Why No German Reinforcements at Stalingrad? 

*Extra Notes, Links and Sources* Despite the evidence given in the video, I have no doubt that some of you will still argue that the Germans couldn’t, or indeed, didn’t replace their losses suffered in 1941 by the summer of 1942. Some will probably complain that Germany was (by as early as 1942) at the bottom of the manpower barrel. But this was simply not the case. The following quote from Liedtke explains that Germany actually squandered her available manpower - “Regardless of the heavy losses sustained over the previous year, the Wehrmacht as a whole had witnessed a net increase of about 1.1 million personnel by 1 July 1942. However, despite the urgency of defeating the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, which should have resulted in a ruthless prioritization towards meeting the needs of the Army, large consignments of personnel were still allocated to the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine.” - Enduring the Whirlwind, Page 209 This, and the evidence presented in the video, points us firmly in the direction of mismanagement and poor staff-work. Germany had the manpower, but didn’t use it correctly. Also to note, the Germans created an additional 22 divisions in 1942. This was at a time when their other divisions weren’t at full strength. This fact is often used as a point against the explain why they didn’t have enough manpower. In reality, with an almost 3,000 kilometer front, which was about to expand to 4,100 kilometers, Germany needed both to reinforce her existing divisions, and create more divisions. So to say that they were wrong to create 22 new divisions is the wrong conclusion to come too, especially when you consider some of these divisions were made from elements of other veteran divisions. Either way, why is Army Group Centre being prioritised in terms of reinforcements over Army Groups A and B? This does not make any sense, regardless whether you agree or disagree with the manpower situation. I’d love to hear your thoughts so let me know. If you would like book recommendations for further reading, the two books I suggest you pick up are Citino’s “Death of the Wehrmacht” and Liedtke’s “Enduring the Whirlwind” - both of which cover the Operation Blau period quite well. *Links* Citino’s lecture on the “Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns in 1942.” ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-UNDhswF1GKk.html My “Your Perception of the WW2 Eastern Front is Wrong” video ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-B-ZHH770WLs.html My “The Numbers Say it All | The Myth of German Superiority on the WW2 Eastern Front” video ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-_7BE8CsM9ds.html Another thank you goes out to my Patreons. If you would like to support me in creating these videos, please take a look at my Patreon page www.patreon.com/TIKhistory *Selected Sources/Bibliography* Citino, R. “Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942.” University of Kansas, 2007. Glantz, D. House, J. “The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 1. To the Gates of Stalingrad. Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942.” University Press of Kansas, 2009. Glantz, D. “When Titan’s Clashed.” University Press of Kansas, 2015. Hayward, J. “Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East 1942-1943.” University Press of Kansas, 1998. Liedtke, G. “Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943.” Helion & Company LTD, 2016. “Germany and the Second World War: Volume VI/II, The Global War.” Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History) Potsdam, Germany. Oxford University Press, 2015. Thanks for watching, and thanks for commenting!

You've hit on a point that according to Kenneth Macksey in his book “Why the Germans Lose at War", has plagued the Prussian Army from the beginning: poor emphasis on logistics. Macksey argues that the Prussian idea is a short war concentrating on movement and that long logistical trains were never emphasized. This failing then was transmitted to the Wehrmacht through the predominance of Potsdam Prussian trained officers. Remember, Hitler complained that his generals did not understand the "economic aspects of war"; it seems he was right.

Halder, the same man who wasn't able or willing to supply Rommel in North Africa wasn't willing or able to supply Paulus in Stalingrad. We might see a trend here...

I studied history and ww2 for 23 years. I have never heard someone talking about that. GREAT WORk

This is clearly off-topic but, man, you deserve a Nobel prize. I wish we had a beer or two some day and discuss history. This is what the Internet in its finest is supposed to be: an endless continuity of eye opening ideas challenging everything you know and forcing you to re-evaluate. I'll be watching your content until I die ;-)

When you had the feeling you had to support one channel and you see it exceeds your expectations and you feel happy for a well reserved success!

Just extraordinary. You shine a light on this conflict like no other. The deficit in supply to this primary objective would beggar belief were the argument not backed up so convincingly. I find myself almost gasping in astonishment. A period i thought i knew well and was so well documented there's nothing more to say until, that is, you enter the debate. Its striking that you can effect an almost visceral response to a well worn subject with such insights. I wont say new insight for the facts are there all along. You bring them to the fore, making history anew. A commentator below jokingly suggested making you professor of history in his fictional dictatorship. I would humbly suggest this to be a real career option for you at any progressive university. My heart felt thanks to you, sir.

