It will turn out badly now as RU-vid destroys the small producers who made the channel in total something wonderful. It is as close to UNTV as there is for all the instructional and educational videos. Inspire, educate & entertain. My poverty is that I cannot give, not that I do not have just enough to survive. I am after all from hippie as a member become Beat.
Military History Visualized love the channel & the info very educational videos about ww2 sounds like germany was in it for a fast paced war to win, but not a long drawn out war which ultimately lead to their loss. By not mass producing things like planes, tanks & ships even though the military equipment was very well built for war. I might support your channel in the future when am more able to do so :-)
codybroken Another was (with paraphrasing): "If a British plane appears, we duck. If an American plane appears, everyone ducks. If the Luftwaffe appear, nobody ducks."
On the training front, experienced allied pilots were pulled from the front so they could train up and coming pilots. German pilots stayed fighting the whole time. That's why the list of WWII fighter aces is completely dominated by German pilots. The great pilots spent their whole time shooting down the enemy, and no time training other pilots to be more like them.
This policy of not resting squadrons inevitably reduced combat effectiveness. By the end of the Battle of Britain various staffel were well under strength, compared to the British who withdrew any squadron that took heavy loses and let them integrate reinforcements away from the main battle.
"Lets take a look at how this formidable German bird got its wing clipped, and ultimately was reduced to a featherless carcass on the side of the road between London and Moscow. " (LOL... damn I love his commentary!)
If anything I was demonstrating a shortcoming on my part, not being able to discern "carcass." The "punch line" commentary was meant to be praise: his line was so good that even without the most important word it was still funny.
I'm very grateful there was no navy air arm, Karl Donitz had a better head on his shoulders than Goering and I'm grateful there wasn't better replacement pilot training, an FW 190 ambushed my grandfather on his way home, if the pilot was better trained, I wouldn't exist!!
All of these problems just come from the fact that Germany is a smaller country with much less resources than the Allies. The Germans and Japanese only had enough resources and man power to win a quick war. In a long drawn out war the Germans and Japanese industrial leaders knew it would be almost impossible to win.
pretty much this. germany had its chance, but anything longer than 5 years it was never going to win. the allies had too much sheer manpower it could turn into production
resources yes man power no germany was the 2° most populous country in europe (after the ussr)and after the bitter loss in ww1 there was no lack of voluntiers to fight for germany and japan in 1940 had a population of 73 million altou not as high as other asian countries japanese people were fanatical for their emperor so the number of available man power was huge plus these two axis countries(lets not include italy because...well poor italy)as totalitarian regimes could easily impose ridiculous conscription law that would have no backlash from the population something "democracies" could never do ,and those conscription law would even further incress the available man power ofc this would dastricly hurt the quality of your units but hey the soviets had this doctrine of human wave assault with no care for losses and we know how that ended for germany basicly this huge and pointless comment was to explain something you probaly dont even care about...hope you enjoy it ps: sorry i have terrible spelling and grammar
bernardobiritiki yes Germany does (and did) have a large population, however the population of Germany is nothing compared to the combined populations of UK, USSR, and US with which it had to contend. Don't forget that democratic countries could and did impose strict conscription laws, the UK for example had conscription. The Germans could not fight a war of attrition, as the geography of Germany means it would be reliant almost exclusively on its own resources during war time, and so there is only so long Germany could go on for before inevitably losing to factions that could gather resources from all around the World.
But Germany got a better battle position. All they had to do after France was avoiding war with the soviets and just defending europe from everything which comes from the atlantic.
To add, that German aircraft production as the war went on, relied more upon ,conscripted foreign and even slave labour...hence doing a much as the individual had to do to survive ,lacking incentive to do more, perhaps even indulging in sabotage. Where, the main allies had a more willing, and paid workforce,those two reasons,along with patriotic duty, was enough to make production far more effective.
@@thenevadadesertrat2713 because they where pushing everything they got to put as many planes on the air because they where losing bad, but those planes are universaly considered as shit and at that point the luftwaffe had basically disapeared
@@thenevadadesertrat2713 Because Speer made German industry actually efficient by 1943 - 44. but it was too late. Had he got the ministry of armament in mid 1930s as second job... many things regarding supply vehicules would have turned different.
+MagzTV THANK you for sharing this mate. Awesome video and historical summery of the Luftwaffe's shortcomings during WW2. Good stuff, Glad Magz told us about this channel...
A German general during WW2 remarked, "The reason the American army does so well in war, is that war is chaos and the American army practices chaos on a daily basis".
Certima My (10yr old) dad saw a he 110 go over the house low and the soldiers in a gun pit in a neaby field didn't shoot because there were no orders. Most of war is amateurs blundering about randomly.
