DYKES and went to work on us
Monty rarely made mistakes, he just had the Americans to contend with. Most of the US Top Brass in WW2 had spent the 1920s and 1930s playing at soldiers with old WW1 equipment and about 120,000 troops, it was a joke!
@@billballbuster7186 >>US Army pre-war army was a joke Yes, then George Catlett Marshall spotted talent and rebuilt it. Truman called GCM "the man who won the war" in that his personnel and logistical genius got the thing done by many, many talented others. Monty was a political weapon, Patton was, too: "propaganda tools". So was the Norden Bombsight. Fine. Patton (nutty but just what you need for taking out modern enemies) could go 90 degrees in almost zero time for Bastogne because he had his staff prep, then update and implement, contingency plans. Monty was handed the world and fumbled the ball into die modderige moerassen van Nederland (those muddy swamps of Die Nederland). If Monty had admitted that when he wrote, I'd put flowers on his grave. As it was, I'd have punched him at SHAEF when I lit his cigar and taken the gaff for it. Once I left the stockade I'd have been famous all the way home.the modderige moerassen van nederland
Totally misleading but I'm not surprised, like Monty not showing up with the other Allied commanders toward the end of the battle, no Britisher ever faces that the battle was lost by the Field Marshall who planned Market-Garden!
As much fluff and puff as Ole Monty himself....... All ego and overhand player as per usual..... Even when M finally crossed the Rhine, it had to be a big show no matter what...
"No battle plan survives the first contact from the enemy." Market Garden was a set piece battle plan. The defeat of Market Garden lengthened the war by months! The loss of men and material was sacrificed on the altar of Monty's ego. In his autobiography, he criticized Ike's plan of advancing on a broad front. Ike gave him his chance at glory. The rest is bloody history.
My father was a weapons platoon leader in the 82nd for Market-Garden. He went on to fight in the Battle of the Bulge where he was critically wounded by a single bomb dropped from a captured allied aircraft.
Montgomerys “Grave yard Garden” and again he was wrong and his screwup caused the life’s of thousands and the capture of many allied soldiers amazing how dangerous a BIG EGO can be .
joec3073 MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), the Lorraine Campaign (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties). All of which took place under Bradley's command.
Hm, Not a big Monty fan myself, but it would be wise and prudent to compare the popular narrative with what actually happened. Market Garden failed because the American 82nd Airborne under Gen. Gavin failed to take the Nijmegen bridges as ordered. Had Gavin immediately done as specifically ordered, Market Garden would likely have succeeded as planned. Montgommery got blamed for failure out of political expedience and private (and petty) animosities, but he had a sound, if for him uncharacteristically audacious plan. Gavin goofed it up.
@@Centurion101B3C 60 plus miles of road surrounded by polder (mud) is the definition of a choke point. What was 1st AB supposed to have done on day one ? What did they actually do ?
@@thevillaaston7811 so was the victory in Europe under Bradley, if Montgomery was that good he would have been in charge but he wasn’t Montgomery was always was victorious when he out numbered , out gunned and was out supplied over the Germans
I've been in a few mass tactical jumps, and they pale into insignificance compared to Market Garden. Jumping into Point Salines during Urgent Fury wasn't that thick with parachutes. Couldn't imagine having to land 6 to 8 miles from my objective.
due to MG the Dutch eastern border province was one huge battlefield. Check Overloon, Venlo, Roermond, Heerlen, but also Nijmegen was constantly shelled and German divers tried to bomb the bridges. @@thevillaaston7811
Eisenhower was far from happy with Montgomery after this disaster and was thinking of asking him to take a step down ,when Monty complained Eisenhower famously said " You can't speak to me like that Monty, I'm your boss ,putting Monty in his place
Great documentaries as always but because of RU-vids rules & blurred over parts of documentaries that is history not a serial killer, I am done watching these have subscribed to History Hit... Thanks for everything👍
Idk. Is it really tho? Once the attack has started then the objectives will be fairly obvious and straightforward for the Germans. Which bridges and where. By the time plans are found and passed on their value is probably close to none
@@tjanderson5892 well it let the germans know the objectives. All they had to do at that point was block and or reinforce those objectives. They allies still had a ways to march before getting to the objectives. Not just that but it also let the germans know their troop strength , supply drops, and anything else they wanted to know.
@@Sonofaguninmo The objectives were pretty obvious, the Allies had been trying to capture bridges with airborne at least since Sicily. In at least one instance having the plans backfired. Fighters were in the air waiting on that days drop which was delayed by bad weather in England, so they used up fuel when they had none to spare.
The Germans made the same mistake in their assault on The Hague in May 1940 and paid the same price. The Battle of The Hague was the only German defeat in their May/June 1940 offensive against the Low Countries and France. In fact their defeat was even worse than Market Garden. They lost two thirds of the committed force for no result at all and their defeat was even swifter than Market Garden. By mid-day of 11 May, the second day of the operation, the battle was essentially over and the remnants of the German paratroopers around The Hague were on the run and being hunted by Dutch forces. From a German point of view the operation was a complete disaster. My Mother, then 9 years old, saw Dutch staff officers retrieve the bag with the complete set of German plans from the wreckage of the Ju-52 which had crashed just outside her house. Of course she didn’t know what it was those officers took at the time, but the description she gave of the event tallied exactly with the official history.
The first time I saw a war grave cemetery was at 14 and it was Oosterbeek ! I will never forget it ! 0osterbeek is better pronounced as " Oosterbake ".
Having watched the film, I heard about Operation Market Garden, but I would still like to learn what the real CONSEQUENCES of the Allied failure at Arnhem were.