"the reasons the Germans lose the battle of Stalingrad is because of poor staff work, the German general staff are the ones to blame for this disaster" I love these type of videos you put out TIK

Great video. I think the reason Army Group Center was receiving the reinforcements was because at this time the Germans also wanted to keep the Rhev salient because it was only about 200 miles away from Moscow. It was a valuable strategic location to maintain but ended never being fully exploited. The Soviets were constantly launching large scale attacks at this sector. The German 9th Army at Rhev was holding the Soviets off but was taking heavy losses.

Well, German losses were heavy across the entire front, and Stalingrad was the farthest away from the German logistical center. Plus, I don't think they expected the Soviet Far East forces to redeployed all the way to Stalingrad, and for all these mechanized forces to materialize and launch a fresh counteroffensive in the winter

The Stalingrad video spree is still alive and well I see? Nice! Was a good video, keep ehm coming TIK.

Halder is surreptitiously loading Army Group Center to take Moscow. This was Halder's obsession.

Halder is the Hotzendorf of his time.

I guess all of those comments about the German General Staff being second to none during World War II was in fact an overstatement.

Love your videos man I got bummed out when I watched all of them and realized there's no more!

ok as some1 who has kina stumbled into TIK over the last week or so, generally iv got good feelings about these videos i like that you dont try and appeal to the lowest intellectual denominator and you have faith that your viewers can manage an attention span slightly longer than a gerbil (long in-depth videos exploring multiple different viewpoints and interpretations, without the tedious moral lording over that some see as the victors almost mandatory prerogative, many thumbs up). HOWEVER when your using graphs, stats, and other material that has ovs been researched (not just direct quotes), an on-screen reference, or caption reference or reference in the description section below would be great. Im not saying that you made them up or anything nefarious of that nature but references are reassuring to a cynical viewer and would certainly make me feel better. even if ppl dont actually check them their good to have. keep up the good work (y)

I'm late to the party, but the Rzhev was the main factor attracting most of the replacements in the Army group Center.

It does open up the question that the whole scenerio of this part of history has not been fully explored. It is a good eye opener.👍👍👍

One more excelent video !!!!. TIK your are lighting, with hard data, proper analysis and conclutions about Stalingrad`s shadows. Congratulations !!!

Interesting theory. Don't ask me where to get the data, but one "proof" of the theory would be a study of the routes and equipment used to supply B and the 6th Army, and the carrying capacity of that system and vehicles. These facts are crucial to your analysis.

This excellent series ( I believe your treatment of Operation Crusader will be the definitive account available online) has done a lot, but this particular contribution on Stalingrad breaks new ground which outshines all of its previous videos. Great!

Just found your channel. I studied the Eastern front in college, and you have some very compelling arguments to demand some different thinking. Excellent.

I am not so sure Halder is to blame. Here's my take: 1-In the original plan Army Group B is just guarding the flank 2-The battles of Rzhev take place until early october (Army Group Center) 3-Model's 9th army is involved in the heavy fighting in Rzhev and he is a notorious unit grabber and hoarder who can get Hitler to give him what he wants 4-The bulk of the red army is still in front of Moscow 5-In Hitler's eyes, Stalingrad becomes important only once he realizes that the TRUE objective of the campaign, the Baku oils fields, are definitively out of reach For french historian Jean Lopez, Stalingrad's importance grows with every german defeat: the Caucasus, El-Alamein, Operation Torch ... Until the capture of the city becomes the only possible good news he can give to the german people.

Am glad that its not 1942 and you Sir are not working for the German general staff. Really enjoyed it.

The massive Rzhev offensive further to the north aimed at Army Group Center by the Soviets was meant to prevent Germany from sending any relief south to Stalingrad.

What a great history channel!!! I love that you are referred to alternative sources and not just to Beevor and guys like Beevor...

Excellent presentation! Very good to point out that Germans were replacing their losses, but replacements were poorly distributed. It is also worth keeping in mind that the Soviets did not have an inexhaustible reservoir of manpower, since the Germans had deprived them of a significant portion of it, through occupation of the western USSR.

Loving this series. This is the first I have heard about the lack of reinforcements. I am curious about a couple things. Did the logistics issue at the start of Blau result from the Soviet offensive on Kharkov in May 42? Did this battle cause stockpiles meant for Blau be used and depleted? The casualty information is also interesting. I have heard the battle for the Don bend was much more brutal than typically lead to believe. This is backed up by the casualty reports. And could Hitlers belief the Soviets were beat because of early successes of Blau against disorganized units that took part in the Kharkov offensive contributed to the lack of reinforcements? By the time they figured it out, it was too late? They took units off the line and afaik they were destined for Leningrad because they thought the Soviets were beat.

thanks for Your videos and the analysis, data and sources. Hard work I'm sure, to eat all the information and then to present it as you do. keep it up !