Time and time again it is pointed out, that back then German command structure was a mess plus some of the best equipment (like the newest tanks) was given not to armed forces, who new how to fight, button SS, who, while fanatically loyal and ready to sacrifice their lives, sucked at achieving goals, so in a way it's a miracle they held out as long as they did. And who's fault was it? Hitler's, as he was afraid of military leaders becoming too influential and deposing him. So, what are the chances of winning a war, when your own supreme commander is one of your worst enemies?
+Peter Smollen Would you happen to know of a still published book that contain that short story? If not still published then any anthologies containing it in case I chance upon it in a used books store.
+SlyPearTree I recall reading years ago that Hitler placed the blame for the defeat squarely on the German people in his last days and made the excuse (despite his meddling having an adverse effect on the war effort) that if the German people couldn't survive what he'd got them into and win then they didn't deserve the great future he had planned for them or even to survive... Not so different from prevailing command ideals from WW1... if soldiers break and quit under the stress of bombardment and hellish conditions the fault is their weakness, for which they must be held accountable and punished, and not our own ridiculous expectations.
I am going to share this with my brother - US Air Force retired. I never asked him how many hours of training he had before he went into combat in Viet Nam. I will now.
My brother (retired with rank of Captain) no longer has his log book but he estimates that he had 200+ hours before he left the USA for Vietnam. BTW I was very uplifted by the stories about Wehrmacht POWs in the USA. They worked for German-American farmers to raise the crops that fed millions. The farmers stuffed them with food also. The Wehrmacht soldiers were paid the same as USA soldiers of the same rank. They also brought culture to the USA i.e. art, choral music and soccer. The soldiers were organized by their non-commission officers. Only the SS caused problems by beating up soldiers that were friendly to Americans. So the SS were sent to a separate camp and then life was better for the rest. It seems the Wehrmacht in the USA won the "Charm offensive". One thing I have learned singing in choirs - leadership makes a big difference. Looks like the non-commissioned Wehrmacht officers were better leaders than the Third Reich. What do you know about these officers ?
thank you! And thank you to your brother for his service. I knew very little about that part, but as far as I know quite many German veterans immigrated to Canada and the USA, some claim that this was due to the great treatment as POWs, but I have no real data nor read any quality article about it. About the officers and NCOs, the Germans were limited for a 100 000 men army prior to the nazis taking over in 1933, but the Army always planned for expansion, thus only the best of the best got in since 1918.
The first book I read in 2013 was "A German Odyssey" by Helmut Hörner. The book was based on the diary he kept while a POW in the USA after 1945. Helmut was a foot soldier and among the first to march into Russia. He was captured by the French east of Normandy. Helmut showed much mental strength and resourcefulness. Happily he returned to his wife and son in Germany. I was totally surprised by his account. So I have read several other books about American WW2 POWs since then. I have asked my family, friends and neighbors if they knew that 360 thousand Wehrmacht POWs stayed in the USA during and after the war. They too are totally surprised. Apparently news about the soldiers was censored , but in the last 20 years there are new publications.
Fascinating. It all links in with the poor allocation of funds for last ditch aircraft too. The difference, in the end, was that while the Allies, in particular Britain and the USA, were focused on winning the war those in command in Germany were playing politics and playing favourites. It characterised their entire war.
A great summation of how you can have the best aces, the best airplanes, the best designers and the best technology, and still lose an air war (and consequently every other part of the war along with it). When I was a young kid, I used to look at pictures of the Fw200 and be impressed. I never found out until much later how incredibly fragile it was (so much so that some of them would _break in half_ on landing from routine combat missions, not even from battle damage); nothing like a Lancaster or a B-17 at all.
Yup. Like they say, "It's the economy, stupid." The "mixed" economies found in fascism are more prone to corruption, nepotism and inefficiency than either a free market or even a planned economy. In capitalism, the industrialists stuff their pockets, in communism, the bureaucrats. In fascism, both.
Wasn't it a militarized civilian aircraft? Or, at least a purposefully lightly built long range scout? Kind of apples and oranges to compare the durability of those designed to take flak with those that spend most of their time wandering over the ocean away from enemy fire.
The reason the German economy did so well in the peacetime was because of its perfect blend of free market and interventionism. Natural monopolies were nationalised, and the market was left to deal with everything else. At the very same time, Nationalistic/traditionalist propaganda was employed along with a national network of labour camps that cut corruption to near 0. The German failure was due to a shortage of rubber, oil, and alloys - all sourced from abroad, and all cut off in the course of the war. Combine that with the resource and industrial behemoth of the US, and it's quite clear that it was neither Hitler's nor the Wermacht's fault - Hitler's enemies simply had much more living space with which to grow their war efforts. A quick knockout blow was necessary, and Hitler was on the right track in terms of that - if England had been cooperative then we wouldn't be living in the dystopian aftermath of the victory of bad ideas we do today.
