There's no such thing as Universally Preferable Behaviour 

Just wanted to say thank you very much for making these vids. I think you are a much better spokesperson for anarcho-capitalism than Stefan Molyneux, and people like you are desperately needed in this circle. Keep up the good work.

A person changing their mind and admitting they were wrong happens so rarely. Kudos!

Universal preferable behavior is not about people universally preferring their preferences. It's about evaluating behaviors and determining whether they would be preferable if they were universalized. Ultimately, one preferring behaviors that affirm logical consistency between interacting individuals and denying behaviors that create logical fallacies is subjective, but the evaluation of the behavior or moral theory is meant to he objective.

@PluralOfEverything "Making the right decisions is better than making mistakes." No. It is not _necessarily_ the case that making false predictions (or holding false beliefs) hurts our ability to realise our preferences than making correct predictions (or holding true beliefs). If you disagree, please explain why.

That is the basis of creating an objective standard of morality and eliminating any subjectivity within a moral proposition. UPB does not deny or ignore the existence of subjective standards of morality that lie in the minds of many people, just as the scientific method does not deny or ignore the existence of religion or any other subjective standard of reality. And just because there are subjective standards doesn't mean that makes objective standards or methodologies untrue.

The act of arguing (of correcting someone you think is wrong) is demonstrating a preference for truth over falsehood in the realm of debate. And there is a difference between preferred and preferable.

"For example, "rape is fine" cannot be universalized because if we all think rape is okay then it's not rape" That's not so. It's logically possible for (involuntary, of course) rape to be judged as (for instance) necessary for the greater good, ie. believed to be 'fine' by all, and still be rape.

Stefan says arguments implies universal preferences, not the contrary. So you need to show an instance of arguments without universal preferences. You said you can enter an argumentation just to fulfill some subjective preference (I think you meant a particular, because a preference can be both subjective and universal) But when you enter an argument you are not only assuming your preference for truth, you are also assuming your interlocutor's preference for truth. That's crucial, because, since we are talking about an argument in general, this interlocutor can be anyone, so you have to assume at least any possible interlocutor's preference for truth. Now that might not be universal yet. But if you say you are in argument just to make your interlocutor agree with you, I'd say that's not really an argument, especially if it's an argument about an ethical system.

@bitbutter Let me re-word in the singular to try to make it clearer: It is not _necessarily_ the case that making a false prediction (or holding a false belief) hurts our ability to realise our preferences more than making a correct prediction (or holding a true belief) does. If you disagree, please explain why.

Thanks. I suppose I don't feel much motivated to speak about this live on air. Stefan is without question a far better orator than I am, and I prefer non-realtime presentations where I can spare everyone my tongue-tied-ness!

@emcaub "so lets say someone is arguing for something, which means that they want the person that they're convincing to prefer a certain behavior universally." What does it mean for a single person to prefer a behaviour 'universally'?

Excellent response to UPB. The fact that the two students share a common desire is the crucial part to understand, for it is that very shared desire they base their recommendations, or preferences on. Without it, as Panzer says, appeals to preference lack persuasive power.

If the assault was not against my will, then I would not have the right to retaliate. If the assaulter asked me beforehand if he had my permission, I would honestly answer "no". In the sense that you're using it, "will" is effectively the same as "prefer". Take this definition for will: "Intend, desire, or wish (something) to happen". Your original claim is becoming too close to "It's universally preferable to not have people do things to your body that you don't prefer".

"I don't think so; it tells us nothing about the ethics of a certain action, only that people universally prefer what they prefer" UPB doesn't evaluate actions, only theories. For example, stabbing cannot be evaluated but murder can.

Without an absolute authority on morality there can be no absolute morality. When there is no absolute morality, morality itself becomes merely an expression of opinion and thus an exercise of free speech. If we except the concept of free speech, morality is then subject to debate and consequently there can be multiple conceptions of morality which, when they can be logical reasoned, are of equal value.

discussing whether or not an AI is responsible for its answers is like discussing whether (or not) a telephone is responsible for the answers I hear from it. In case of the telephone, the one responsible is the person on the other end speaking. Similarly, the one responsible for an AI's answers is the one who programmed it. When you're talking to a telephone (or AI), you're not discussing with the telephone (AI), you're discussing with the person on the other end (the programmer of the AI).

