When Losing a Battle Won an Entire War 

The same crew found USS Hornet in January 2019, after her sinking in Santa Cruz

i wonder what Patrick Bateman has to say about Paul Allen’s discovered wreckage

@@sammcoin8430 My god, look at all the watermarks.

@@sammcoin8430 Impressive. Very nice. Let's see Paul Allen's carrier group.

Meanwhile today RV Petrel fell over whilst in dry dock in Scotland.

The Battle of the Coral Sea stopped the Japanese invasion of Port Morsby. Where the planned to set up a base for the invasion of Australia.

Because the Aussies knew that the Americans 🇺🇸 and Navy had saved Australia from what would have been a dreadful invasion of their homeland. And till this very day the Australian people remember and are still grateful for our stopping the Japanese.

@@jnstonbely5215 Japs were never going to invade Australia. Way too hard. To invade from the North was impossible. The country up there is very harsh and if you don't know the area, very easy to get lost and not much water around either. They would have stayed on the Solomon Islands and used that to stop America getting to Australia to use as a base.

@@jnstonbely5215 The Army won the battle of Kolkata which stop the Japanese Army from advancing into Port Moresby so they could invade Australia

@@BatMan-oe2gh The Australian official history states that all the Japanese had to do was cut Australia off from America, and they could take Australia over "at their leisure". The Americans built a massive airfield at Tocumwul, in southern Australia, the largest airfield in the southern hemisphere at the time. But after Coral Sea, it was no longer seen as being needed, an invasion in southern Australia was no longer expected, and air assets were moved north.

Cabot was the orginal name of CV 16.

The planned name of the carrier under construction at the Fore River shipyard was to be "Cabot." After news of the loss of Lexington at the Battle of the Coral Sea, the shipyard workers requested that the ship they were building be renamed "Lexington." This wish was granted and I was lucky enough to serve aboard that vessel from 1980 to 1983 when she operated out of Pensacola training future carrier pilots. Even then, that ship could still make 33 knots of speed at age 40. She is, today, the only Essex-class carrier left that was built at Fore River shipyard. After the war Tojo blamed Japan's loss on three factors...Island hopping strategy, American submarines, and fast carrier task forces. Thanks for your comment.

I am constantly in awe of all the people who contributed to the war effort. I'll bet your dad and his coworkers put in extra effort to get the new Lexington into the fight even sooner.

Lexington is tied up in Corpus Christi today. Lexington CV2 was recently found by MV Petrel at the bottom of the Coral Sea.

Cool story bro

Your Grandpa did great service on the USS Niagra supporting their PT boat division. And the same for his duty on the USS Kalinin Bay. I honor him and hope he shared his memories with you.

Respect.

And said generation fucked us over with social "security", medicaid, medicare, so called campaign finance "reform" which meant only super rich people can run for political office or be slaves to the federal DNC/RNC chairs... implementing socialism/fascism at home... We were the losers.

god bless your family and FJB.

Thank you for saving us from what? Bro everyone is propagating their own ideal and denying anything else. Same with the US. Why can't we just preach a single thing combining the good parts of what you wrote in capitals

@@space0015 Its called having a working brain instead all tied up ya feelin's darlin

Unnecessarily complex plans were a hallmark of the IJN for pretty much the entire war.

@@7thsealord888 The fact the attack on Pearl Harbor went off without a hitch was fairly miraculousness. If it hadn't been nearly unopposed it very well might have gone very, very badly for them as soon as any one thing stopped being as their plan assumed. It's odd that while the IJN always overcomplicated everything the IJA always seemed to default to banzai charges until finally adopting devilishly layerd defenses after losing the initiative in the Pacific.

@@johnassal5838 No it didn't. Main targets were not in port (carriers), second priority targets (modern heavy cruisers) were mostly ignored in favor of the old battleships for BS reasons, and the dud/miss rate was insane, against STATIONARY targets. The attack on Pearl Harbor went "well", with just a few losses, but in terms of mission targets, it was a failure.