To be fair in a few short years they stopped having the best tech.The Brits had better radar, their enigma code was broken,the Spitfire and Mustang were awesome, etc etc etc I agree, I may marvel at the Tiger for example but in reality it was something that took ages to make and constantly broke down while the Soviets and Americans were producing 10 tanks at the same time that didnt break down that much.
All these videos tend to confirm that all aspects of the German war effort were geared towards quick victories and a short war. As soon as the early quick victories, Poland, Holland, Belgium, and France ended and the wars of attrition started with first Britain and then Russia and America Germany's economy nor its armed forces could cope. They were simply worn down.
A war of attrition would have been untenable with any economy the Germans decided to employ since as soon as the USA/UK entered the war, vital natural resources from abroad would become unavailable. The only option was to reach a compromise with the UK in order to secure rubber, and have an incredible success with Op.Barbarossa/Case Blue in order to secure oil. A war of attrition was not on the table for German High Command as soon as war with the Russians became unavoidable (and it certainly did).
I clicked on this one from a recent MHV video. Your progress as a creator is apparent. This video isn't bad by any means but it's clear that your skills have massively improved. Keep it up
I had this video playing in the background while doing other stuff around the house and that ending just completely grabbed my attention. "nothing more than a featherless, headless chicken..." That is both harsh and quite a mental image. XD Love your videos. I just discovered your channel and definitely will be watching more episodes. Love the accent too, by the way.
I shudder to imagine what might have happened if the kriegsmarine had entered the war with 200 G3Ms, 50 H6Ks, a reliable supply of type 91 torpedoes, and a couple Japanese advisors on their use. Given what the Condors did historically and what the Japanese did with them in the South Pacific, I suspect that they could have done terrible damage to the North Atlantic convoys. It reminds me of something Jon Parshall said during his talk with Drachinifel about Midway. World War II was a war of systems, and the allies won in no small part because they had the better system.
David Irving (and I am aware about his persona) wrote an excellent book "Die Tragödie der deutschen Luftwaffe", which was mainly based on the diaries of Erhard Milch, field marshal an production leader of the Luftwaffe. His conlusion is cementing the position about Udet, as one of the main culprits of the failing Luftwaffe, which actually started with being outproduced by the British as early as 1940. The BF 109 started to be outdated too and it took until August 1941 for the FW190 to be introduced. The BF 109 stood in service even until end of the war, imagine that this plane was introduced as early as 1937. Irving argues, that the Luftwaffe was hampered by a lack of technical innovations and some the engineers like Willy Messerschmitt were quite the prideful lot. The ME 262 came at a very late stage. Also the Germans had no viable strategic bomber, while on the other side, very good designs were introduced like the Mosquito. Aside from that, many materials were sparse too like for example nonsynthetic rubber, rare minerals and metals, aside from the ever important fuel. My best take from Irvings book was the detail given on resources, production and engineering.
I would argue that the failures of the Luftwaffe should be divided into two distinct categories: Internal and external factors. I think MHV correctly identifies several weaknesses, but the Luftwaffe was hardly to blame for such external factors as the deficiencies in the Nazi economic system and only partly to blame for the military doctrinal weakness which saw it as fulfilling two major roles (air superiority and "flying artillery", i.e. tactical bombing) and one minor one (paradrops), while omitting or neglecting such tasks as sea operations and especially strategic bombing (I'm surprised this wasn't mentioned). However, the faulty logistics and training system was obviously something the Luftwaffe could have improved without too much trouble. One thing that also needs to be factored in is that during the Battle of Britain, German airmen who bailed out would become POWs while British airmen could be back at their bases, sometimes within hours and certainly within days if they were otherwise uninjured. This actually strengthens MHV's argument for a seaborne air campaign which would have substantially evened this British advantage as most airmen, British or German, would've had to be picked up by rescue craft or planes.
strategic bombing is omitted, because most people miss that strategic bombing 1940 is completely different from 1944. (Although I should have addressed this in the video, but at the time I made this video I hadn't fully grasped it myself.) Similarly as a Panzer I is different from a Panzer V or VI. Thus, 1) in 1940 the Luftwaffe could conduct strategic bombing mission on a similar or higher level than all other powers, 2) later on a strategic bomber force wasn't necessary, because the Wehrmacht bleed dry on the Eastern Front, not to mention missing the industrial capabilities, resources, manpower and training facilities. Also the nazi economy wasn't that inefficient as long believed, see Adam Tooze Wages of Destruction; in short: Speer was a salesman and everyone from the nazis up to his Allied interrogators never really questioned his statements nor those of his statistician.