Main consequence is that the allies did not win the war in 1944 (stated several times). OK? Take notes while you watch; it helps. Then, to extrapolate*, continued war gave Germany time to rearm for "The Battle of the Bulge" on resource-depleted, wintered-in allies. * extrapolate - to predict by projecting past experience or known data ;-]
@@BasVossenThe allies allowed the Russians to take Berlin,a formidable objective.The 2nd World War was effectively over in 1944.After the battle of Stallingrad the Germans knew they could not win that War.After Kursk Germany knew they would lose the War.
The arrogance of Montgomery in sending these men to their deaths is still shocking to this day. There is not way to justify the needless risk he took on this mission.
@@johndawes9337, Boy Browning and Brereton came up with the plan. Ike signed off on it. Monty was arrogant enough to put his name to it, hence the 90% success statement.
@@jimf4260 Market Garden was not a defeat. It took 100km of German held ground. The Germans retreated and lost Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The allies later used Nijmegen to attack into Germany. Only Arnhem was a defeat but technically this was an all air operation. Planned by the air forces. Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:ty John Peate
Yes and he had the gaul to say it was a success. He ws a glory hound full of himself accusing the Americans vof beihg incompitent. He actually prolonged the war ad was responsible for the deaths of thousands of allied troops!
In 1976 I was 6yo living in England this lovely Lady would very excitedly tell us ad-nausea these stories of over a thousand Allied Planes, as far as she could see. I always knew about the Battle of Britain & Allied Planes flying to Europe to Attack the Germans, but now I finally understood the story that i was told over a dozen times of the Friendly Planes that filled the skies in 1944. It must of been a sight. This Lady was 6yo in 1944, & was unsure of her future, as was her whole Town. They imagined the worse, being overrun by Germans. The sight of those Planes totally lifted everyones spirits. Im now looking for stories from other People that witnessed that awesome sight.
The story telling is nice, but the use of stock footage that has nothing to do with the narrative is distracting. For example showing American soldiers when talking about the British para's, showing tanks when talking about para troopers and random bridges when talking about the Son bridge. The censoring / blurring is also irritating. This is supposed to be a history documentary, not p*rn.
Well said. Furthermore, as I like it as an American, is it possible that there is another voice other than a British voice that can narrate the story? Is there some kind of prohibition against all other English speaking people?
Consequences? The UK 1st Airborne Division, reduced to under 2000 effectives was substantially combat ineffective for the remainder of the War. Montgomery expressed his satisfaction with the defeat, calling it a "victory" even after German commandos blew 80 feet out of the middle of the Waal bridge on September 29th. Bumbling Browning blamed the defeat on the commander of the Polish brigade, a unit not even dropped into combat until September 21st - the 5th day = due to poor weather - after the battle was well lost except in Montgomery's superego. General Sosabowski was removed from command in a disgraceful sacrifice to pride..
Yes, but if you have the advantages like numbers, quality of enlisted men, supply and surprise on your side, a failure should lead to qustions in respect to leadership and leadership culture.
@@James-to7pi Macarthur ran away like a mongrel dog. Who lived in luxury here in Brisbane Who never visited his troops if there were any enemy within cooee Who tried to get Australia to stop sending Rations to Britain post war and divert them to Japan Monty Who was one the last to leave the Beaches at Dunkirk after making sure that his soldiers from his Brigade had got away. Who lived on the front lines with his troops in a truck with a bed a table some chairs and a trunk for 4 years While American generals lived in Villas miles from the front. Who took the surrender of the Germans in a tent. Who was put in charge of two US Armies 600000 + to straighten the bulge Who had beaten Rommel at El Alamein in the field and then beat him at his Atlantic Wall It was Monty who planned D/Day.
It is still a disgrace that for so long General Sosabowski was blamed for the failure by both Montgomery and Browning, when in fact the operation had been over effectively before most of the Poles touched down in the Netherlands. Later Queen Beatrix corrected this by giving a high medal (the bronze lion) to the family of General Sosabowski and the Dutch Military Order of William (in Dutch de Willemsorde) for the Polish parachute brigade of after the collapse of the Iron Curtain. All fought bravely, but were let down by a stupid plan, capture of the full plans and bad intel, none of this was the fault of the Polish. The British political leaders and several of their military leaders played a dirty game with the brave Polish parachutist and Sosabowski.
@@johndawes9337 I provided a ton of quotes and links, from several WW2 websites and sites specifically to Market Garden but mysteriously it seems to have vanished. The Polish Brigade was moved to Nijmegen to defend the withdrawal of British troops in Operation Berlin, before returning to England in early October.[176] Shortly afterwards, the British scapegoated Sosabowski and the Polish Brigade for the failure at Arnhem, perhaps to cover their own failings. On 17 October, Montgomery informed Alan Brooke-Chief of the Imperial General Staff-that he felt the Polish forces had "fought very badly" at Arnhem and that he did not want them under his command Brian Urquhart-who had done so much to warn his superiors about the dangers of Arnhem-described the criticism of Sosabowski and the brigade as "grotesque" and his dismissal as a "shameful act" en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Arnhem more about how Sosabowski was scapegoated and used as a political tool to force the hand of the Polish government in exile, Churchill needed a weapon to force the Poles to work with Stalinist forces, the scapegoated Polish Parachutist were that weapon, you can read more about that here en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanis%C5%82aw_Sosabowski
@@petervandervliet640 - "moved to Nijmegen to defend the withdrawal of British troops in Operation Berlin" is obviously nonsensical if you look at a map. The Poles covered the withdrawal from Driel. The whole Wiki article is poopoo, as John says. The Poles were rightly criticised for poor discipline, Rob Kershaw even has complaints from the SS (!) about their medics being fired on by the Poles in Oosterbeek (It Never Snows In September, 1990), and Browning's complaint that Sosabowski was difficult to work with and insubordinate to Horrocks at the Valburg conference are both undisputed facts with many witnesses. It was for these reasons Browning wanted the Brigade removed from his command and Montgomery, after initially writing to Sosabowski to thank him and his brigade for their efforts and request recommendations for awards, subsequently backed Browning's report. Nowhere have I seen any evidence a British commander blamed the Poles for the failure of the operation, because it doesn't make any sense - they arrived too late to compromise the operation - and nobody has been able to provide any evidence for it when challenged to do so.