@@NahuCommNS The fact they ever launched the attack was a strategic failure. Even Yamamoto seemed to miss that the public reaction would be just as vengeful even if that declaration of war arrived just before the attack as intended instead of after. Catching the carriers might've gained them another six months before the momentum shifted and ignoring the entire Pacific fleet's fuel reserve in those tank farms might've cost as much again but they'd still be too committed in China to invade the west coast or Australia and the longer the Pacific campaign went the more atom bombs would've been available by the end... With a functional radar in place they really should've flown into defending aircraft instead of catching all them all on the ground on top of those missed opportunities.

@@johnassal5838 I agree. Though to be honest, it was inevitable at that point. Japanese government weren't going to back down and lose prestige for cultural and political reasons, and the US fuel embargo left them with either that which they wouldn't do, or go to war to secure the oil resources they needed. Also, fighting a two front war as well. Strategically, was an absolutely stupid and irrational decision, and they couldn't have screwed up worse even if they tried to. Cheers.

I'd argue that the defective American Torpedoes had a larger effect in my opinion, than the possibility of the possibility of 6 carriers being present at midway instead of the 4 that were present. That's simply how terrible those Torpedoes were, there were numerous hits and near misses, that did not work because of the defective America Torpedoes. If they were not defective, the increase of carriers would not have a made much of a difference, due to the earlier American raids on the Japanese fleet would have been more effective. Atleast 2 Japanese Carriers would have been unable to be used in the battle, making the addition of 2 extra carriers not have much of a impact on the outcome of the battle.

Actually, had Yamamoto wished, he could’ve had six carriers but he chose to bring only four. Remember the diversion carrier attack on the Aleutian Islands? It was worse than pointless in that the USA ended up with an intact ZERO.

@@rwarren58 and that was because the Japanese brass were scared about the potential of another bombing raid on the home islands. Doolittle's bomber raid did almost no actual damage to the Japanese war effort but it had an outsized impact psychologically.

@@noticedruid4985 Man that's one of the worst parts of the war. They sent a bunch of mostly obsolete torpedo bombers to get shot down while trying to drop defective torpedoes. Military brass knew the torpedoes were defective but they covered it up. Very few of the torpedo bomber crew survived the battle.

Any idea why the IJN doctrine didn't allow combining of air groups? Reduce bickering/infighting?

@@pierrecurie more the sailors of a ship should fight with said ship and not fight for other ships

Wars are usually won by the side with the greatest resources and that makes the fewest mistakes.

A lose at Midway would only delay the inevitable. They were never gonna out Build the United States. And likely still have suffered similar loses as the American Surprise Attack still happens. Japan wasn’t even able to replace the ships they lost. By the end of 1942 America was building 5 carriers, while Japan could barely start building 1.

That sounds stupid doctrine. Why did they put that in the first place?

@@gorilladisco9108 Japan was super strict with its doctrines. It was the same reason Nagumo waited till his planes returned, to launch an attack on the US Carriers, so by the time the US bombers arrived they were just now getting ready to launch, so dozens of fully fueled and armed planes were all sitting on the flight decks and lower hangers.

@@onefadedgunner3281 I know they are super strict. But what kind of moron ordered their troop to stick on their disabled ship? Who wrote that guidebook? 😅

Wow, that is pretty cool, thx for sharing

Well, Adelaide got it wrong. Nimitz should never have been a "court." What the hell is that about? "Nimitz Boulevard" shoulda been the MAIN DRAG through town. Nimitz was America's great admiral in WW2, responsible for the daring actions at both Coral Sea and Midway. And many others.

@@lololomo5484 there's always one rude big mouth, isn't there?

That's nice to know.

My grandad was on Yorktown at Midway, he survived the war, God bless our greatest generation.

What u think China is doing.

Indeed this is probably why we won't win when China/Taiwan happens... Sadly, Every factory is in China now.

It does call into question the wisdom of outsourcing industrial capacity to our enemies.

My grandfather served on the Lexington, too-- CPO, signalman. He loved that ship.

thanks to both of you

i bet he could get a head of steam on her that would make boomer crews want coal or oil down there instead of plutonium

Love from India

@@SILOPshuvambanerjee It's been awhile since I seen a friendly Indian. It's refreshing and really lightens my heart to see something other then bitter politics from it

@@WhatHappenedIn-vt3vq Not a cricket fan, I take it?

