"Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam" by Dr. Lewis Sorley 

Thank you for bringing this sickening truth to the forefront. So sad.

The man once said that he did not study the battle of Dien Bien Phu. Shocking. In South Africa we studied this battle in grade 10.

I read Dr. Sorley's book on Westmoreland after watching this video, but honestly am a little bit disappointed. Dr. Sorley does an exceptional job describing General Westmoreland's early Army career, and highlighting his many leadership failures as the commander of MACV. But I do believe the author glosses over the decision to build up American conventional forces in RVN and puts much of that blame directly on General Westmoreland. If this was the only book you read on the American involvement in Viet-Nam, you'd likely come to the conclusion that the decision to use US conventional forces in South Vietnam was General Westmoreland's and General Westmoreland's alone. The proverb comes to mind, "Success has many fathers, failure is an orphan." Vietnam is Westmoreland's orphan. I believe anyone who wants to understand the US military involvement in Viet-Nam should spend time researching the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the Krulak-Mendenhall report, the CIA-sponsored coup against Ngo Dinh Diem, and the French involvement prior to the US involvement. Much of this happened before General Westmoreland's command, or outside the scope of his command authority. I think the decision to appoint General Westmoreland to CG MACV was made in the context that the Johnson Administration and Security Council had already made a decision to use American conventional forces in defense of the RVN, and they were looking for a conventional forces commander who would use maneuver and firepower to defeat the enemy in battle. I would encourage anyone who's interested in military history, and specifically about the US involvement in Vietnam to read Dr. Sorley's book, but don't let that be the only book you read on the subject.

Lost opportunity for a short war. In early 1965 the Joint Chiefs presented Johnson with what could have been a war-winning strategy, but was contrary to the way the war was then being directed by Johnson and McNamara. The Chiefs proposed an immediate and massive air bombing campaign code named LINEBACKER against Hanoi, and Haiphong, the North’s principal port. A fierce, intense, short campaign, they believed, would bring the North to discussion of terms for peace. At the time, the North’s air defenses were weak; chances of operational success were high. In four stages over thirteen weeks the US would deploy waves of B- 52s and fighter bombers to destroy the North’s air forces, mine its rivers and harbors, destroy its civil support infrastructure and power grid, isolate it from China, and annihilate as much of its political leadership as possible. The first waves of B-52s were actually inbound to targets in Vietnam when the operation was cancelled on recommendation of Secretary of Defense McNamara, who advocated a ‘gradualist’ escalation of bombing against selected and tightly-controlled targets in the North. Ironically Nixon’s decision to unleash B-52s against Hanoi in 1972, which was instrumental in finally driving the North to negotiate, was code named LiNEBACKER II.

This is a wonderful lecture that filled a hole in my knowledge. Thank you Dr Sorley and TheUSAHEC.

Excellent

Thank you for bringing this story to afront. 😀

WestmorelandBros... its over

You always send in an army to overwhelmingly win, never to sit back and contain. Queasiness back home at the horrors of war should never sit, and should never be permitted to sit, on an army's conscience.

Some mistakes and misunderstood about Vietnam War! General Westmoreland DO his best and He Win after all by and with Korea US Alliance! Do you not agree with me ? That's OK! I don't mind ~~ because of American.

Westmoreland didn't lose the Vietnam War because it was unwinnable in the first place. The North had all its weaponry and other supplies provided by China which bordered them. We were unable to cut the supply trails by which the North maintained the VC. So long as the North maintained the VC, they were almost impossible to uproot. They could hide and pick the time and place for ambushes. Mostly, it was a war of booby traps and sniping. To win the war in Vietnam, we would have had to greatly expand operations, including sealing off the Chinese border with the North. Such action risked conflict with China and the Soviet Union. No U.S. politician dared such a move because an uproar would have followed and intense scrutiny as to why we were there the first place. The VC were never destroyed. At the beginning of Tet, they possessed a field force of 240,000. Casualties from Tet phase one were 48,000. Tet phase two cost 24,000 and Tet three 20,000. The first statistic comes from "The Pentagon Papers", P. 617. The other two from Wiki. So out of a starting force of 240,000 VC, 148,000 survived. The North would later replace one-third of the losses, sending in some 30,000 PAVN regulars. Hence, by the middle of 1968 the VC still possessed 180,000 troops, with the PAVN component being better armed. Tet failed to accomplish its goal of seizing the major cities. But as consolation, since the urban fighting drew in most of the U.S. and ARVN forces, it left a vacuum in the countryside the VC filled., setting back the pacification program. This is not exactly total destruction. The Kit Carson program later whittled the VC down further, but not enough to put them out of action. Yes, the bombing of Hanoi at the end of 1972 to 1973 forced the North to the negotiation table. But the truce which followed wasn't much of a victory. The VC retained control of the countryside they held in the South.. American ground forces were almost entirely gone.. Nixon knew the war was lost the day he took office. His solution, "Vietnamization" was to transfer the burden of war to the South Vietnamese. As a teenager, I knew from returning vets the ARVN was no match for the North. So Nixon got us out of the war, but by abandoning the South. As for Congress, they were simply sick of the whole affair. They were lied to. South Vietnam was a dictatorship, not a democracy. Much of the aid we sent ended up on the black market, especially gasoline. The idea of risking American lives to prop up such a rotten regime was anathema at that point. The lesson to be learned from Vietnam is that we were maneuvered into it by the CIA, specifically by way of its 34A plans which led to the Gulf of Tonkin. We can conclude the agency operates outside the law and civilian control, and represents an ongoing threat to undermine U.S.foreign policy in the pursuit of its own goals.

He actually makes a case for Westmoreland being a great General.

General Westmorland was a great Military Officer it was not his fault that Politicans in Washington DC gave up on Vietnam after they started the War.

Westmorland did NOT lose he Vietnam War. It was lost in Washington, NOT Vietnam by cowardly leftists (not all of them Democrats) who excoriated anyone who even breathed the word "Victory." We started losing in Korea and we have been losing ever since. Don't blame Westmorland.

What a terrible epithet... & what a terrible "gig" for a general.

I really think this analysis is nonsense. ultimately it doesn't matter how well equipped the south was, was look at the afghan government vs the taliban. the west are alway going to back the corrupt, and you can pour men, money and time down that hole but it isn't going to win, blaming the soldiers, equipment and strategy is superficial and easy. winning hearts and minds sounds glib and fluffy, but ultimately if it can't be done then don't bother sending people to fight.