@FlailingJunk It's partly an attempt to correct stef, and others. I'm assuming that stef prefers making sound arguments over making unsound ones. I might be wrong about that of course. No assumption of universal preferences is required here, only an assumption about the subjective preferences of an individual in this case. I hope that clears up the confusion.

What I mean to say, instead of lying, was that someone partaking in the debate has an alterior motive instead of to actually debate. If this is the case, then it is not really a debate. Truth: the correlation between our ideas and reality.

Objective morality doesn't mean deontology. Morality doesn't have to be a set of rules, it can be a method of determining morality. Objective morality does exist: I think it would be fair to say that one should not hurt others for no reason, for example.

So lets say someone is arguing for something, which means that they want the person that they're convincing to prefer a certain behavior universally. So to argue against UPB is to argue that we universally should not believe in UPB.

@Herv3 re. Harmful consequences: I don't have anything concrete in mind. False beliefs often work out that way though, and I don't think that correlation is entirely coincidental.

Arguing does not demonstrate that truth is universally preferable (or preferred).

@FlailingJunk "You are not saying something about the necessary presuppositions of correction." Yes I am. I am saying there are no necessary presuppositions (though there are some common and likely ones imo). And this is where Molyneux is mistaken.

I always thought if there was Universally Preferable Behaviour he should have made a list but there is none. He leaves it subjective like our normal everyday lives; Anarchy baby.

You should call in and say that to him in person!

Also, you should call into the Stefan Molyneux show and discuss/debate this. It would be a fantastic discussion between the two of you.

@bitbutter TO correct myself this time: I mean rather that some of the necessary presuppositions of correction that Molyneux claims to exist, are not actually necessary at all. IN particular theres no need to suppose that holding true beliefs is _universally_ better than holding false ones, though there's very probably a _local_ and non-absolue preference for true beliefs, held by both speakers, to some degree.

@silverfoils thanks for the response. I'll consider it, but the prospect of being 'live' in front of the internet world makes me a little nervous. Edgar is slated to be online before 2012. Almost certainly in december.

"But if everyone agrees then it's voluntary, thus not rape, right?" Please pay closer attention: In my hypothetical, rape is 'fine' (judged by all to be ultimately 'for the greater good') and still involuntary (ie. it's still rape). There's no necessary contradiction there.

@bitbutter No, I'm saying it's universally preferable to not have someone do something to your own body against your will. You can't argue "I don't mind people doing something to my body against my will!" because that would be saying "I will that you do something to my body against my will".

@rkyeun "I don't see what's difficult about a false motive" It's not a necessary, established, or clarifying concept. Motives can be based on false or true beliefs, they are not themselves true of false. Also a motive is not something you can achieve.

"Universally Preferable Behaviour does exist. It's universally preferable to not have people do things to your body against your consent/will." That doesn't work, since "to not have people do things to your body against your will" is not a behaviour in the first place--so it cannot be a universally preferable one (and to refrain from using other's bodies against their will/consent is certainly not universally preferable).

@PluralOfEverything "I didn't say they help us realize our preferences." I know. True beliefs are ultimately only useful, to the extent that they are, _because_ they help us realise our preferences (by making accurate predictions). As I said, the degree to which something helps us realise our subjective preferences is the only tenable standard for making judgements like 'better', 'improvement' etc.

@PluralOfEverything "You don't think that it is in our basic nature to want the things we believe to be true? " Maybe. I don't understand the relevance of that here.

@bitbutter An unusual position to take, that the definition a term is given by the coiner of the term is the incorrect one in the very context the term was originally defined, but fine. I would point out that the difference is qualitative. "It is wrong to kill under conditions X, Y, and Z" is a subset (if you will) of "It's wrong to kill [under all conditions.]" But "It is moral to kill under conditions A, B, and C" is not a subset of "It's wrong to kill [under all conditions.]"