Love the Australians. Sad we don't give them enough credit. I guess that's kind of natural.

Australia has always helped the US. Australia even sent troops to Vietnam

Just don’t let the truth get in the way of an American victory. I don’t think they can handle it. They won the war after all. Lol

You just have to accept the fact that history written by Americans is telling their story, not yours. I'm from the Great White North and am pretty much used to it.

@@davidbeattie4294 I'm not complaining, all countries do it. I was just adding some additional history that I thought might interest viewers.

And no one from the US should forget the sacrifice that the Aussie forces made in all the bloody battles in NG and the sailors that died fighting the Japanese but many of them do not know anything about that and it is a shame.

Yes they did , it was drown out and be subject to european / anglo whims , like the rest of asia , or fight and try to be a power like them , no other choice give the ongoin massive war in china.

@@cseijifja Feels like someone is underestimating the US again... They didn't, they may have had more powerful forces at the start but the US industry got to work way before Japan could shut it down, as an example, in the Atlantic front, Liberty class freighters were built as fast as 42 days, one even being built in 4. Soon their industrial capability made it so that their air and naval capability near the end was almost overwhelming for their Japanese counterparts to deal with.

​@@cseijifja they could have withdrawn from china in 1940.

@@thecappeningchannel515 They could NOT. They started invasion because they had to acquire the resources from China. They had not better choice. And even if they had withdrown from China, there would be MANY MILLIONS of Chinese and Korean troopers waiting to revenge.

You know Mitsubishi made aircrafts were used to attack in Pearl Harbor and in other battles.

It's better if Japan won WW2, there'll be American and Australian comfort girls serving Imperial soldiers

The Mitsubishi A6M2 "Zero" is a...

Japanese cars are great. What fine engineers! Dad fought in the Solomons but loved his Honda Accord. (All his kids drive Japanese vehicles - my sister-in-law's brother helps build Toyotas in Japan). Japan is our ally now - and I'm glad about that - I have Japanese friends. The Coral Sea is just across the ditch (from New Zealand) and up a bit. Its not that far away.

Great book!

Yamamoto was right about carriers and that's about it. As an admiral he was an imbecile. He sent their whole fleet in blind with no intelligence. The Americans made a lot of mistakes that day and still wound up w/ a resounding victory. With luck the best hope for Japan was to just lose badly and not get annihilated. Its a shame we shot him out of the sky, if he was still in charge the Pacific war might have ended sooner. Nagumo gets all the blame but he was set up to fail.

@@rook1196 He was very dumb, frittered away his numerical superiority and when others wanted to take into account other possibilities he ordered them not to. All for an island he couldn't defend and couldn't reasonably use offensively.

That’s a great book. 📖

This is something people don't consider when reviewing aftermath facts and the decisions that lead to them. Even today, in Japanese culture, when someone is the leader be it in business or otherwise and they decide something it is not only the expectation this decision is followed but the structure of the decision and those around the leader are such that no thought is given, or at least spoken or acted on, that the decision could be wrong. Once the decision is made. Prior there may be discussion or requests for opinions but the leader decides, and then it is followed with fervor. Yamamoto wrote he disagreed with the attack on Pearl harbor. But he followed the decision to attack, and committed completely to it. Once that happened, it was on him to try to fight a war with a foe that should never have been provoked. The war in the Pacific is simply a series of Japanese commanders making the wrong decision over and over and over again. I don't know if anyone really can fully understand why. People will say the commanders were fools, but on the other hand they did not know the US knew all their plans because of the code break. Imagine creating a plan only for the enemy to somehow appear at just the right place to counteract. How do you respond? I think this is why the plans became so elaborate. Japan worked under assumption they were in secret and must have thought the US either had much better intel, spies, or a bigger navy then they thought, so japan made things harder on themselves trying to "trick" the seemingly impossible to deceive enemy. None of this takes into account Japan's unwillingness to commit gunships to battle. Even in this Coral sea, if they had steamed out with some gunships to engage the enemy things may have changed. The same can be said at Midway, there was a significant force accompanying the carrier force, they were held in reserve and then retreated without firing a shot as the carriers exploded. It seems Japan was concerned with conserving resources in every regard EXCEPT pilots.