Excellent video, I have not read all the comments so somebody might already have commented the same or something similar: In order to conclude that it was the OKH's fault that Paulus could not take Stalingrad I would ideally like to know the following: 1) How many of the reinforcements sent to the Eastern Front were new/fresh troops and how many were in fact recovered troops that were returning to their old units after being wounded? 2) In addition I also believe that considering the first question it would be interested to look at a longer period than just the 4 months from August to November 1942 since there normally is a delay from when you take a loss and until you in fact get reinforcements / replacements. The combination of these two factors migth be one of the reasons why especially Army Group Centre got significantly more reinforcements than than their actual losses during the 4 months? And I would also assume that on average the units in Army Group Centre, had higher losses than Army Group South (or A and B) over the winter - and that a lot of the reinforcements received by Army Group Centre could be troops returning to the units are being wounded I therefore - if possible - we should look over a longer period and compare losses & reinforcements of the various army groups since only looking at the 4 months from August to November 1942 might not give the right picture. Having said all of this and considering the way Blau was progressing (or not really progressing) I do believe that OKH and Hitler should have allocated more troops to the south - and that sending most of the 11th Army north was a mistake!

Of course the Axis favoured the reinforcement of Army Group Centre - it was resisting the main axis of the Red Army's attack - the 3 battles of Rzhev. Glantz refers to these as Zhukov's greatest blunders. Massed Red forces smashing repeatedly against AGC - with a goal of no less than the destruction of AGC - the better to finish the war in 1942. In your analysis you never tell us where the main focus of Soviet effort was. What was reinforced on the axis side is given to us in isolation. You're missing half the equation - the Red strategic schwerpunkt at AGC. If you reinforce Army Group B you risk the destruction of AGC. Zhukov was inept in 1942 - no maskirovka just blasting away with green troops. The Germans saw it all coming and, of course, reinforced. As you say 90% of Stalingrad was conquered by late October. Chuikov was largely finished. The Germans thought that that theatre was safe. Why did they get it wrong? Partly because Vatutin was an excellent commander who was adept at maskirovka at a time when the overrated Zhukov was still learning (expensively) on the job. Bottom line - if you are short of manpower - which Germany always was - you have to put your men where you think the threat is. They knew Zhukov's threat to AGC. Operation Uranus came as a surprise because of the excellent work of Vatutin. I like your work my scouse friend - but the Germans acted as logically as they could given the situation as they saw it.

@TIK One very important thing I don't think that very much military history really brings out is that large numbers of soldiers are not 'teeth arms' (ie, infantry, armour, artillery and engineers). Infantry tend to take 70% plus, of losses and most of the rest are armour, engineers and artillery. A lot of soldiers involved in supply, admin etc, while doing vital jobs, normally take very few losses. It is really worthwhile, when you can, to look at actual combat losses by arm and especially infantry, that ALWAYS do most of the dying.

Just re-watching some of your previous Stalingrad / oost front videos in preparation for the main course when its completed in a couple of weeks ( no pressure there ) . I am really looking forward to your forthcoming work . Nice one - keep it up TIK .

Remember the huge battles going on to defend the Rhez salient in Army Group Centre in 1942 - Walter Model commanding the 9th Army at Rhez barely held off the attacks and the Red Army lost up to 2 million men in the battles there.

Did fighting around Rzhev is a factor? it happen before and end after stalingrad

5:06 lol, Dumitrescu was like: "Russia is too OP, can I pls make my line shorter, so at least I have some chance of success?"

yes and no. you see ... Col. Adam (was responsible for Reinforcements as the 1C-Officer of the 6.Army) constantly begs for men and officers and went to Berlin 2 times and to Winnytza 3 or 4 times to put pressure on his superiors. with little to no result. and he also is constantly complaining how little food and ammunition supply the 6. Army got. Paulus decided to even leave the majority of horses behind on the Don-River because there was not enough food the feed all the horses (A TERRIBLE DECISION ! because these horses could helped a lot in the encirclement to keep the men alive ) a second thing is: the reinforcements are not nearly as good as the men lost. most of them are poorly trained, a lot with no fighting experience. and most important : the huge lack of good sergeants and lower rank officers. if you loose those highly skilled men of the inter-war-period you cannot simply replace them by promoting soldiers.