@@johnadams5489 - only 21.Panzer-Division at Caen were in the invasion area with 124 tanks (mostly Mark IV with a few Mark III), although the training unit Panzer-Ersatz-Abteilung 100 with some captured obsolete French Renault R35 tanks counter-attacked the 82nd Airborne holding La Fière bridge near Sainte-Mère-Église. All other panzer units were held in reserve as Panzergruppe West, which could be released only on Hitler's orders, and no one wanted to wake him on the morning of the invasion. The Tigers in Saving Private Ryan are fiction. Hollywood fantasy. Sorry. (Not sorry).
An entertaining movie is not a substitute for good historiography, esp. when many of the shown aspects are wrong and of course do not ask the right questions.
@@olafkunert3714 I completely agree. Holliweird always adds in things that really did not happen for drama reasons. They also leave out facts. I was just saying it was a decent movie but yeah it lacked historical accuracy for sure.
@@andrewwhale3885 If you back out of this version on War Stories, and go to the search bar, enter "Battlefield documentary" and you can find it un-blured.
Probably because they will get demonetized by RU-vid. You want documentaries without RU-vid censorship, then buy the full video, sponsor this channel, or STFU.
It wasn't really. They were given a gift of a two day time window by the US 82nd to bring in tanks from Germany. Also, the road was still clear 40 hours after the jump.
They were probably the best soldiers all around in the war. And they had tons of experience, fighting the Russians, fighting and Europe. A lot of Allied troops were green really. The Germans beat themselves and Russia. We all know that. After they lost in Russia the war was over.@johnburns4017
@@Fuxerz After the small British BEF retreated from Dunkirk, the German never had one campaign victory over the British. The Germans were on the run by the time the USA had boots on the ground against the Axis. The Germans had been *stopped:* ♦ in the west at the Battle of Britain in 1940; ♦ in the east at the Battle of Moscow in 1941. In which Britain provided 40% of the Soviet tanks. The Germans were *on the run* after the simultaneous battles in late 1942 of: ♦ El Alemein; ♦ Stalingrad; The Battle of El Alemein culminated in a quarter of a million Axis prisoners taken in Tunisia - more than taken at Stalingrad.
@@johnburns4017 babbled :After the small British BEF retreated from Dunkirk -------------------------------------------------------------- Just stop deny,lie and alibi - burns you blowhole you have talked some tripe but that one takes the cake. There were 140,000 tommies taking to the channel with Brooke and Bernard leading the charge. The only thing superceding your nonsense is your willingness to tell it. Jump in the channel and bring your loofah,bernard will be by for your FULL MONTY
Because RU-vid is a bunch of idiots that give you ads while censoring historical images. This is outrageous and disrespectful towards all those who gave their lives there. Shame on you, YT!
The crossing of the Waal was NOT in "assault boats" but in 26 folding canvas engineering boats furnished to the 504th Parachute Infantry by the British - with 75% of the paddles missing. Seizure of a bridgehead on the north bank of the Waal was effectively the end of Market-Garden. The front line stayed there for five months and Arnhem was captured in April, 1945.
@thomaslinton5765 ---. Hello. I noticed that mistake from the video maker myself and started chuckling. Men getting into Higgins boats marked USN, on a river in the Netherlands??? Nope. Those were small river craft made of foldable canvas. This video is an example of slice / splice / connect and press "start".
The 82nd crossing the river resulted in the capture of the Rail bridge at Nijmegen, NOT the road bridge. The road bridge was captured by Guards armoured tanks after fighting through the town for 36 hours. If Gavin's troops had seized and held the bridge in the first few hours it may have been a different story. 30 corps arrived at Nijmegen 6 hours ahead of schedule. The stopping for tea never happened, in fact the US paratroopers were delighted to see the tanks. The tanks which crossed the bridge could not press on to Arnhem having spent their ammo and fuel and having lost crews. They needed to wait for support and resupply. The time it took to capture Nijmegen allowed German reinforcements to be shipped in from Grmany which ultimately doomed the troops at Arnhem and stopped 30 Corp.
BBC: "Market Garden was one of the boldest plans of World War Two. Thirty thousand British and American airborne troops were to be flown behind enemy lines to capture the eight bridges that spanned the network of canals and rivers on the Dutch/German border. . . . The plan was conceived by General Bernard Montgomery, commander of the British forces in Europe."
The ORIGINAL plan was conceived by Montgomery it was shelved and Ike and Bedel Smith changed it. Montgomery is not list as being in charge on the ORBAT of the Battle
@@jacktattis, I thought it was Boy Browning and Brereton that came up with the plan. Monty did his usual thing of taking other people's ideas and sold it to Ike. It then got rehashed into "A Bridge Too Far". Cornelius Ryan re-wrote history and Ike didn't correct anyone.
@@jimf4260 I have read elsewhere. Montgomery made a plan earlier that was shelved, someone I do not know who renewed it changed it a fair bit and submitted it to Ike.
@@jimf4260 Comet planned Operation Comet then cancelled it. SHAEF liked the concept then took hold of it using the FAA Army, who were answerable to SHAEF, who expanded it into Market Garden. The FAAA planned it. Monty was sidelined. The FAAA was notionally inside the 21st Army Group but a SHEAF responsibility.