@balanceseeker Don't understand how this is relevant. My previous point may not have been understood. "You ought not kill" says the same as "You ought not end a biochemical process given X Y and Z" (with XYZ filled in appropriately). The apparent lack of qualification in "You ought not kill" is an accident, it looks that way b/c we have a single word for "Ending a biochemical process given X Y and Z". The apparent difference between qualified and unqualified moral statements is a red herring.

@PluralOfEverything Ah i see. Yes i can see how that might be confusing. I don't mean realise as a mental event (as in "i realised I'd left the kettle on"), but realise as in "make real"--ie. to have the world change in a way that better aligns with your preferences. It's not clear that false beliefs will always and necessarily (aka universally) be worse than true beliefs when it comes to having the world align with your preferences.

why would an ai program not be responsible for its arguments? its a blurry line between the program and its creator. if the program is fully autonomous then it must be responsible for itself, no? and if it is not fully autonomous then its creator must be responsible for it. i see this as being the same as an animal and its owner. if a dog bites someone is it responsible? well yes if it is a wild dog (autonomous ai), and no if it is someone's pet - in this case the owner is responsible (ai program that is not fully autonomous).

@PluralOfEverything "They convince themselves that what they believe is true, which shows that they are aware that it is better to believe something that is true than something that is not true." I'm afraid it doesn't show that. At most it shows that they simply prefer the state of having convinced themselves of the truth of a lie, over the state of admitting to themselves that it the claim is false.

@balanceseeker then Kant was simply wrong about the term he coined ;) The distinction between "It's wrong to kill" and "It's wrong to kill under conditions X, Y and Z" is not a qualitative one, they're just different degrees of specificity.

@rkyeun Sorry, I can't parse that properly. Molyneux's claim is that the act of debating implies the presupposition that truth is universally better than falsehood. It's simply not true. It implies, at best, that right now--the arguer believes that using reason to argue for the truth satisfies his preferences better than alternative courses of action (eg lying, or engaging in unreason, mysticism etc) would.

One of the thing you might want to dismiss is the idea that objective morality requires categorical imperatives. The only thing that is required for objective morality is given a certain set of conditions, X is (or is not) moral, regardless of opinion. As an objective ethicist, I have no problem dismissing categorical imperatives that remit no exceptions. In fact, I think such statements are inherently immoral, as any action potentially could be moral given the right (maybe rare) context.

@PluralOfEverything Your point is in fact a flat assertion. This: "which shows that they are aware that it is better to believe something that is true than something that is not true" is presented as though it was self evident--but it's not. Perhaps you can explain why you believe the phenomenon of denial entails the presupposition that truth is better (in an absolute sense, irrespective of preferences and values) than falsehood?

"If u say rape is fine in this case but not fine in that case then what u have is 2 rules contradicting each other." That's not what i said. In my hypothetical, rape is 'fine' (judged by all to be ultimately 'for the greater good') and still involuntary (ie. it's still rape). There's no necessary contradiction there.

@balanceseeker "You ought not kill" (YONK) is true of false, sure. This doesn't speak to my point: "YONK" is not a fundamentally different _kind of claim_ to "You ought not lie under conditions X Y and Z", because "YONK" in fact reduces to "You ought not end a biochemical process under conditions X Y and Z" (those conditions, when present, are what allow us to properly apply the label 'killing'). That's why both qualified and unqualified moral claims are categorical imperatives imo.

Perhaps another time we could pick up the discussion again then.

Not minding shows the lack of will, not will.

I think one problem may be the definition of "objective" - is objectivity metaphysical or epistemological? That is, is "objective reality" something that exists physically, or is it simply the premises of reality that everyone agrees upon? If the former, then you are correct. If the latter, there is, it seems, still room for Molyneux's argument.

Molyneux sounds like he is making the minimalist social contract argument. Basically, by interacting with other people you are agreeing to certain rules. (this is minimalist because it doesn't say anything about the state and the rules are to be as minimal as possible)

Even if, in the moment of rape, it was allowed because of belief that it is for the greater good.

@balanceseeker "One of the thing you might want to dismiss is the idea that objective morality requires categorical imperatives." I disagree. Can you think of a moral claim that cannot be framed as a categorical imperative? I can't.