USS Hornet was also part of that raid.

Rocketsong: That's a most interesting comment (intercepts), one I had not seen before. Got any references?

The Doolittle raid was a morale thing when you look at it. The damage inflicted on Japan was minimal.

@@peternewman7940 "The morale is to the physical as three is to one," Napoleon once said. I have seen this borne out in my life, with well equipped teams being stopped by malaise and bad morale.

@@Luked0g440 yeah, the Hornet was on the raid. Plus it was at Midway where it had exactly zero impact on the battle due to a flight commander that was too arrogant and inexperienced and lead all the plane on a flight to nowhere.

Its one of the few times where the US didnt know if they could win, it wasnt a forgone conclusion like most of the European theatre

The Java sea campaign is brutal. A voyage of the damned.

I find it interesting because history might repeat itself.

Jump into 40k warhammer lore...if you're really looking for uncertainty! (Baldremort, Arch, A Border Prince, Luetin) (For real, give it a go...a truly fantastic "universe" ... anyway...)

@@theduplicator3270 tsk, tsk... Won't repeat...it will rhyme.....

I’ve read that Nimitz later said that if Japan had had six carriers at Midway, there’s no way America would have won.

Nimitz was willing to lose two carriers at Midway, if they could simply take out two Japanese ones. Declassified records show he was willing to go 2 on 5. Nobody was planning on an outright victory at Midway. Nimitz knew that the US would always win a war of attrition.

@@rogerknights857 The what-ifs for the US had a lot more impact to them; the war might well have been won by 1944 if the Bureau of Ordnance had given the navy a working Mk. 14 torpedo from day 1.

Didn't the Japanese divert two carriers to their concurrent operation to invade the Aleutins ? Otherwise the could have had six at Midway ?

@@maconescotland8996 I’m positive only one went to the Aleutians. Two of the Japanese carriers sent to the Coral Sea, and that Yamamoto wanted to go to Midway, were held back, one because it was so damaged, and the other because it had lost so many aircraft. There were sufficient plane and pilots on the damaged craft to make up the shortage, but the Japanese were too rigid to allow that. A big mistake!

Yet, because the Japanese took a circuitous route, Fletcher had no idea where they were. In this battle, it was probably a good move.

Thx. No Thx.

She's a good looking ship for some reason.

Dear larky368, good point, I suspect that they assumed their Codes were, initially at least, impenetrable, and unless they became aware that a sunk vessel was accessible, and therefore the possibility of captured code books was a real possibility, there would have to be a series of "coincidences" that would lead to a real suspicion of compromised codes. It should be pointed out that Allied Occupation Forces NEVER recovered any wartime codes from Japan. Also interesting, is that Germany was convinced that the Enigma codes were practically unbreakable, despite a German mathematician telling them otherwise, regards from Australia.

IJN did a war simulation on MI before deploying, just to see how things might play out. The commander playing the part of the Americans sent bombers from Midway to strike the carriers, sinking iirc 2. (IRL America DID send bombers but they flew too high and missed with every bomb) Ultimately the American side won the wargame. The referee of the exercise refused to accept that Japan could possibly lose. He invalidated the results, and the exercise was run again. But the commander was barred from using his bombers because "the Americans would have no reason to have bombers there because they won't know we were coming". Of course Japan won the wargame after that change, which made everyone confident MI would be a Japanese victory. This pretty much illustrates the arrogance of the IJN in WW2. "We won't lose because we can't lose" pretty much sums it up. Their codes were given the same consideration, "They can't have been broken because they cannot BE broken." Although giving credit where credit is due, America played a very careful game with code-breaking intelligence. England took it to a whole new level, on a few occasions making heavy sacrifices when notice of an impending attack "could only have been known due to enigma being broken". I assume the Americans treated Purple with similar rules, and we just haven't publicly discovered anything that could have been prevented. Regardless, in the long run, making sure the enemy doesn't realize their codes are broken proved time and time again to be an incredibly valuable advantage. It helps when the enemy is thoroughly convinced they are the "superior race", which both Germany AND Japan had going for them. That's what they were all taught, so it's hard to fault them for acting like they believed it. It wasn't an act - they all believed the propaganda and it ended up backfiring on them. The boost to morale they got was overshadowed by unwavering overconfidence.