Get and read the book titled: "A Bridge Too Far" by Cornelius Ryan. It has still photos and much detail. There was also a good movie of the same title made in 1977.
Market Garden was a great idea, in theory, imo. Then again, so was Gallipoli, and Erich Von Falkenhayn's Gericht plan at Verdun, during Ww1. Even the best plans can come unstuck in warfare. Montgomery didn't help himself by being so egotistical and outspoken, either. Half the Allied command probably enjoyed him coming unstuck here, and his struggles at Caen (on a personal level, anyway)...
The reason that there were so many doubters of Market Garden was that it required almost everything to go right, and for nothing to go wrong. That means you had to be incredibly lucky for it to work. That isn't a great plan.
If Montgomery had operational control it would have worked but Eisenhower gave it to US general Bereton who had no experience with airbourn troops...none. should have been 2 drops one day but Bereton said no, how ever hindsight is forsight for idiots ?
Two decisions doomed this operation: 1st failure to quickly secure the Nijmegen bridge due to immediate concern about German forces in the Groesbeek heights to the east, 2nd failure to drop the 1st close to their objective. It would have been far preferable to take greater casualties landing in questionable terrain than to land over 8 km away, entirely off the line of advance. However it might not have been his direct choices, both have to be laid to the responsibility of 'Boy' Browning. Even reversing both these blunders the battle would have been 'a near run thing' as the Allies had underestimated the German forces available to resist the operation. But these two choices certainly doomed it. In retrospect the best prospect would have landed the 1st immediately south of the bridge, and landed the Polish brigade, the 1st day, immediately north of the Nijmegen bridge. While capture of the Nijmegen bridge the 1st day might have been critical, it is worth noting that the Germans attacked out of the Goresbeek and captured an 82nd landing zone. This resulted in recall of forces driving on the Nijmegen bridge, as loss of the drop zones might well have left two allied divisions 'flapping in the breeze' instead of just one.
The stubborn decision by Brereton and Williams to not fly double missions on day one killed the operation. The Germans concluded dispersed drops over a number of days was the biggest mistake made by the allies in the operation. That decision rests squarely with Brereton and Williams. They cared more about USAAF Troop Carrier Command personnel not getting too tired, than the well being of the paratroopers dropped behind enemy lines. An unforgivable disgraceful attitude. Williams I can understand. Brereton should have been fired.
Gavin was ordered by Browning to secure the heights to the east as a threat to the impossibly thin logistics line from Belgium. Even light artillery spotted from those heights would =have cut off everything north of the 101st. A drop north of the Waal might have helped with the problem of conflicting priorities made worse by not dropping the division intact on Day 1, a joint Brereton/Williams blunder.
I can not agree. This operation was doomed by decision to do this action. . . . Why? . . . All plan was based at faith that that the enemy shall do what is written in the plan. And that no problems shall appear. . . . But these horrible Germans did something different than was planned, so unfair behavior!
@@jirichuran General James Mattis has said, “No war is over until the enemy says it’s over. We may think it over, we may declare it over, but in fact, the enemy gets a vote.”
@@johndawes9337 Railroad strike (1944) In September 1944, the Dutch government in London calls for a railway strike in the Netherlands. The strike must halt German troop transport in order for the Allied forces to be able to initiate their air landings at Arnhem for Operation Market Garden.
The Germans took a different view of Market Garden. I can’t remember which German general said this: “Over the course of a few days the Allies shifted their front about 100km forward. That is not a defeat, nor a failure.” Another matter is whether Market Garden was ill-conceived. Certain aspects of its planning were, some of which are highlighted here. But as an operation as such it was worth the effort. If you weigh the potential loss of 3 divisions of paratroopers which were basically unemployed in England against the possibility of ending the war quickly, then, horrible as it may be, that is an acceptable trade-off. In the end one of those 3 divisions was severely mauled, but not completely destroyed. The other two came out OK and achieved their objectives. War is not a mathematical calculation. It was the Allies’ misfortune that they ran into a force commanded by probably the most capable German general of WWII when it came to salvaging impossible situations.
AND THERE THE VULNERABLE SALIENT STOPPED UNTIL GERMANY SURRENDERED - AND AT A TERRIBLE COST. AND IT WAS NOT NEARLY 100 KM DEEP AS IT ONLY GOT TO Nijmegen NOT ARNHEM.
@@alexlanning712 maybe you need some facts Alex Market Garden was not a defeat. It took 100km of German held ground. The Germans retreated and lost Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The allies later used Nijmegen to attack into Germany. Only Arnhem was a defeat but technically this was an all air operation. Planned by the air forces. Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:
This video has absolutely nothing about "(t)he real consequences of the Allied failure at Arnhem"! Save the hour of my life I lost waiting to hear anything that had to do with the title! It never does! Total waste of time.
We are Dutch and we live in the Netherlands. Stop using "Holland" when you mean the Netherlands. Holland are two provinces in the west of the Netherlands. We don't call Scotland England. Scots would not appreciate that.
So what were the REAL consequences? As opposed, presumably, to the non-real consequences. Who comes up with these silly titles? Why not just call it 'Operation Market Garden'. As such it was an excellent programme.
why? Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:
In the 80 years since the sad failure of this audacious plan there have been many serious and scholarly studies that concluded what was obvious from day one. It was overly complicated and depended on controlling too many variables that could never all be controlled. A few minor set backs or failures had the ability to derail the whole thing. All this was raised before a single man left Britian but was ignored or minimized. Today that's called magical thinking.
Including Monty' still planning Market Garden as if it was being conducted in the North African desert. 30 Corps were given an impossible task as the relief column. That distance they were expected to cover down what was to all intense & purposes a single track road was utter stupidity.