Wow, thanks for your well-argued and quick response and I can see why you left out strategic bombing, though, as far as I know, the British in particular were already planning for large scale strategic bombing and their delay in implementing it was simply because they (wisely) prioritised Fighter Command over Bomber Command during their desperate scramble to rearm. To my knowledge, strategic bombing was simply not prioritised doctrinally by the Luftwaffe or the military thinkers in the Third Reich which saw the Luftwaffe as, basically, the companion of the Wehrmacht (matching your point about the lack of naval aviation too). Btw, I was not claiming that the Nazi economy was inefficient as such, but that it suffered from a level of harmful personal rivalries and arbitrary opinions as to what was to be necessary features that didn't hamper the other combatants to the same degree. Your example of Udet's dive bombing fetish is one of the more notorious cases, and I know you've mentioned the (uncorrected) faults with the Tiger elsewhere and you could add the fact that the development of the StG 44 was almost derailed by Hitler's antagonism as another classic story. What compounded such problem was the constant search for "perfect" solutions and diffusion of efforts, rather than maximising output of equipment that was "good enough" as done by the US with its Sherman tank and the USSR with the T-34. In both the latter cases, the US and USSR decided to simply improve their existing tanks, thus benefiting from being able to use their established production lines, instead of attempting to replace them with entirely new designs, necessitating retooling of production lines (i.e. loss of efficiency) as well as the usual "teething problems" that follows any introduction of a new design. Also, the Nazi regime was extremely loath and slow to mobilise the economy for total war (e.g. by "drafting" women to work in the factories, shifting to a rigorous command economy, or implementing strict rationing), leaving gaps between demand and production that the Nazi regime would then have to scramble to patch up through ad hoc initiatives. By contrast, the Allies immediately instituted the kind of "war socialism" that had been developed during WWI (ironically, especially by Imperial Germany, isolated as it was from the world markets).
yeah, the Luftwaffe was mainly oriented towards being a supportive arm for the Army (Heer). common misconception the Wehrmacht is Army + Air Force + Navy (Heer, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine). The point is the non-focus on strategic bombers didn't contribute to the demise of the Luftwaffe or even prevented an earlier failure. I doubt that they could have fielded a bomber force strong enough to beat the RAF in 1940 and even if so, I doubt Sealion would have any chance. Well, Tooze argues that Germany was already in 1940 quite well mobilized in terms of industry. The focus on "perfect" equipment is probably a bit misleading seeing that the PzIV was main workhorse of the Germans. Yes, Germany lacked mass production capabilities early on, but those were not the result of not mobilizing properly, but more of Germany was fully industrialized in general.
You're right of course, the correct nomenclature is Heer, my bad. As for strategic bombing, I'm not so much thinking of it in terms of making Sea Lion possible, I agree that it was an extremely dubious prospect from the start, but instead as an attritional weapon to be employed against not only Britain but especially the USSR and its production facilities. Of course, in terms of mass production, Germany was somewhat handicapped by having to rearm "in stealth", but it still had a huge production capacity and could draw on the output of its conquered territories as well. As for strict rationing, Britain was well prepared and instituted such a system immediately and tried to employ women in as many non-combat roles as possible. Germany was far slower in taking similar measures, but was able to alleviate the labour issues by drawing on the manpower of its conquered territories (and using POWs, despite the 1929 Geneva Convention banning this). My point about total war is that the German war economy was somewhat less systematic, compared to its opponents', and that in addition it did not focus quickly enough on building up a huge production capacity of, for example, a few, standard tanks. You're right that the PzIV was the work horse, but consider how much more efficient it would've been to pour a large part of the resources spent on the various "perfect" new tank models (especially the Tiger and Panther) into boosting the production of improved PzIV's. Instead, Germany had multiple production lines churning out multiple tank models, several of which were really "works in progress" which mean they were plagued by the sort of teething problems you always get in these cases. The StuGs were really a great counter example as they were "good enough" and could be produced using existing production lines which was especially useful when the original tank models the lines were set up to produce were becoming obsolete, such as the PzIII or the Pz38(t). Another counter example was arguably the StG 44, once it met with not only Hitler's approval, but his enthusiastic support. By contrast, the pursuit of the V2 would eventually create a "Wunderwaffe", but at a staggering cost and too late to actually matter. We can only be thankful that these resources were not spent on mass producing the far cheaper V1s.
Excellent video. My one criticism is that whilst you picked-up on many areas where the Luftwaffe's management fell short, you missed one key factor which really overshadowed all others. This was that the Luftwaffe was originally seen as a purely tactical force - and was equipped accordingly. This was why it fell short when used strategically such as in the BoB and UK Blitz. In contrast, the RAF always aspired to have a strategical capability, even if, during the early part of the war it was very ineffective. However, from the middle of the war onwards, the RAF had a huge strategic effect, and, aided by the USAAF, not only affected general war production in Germany, but also affected fuel-supplies and sucked-in German forces for Reich Defence that would otherwise have been used at the battle-fronts. The German leadership never really got out of this 'tactical' mindset - which was fine for a blitzkrieg - in wholly unsuited for a wider, longer war. I suggest this factor should be right at the top of the list.