I have read Shattered Sword, and the stupidity of Hiryu to keep on attacking until it was lost, highlights Japanese incompetence. After losing 3 carriers in quick succession, the IJN should have recovered what they could and retired from the battlefield. They might have been able to quickly rebuilt their strength and caused the USN more grief.

My ancestors were Chinese who knew quite a bit about the Jap warrior spirit: prospective winners do not care much about defense (damage control) because fast and precise blows conclude fights. Such a lack of all-round consideration was a factor leading to their failure.

@@GrowFoodSustainably have to agree with you, their intent was always to attack full force and things like defense were often considered against the warrior code. For the Navy it came down to factors that destroyed them, blind obedience to orders, and adapting to the situation was against their warrior code. Damage Control was a very secondary thought, most of their DC was assigned to a handful of the crew ONLY, and recovering lost sailors and airmen was also not even a consideration due to the warrior codes they lived by. Many of their failures were directly attributed to their warrior code lifestyle. There are several countries that are major players on the world stage presently that seem to be drawn to this useless and counterproductive code which in a conflict end with them being self consumed nearly as badly as their adversarial actions against them.

SAS ? SBS ?

I think you better have a look at the conflict in Somalia. Why did the US struggle to try defeating the malitia? POOR TACTICS, & THEY WERE PINNED DOWN!! As for the Coral Sea battle, HMAS Australia (Australian battleship) was NOT sunk, though she did receive minor damage. As for having the best leaders during WW2, what a fucking load of bullshit mate. You need to fucking learn the BRITISH had to deal with Germany pretty much ON THEIR OWN!!! Once the Brits change tactics, the Germans were shocked. The USA had help from other countries, including Australia.

Victor David Hansen said that the reason is that Marshall cleared out the deadwood-34 generals-at the start of the war.

Sorry but I believe Admiral Halsey was an incompetent leader. U.S. Navy veteran. I served aboard the U.S.S. Lexington in the early 80's.

@Retired Bore Love your handle. Exactly, The US replaced the Lexington in December of 1942, The Japanese didn't replace Shoho until 1944. In no way shape or form was Coral Sea any kind of a loss.

Yes. Invincible Japanese were stopped for the first time. Moresby saved. Put Milne Bay and Kokoda disasters as serious Plan Bs for Japanese. Laid the groundwork for massive victories at Midway, New Guinea and Guadalcanal after which Japan was a dead man walking.

I’d actually argue there’s a stronger argument for calling Jutland a German victory than for calling CS a Japanese victory. See, the German goal at Jutland was NOT, in fact, to beat the British in a single decisive battle and break out. The Germans did want to break the blockade, but that was the goal for the naval theatre as a whole, NOT for any one operation. The Germans never wanted a decisive battle because they’d lose in such a battle; they instead tried to opt for a lot of smaller piecemeal engagements to whittle down the British capital ship engagement a few ships at a time, and only bother with any sort of breakout once the numerical advantage had shifted. What happened at Jutland was that the Germans set up one of those piecemeal engagements, trying to go after the British battlecruisers (and ONLY the British battlecruisers), then get the hell out of there before the entire Grand Fleet showed up. The Grand Fleet showed up much sooner than the Germans expected, but even if that hadn’t happened, the Germans wouldn’t have tried to break out: that just wasn’t part of their plans for that day. They’d have gone home as they wanted to do, albeit in significantly better shape. So the Germans actually did accomplish their objective at Jutland (since they weren’t, in fact, trying to break out right there and then and were merely trying to lay the foundations for a breakout much later down the line), even though they took much heavier losses than expected. That’s not really the same as in Coral Sea where the Japanese outright failed in their objective.