@bitbutter I'm not saying it's universally preferable not to do something to a person's body against their will. I'm saying it's universally preferable to not have someone do something to YOUR OWN body against your will. A rapist will want to have sex with someone else against their will, but will not want someone have someone to have sex with him against his will (and if he did it wouldn't be against his will).

Universally Preferable Behaviour does exist. It's universally preferable to not have people do things to your body against your consent/will. You can't say "Yeah well what if someone doesn't mind having stuff done to them against their will? Checkmate." because that is a self refuting statement, since not minding something shows will.

not being able to do something is not a behaviour.

I think most people would agree that there are both situations in which it would be preferable to tell the truth and other situations in which it would be preferable to tell a lie - how then could it be *universally preferable* always to tell the truth?

@bitbutter I liked the video and I'm a fan of Molyneux so with that I'd like to say thanks. I'm curious as to why you would say it might have "harmful consequences." Could you go into that a little more?

That's a fantastic point and drastically increased my understanding of the debate at hand. Thank you.

@greenghost2008 Yeah that seems about right. The problem for him is that there's no performative contradiction in denying several of his premises while debating, although he claims otherwise.

Hello. You might to be interested in a group called Atheists For Liberty. Just saying. P.S. Is Tomasz your name? That's a Polish spelling but you have accent of a native English speaker. It makes me curious, why Tomasz?

Your comment was marked as spam so i didn't see it until now. The URL doesn't work. You're welcome to explain what you think you've figured out though.

@DoctorCapitalist "It's universally preferable to not have people do things to your body against your consent/will." I think you've found a slightly less clear way of saying 'people always prefer not to have things happen that they don't prefer'. This doesn't help us. Is it universally preferable not _to do_ something to a persons body against their will? I'd say obviously not.

@FreiwilligFrei but u cant correct somebody without a reference to a universal otherwise it would be like correcting someone on his taste of icecream. so in that moment u correct somebody it must be to a universal (upb). so in that moment u correct stef its not about a subjective opinion like taste it should be about a universal.otherwise it makes no sense to correct him. its also important to check the theory and not instances.

@bitbutter Thank you for bearing with my questions. If Stef wants to be right then he must hold beliefs that cohere with reality, but this is not limited to Stef is it? If this is the standard that you would hold anyone to then you have found a universal preference as Stef uses the term. It is confusing language I admit. I was surprised that he used the term in that way when I looked back at his book for this discussion, but take a look at Preferences and Universality on page 33.

@bitbutter Excellent. What does it mean to be wrong?

@bitbutter Just because I can decry an instance of murder and then frame the claim as the categorical statement, "One should never murder," says nothing as to why I need to use them. Of course, I guess this is a matter of definition as well. Would you consider the statement, "Given circumstance A, X is moral, but given B, X is immoral," a categorical imperative? I do not consider it a categorical statement, but perhaps you would. If so, we are arguing definitions, not substance.

@bitbutter A slightly more concise way of phrasing your tautology: "People universally prefer those things that they prefer". I'd agree with that.

@bitbutter "The apparent difference.." is a difference, because either it is true that "You ought not kill [in all circumstances]" and thus there is no case that exists that one ought to kill someone, OR the statement "You ought not kill [in all circumstances]" is false because some case does exist that one ought to kill. Again, you have focused simply on one side of the moral statement, flat ignoring the other half of the problem, the half that shows the difference. I will PM this in detail.

@bitbutter I am not confused. I see exactly what you are doing. Universal preferences and universally preferable behavior are not even close to the same thing. And again, if you are leaving open the possibility that you are correcting someone for reasons other then that they are wrong you are saying that you are leaving open the possibility that you are bullying or manipulating them rather then correcting them. You are not saying something about the necessary presuppositions of correction.

@myusernameisluc It depends. If it is a murderer/robber being sent to prison, then his actions have shown that he denies the universal principle of "Don't do things to people's bodies or property against their consent".