I am just halfway the video, but it is critical to note that losses were mostly frontline troops, so a deficit of 20k men in losses compares to a much greater proportion of combat strength than the numbers may indicate

Excellent information

The fact they were able to replace German divisions with Italian and Romanian suggests they were capable of sending men there. I really wonder why did they thought it necessary to divert a division to France of all the places. It almost looks as if they were not really expecting a counter attack at this point.

Probably one of the best videos that explains the story of the 6th armies struggles a must watch

It’s pretty obvious the Germans did not increase replacement to 6th Army because they could not supply them adequately., unless you have evidence Halder was undermining Fall Blau in order to support an attack elsewhere(Moscow?). I was hoping you would touch on this more. Its one thing to have soldiers, its another to supply them a thousand miles away.

Halder replaced at the end of September and that explains the increase of reinforcements during October and November..I think Halder sabotaged Op Blau

Even America who had to cross an ocean replaced casualties better

Half an hour long video. It's not like I have short attention spam, but most of the videos this long are usually simply boring and could be cut in length by half. This one, I had no problem watching from beggining to the end. Well, considering its not the first one I've watched, I just subscribed.

Efficiency signifies the level of performance that uses the least amount of inputs to achieve the highest amount of output. I think that it was the target : maximum efficiency for the 6th army

One thing to remember is the series of meat grinder battles around the Rhzev salient in starting in early through out 1942. The Soviets got the worst of the casualties. The Germans also took heavy losses. The swampy, wet and forested ground made the avenues of approach in the Rhzev salient very predictable and difficult for armor for either side. The Soviets brought up much heavy artillery and blasted their objectives but the entrenched Germans were difficult to dislodge. Eventually, in early 1943 the Germans ordered a planned series of retreats out of the Rhzev salient. We only know the basics about the series of meatgrinder battles around the Rhzev salient. Scholars like David Glantz have researched and written about Rhzev salient battles. However, we still don't have a deep understanding about them. The Soviets authorities hid the battle and made it go away but it was really like a battle of the Somme in a lot of ways only it was a strategic victory for the Soviets. I think the Rhzev battle were strategically worse for the Germans because this battle pulled resources and manpower away from Stalingrad. The other important point was the continued heavy fighting around Leningrad that also was going on in 1942. This fighting too was very costly and prolonged. So the Germans simply did NOT have the manpower reserves to even HOLD what they had gained in 1941 with Army Group Center engaged in heavy costly fighting in the Rhzev salient battles, the heavy combat to maintain the siege of Leningrad, and at the same time achieve the widespread objectives for Operation Blau with Army Group A in the Caucasus and Army Group B in Stalingrad. Statistics also do a poor job of explaining the losses of combat experienced captains, lieutenants, and NCO's. These experienced officers and Noncoms make everything work in any Army or military organization. The quality of the Wehrmacht infantry leaderhship dropped off significantly after all of these heavy grinding Wehrmacht manpower losses. In the meantime, the Soviet Army military reforms were really showing dividends in the Stalingrad battles. After Stalingrad, the Soviet Army achieved qualitative and quantitative superiority in all areas, of trained manpower, tanks, artillery, and warplanes. Soviet generalship under Zhukov, Vassilevsky, Rokossovsky, and the artilleryman Voronuv achieved superior generalship of combined arms operations doctrine over the German Wehrmacht for the rest of the war. These Soviet commanders listed above out generaled the German generals in combined arms front operations. The Soviet officer corps became experts at this form of warfare. So I go back to Shirer's "Rise and Fall of the 3rd Reich." Shirer describes the German Wehrmacht's defeat in the battle of Moscow as the most important decisive turning point of WW2. The German Wehrmacht was at its strongest and peak of performance during Operation Barbarossa in 1941. The German's best chance of knocking the Soviet Union out of the war was in front of Moscow in late 1941. The Germans gave it everything they had with their best units and most experienced commanders. But the German Wehrmacht was defeated and driven back decisively on December 5th, 1941 by Marshal Zhukov's counteroffensive. The Germans would never again be able to control the initiative with all three of their Army Groups after the Battle of Moscow. After Moscow, the Germans spent most of their time reacting to Soviet attacks or Soviet actions with two of their Army Groups. After Stalingrad, except for about two weeks at Kursk, the Germans would react to incessant Soviet offensives and attacks for the rest of the war. New research from Soviet archives really doesn't fundamentally change Shirer's description of the decisive defeat the Germans faced in front of Moscow with about 1.2 MILLION German casualties by early 1942. The Soviet Army's superior arctic technology, winter equipment, winterized vehicles,and warm quilted uniforms allowed the Soviet soldier to fight and win in minus 40 below temperatures. Germany's terrible logistical problems came home to roost in decisive fashion in front of Moscow during their failed Operation Typhoon. At the Nurmeburg trials, General Keitel was asked when he knew the war was lost for Germany. He said one word, "Moscow." www.jacquespauwels.net/70-years-ago-december-1941-turning-point-of-world-war-ii/