@Retired Bore I mean….just about every scholarly work that looks at German naval doctrine in the leadup to/during WWI (even those that incorrectly assume Jutland was a breakout attempt) will point out that the Germans wanted an attritional strategy instead of a “single decisive battle” strategy, which the British countered by either not showing up to the piecemeal engagements the Germans set up, or (as at Jutland) showing up with a much larger force than the Germans planned to deal with. Also, the High Seas Fleet actually did attempt to set up more piecemeal engagements they wanted after Jutland (as well as trying to deal with the Imperial Russian Navy). The British just refused to cooperate with their attempts, which is why these attempts didn’t work out for the Germans, and the inability of the Germans to get in as many of these these small-scale piecemeal engagements as they needed was the main reason behind the HSF’s failure and eventual defeat in WWI. If the Battle of Jutland didn’t happen, the Germans wouldn’t be in any better position in the long run (in fact, if anything they’d have been in an even worse position in the long run because the numerical and strength disparity between the British and German capital ship forces would have been even worse).

Battle of Coral sea was insignificant blip. It would not have mattered if Japan invaded Australia. True, the Ozzies would not have liked it, but there was zero oil, industrial materials, machinery etc there. All Oz would have been would be yet ANOTHER manpower drain on Japan.

Well then don’t hold Australia. Destroy the cities and city populations, take everything useful, and head to Old Guinea

Maybe they heard that everything tries to kill you here anyway and thought "stuff that!"

@@peteanderson2533 Lets face it with wild life with the attitudes ours has a couple of thousand armed men is the least of ya worries LMAO

Hello @beckter181 and others, it should also be pointed out that the last Japanese air raid over Australia took place in 1944 ( in North Queensland ), and Japanese raiding parties had landed in northern Australia, and to this day, there are Japanese markers in northern Australia that emanate from this time. So the threat of Japanese assaults, even though small in practice, was real, and Australian forces had to make provision for this reality. Small forces can create havoc, and a lot of damage, as Germany found out when the British stole a complete radar set from northern France, Regards from Australia.

Japan had huge armys in the north of japan it was 50 or 60% of there overall force incase russia invaded.. Thus part reason usa wasent going to invade japan with troops and ships like all the other islands. If germany was more successful with russia.... mabey japan would have had a good crack at Australia, with them reserve troops a bit later on.

It actually had a secondary effect. You see, an ensign on yorktown watched the lexington sink and realized a weakness in carrier design. Their fuel lines. He devised the idea of purging the fuel lines with co2 when they weren't being used. This idea went up the command and a functional design was implemented by the time yorktown pulled into harbor. From there, the information was spread to the rest of the navy. But more importantly, it is the reason yorktown took the battering she took and nearly pulled it off. She was actually under tow when the submarine attack finally did her in.

*usher in

There is no strategic loss a tactical victory can even out.

@@scottl9660 As the Japanese learned to their regret.

Won't argue MacArthur's character, but he was ordered by Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs to retire to Australia to organize the defense and relief of the Western Pacific. He did not choose to leave the Philippines, but only did so under direct orders. He did, however, coordinate a terrific underground resistance there throughout the war, and significantly drained Japan's manpower and shipping resources during the New Guinea campaign.

@@sumrdreamer Actually MacArthur said there was no chance of organized resistance in the Philippines until it became clear that there was a resistance movement especially on Mindano . During the war the Filipino resistance would grow to over 30,000 troops thru out the islands.

Proximity fuse. It was not a PC rather a version of a radar. An oscillator sensing objects.

I saw that!

My friends Geoffrey Heath, Murray Forest, Mervcyn Loxton, Walter Carger, & Norm Sleep were on HMAS AUSTRALIA during the Coral Sea battle. Problem is too much emphasis is placed on the USA being there, making it sound like they were the only ones there. Time this fucking crap stopped.

@@christophermarshall5765 why don't you post this on your own rather than a comment on my post?

@@thomasswafford250 I already have done so. I’m doing this to ensure people know all the facts.