Thank you! James Corum actually argues against it and states that the Luftwaffe was capable of strategic operations in 1940. He got a point there, 1940 is not 1943 or 1944. For 1940 the Luftwaffe had strategic capabilities, but even if you disagree on that part. The lack of strategic bombing capabilities didn't doom the Luftwaffe at all. So this is actually outside of the scope of the video. If anything it would have been the error of the Luftwaffe to skip on bombers for the most part and switch to defensive (fighter) strategy instead of pursuing an offensive (bomber) strategy. Something I touch a bit in a newer video, here: ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-JSIgldbu5QU.html
Well, the lack of a strategic 'mindset' was a big factor. For example, for daylight operations, it's primary frontline fighter, the '109, lacked long-range drop tanks during the BoB, which meant that the daylight bombers were left undefended, as Galland himself often bemoaned. This was a serious, basic error. Also - even during night operations, where the German electronic navigation aids were at that time farsuperior to the British, and allowed quite accurate bombing, the smaller aircraft lacked hitting power - and target assignment was also poor. Just to give an example - over 50% of the UK's Spitfires as well as many Lancasters, were produced in the Shadow Factory at Castle Bromwich in Birmingham. This was well within range of the Luftwaffes HeIII - and this was well known to the Luftwaffe - and yet Castle Bromwich was hardly every bombed, and then only by single bombers.... Likewise the Austin Shadow Factory at Longbridge, which was even bigger, producing Hurricanes, Stirlings, Battles, guns, tanks, trucks and ammunition... All this at a time when the RAF were lucky to get bombs within several MILES of it's targets... Many German bombs fell on Birmingham's city centre - where there were no factories, so the effort was wasted. Had those bombs fallen on he aircraft factories, the net effects would have been serious. However, lets remember this isn't all about equipment, it's much more than that, it's about the 'mindset' of the Luftwaffe's leadership - and that WAS primarily Tactical....and remained so. I'll grant you that in terms of the title of the video, it is open to interpretation. If we imagine, for example, that the Luftwaffe's bomber force had been used primarily at night, and had been used to disable fighter-production before adequate dispersed-production had taken place....then Britain would have run-out of fighters quickly, and the Luftwaffe would have had the opportunity to gain daylight air superiority, especially with drop-tank equipped '109's. That would have been a game-changer at the time, when Britain was very weak. Ultimately, Hitlers failure to finish-off Britain when he had the ideal opportunity, doomed any chance of ultimate success in that conflict. It's a truism of war, business - and life, that Strategy alway comes before Tactics.
Once again a fabulous video. I have watched many of the vids published by this author, and his ability to see things clearly is astonishing. I have watched many documentaries on WW2, but this guy is in a league of his own. Perhaps even better than Robert Citino. This video, once again, highlights the German inability in WW2 to understand and appreciate the grand strategy required to win out.
Good series my friend! I've studied a lot about WW2 from the allied side (Canada in particular), so hearing this analysis of the German forces is a totally different and interesting take.
When it wasn't breaking in two :P There were structural weaknesses, probably caused by the huge fuel tanks they shoehorned in the fuselage to give them range. There were probably reasons that they didn't strengthen the fuselage, undercarriage.
Man you deserve an award.very knowledgeable and helpful for beginners and experts as well in world war 2 history study.but the ending was even more perfect.."featherless,headless chicken" lol..feel sorry for the luftwaffe which could have been glorious but was doomed in the end..
Thank you for a good summary. In essence, the Luftwaffe and supporting industry were build around short tactical campaigns, were slow to build up to a total war, were overwhelmed by Allied production and their only hope of competing, technical superiority, failed. IMO it would be worth emphasising at the end that the Germans had thousands of aircraft at factories because the Allied bomber offensive had so restricted fuel and transportation that the Luftwaffe didn't have the pilots to fly them. Even then, the quality of pilots collecting aircraft and encounters with US fighter sweeps meant that a large proportion were destroyed in delivery.
You're amazing I've watches loads of your videos so far and I'm very impressed no bias opinions just plain all solid facts and great explanation count me as a sub.
You're very right about Germany not assisting its allies. I know Hungary asked for licence production of the Bf109 in 1941, but was refused. Later an agreement was reached and some hundreds of Bf109s and Me 210s were made. Also Daimler Benz engines were produced, but it was too little and too late.
+W Schnaufer All Hail to the Mighty Jingles! Supreme Overlord of Life! Leader of the Great Jingles Expeditionary Force! Bringer of Peace, Hunter of Scumbags and Giver of Salt Mines!!!