I have yet to watch the entire video, but wanted to say as someone that grew to love SM and then overtime grew indifferent to his arguments I've finally pointed out exactly what bothers me about a lot of his "philosophy". SM and the vast majority of his audience's arguments are based on assumptions. They assume how everyone feels, reacts, lives, communicates, love's ect. Ect. He is too binary with all his arguments. It's you are x or y....100 percent of the time. Maybe look into RTR next? It has so many contradictory arguments, my head could explode. 1st part of the book, he goes on and on about how people assume x when their loved ones don't do or do y. Both parties will always be lead by their assumptions, and will eventually deteriorate the relationship. He pointed out, that one parties assumptions will be right!! Ex. If you have to nag Your spouse doesn't respect you. By nagging, you aren't getting your needs met so it's fairly obvious they don't want to meet your needs, and have no respect for your needs. But then later on in the 2nd part he says you can never assume and will be wrong in your assumptions every time!! You can't guess or "assume" what one is thinking when your loved one is upset or doing something you dislike..., both parties must ask questions to get to the root of the issues.....ummm I'm confused.

"You want me to explain how someone might prefer to make accurate predictions with true information than to make mistakes with false information?" No, please pay closer attention. It is not _necessarily_ (NB that word is important) the case that making false predictions (or holding false beliefs) hurts our ability to realise our preferences more than making correct predictions (or holding true beliefs) does. If you disagree, please explain why.

"Just because Molyneux draws some false conclusions, it doesn't mean that UPB doesn't exist, that's a false conclusion on your part." I don't claim otherwise, so that's a straw man. UPB fails because there are no grounds for believing that any subjective preference is universal. The rest of your comment doesn't make sense to me since UPB doesn't exist, and your comment assumes it does.

@PluralOfEverything I see. No, i certainly don't think that all people at all times prefer (frightening) truths over (comforting) non-truths.

what you are saying is that people universally prefer their preferences. This is a vacuous truth.

Has Richard Joyce ever addressed Stefan's arguments, or the converse?

@bitbutter Sure, if something applies in all circumstances, saying that it also applies in a certain set of circumstances is simply specificity. (Never said it wasn't) However, when one says it does not apply in other circumstances, we are talking about something different, and you ignored that point. To argue against that position is to violate that law of non-contradiction, because in case A, you would have to say that "Do not kill" both applies and does not apply.

I was interested in how this would continue. Sad it ended.

Stefan Molyneux also tends to confuse anti-realism with nihilism. His whole argument was basically a strawman.

There is a third possibility. What about committing oneself not to a universal tacit understanding but to a merely /middle sized' understanding that at any rate this person in front of me is worth talking to? Also, we mustn't get to relaxed about assuming that the television has nothing to contribute to the discussion. Intelligence like beauty is in the eye of the beholder and just because you have never given any serious consideration to your televisions motives that does not mean that it hasn't got any. There was a time when slaves were in the same case.

@FlailingJunk "If Stef wants to be right then he must hold beliefs that cohere with reality, but this is not limited to Stef is it?" Agreed. "If this is the standard that you would hold anyone to then you have found a universal preference as Stef uses the term." This makes no sense to me, i don't follow this reasoning. If true, stef is using 'preference' in a very idiosyncratic way that I don't yet understand (but you do). From reading UPB I didn't get the impression that that was the case.

"or that science itself is not a universally preferable behavior when trying to understand the natural world." You're describing a hypothetical imperative: "If your goal is X then you ought to do Y". That's fine. But notice that there's no reason to suppose that a person's goal _is_ X. This is the problem with some of the claims of UPB. ie a given behaviour cannot be universally preferable because the goal that it presupposes is not universally held.

Give Stef a call to discuss on his Sunday show. I know he's very much open to reason & evidence. He also does videos where he discusses emails sent to him. When is Edgar due out? Thanks.

@bitbutter Okay, but then compare that to the statement "You ought not end a biochemical process under conditions X Y and Z (those that when present define killing) except under conditions A B and C" It is still killing. It is just that now there is an exception. Reducing it down or scaling it up makes no difference. In circumstance A, it is either right or not to kill (aka end biochemical ...). The conditions X Y and Z are present to call it killing. YONK is true. Except it isn't in case A.

Are you sure you're not saying that, in the hypothetical case where rape is UPB, it is possible for someone to get raped (against their will) and afterwards rationalise to themselves that it was for the greater good? In this case, rape is not UPB because at the instance of rape, it was not preferred. If, in the instance of rape, it was preferred, it was voluntary and thus not rape.