@@christophermarshall5765 I understand your point, but it had nothing to do with my post.

@@christophermarshall5765 so take your diatribe elsewhere. This about the fact my father was there, not a statement about the overall war effort.

Yes japan kept aprox 50 or 60% of there army in reserve on main japan incase the russians invaded. Part reason usa dident do troop invasion of main japan... if Russia fell to germany well it be a different story.

@@jamierowe9736 Fear of Russia was the sole basis of the alliance between Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. Such as it was.

Had Japan actually landed significant troops on Australia, the strategic balance of power in the Pacific would definitely have shifted, and resources sent elsewhere (Africa, India, New Guinea, Guadalcanal) would have had to divert to defend Australia. It would have been a different war, but likely with the same outcome.

​@@sumrdreamer Such an attempt would have impacted Japan itself far far more than the Allies. What many people fail to realize is just how stretched Japan's supply lines were at the furthest extent of their expansion. So, they would have had to do all that - take AND hold Malaya, the Philippines, Borneo, the Dutch Indies, the Solomon Islands, etc.. THEN, on top of this, muster a big enough force of troops and ships to invade an entire continent. Much of Australia's army was still in the Middle East, but they were coming back, and there was still a substantial reserve at home capable of driving a tank or carrying a rifle.

and by one miracle, in the dockyards of perl harbor. "We'll need 90 days to fix her." "You have THREE."

A co-incidence did not help Japan either: the Jap government planned to notify the US government of war and then start Pearl Harbour but the document arrived about 90 minutes late, rendering the action a cowardly sneak attack to infuriate all Americans.

Are these the same Americans who sat back for 3 years and watched Australian and New Zealand blood being spilled in Europe , North Africa and the Far East ? Hmm ?

over-extending in war usually ends badly. England knew this, while Japan did not.

Not so much expendable as indefensible. The Brits got mopped up rather hard when they attempted to stop the Japanese early in the war. ...But then, the majority of their newer ships were over in the Atlantic trying to keep the Germans from landing in England and ending the blockade.

Wash your dirty mouth out with soap & stop being so utterly disrespectful & cowardly

HMS Illustrious was a BRITISH ship, so the British did NOT study the ship during repairs in the US, as it was one of their own. She was built by Vickers Armstrong, laid down in April 1937, launched in April 1939.

@@christophermarshall5765 yes they DID study her damage to see what lessons they could learn.

I’ve read that an Admiral Lee was very influential in upgrading the AA firepower on American ships.

@@rogerknights857 more so admiral king.

@@rogerknights857 Lee was credited with upgrading the precision of naval gunnery, and at Guadalcanal used modern radar in combination with excellent gunnery to decisively defeat a Japanese capital ship in a dramatic night battle. Lee was Captain of USS Washington in that engagement, and later was promoted to Admiral and commanded the fleet battleship squadron for the rest of the war.

True, but at the time the US navy didn't have as many operational carriers as the Japs, so couldn't afford to trade carriers...which is what happened in the battle. They achieved their objective, but had the trend of losing a carrier for every Japanese carrier sunk, they were going to lose the Pacific.

@@Pete856 The USN could afford to make good it's carrier losses due to it's massive ship-building capacities. The IJN could not. So, the theatre was never in doubt, it was just a question of time and at what cost. Yamamoto knew this.

@@glock22357 True, but as said "at the time" the USN didn't have as many carriers. This is why the imperial navy wanted to draw out the US carriers and destroy them at Midway...this would've opened up the Pacific for long enough to allow them to take all their objectives before the USN could recover.

@@Pete856 You're not making any specific point or counter-point. I highlighted inaccuracies in this video, and you're stating.......what, exactly? What is it you're debating against out of what I've posted?

@@glock22357 totally agree with point 2, mostly agree with point one, I’d add that that the goal of that attacking on all fronts was to build defensive depth. That depth was to be used to attrit the counterattacking US fleet with land based aviation and submarines forces prior to a Mahanian style decisive battle after which the US would sue for peace. Attacking operationally for a strategic defense.