OUTSTANDING dissertation. I am a military history NUT myself and just SUBSCRIBED. you may mention it in other works BUT I think that THE reason the Germans did NOT win the Battle of Britain was 1) NOT taking out the English "Chain Home" radar system early on which allowed the RAF to stay on the ground and only "scramble" when German raids were defected. 2) NOT finishing off the RAF airfields early on in the battle and instead, after England bombed Berlin (and Hitler over-reacted), targeting cities like London for "terror bombing" and 3) NOT having the fighters with the range OR the bombers with the payload necessary to WIN the fight
My father was in the RCAF in WWII. He was fixing planes very well within a year of joining up. They did that by simplifying the methods of repair. They learned how to run a series of tests to determine the rough general area of the problem, then they took out and replaced the whole unit! But how else were they going to train an 18 year old to be a competent mechanic by the age of 19? My dad said that he did not really learn about engines until we moved to California and he had to fix the car himself!
love the series. Especially the german accent! It makes the commentary not feel so one sided. Good clear analysis of how policy, planning, resources, leadership, are every bit as important as "boots on the ground" in the conduct of war on a modern scale.
Was the sponsor of this video “Spitfire ale”? “Downed all over Kent, just like the Luftwaffe”. The content was very interesting btw thanks, or should i say...very palatable ;)
The American aircraft industry was run by genius tycoons like Leroy Grumman who could deliver scores of thousands of planes without some aviation minister bossing them around. They also made HUGE investments in R&D early on, before large production numbers forced them to commit to a final design with minor tweaks. The R-2800 engine is probably the best example, a 1939 engine that was still better than anything the Germans had in 1945.
Just imagine, having tens of thousands of plane in the early stages of the war and only having few hundreds operational planes in the later stages of the war.
Thank you! Always appreciate your descriptive, technical insight to the topics that you present. This video includes a stark contrast from the myth of a superhuman war machine of WW2 to the contributing facts that lead to their ultimate defeat. It can seem a destiny - but as you laid out, there are facts (details) that explain what happened. Under your technical accounts, you list some of the human failures that lead to defeat. These details (supported by facts) show that foresight, commitment o of resources, valuing allies and escaping the boundaries of hubris can enable victory - while being blind leads to a demise. Thank you for the lesson!!
Man, these things are like eating peanuts, once you start watching them you can't stop. They are highly informative well researched, and pleasantly presented, very easy to watch. Keep making them and I'll keep watching them.They are like Cliffs notes foe WW2. Thanks for the effort!!!
He did not address the Italians in Ethiopia nor the Vichy French Navy in Morocco. Italy had 300,000 troops and in Egypt England had 30,000 troops. England repulsed two attacks and the Italians quit trying to take over Egypt. The Vichy gave up in less than 48 hours after it was attacked. When North Africa was controlled by the Allies then the shuttle bombing began, resources that Germany needed were basically halted such as chromium. If Germany had controlled Africa then the war would have lasted longer. The outcome may have been the same or armistice or peace signing could have happened.
Goring also stopped Jets like the ME-262 from having priority over his "superior" prop fighters as the ME-262 could have been introduced in maybe late 1943 instead of in june 1944. Good video, I just found your channel today I enjoy your work! :)
I'm surprised you didn't touch on another crucial training deficiency in the Luftwaffe: skilled pilots and commanders were seldom rotated out. The Luftwaffe's best pilots stayed in frontline combat units basically until they were killed or captured, a system very different from the US Army Air Forces or even the German Army. The US Army Air Forces would take experienced combat pilots from frontline units to support training new pilots, ensuring institutional knowledge was built up and skills could be passed on. Not only were the pilots given less training time, the quality of the training was notably inferior because the Luftwaffe aces pretty much took their knowledge to the grave.
+Salt0fTheEarth good point, but I think it is more of a detail than a structural deficit. If you consider how little attention the Germans spent on training, it is not surprising that they used this approach... I mean they sent a lot of trainers into Stalingrad, where artillery attacked the airfields...
I remember reading that Gerhard Milch investigated delays in providing new aircraft from the factories. He found that otherwise airworthy planes were being delayed because their HAND-SEWN leather seats took so much time. That was but a single item he was had to correct. Udet had made a real mess of things.
Im really like your channel keep up the good work you have opened up some areas that may have influenced the war. The Germans were ill equipped for the battle of Brittain it's short ranged aircraft were designed for war in continental europe. Pilot training was the key in late 1943 the mustangs started reaching theater with their better training and long endurance the Americans really started driving the nails into an already stressed luftwafffe.
Great analysis. Very interesting thatyou have a point on the pilot training. Usualy the historiansconsider just the airplanenumbers and their pure performance, but forget the importance of pilot quality or of the good logistic support.
