I think Blackburn might be underplaying the “relativist”position a bit too much, especially by merely pointing to some French post-structuralists as well as Nietzsche and Freud. Even calling that position “relativism” seems to lose any productive grasp on the diversity and focus of each thinker in this group. Perhaps a better way to think about them is attaching to them a “pluralistic” position? Painting them with a broad brush with the idea of “my truth, your truth, their truth” as well as having Rorty as the spokesman of the bunch is a lazy move. These thinkers (and many others left unmentioned) have a lot to offer, if only one does not become absorbed into old biases (e.g., the analytic/continental divide and the reputations of each side).
I don't think he's intending to argue that you shouldn't read the "relativist" philosophers, since they bring up good reasons to doubt particular institutions and formulations of truth, just that Rorty and any others who might want to throw truth as representation out entirely are wrong to do so.
The map represents because we have learned to use the map in a representing way. Of course part of the learning is being entrenched in a causal context. But the causal setting wouldn't lead to the representational character of the map if it weren't by peoples ways to use it. This is the horizontal character of representation. We don't need to abandon "representation" and its embedding in a causal setting, but we have to take care to "deflate" it.
Simon is an excellent expositor of his own ideas, as well as those of people to which he has extended the principle of (interpretive) charity. What’s missing here - and the absence is glaring - is that the analytic philosopher’s understanding of what it means to create and defend a philosophical position is itself not a given, and in fact needs defending. To see what I’m getting at, read Heidegger’s work on technology and then ask yourself: Is he attempting to “prove” that technology is never neutral? Heidegger certainly has a firm position on the question. But his method does not invoke proof, nor would he be offended if an intelligent reader couldn’t come around to adopting his position. Take a step back and think about that for a minute.
I believe it's meant to be: "P" is true if and only if P, where "P" is the sentence representing the thing P in the world. So its not meant to be trivial if you say "P" is true if and only if P is the actual state of reality.
Interesting that all the propositions employed as examples of settling truth are empirical-- capable of affirmation or denial through investigation. This is typical of the British approach. It seems to lead to a very parochial understanding of what philosophical reflection concerns itself with. Hume, rather than Kant, continues to furnish the paradigm, unfortunately.
This is exactly bang on. And Kant was so much more impressive as a thinker, both in terms of his imagination, but also in terms of his raw capability for rigor. Reading Hume and Kant back to back shows you how amateurish (in terms of rigor and polish) most philosophers are when compared to IK.