Another interesting, informative and original vid presenting information that I'd never heard about and explaining what it means in relation to the battle and the war in the east. Well done TIK, you are such a great help to those of us interested in knowing what really happened and why. So many of us think we know the how, what and where of WW2 but really we know very little more than the headlines and understand even less. I'd just like to say thanks again, your work is well worth supporting.

It took him 10 minutes to say the main point, the OKW supplied the the wrong army groups

It occurred to me that Hitler's decision to no longer employ the Fallshirmjaeger as an airborne division after the losses at Crete was a HUGE shortsighted mistake. Could he have possibly used a Fallshirmjaeger divsion to execute a Coup de Main attack on the oil fields?

Sixth Army was vastly over strength already and it was easily expected to secure the city, which it largely did. The only problem was the army’s flanks. The army itself was over-concentrated around the city. Weak Rumanian and Italian units held its flanks. These collapsed when the Soviet Uranus Operation began, trapping Sixth Army by double envelopment. Statistics do not tell the real story.

The thing is... maybe Germans were understrength around Stalingrad, but this is not, where Soviets broke the front, furthermore: Paulus could hold out until they literally starved to death. It was the Romanian, Italian and Hungarian armies that were overrun. The real question: why were they neglected so severely? And it wasn't about tanks and fuel which was obviously quite scarce or motorized units... They lacked any adequate anti-armor and winter equipment. It was static infantry waiting for tanks freezing to death.

Mate, you should have put these graphs over the top of each other, instead of side by side. 15 mins in and greatly enjoying this :).

as soon ill take the command in my country ill offer you the position of head professor of history in our military schools

TIK looks like someone who drinks nothing but beer.

But even if 6th Army had received some replacements in Stalingrad, wouldn't that just mean that a few more would have become encircled?

Very illustrating to enlighten the question. Thanks for this explanations, TIK! You changed my view to "madman" Hitler, Stalingrad and WW2 overall.

Always a fun and educational video. Awesome accompaniment for breakfast! :)

The quality of German manpower fell significantly from 1941, yes they were replaced, however the quality was not that of the original.

my grandfather was in romanian army at stalingrad and he was saying that the supplies were non existent, one day in one box they found books(in german).The ammunition was rationed and even grenades were scarce .The food was completed by hunting and fishing . Many times they saw the russians doing the same.the russian attack was not a surprise and germans refused all the demands to retreat to a better position. the germans gambled on the russian innactivity and all the army was for show.

It's not that they didn't have enough men. They had a wider theatre across which to spread these million or so additional troops.

This does not include the fact that the Germans had lost more than a million men by the time they got to the Don River. Also, the entire Sixth Army was literally starved of food, ammunition and fuel not to mention winter clothing. By the time the Russians completed the encirclement most of the German army could be considered fought out. They talked about a breakout but the condition of the troops and the few working tanks and trucks with fuel made that impossible.The Luftwaffe's effort to supply the army by air was a dismal, costly failure.

Thanks. I really enjoyed this. I have some questions about your work, though. As a soldier myself, I know that it's not all about numbers, and you didn't peel back the onion enough for me :) If I lose 10,000 veteran infantrymen and they are replaced by 10,000 cooks and admin types, I have lost some capability. Even if I replace them with 10,000 infantrymen right out of initial training (and I would include in this category repurposed sailors and air crews, as the Germans did later in the war), I am falling behind. Do you have the math on this additional layer of analysis?

Help Tik. I’m reading my GCSE notes on the Second World War saying that the Germans were defeated at Kursk because of the effectiveness of the t-34... sigh

I am not sure if you mentioned this, but maybe 'army group center' received the most replacements because perhaps the divisions were depleted from Operation Typhoon and the Soviets winter offensive? Also, do you think that case blue (Fall Blau) could have //would have been a success if the germans did not enter stalingrad, and bypassed it

Man you deliver the facts and I enjoy your stuff. Very Nicely Done.