Finn here, somewhat history nerd of Finnish Air Forces during WWII. The way I understood it when it came to German engines supplied (at least to Finnish forces) was that German industry could not even keep up with own demand, so it would be understandable that allies get to pick up scraps... As a side-note, there was a Finnish version of the BF-109 made in Finland, nicknamed "Puu-Mersu" (Wooden Mercedes) that was basically ME-109 made out of wood. Had all the characteristics of ME-109, but rate of climb was greater. The thing that stopped it from going to production was the lack of engines.
Daniel Eyre A stupid comparison. Mexicans and Americans speak different languages. Austrians and Germans speak the same language, although there are differences in dialect.
But Britain had a smaller population and land area and had to transport its resources across U boat infested waters. Yet it out produced Germany even while being bombed and when it wasn't bombing Germany back in any serious way
@@IrishCarney The Germans made the mistake of Bombing Residential and populated areas to say the British people, and focused less on the Industrial and production areas. However, Their key advantage was Oil. No matter what, Britain had the longevity to win, solely for Oil. The Germans couldn't run their Air, Subs, and Panzers effectively for a long war on their oil supply, Hence Operation Barbarossa was put in effect to gain the Ural Oil Fields, as Germany Expected the Soviets to Give up like France, had the Nazis taken Moscow. Only then, could the Germans have taken out GBR, through a one-sided attrition. The Brits never out produced the Germans on Armor, and slowly defeated the Lutwaffe. Luckily, their standing fleet was enough to help them hold out longer. And, in real life, it was two-sided attrition because the Germans never had sufficient reserves or trade to continue a massive war, especially as an offensive war which obviously takes more manpower and oil to run, two things Germany didn't have. Not to mention, in production, the Germans were going for Quality over Quantity, so they never had near the numbers they needed, and same with their population. AND once the Soviets broke the line, more forces had to be diverted East, so a D-Day scenario was slightly More Practical.
@@cameronbowshlagger2722 Britain didn't have oil either. That had to be transported across U boat infested waters too. As for quality over quantity, that became the German focus against the Soviets especially once the tide turned in the East. But that wasn't their perception or plan against the British, whose planes were as good as the Germans or better. You're right it was a mistake to bomb London, but as MHV and Military Aviation History have shown, it's probably untrue that Germany could have beaten the RAF if it stuck with hitting airfields. The Brits were able to do quick repairs and anyway could use just about any grassy field for their fighters (unlike modern jets that need long concrete runways), and again were just more efficient and productive in their aircraft industry. The Germans' best chance against Britain was probably to focus on the radar installations and especially the ports and shipping to help the effort to choke off the incoming food, oil, ammunition, and raw materials. Drawing the RAF out over the Channel and the North Sea would almost cancel the British attrition advantage over British soil where downed Britons could fight the next day but downed Germans were captured. Similarly the Germans should have skipped white-elephant projects like the Bismarcks and for the same resources had many more fast USS Atlanta style light cruisers as commerce raiders. Outrun the big British ships or ward them off with a torpedo or two, and use the dual purpose guns to outgun the convoy-guarding destroyers and escort carriers and shoot down any aircraft. As for Germany and oil, they'd have been better off using Romanian natural gas (which was wasted and just flared off on site) and German coal to make methanol as a gasoline substitute and di methyl ether as a diesel substitute, for their tanks, fighter planes, coastal defense ships etc which ate the vast majority of their fuel. Use oil only when range was crucial like long range U boats, commerce raiders, and naval patrol aircraft. Coal to gasoline is a much more expensive and complicated process than coal to methanol, and natural gas to methanol is ridiculously cheap and easy. Methanol also is ultra high octane, and the Germans were stuck throughout the war with miserably low octane gasoline, harming their fighter performance compared to the high test aviation gasoline the West used that effectively added a lot of horsepower.
@@IrishCarney You know what, that was some real shit you just said. I still hold the point that no matter what, sooner or later, the Germans would run out of either Men or Fuel, or both. No matter what, the Soviets were going to win the East, so Germany still would lose, but a German to British Invasion sounds more possible in your description.
Leadership, or a lack of, was exactly what defeated the German war effort. Luckily for the Allies, Hitler and some of his cronies were so wrapped up in their own egos to listen to the advice of better military minds at their disposal. Bad decisions coupled with production numbers vastly inferior to that of the Allies made the war more dire for Germany as time dragged on. Hitler's major mistakes were declaring war against the US and then invading Russia. Again, leadership was the thing that doomed the Axis Powers in WW II.
When did Hitler declared war on the US? And Hitler attecked Soviets like a hour before they would strike. War with USSR would happen anyway and Germans decided to strike first because they knew their offensive is better and they underestimated Russian resolve.