Agreed although it could also have been a total failure to appreciated how quickly the Germans could recover from a defeat - at that stage of the war this should have been obvious. I have read that the Browning's HQ were so keen to get into the action that they didn't really look at the plan in depth.
Britain was right across the channel,not 8,333 miles from home.Monty and mac both should have been removed maybe even dischared - frauds the both of them
Maybe if Mac had the 170 M3 light tanks that were in North Africa December 1941 in addition to the 108 he did have, and USS Wasp and Ranger were not on loan to Britain.
TIK history did the most intense research ever by a historian and put the Blame on Gavin …a U.S. airborne general who mis understood Brownings instructions at the bridge at Nijmegen…taking a day to clear nearby woods …
There's a famous report where Monty blamed MG's failure on the Polish. Imagine the gall and vanity of Monty, further saying it was 90% successful. Sure, go buy a new car that's only 90% built. That's the same as worthless.
@@sumivescent In this case it's less than worthless since it achieved nothing that couldn't have been achieved without battle by crossing the Rhine farther south. A high price was paid in men and materials, and it completely stopped the other 2 Allied army groups, something the Germans couldn't do. An extremely high price to pay for a narrow corridor of land that still faced the same obstacles in early '45 that it faced in 9/'44. Nothing was achieved... for the Allies, that is. The Germans benefited greatly from it. So yes... pretty worthless. Even the eastern operations you mentioned had many benefits, ie draining off a large percentage of men and materials (Monty's specialty) and kept the opponents from stabilizing a defensive front. Among other things.
I left it a long time ago Major Tony Hibbert a video where he states how Monty and Browning hung the poles and Sosibowski out to dry.If I dig it up will you two wags quit posting? Yes or No
"General Sir Bernard Montgomery KCB DSO, Commander of 21st Army Group., who was the originator of 'Operation Market Garden' which he intended to be 'a springboard for a powerful and full-blooded thrust to the heart of Germany'." Imperial War Museum.
Montgomery made so many wrong decisions in the landing of the Normandie. His task was to capture Caen on the day of the landing, but he could not get his trucks from the beaches. After 10 days he still was not in Caen. Cost the Canadian and British a lot of man. This would not happend if Eisenhower would be in charge. Same happens in Arnheim Holland
Monty's task was to command ALL ground forces for the invasion. His "task" was to reach Paris and the Seine by D-DAY+ 90. He got there two weeks early, with 20% fewer casualties than expected.
@@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85 "While during the planning there had been lofty talk, from Montgomery especially, of driving beyond Caen on D-Day" Forces Net The Days After D-Day: What Happened Next page
@@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85 Yes and you can thank Bradley and Patton for getting things back on track with Operation Cobra, then you had Montgomery's failure to close the Falaise pocket allowing tons of Germans to escape. Paris was not captured on time because of Montgomery it was captured on time in spite of him.
The reason that it took a month for the allies to take Caen was due to the fact that German Panzers were there at division strength. Eisenhower said, and I watched him say it today in the CBS programme of D - Day 20 years later, (which is on Youtue). Eisenhower said that because Montgomery was attacking Caen in strength, this forced the Germans to concentrate much more men and material to defend it than they wished to, and this high concentration of German forces around Caen allowed Patten's army to break out after taking Cherbourg. Not in the original Operation Overlord plan, but a good outcome. Montgomery was a cautious general because he was a leftenant, (lieutenant) in WW1 and had seen the senseless waste of 1000s of soldiers lives for very little gain on the battlefield. And let us not forget that Monty beat general Rommel in the deserts of North Africa.
The biased commentary on Gavin waiting for British support to arrive actually highlights one of the main mistakes made, this time by a US Airborne Commander; Gavin could have sent his airborne troops to seize Nijmegen bridge soon after they made their landing, but instead chose to shell non-existent enemy armour in the forests his command overlooked; an armed reconnaissance was sent which confirmed minimal defences at the bridge, but Gavin decided the bridge, contrary to his orders, wasn’t the priority; General Gavin, like one General Lucas at Anzio, was TOO CAUTIOUS!
"non-existent enemy armour in the forests" British AO, British intel. 1st AB took 4 hours to go 4 miles/6k from LZ Z to the rail bridge arriving just in time to see it destroyed.
Market Garden was not a defeat. It took 100km of German held ground. The Germans retreated and lost Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The allies later used Nijmegen to attack into Germany. Only Arnhem was a defeat but technically this was an all air operation. Planned by the air forces. Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944: thank you JP
Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. 100km of German held ground in just 3 days.
It was Montgomery's plan, and ignoring the official Order of Battle is weak. First Allied Airborne Army was part of Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Browning, Williams, and Brereton are minor demons to Montgomery's Old Scratch - the master advocate of the "Full Blooded" Narrow Approach. I was a disaster. Nijmegen was the front line for the next five months as the Allies had greatly enlarged their flanks to no benefit, weakening their offensive power, so not NEARLY 100 km. Arnhem fell in April, 1945, and Germans troops were in the Netherlands until May, 1945.
@@thomaslinton5765 if you read what i posted you will see they are not MY facts but From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944..looks like you have a reading problem tommy boy
@@lyndoncmp5751 The medal part maybe, but it's certainly not a myth that Monty was incompetent. Woefully so. The leaders he replaced were far better, but they didn't have a fraction of the logistical support that Monty demanded before he would turn a wheel. And it was still a close run thing. He couldn't hold a candle to Rommel.
Montgomery being incompetent is the more obvious myth than the dubious medal story. He was one of the most successful commanders of the war and only hated by the Americans for completely irrational reasons, mostly because he wasn't American - an absolutey unforgiveable crime. He didn't plan MARKET GARDEN, since Army Group commanders are responsible for strategy and not operational planning, so you need to look at Brereton and Williams for the airborne planning and Gavin and Lindquist for the tactical blunder at Nijmegen on the first day that allowed 10.SS-Panzer-Division to reinforce the city.