:coughHalder:... lol xD

Interesting analysis. I would say though that Germans suffered from hubris, and that they were defeated by the three generals; General Mud, General Winter, and General Distance

Interesting and informative. Excellent photography pictures enabling the viewers to better understand what the orator was describing. Berlin was a disillusioned/group of disorganized communication between the different armored forces groups. Along with the disillusioned arrogant Hitler constantly changing/over ruling his seasoned/experiences generals military operations. Listening to Goring's impractical military operations advice. Only added to the communications debacle. Caused a much less efficient/organized military operation. Giving the allied forces. A decisive advantage in different military operations. "D" Day is a classic example of poor or non existent communications.

It's probably because they put Moscow as a main objective. Defeating Russian at Stalingrad in winter wasn't possible even with complete reinforcements

I like your channel Its a nice change in how the war is explained and illustrated , thanks !

Another outstanding video. Thanks. The consumption of life in theses battles is breathtaking.

You are so riveting to watch, and listen to. Thank you.

Great work, great analysis. Congrats. Greetings from Brazil.

I have always believed that the primary German problem in WWII was not manpower, at least not until very late in the war, but logistics. The German Army was designed to fight a limited war in Western Europe and relied on a logistics system based on railroads. The Treaty of Versailles required the German Army to maintain a large ratio of Cavalry to Infantry units, which resulted in the Germans possessing a lot of horses when the war started. Through the mid-thirties, when they were beginning to mechanize, they shifted those horses into the supply system with the idea that supplies would move by rail to as close to the front as possible and then to the consuming units by horse-drawn wagons. As I think we all know, the Soviet rail system operated on a different gauge than the rest of Europe, so the Germans could not bring their own trains until the gauge was changed, a very slow laborious process. They had to rely on the limited number of captured Soviet locomotives and cars, and the horses had to pull the supplies over greater distances as the army advanced, also a very slow and laborious process. As winter came on, fodder became a critical problem, and an underfed horse is a weak horse, so wagons cannot be loaded as heavily, slowing the supply train down further. Contrast this with the Red Army of late 1943 - 45. They had received large numbers of 6 x 6 Studebaker trucks via Lend-Lease that, when added to their own production, gave the Red Army unprecedented mobility and enabled them to develop the sophisticated logistics system needed to supply huge armies on the move. This probably cut a year off of the war in the East. We rarely hear about this because a truck is not as sexy as a tank, and the problems of a General moving vast armies across the map are a better read than those of a quartermaster trying to get a fan belt to where it is needed when it is needed. Both are equally important, a General has to plan and lead, but without the fan belt, the tank doesn't move very far, and without an effective logistics system, an army is just a mob of guys wandering around looking for something to eat. In a nutshell, I do not believe that the Germans had either the logistical infrastructure or know-how to fight a global war. Unless they were able to force surrender very quickly at the beginning, they were doomed to failure.

Very well explained. I finally got answers to the questions which have been bothering me since my childhood in the USSR (that is itself a consequence of the Russian occupation of my country as a consequence of Stalingrad).

Damn. Imagine if Paulus had been able to present these numbers to Hitler in that 12 September meeting… “in the 9 weeks since leaving Voronezh, my Army has lost approximately 90,000 men and received less than half that many replacements. If you really want me to go into the city, I’m going to need at least three fresh divisions or the equivalent thereof, plus, a rest period for my exhausted troops.”

Wasnt the Rzeh meat grinder (army group center) requiring forces to remain stable? thats the first thing that comes to mind

In the end I'm happy with the results of the battle :-)

You all forget the human factor. Germans had doubts at this point of the war in their superiority and reasons why they do what they do. Russians conversely understood that it's termination war against them. So Russians beat Germans by the heart first of all.

One of the main shortages the German military had that is not well known is the lack of officers. As the German armies rapidly grew under Hitler the lack of trained officers was a massive problem for the military

Island of Fire will fill some of the gaps in it is ridiculously cheap for a reissued book on Amazon.

AGC army group center were held up at the rezhev salient during operation Mars. There were two Russian operations: Mars and Uranus. They were twin operations. Their purpose: 1. To hold up army group center and delay AGC from reinforcing Paulus. 2. Was the battle for Stalingrad and building up enough troops to encircle them. Until the Soviet Union fell, historians knew very little about all the battles around Rezhev. Here is what Stalin told the allies: On 27 and 28 November 1942 respectively, Premier Stalin wrote to them in almost identical words: “… We’ve decided to undertake an operation on the central front as well, in order to impede the enemy from sending forces to the south ….”

