I think the idea of _X_ being *constitutive* of Y is very clarifying-it avoids the confusion of saying _X_ and _Y_ are “identical” when they’re not. And there is the idea of asymmetry. You can change the lower level-you can add or take away a pixel or two-and the supervening level-the letter-remains, for all practical purposes, unchanged. _But_ if you change the supervening level-the letters or the words-the subvening level - the pixels - _has_ to change. It’s a fascinating concept. Your explanation was very helpful!
Oh, thanks. This explanation was much more clear and useful than the video. But the example of the V shape does not hold or is very unclear. Depending on how you imagine this V shape, changing the position of even one ball can destroy the V shape. Anyway, thanks a lot for your comment, now I finally understood the concept.
Am currently trying to get to grips with "The Conscious Mind" by David Chalmers and supervenience was a key term which I didn't understand, but do now, (a bit) Great stuff!
Helpful. I’ve been trying to understand this concept for a while now. A non-causal dependency relationship or the higher level phenomena is constituted by the lower level phenomena. And a change to one must entail a change to the other. I was thinking about this idea in relation to how mathematics describes reality. If all empirical phenomena ultimately supervenes on physics, then the universe at its most basic level must be described mathematically since physics uses mathematics as its language.
The billiard balls ARE ALSO ‘V’ shaped. The letters ARE ALSO the square pixels. The ‘V’ shape and the letters ARE the form (an attribute) of the balls and square pixels. Mind is qualitatively distinct from brain matter, yet with intimate correlation. Supervenience speaks of relational attributes of something to itself. Mind and brain/body are distinct from each other YET correlate with each other. Like the billiard balls and letter supervenience examples, mind & body DO also change with each other, but in a different sense. For mind & body you have the case of “Whenever there’s a certain change to A there is also at least some change to B as well.” But the billiard balls and letters examples are a case of “Whenever A changes in ‘This’ sense A necessarily also changes in ‘That’ sense as well.” If philosophers say “The mind supervenes on the brain”…then they are wrongfully equating the relationship between mind and brain with the relationship between a letter, and pixels that make that letter up.
Thanks! Epiphenomenalism is a specific dualist theory of mind: basically, the mind is distinct from the brain (& from all physical matter) and doesn’t interact with it at all. All your deliberate behaviour is caused by prior brain events, not by mental events. Eg when you hit your thumb with a hammer, you say ‘ow’ because chemical processes in your brain, not because it hurts. The pain you feel doesn’t cause anything - it’s an epiphenomenon.
Thank you for the video! How does supervenience play a role in David Lewis’ possible world’s theory. One could think that an ontological explanation for a modal statement in the actual world supervenes on there being another similar world (causally separated) which provides a truth-maker for the modal statement? A non causal dependency?
Lewis uses supervenience lots: his big idea of ‘Humean supervenience’ is that everything supervenes on particular matters of local fact. Eg causation supervenes on the pattern of events. Mods facts trivially supervene on anything, since any modal fact couldn’t have been otherwise.
Constitution is usually a relation between two objects: eg the piece of plastic constitutes the shampoo bottle. Causation is usually between events: striking the match (in the right circumstances) causes the flame.
It’s tricky with maths because maths is necessary, and as a consequence, trivially supervenes on anything at all! That’s a problem with the definition of supervenience.
When you say ‘non-causal’ could that be understood as, e.g, ‘non-causal at a certain explanatory level’ or perhaps ‘ultimately causal given added complexity’? Perhaps I am being an old determinist here, but I don’t quite get the ‘non’ bit in the causality part.
It's meant to be totally non-causal. Example: there's the location of each ball, and then there's the shape they make together. The locations don't cause the shape, the constitute it. Another way to look at it: typically, cause comes before effect. But we're talking about the locations and the shape at exactly the same instant.
@@AtticPhilosophy ..Surely we can say that the arrangement of the balls causes our perception of a V (as a "material cause" to use the Aristotelian framework)? Other causes are our knowledge of letters (ability to read), and the action that set the balls in motion to then come to rest in that perceived shape. And since a perception comes after the thing perceived, the arrangement of the balls is prior to the perception by an instant?
@@socraticsceptic8047 Yes, their arrangement causes our perception. But we're not talking about our perception of them here, we're talking about (a) their arrangement and (b) the V-shape itself. Or (a) dots on the screen and (b) text on the screen. In each case, phenomena (b) supervenes on (a). Our perception of (a) or (b) is a different phenomena, due to causation.
@@AtticPhilosophy Thanks for rely... so are you saying 1, there are some dots arranged on a screen, 2, there is our perception of a "V" and then 3. there is also a supervening "V" out there in itself? Is this last entity strictly necessary - what purpose does it serve?
@@socraticsceptic8047 You're reading this sentence. There's 1 sentence, but lots of dots making it up, so (according to many philosophers) they're not identical. What purpose does the sentence serve? So you can read it! (But another view is: the sentence and the arrangement of dots are identical to each other. Still supervenience, but now a trivial case). Same issues go in the main case of mind and brain: you might say they're distinct, and mind supervenes on brain, or you might say they're identical, or you might say something else entirely.
Are we talking about the relationship between (eg) the arrangement of dots on your phone screen and the words that appear on it? The arrangement doesn’t cause words to appear, rather it constitutes those words. Constituting something is different from causing it. Right now, what’s causing the words on my phone screen is my typing (plus the OS programming etc).
It’s the view, found in David Lewis, primarily, that every feature of reality, ultimately supervenes on the basic properties of space-time points. Less abstractly, all the difficult metaphysical concepts, like chance, causation, possibility and necessity, laws of nature, the mind, and so on, all boil down to particular things happening at particular places and times.
@@AtticPhilosophy So when Lewis says that "all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and another," how can this be explained more simply? I am simply finding it hard to see how that actually looks like physically. Is he saying they are just static ball-like microscopic atoms and each atom/point is its own unique thing in spacetime and they remain separate from everything else and do not depend upon anything else? It is also only the properties of these physical atoms that change (such as mass/charge)?
@@jimmyfaulkner1855 Essentially yes: the properties of one spacetime point aren't fixed or determined by anything else, before, simultaneously, or after. One particular instance: there aren't laws of nature which drive the facts along, from past to future. Rather, the 'laws of nature' are just patterns of stuff that happens.