"Those stories are indeed doing the rounds, that he also received a medallion for the Battle of the Scheldt, the Distinguished Conduct Medal. He would have captured 93 soldiers there. He refused [the medal] because of General Montgomery. But you cannot find anything about all of that. Major fought in Zeeland, and undoubtedly he would have been competent. But about his medal we read nothing. And do not be mistaken; if someone came ten minutes too late to the evening roll call, then that is in the reports. Or that they get new shoes on Tuesday. And then there would be nothing noted down about the medal for Major? Would be really weird, I cannot imagine that." Dirk Staat, conservator of the Dutch National Military Museum In truth he had received seven days off as thanks for his heroic deed, which he spent in Belgium, prior to the award ceremony. "But the little car didn't want to start", wrote Major. "That's why I came back too late, and what's worse: I wasn't present to receive the distinction from Montgomery."' Tony Atherton (May 7, 2005). "Divergent portraits of war". The Ottawa Citizen. canada.com. uk.linkedin.com/in/tony-atherton-60702711
@@johni5355 But Montgomery was the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He won more battles, took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2. After Eisenhower took over from Montgomery as C-in-C of all ground forces in September 1944, everything went pear shaped, the advance stalled and the Americans were pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes. Unthinkable under Montgomery. As for Africa, I'll defer to von Mellenthin: "During August (1942) we heard of important changes of command on the British side. General Montgomery had taken over command of Eighth Army. There can be no question that the fighting efficiency of the British improved vastly under the new leadership, and for the first time Eighth Army had a commander who really made his will felt throughout the whole force. Montgomery is undoubtedly a great tactician, circumspect and thorough in making his plans, utterly ruthless in carrying them out. He brought a new spirit to Eighth Army, and illustrated once again the vital importance of personal leadership in war. That Montgomery was probably the best tactician if not the best strategist of the war is undoubted. We knew his methods well, his ability to move a division across our front in 1940 fighting by day and moving through the night was because of his adherence to training his men. His arrival in the desert changed the 8th army, he was ruthless in his will to win and impressed this on others. He was a very good army trainer and he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery. The devastation of his attacks with artillery shocked us. When the Americans stalled in 1944 (Ardennes), we knew without being told that Montgomery was in the region, he was very good at realising when a battlefield had become confused, we talked of his 'tidying up the battlefield' and reorganising lines of communication. Montgomery was a master of logistics, in the desert we in the staff warned Rommel that our recce had seen fuel and ammo dumps forward of the battle. Rommel shrugged and said not important we will deal with 'another British general here'. That Montgomery did this meant that he believed where he would be in the weeks to come"" From Von Mellenthin: Panzer Battles, Chapter IX Farewell To Africa, pages 137/138
My understanding is that Gavin of the 82nd was also at fault. His orders were to take Nijmegen bridge, but he got distracted by an incorrect report that Germans were on his flank. He focused on that phantom theat and didn't attack the bridge asap. By the time he did, the Germans had strongly reinforced the other side of the bridge and couldn't be disloged without the arrival of British armor a day later.
"The 82nd Airborne Division, however, certainly does not deserve any particular criticism for this as their priorities appear to be a further product of the blind optimism that dogged Operation Market Garden, of which everyone involved was guilty. At Nijmegen, as with everywhere else, the assumption was that resistance would be light and so the main concern of the airborne units was to make the advance of the ground forces as rapid and as uncomplicated as possible, instead of devoting all their attention to primary objectives. Furthermore, it should be understood that the 82nd Airborne Division had by far the most complicated plan of any of the Airborne units involved with Market Garden, their troops being required to capture numerous objectives over a considerable expanse of terrain." Pegasus Archive 30. Reasons for the Failure page
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- He may have "mostly" followed orders but not all of them. His orders were to take the bridge ASAP. As mentioned, he apparently dwaldled because of a phantom threat to his flank. By the time he attacked the bridge, it was too late. But whatever! Beleive what you want, as I'm sure you will anyway!
@@jackkunkel All I'm saying is that it was the men at the TOP of the food chain who were setting the priorities, ie Frederick Browning and Lewis Brereton. Everything from the inept planning for the drop zones, the refusal to consider 2nd lifts on the first day and the goofy idea to drop midday instead of early, focusing on the Groesbeek heights instead of the Bridges etc. Brereton rightly takes a big slice of the blame for the failure of "Market", with a generous portion doled out to Browning.
Contrary to its title, this video hardly touches on the consequences of the allied failure at Arnhem? It features sections where the image is blurred out and other sections where the images and narrative don't marry (e.g. talking about the British Paras but showing Americans or Germans or British 30 Corp with their tanks).
I played the computer game ARNHEM on my 8bit a lot. I failed many times, but I remember when I first won. It was a simple game compared to reality, and Walter Model against me was a simple silicone brain, yet the game could be won only when almost all operations were performed optimally for the game mechanics and the initial landings at Arnhem were ideal. Even though the game was simple by today's standards, it modelled well how small was the chance of success.
"Even though the game was simple by today's standards, it modelled well how small was the chance of success." That is a nonsensical argument. You could read "It never snows in September" by Rober Kershaw. He spent a lot of time in German archives and give in contrast to most UK/US authors an honest assessment of German forces - numbers and quality. The conclusion are different. Hint: There is something wrong if you are fought to a standstill by outnumbered and on average low quality enemy forces.
Hardly Miontgomery's only failure. Merely his worst. There was his failure to advance up the Italian boot, his failure to capture Caen, and his failure to close the Falaise Gap expeditiously.