Tik, I have really enjoyed your in depth research and reasoning in your WW2 video’s. Clearly you have spent a lot of time researching and coming to proper conclusions that others that write books have not been able to do. I can see that Hitler’s priority was Army Group A not B, simply because he wanted the fuel. Hoth was only pulled back as you state as Paulus force had become to weak to take Stalingrad on their own. Most of my suggestions are going to come from various video’s that you and a few others have made. As far as Army Group Center getting the most reinforcements, you sir, would know better than me, if these were necessary as what actions and battles were taking place there. I can see that Halder might have been a problem, but I doubt he was the main problem for Paulus not getting replacements, reinforcements, and supply. Tik, you did a video on the rations that Paulus’s army was getting. It was an amazing video, in the detail it went into. Let me digress for a minute please. From your video, when Paulus started across the steppes, the food ration was cut for the first time. They were told to live off the land, except as you point out, the steppes had very little to live off. It is at this point that the soldiers probably started to loose weight. Not sure about the conditions of the horses, as the German army could uses horses as to not depend on fuel so much as other nations. Mostly horses can graze on the steppes, unless the army is moving to fast to allow that, which I believe they were at times. So the conditions of the horses and men before they got to Stalingrad was not good, and once they got into Stalingrad, there were no food for the horses, and the horses became food for the soldiers. Horses were needed to pull artillery guns and other military hardware. There is a video on youtube, about Paulus after he was captured. the Russian who is with them describes the car trip north for 30km to a house where Paulus will stay. He describes the captured German soldiers from Stalingrad being marched by. And he states that the weather there was -30F at night. Just a guess, as you have said in your video’s, that 95% died in captivity, I bet many many died on this march, I have been in -30F and even someone in good health, should get out of this asap. So your question: “Why No German Reinforcements at Stalingrad?” Is it possible we are asking the wrong question? Should not the question be: Why was the German 6th Army not supplied with rations? Or why was not the 6th army not adequately supplied, even way before Stalingrad? The reason it is the wrong question is, if you cannot feed you troops, or supply them, why would you want to send more there to starve or die. I was once told by a veteran of WW2, that the Germans relied on 3 main railways and their horses for the majority of their resupply. As trucks needed fuel, and roads in Soviet Russia was beyond poor.

Paulus and the 6th were also encircled and needed to be a breakthrough ( by Hoth, I think) to get the drastically needed food, clothing, and ammunition. BUT no Wehrmacht unit could breat through the Soviet encirclement of the 6th. THe German air force was trying to drop MUCH-needed supplies, but never enough.

Excellent review of “another viewpoint.” Thanks for your time.👍

Excellent presentation. Germany in general, the Prussian war mentality in particular was so geared to war of offensive movement that a defensive stand or holding pattern was simply not part of the curricula. They had no heavy strategic bombers, no large rugged air transports (except the Gigant which was too few, too late and too fragile), most all air transport was done with the antiquated and difficult Fokker tri-motor, not even large armored heavy haul ground transports, most of the ground transport was done by Horse. Once their offensive strategy ground down into a street brawl they were destined to lose no matter how many people they replaced, you can't fire a rifle without bullets and you can't expect starving soldiers to fight effectively.

I noticed that you did not mention that at around the same time the Wehrmacht was fighting for survival following Operation Saturn at Stalingrad, the Germans were able to put together around 250,000 men and sent them into North Africa! Good thing no-one in OKH or OKW thought about using ME323 on the eastern front to ship petrol to the forward units (instead they were sent to Tunisia where many of them got shot down). And those 4 transfered armored divisions would have given Paulus the strategic reserve to have fended off the Soviet counterattack. As you said, talk about misplaced priorities. One almost has to feel sorry for Paulus getting the short end of the stick for his defeat here.