Although in science, theories are provisional there's still a standard of truth. In science this standard is infinitely preferable. Any scientific method who's standard is falsehood is wrong. Morality is a subset of UPB. Morality is activated when people interact and UPB premises are always put forward whether explicitly or implicitly. Those that that fail logically (like justifications for rape, murder, theft and assault) are wrong.

"if i choose not to, i'm actively avoiding doing u harm. Isn't that a behavior?" Yes, but its one that's certainly not universally preferable. And "to not have people do things to your body against your will" is not a behaviour.

Could you call him up on skype for his Sunday call in show to discuss? I'm not sure I follow your line of reasoning and I think the banter will help both of your cases.

Wait a second, you can't will someone to do something against your will, that's self contradictory.

@FlailingJunk "If you are not correcting him because he is wrong" I am correcting him because _i believe_ he's wrong: _and_ because I also believe he values truth, as do I (no universal preferences required).

That doesn't make sense, you would will the person to assault you as you value practising spontaneous martial arts.

So in our current context, it would be helpful to replace the word "truth" with "real"?

I think what Stefan is referring to in his premises are two entities that each have consciousness engaged in a genuine debate. If one party is lying, then it is not a debate. Or am I confused...

@bitbutter "not contingent on any set of values or preferences in the subject" But it is contingent upon circumstances... Kant, the individual I believe who invented the term, would not abide by such contingencies. The whole example of lying to save a life is a classic retort to Deontology for this very reason. If everyone in the world lied all the time, the world would suffer. Thus, Kant reasons, the categorical imperative is that it is wrong to lie, period. Circumstances be damned.

Really more to do with values methinks. You would value not having to fight with the man and would wish for that to be avoided, but would still feel a kind of positive feedback from fighting him anyway. For example, if someone comes up to me and mugs me of $5, I would rather keep that $5 but I would still have the positive feedback of being able to spend the rest of my money, but I lose out on my values. namsayin

@PluralOfEverything "We know that falsehood doesn't help us. Only the truth does." No! We do not know this. I agree that, in general, holding true beliefs helps us realise our preferences better than holding false beliefs does. But I see no reason to suppose that true beliefs _universally_ help us realise our preferences better than false beliefs do. So far this tall claim has not been substantiated.

@PluralOfEverything You're the UPB advocate (i guess). As such the burden is on you to explain why it's _necessarily_ the case that a true belief will help a person realise their preferences to a greater degree than a false one. Molyneux didn't manage this. I don't believe you can either.

@bitbutter If you are not correcting him because he is wrong then you are not correcting him. There are other things that you may be doing, some of which I have mentioned, but you are not in fact correcting him.

@FlailingJunk Being wrong, as i mean it here, is the state of holding beliefs that don't cohere with reality.

@balanceseeker "I would point out that the difference is qualitative." It's not. The different is quantative, and a matter of specificity, the parent/subset relationship notwithstanding. Look at it this way: "You should not kill" is really another was of saying "You should not deliberately put an end to bio/chemical/electric processes under conditions X, Y and Z". The difference between statements that appear to include qualifiers and those that appear not to is illusory.

"Debate implies that truth is objectively, and universally better than falsehood". First you would need to define truth. When you do so you will realize there are first and primally many truths which need to exist and remain existing in order for falsity to ever exist. I would successfully argue non truth can only exist in a mind or mind like system. I would ask for an example in which falsity might be objectively and/or universally better than truth. "Peaceful debate implies that peaceful debating is universally the best way to resolve disputes" Again you need to consider the foundations of existence, the nature of society, and law. If humans utilize law, cooperation, and peace for mutual benefit, for thousands of years, and then you say peaceful debate is not the best way to resolve dispute, you are going against the grain of everything known as law and order, that allowed humans to construct all that is good and prosperous. Also the meaning of universally, needs to be defined and agreed upon. For planets that have intelligent and/or unintelligent life most likely contain vast differences, so are you saying universally like if a human was on those planets, or universally as in any conceivable ontology that was birthed in a human body on earth ought to agree?