Hardly Montgomery's only failure, merely his worst. There was his failure to move up the Italian boot, his failure to capture Caen, and his failure to expeditiously close the Falaise Gap. His only major talent was generating good PR.
@@MrEsMysteriesMagicks yawn..Caen 80% of enemy armour kind of slows things up but Paris was recaptured ahead of time thanks to Monty...Falsies gap was down to Bradley stopping Patton..his major talent was bashing Rommel 5 times never losing a battle and stepping in to save the US 1st and 9th armies from getting routed at St Vith after there boss ran away in a panic. so that Ike had to ask Monty to take over...
@@bigwoody4704 Woody go and read the operation It was the Brits / Canadians that saved your arses by taking the bulk of the German Panzers, you ungrateful wretch Patton was not even in the country until August So the Brits /Canucks fought the best the Germans had for 2 months
@@MrEsMysteriesMagicks He was up the Boot and took the hardest area the eastern side while the US failed in Front of Mont Casino. It took Brit led forces The Poles with Kiwi and Indian help took it The Brits were in position to encircle the Germann Army but Clark diverted his forces to take Rome AGAINST ORDERS 2. Caen was captured by the Brits before the deadline. Too much has been written that Caen was supposed to Have been captured in six days. Impossible 3.It was not the Canadians and Brits that failed to close the Gap That was Patton and Bradley had to rein him in.
Perhaps American senior officers were still fighting the war of independence at a time they should have been concentrating on defeating Germany and Japan? Montgomery was constantly having to remind them to focus, at times to no avail.
Perhaps if the Britsh actually had Field Commanders instead of royal rubes they wouldn't have gotten bounced out of Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 -Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941 -Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942 Then lose an EMPIRE - shameful but expected
@@bigwoody4704 "Perhaps if the Britsh actually had Field Commanders instead of royal rubes " Royal? Sorry Woody but this myth of aristocracy/royal has to end. Just to clarify below. Bill Slim, often argued as the best British general of WW2? Highest education was grammar school, his father was a failed businessman, never went to University. Richard O'Connor - Indian military background (father was a soldier), never went to university. Bernard Montgomery -father was a preacher in Tasmania, never went to university. Harold Alexander - father was an Earl, never went to university. Brian Horrocks - father was a doctor in the army, never went to university. Can you see the common background? Other than the fact almost all of them attended Sandhurst (except for Bill slim) and all of them were extremely competent generals.
The benefits: 1. It isolated over 4,000 German coastal defenders and prevented them from being used as "filler" for German combat units which was the practice at the time. 2. It pushed the V-1 launch sites out of the range of mainland England. 3. It allowed USAAF to start basing airfields in the Netherlands allowing fighter coverage to now extend into Austria. "Operation Bodenplatte" in January would be the Luftwaffe's final air offensive aimed at destroying these bases. 4. Both the 9th and 10th SS (Two of the top tier division in the German army at the time) were stationed at Arnhem for prep (R&R) as the lead elements in the upcoming "Wacht am Rhine" otherwise known as "Battle of the Bulge". As a result of M-G, both units were so heavily mauled that the 9th was moved into reserve-support and the 10th was moved to the Eastern front. Had M-G never have taken place, the result of Bulge could have been very different.
They did not have enough fuel for the tanks they did have. "Poor communications caused heavy and avoidable casualties in 1st Parachute Brigade since the battalions and companies were unable to coordinate their advances, sometimes running into the same opposition which had frustrated an earlier unit advance. Yet this was not the cause of failure. By the time the German opposition had solidified on D+1, with mortars, light flak and armoured vehicles, there was really no chance of relieving Frost at the bridge, even with communications at their best. page 51 Canadian Military History PDF Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden
Consequences? If you got killed there it certainly sucked. But always remember this: the D-Day invasion was June 6, 1944 and Germany surrendered 11 months later. Why does it seem that something so amazing is ignored by history?
I read the comments. I didn't watch the video. The comments tell me there was no mention of the consequences. It was just a short, abbreviated, sequential history.
Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. 100km of German held ground taken in just 3 days. The Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine campaigns that same autumn were far bigger and more costly failures.
You could add in Patton's Metz campaign of four weeks, but Metz was surrounded by many forts and is that considered a failure? But did Monty hold the 100km of German-held ground? Market - Garden was two separate involvements by the allies. After Patton relieved Bastogne, the Germans eventually skedaddled back from whence they came.
The decision by Brereton and Williams to not fly double missions on day one killed the operation. The Germans concluded that dispersed drops over a number of days was the biggest mistake made by the allies in the operation. That decision rests squarely with Brereton and Williams. They cared more about USAAF Troop Carrier Command personnel not getting too tired, than the well being of the paratroopers dropped behind enemy lines. Williams I can understand as he was concerned about his own Troop Carrier Command crews. Brereton, as Commander of First Allied Airborne Army should have been fired. He put USAAF crews ahead of his own paratroopers. An unbelievablly disgraceful attitude. Eisenhower dropped a clanger when he appointed the incompetent Brereton.
Didn't kill it, but certainly compromised the planning. Gavin's dismissal of a British request to drop a battalion at the north end of the Nijmegen highway bridge compounded the error and his plan to have the 508th send a battalion directly to the bridge fell apart with an unforced error of judgement made by the 508th commander, who failed to carry out this clear instruction while the bridge was almost completely undefended.
I can't agree. The opration was killed by Germans. All plan was based at expectation that ALL units fulfil what is written in the plan.. . But these horrible Germans did something quite different than was planned, how unfair !
@@jirichuran There were more Airborne forces than German at the time of the drops, with more anti tank guns than the Germans had tanks. There SHOULD have been enough to deal with what the Germans had in the area at the time. Different PLANNING AND EXECUTION at the top may well have provided a different outcome, regardless of the Germans.