A history student has to look at ALL the battles going on the Eastern front rather than just Stalingrad by itself. We need to consider in the north heavy fighting around Leningrad inflicting heavy losses on Army Group North during 1942/early 43. The German Army Group Center had to deal with a series of heavy battles around the Rezhev salient. The Soviet historians refer to the Rezhev salient battles as the "Rezhev meatgrinder." Soviet losses were quite heavy larger than the German Army Group Center. However, the Rezhev salient battles put constant pressure on Army Group Center. Eventually, the German high command ordered a withdrawal from the Rezhev salient. The point here is the Soviet Army put tremendous pressure on the German Army Group Center. So the German staff officers at headquarters had to reinforce the German forces defending the Rezhev salient. So the replacement situation became desperate for Germany everywhere in 1942/earlly 1943. Complicating the situation even more was the heavy combat going on around Novorossysks. The fighting around Novorossyks was called a "micro-Stalingrad" with heavy urban fighting around the cement plant and industrial areas of Novorossyks. The point here is the the ATTRITION EVERYWHERE along the ENTIRE EASTERN FRONT in 1942/43. The reasons the main offensive for Operation Blau wasn't reinforced is because the German Wehrmacht's enormous logistical issues. The German high command had major crisis problems EVERYWHERE along the front. The movement of 11 Divisions moved from Army Group B to elsewhere was in large part due to the Rezhev salient battles, fighting at Leningrad and the stalemated battle around Novorossyks. In theory, the Germans had enough manpower on paper to replace the Stalingrad losses for 6th Army. Here again, Stalin and his generals understood the importance of attacking everywhere along the front. The Rezhev meatgrinder had profound impacts upon the German Wehrmacht as did the other battles mentioned here simultaneously all along the front. It really was a matter of too much attrition of German manpower everywhere in total aggregate terms for the German Wehrmacht commanders and staff officers to get their replacement priorities correct. It is almost impossible when facing grim hard battles along a huge front over a thousand miles long to get all the logistical and manpower replacement issues correct due to constant changing circumstances of pitched battles. We know these assessments are correct because German infantry divisions went from THREE regiments of infantry down to TWO infantry regiments at about this time in 1942/43. The German high command replaced the third regiment of infantry with more artillery units. This substitution of a regiment of infantry with artillery units meant a defensive war for the Wehrmacht for the rest of the war. Germany lost its extra reserves of manpower for major offensives in 1942/early 1943 from the aggregate attrition from ALL the battles ccomined on the Eastern front. The Soviets were experts at mass producing infantry rifle divisions. Lenin or some other Revolutionary leader said in warfare that quantity has a quality all its own.

Hey I just wanted to let you know this is an amazing video. Really well put together and a great explanation. I am impressed!

According to the stories of the Romanian veterans from Stalingrad, the Germans had massed numerous troops in the city and in its vicinity. The 3rd and 4th Romanian armies took over the alignments of some German armies, to the north and south of the city, respectively. The Romanian generals protested against the length of the assigned alignments, which allowed the maintenance of a single line of defense and only in some places a second line. Without reserves and without the real cooperation of the German army, the sectors of the two armies were chosen by the Soviets to break the front.

Army group center was given priority because the Soviets were planning a huge offensive operation mars In that sector. They barely blunted that offensive which was to be the main offensive, it was the biggest soviet defeat in offensive action during the war

Hi Tik I read a bunch a source but my think is the army group center have the most force reinforcement because repeatedly the german got ignore by being getting gain more then encircle soviet troop at army group north so no effective encirclement at group north in 1941 and the big salient like a sword . This plagued the german campaign in 1942 .

TIK I would love you’re opinion on this... had Palus not gone into Stalingrad but simply concentrated on cutting off the Volga south of Stalingrad they could have achieved the goals of keeping the Soviets oil starved, being able to throw up a impregnable defensive line from army group B to army group central enabling them to enforce army group A to take the Caucuses...always wondered would love to have you’re opinion.

Army Group Centre was dealing with a very aggressive soviet army bent on dislodging them from the Rzhev salient. The possibility of an envelopment in the center was a real concern. After all, most of the soviet army was concentrated there. Even Stalin was still thinking that the invasion of Moscow was the main objective of the Wehrmacht at the time.

Another reason why so many reinforcements to the north and centre.are.the Soviet offensives of August there. It made sense to send reinforcements there, in addition to the lack of logistical capacity in the south. At least they should have keep 2 more panzer divisions near Rostov just in case. Just read Glantz book on the Rhez November offensive and is amazing how Germans keep pouring tier 1 reinforcements and finally stopped the soviets on their tracks.

Thank u for bibliography n links...

My general sense is that the German High Command felt that the main action was in the center near Moscow and that the southern region was a bit of a sideshow (also hard to supply logistically) to the main act in the center/north. They obviously misjudged the situation and by October tried to correct it but it was too little, too late; typical misjudging the situation in a chaotic and stressful environment.

I accept your detailed analysis. Great job. But may it have been nothing more than that it was Hitler who made the Caucasus a priority and Halder, having contempt for Hitler's military prowess, decided that it was not? If they wanted to supply Paulus they could have. After all, there were extended supply lines for all the German armies in the East. And what was the relationship of Paulus to his higher command? Were there personal clashes that precluded someone helping him?

Never pass by a video with the name TIK. As Toni tiger says... They're great!