If i remember correctly the biggest airborne operation was not long after and it was over the Rhine and not operation Market Garden, which by the way was two different operations, Operation Market and Operation Garden
The biggest single airborne airlift was for VARSITY (the Rhine crossing in 1945), but the largest airborne operation in history remains MARKET GARDEN, which had to have three airlifts over three days to transport three divisions. The reason is because the airlift transport capacity was increasing throughout the war, so that's why MARKET GARDEN was larger than the airborne operation for Normandy, and VARSITY needed only a single lift for two divisions.
Monty was the most successful general in WW2. He went through nine countries wirhout a reverse. He made US generals look like they were - complete amateurs.
Which subordinate? And what's your source? In his memoirs he blamed a lack of administration (i.e. logistics) support (indirectly Eisenhower and Bedell Smith's false assurances), and himself for not intervening in the planning to insist troops were landed closer to the bridges.
Montgomery cost the allies a lot of men, resources and time with his incompetent plans, Eisenhower didn't trust Montgomery one bit but had to put up with him because of politics.
he lost a lot less than Patton and Bradley ..Metz 55k troops lost and Hurtgen forest 33k lost troops but there again Monty did not plan MG that was Brereton and Williams, Ike demanded it went ahead..read books Joe those hollywood movies teach you nothing
Monti is a canning company and i is sure they do not have a plant in Goodwood.. i do believe they sell all the cans in supermarkets not market gardens..as for overrated i have always enjoyed there tinned pairs.
"He miserably failed during operation good wood also" Yeah according to your "interpretation" while British military historians John Buckley, Ian Daglish, Simon Trew, Stephen Badsey and Christopher Dunphie all disagree with that. Perhaps maybe research these events better from a source other than American?
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- I have disagreement with their statement that Monte didn’t fail , the events clearly state whether be from any source that he miserably failed Thts a fact Few British historians can’t distort that
@@georgestone6807 you are a master at speaking from your chocolate starfish..how is anyone meant to take you seriously if you can not even get the mans name right.
@@georgestone6807 Those Historians all agree that Operation Goodwood was a successful effort to draw in the German reserves, unto the 21st Army group to support Operation Cobra. Unfortunately It's the Americans *bias* that is pushed while the facts from the British are ignored. Typical Politics.
There is rather a good book titled "Lost at Nijmegan" by R.G. Poulussen I would encourage anyone with an interest to read. Some of the big authors I find rehash what we already know. Saying that tho, Martin Midlebrooks "Arnhem" and the book "It never Snows in September" are excellent.
Poullusen wasn't a historian he was a photographer.And he sold his graffitti to poor trampled cabbage leaves like johnny because it excused Monty for the responsiblity for the failure of Monty's plan
Gosh! So many top Generals and Field Marshals here in the comments! Both sides could have really done with all your expert, professional Generalship at the time, huh? 🤣🤪🤣
@@bigwoody4704 lilwoodyWhittaker i think you will find Boy that Ike was the one that was always far away.. Though he insisted upon taking field command after Normandy, Eisenhower’s headquarters were many hundreds of miles from the battlefield- sometimes further than London would have been. Monty liked to keep well up with his army commanders, Bradley to remain further behind; moreover Bradley's stalwart resistance to priority being given to the Ruhr offensive is revealed the more clearly in his choice of headquarter sites. In mid-November, Eisenhower had to get his chauffeur, Mrs Summersby to find out if Bradley’s attack on the Rhine had gone ahead, so out of touch was he. The broad-front advance was very slow. Under Monty the allies moved 500 km in only three months from D-Day to September 1944. Under Eisenhower they barely moved 100 km in seven months from September 1944 March 1945. Eisenhower’s slow advance gave the Germans time and space to concentrate their forces and pierce through the thin, unbalanced US line in the Ardennes. Once Eisenhower took over, the American armies dispersed and spread themselves so thin that the Germans could move units to the Eastern front and still hold them. That’s how they managed to build up the reserve for the Bulge. Unfortunately Eisenhower had form. From American historian Roger Cirillo’s paper No Band of Brothers:
We lost a battle but won the war. People need to grow up and undestand you do not win every battle. Perhaps if the American had built theit Mulbery harbour properly it would have survived the storm like the British one did. More kit could have been landed far more quickly.So many other things besides this.
"We found that the waves at the American harbour were significantly larger than those at the British Mulberry - although both experienced waves larger than they were designed to withstand. This goes a long way to explain why the American harbour failed whilst the British one narrowly survived. We also found that a storm of the severity of the 1944 storm would only be expected to occur during the summer once in every 40 years." University of Oxford The storm that struck the Mulberry Harbours page "Mulberry A was more exposed than B and therefore suffered a great deal more damage." Think Defence UK Mulberry Harbours page Battleship HMS Centurion was scuttled as a breakwater during the Invasion of Normandy off Omaha Beach on 9 June 1944 to protect a Mulberry harbour built to supply the forces ashore. She was broken in two by the storm. "Undismayed by the destruction of their artificial harbour, the Americans applied to the development of the Omaha and Utah anchorages their tremendous talent for invention and organization. In defiance of orthodox opinion they beached coasters (LST's) and unloaded them direct into Army lorries at low tide... during July the Americans here handled more than twice the tonnage which passed through the British Mulberry." Chester, Wilmot , The Struggle for Europe page 387
It was Montgomery's plan ,he asked Eisenhower for permission to go ahead Eisenhower said he didn't think it was a good idea and he was right ,the blame lies with Montgomery @@johndawes9337
@johndawes9337 Not long after the war, Montgomery admitted he was to blame for most of Market Garden he even tried to blame his boss Eisenhower for part of the failure