After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and the US declared war against Japan. Hitler was then treaty bound with Japan to declare war on the US. The invasion of Russia opened up a second front for the Nazis and they simply didn't have the ability to close either in a timely manner.
While I agree with much of your insinuations, poor leadership from the Axis command did officially bring the US into the war at the end of 1941. Germany should have tried to finish off England before opening the Russian Front either by securing a treaty or invasion. The invasion of Russia was Hitler's worst blunder of the war; the Germans simply didn't have the men and supplies to fight in all directions! This is what i said initially.
Paul Simmons finnish off UK? How finnish off? They haven't even weakend them. They had no way to get to the Great Britain and loyal India could provide endless manpower while British industry and allies supply them.
I also like the German accent! Also one thing to note, Luftwaffe made the first ever jet fighter...shame the leadership failed them so badly. Good analysis overall + 1 sub
Adding to the logistical part, germany also failed to standardise planes like the 109 and the 190, there were too many different variants in active service adding to the logistical nightmare. Also if the doras were put into production eariler they could have theoretically completely crushed the allies bombing campaign.
The allies trained pilots as dedicated fighter or bomber etc pilots. Luftwaffe pilots were expected to do the lot and could be assigned to a completely different role where they lacked any experience.
Thanks for this, and particularly its conciser (A word I'm coining here, to mean: more concise) length. I was watching other WW2 history vids and they mentioned the state of the Luftwaffe at the end of the war and I wanted a refresher for how/why it had diminished.
nice one about the Luftwaffe maintenance organisation, the training organisation and the lack of a fleet air arm which made cooperation with the navy an impossibility.
Soarin Skies that's not really fair. If you consider the size of germany. Vs how much area it conquered. The capability of this little country. The innovation. I'm glad they lost. But their achievements amaze me.
@@hollythorn9004 overthrew a few small underdeveloped nations and had one large victory handed to them by incompetent and disorganised French generals and politicians. from that point onward it's taken to pound town by Britain and later the Soviets. That's not much of an accomplishment, rather insane overconfidence quickly paid for. And the "Innovation" is very overstated. There was hardly any field of research Germany had a significant advantage in and most "inventions" credited to the German last effort wonder weapon programs were ramshackle contraptions of interwar research. The only truly advanced field of research would have been rocketry, and that by at best 6-18 months
Wow, I appreciate the information and how you explain the core points in detail. You speak brilliant english, Probably better than me... And im australian.:)
this german accent is cool but also sometimes complicates listening I dont know if its not possible for german to pronounce words like world, war not as vorld, var?
Not surrender, no, but "Terms". Most British senior politicians stated that they would have accepted decent terms if offered. Even the ex-king Edward was a bit of a Nazi sympathizer, IIRC. Winston Churchill led an active and adventurous life, which could have easily have ended before 1940. It's a little scary to think of how things might have turned out without his particular personality in the mix. His portrayal of Britain as the underdog/bulldog struck a sympathetic chord in the US, at a time when most Americans were still hoping to stay out of yet another European blood-bath.
During the peak of the Blitz, RAF official reports stated that if German pressure continued, the RAF would be incapable of combat in the next one or two weeks. And just at that time, Goring ordered the Luftwaffe to switch priority from airbases and other RAF installations, and focus on bombing London and other cities. That switch enabled the RAF to recover and in the end defeat the Luftwaffe. Now, had there not been an idiot like Goring in command, the Luftwaffe wouldn't change it's plans just at the moment when they started paying off, and would likely have a naval air arm ready to fight. With complete aerial superiority and a functioning naval air arm, the Royal Navy would be easily incapacitated within a month, since it's undefended ports and ships would be easy targets. With supply lines severed and no navy and air force to defend against German invasion, even Churchill would have accepted terms. If not, Britain would have fallen to German troops anyway. That doesn't mean Germany would instantly win the war, since the conquest of Britain would take time and resources, and would postpone Operation Barbarossa for at least a year. By that time Russia would likely have prepared sufficiently enough for war that the easy German victories at the beginning of the conquest of Russia would likely never happen.
You forgot 1) Lack of a strategic 4 engine long range bomber 2) Lack of development..e.g. the Me-109 remained in front line service throughout the war 3) Failure to take advantage of jet technology
>Failure to take advantage of jet technology I'd argue that German jet technology really wasn't good enough to make a significant difference at the time; at least going by what they had in the ME262. Engines with 10-hour lifespans between overhauls isn't going to be terribly sustainable unless you have a whole lot of mass production capabilities.
@@mrstxx2048 The USA only had TWO nukes. A mere 50 jet planes at the right moment could have been traumatic for the Allies. The Brits quickly stopped daylight bombing due to losses. Do you think seeing ME-262s in 1942 might have caused them to re-think bombing again?
I have to correct you re Bf109 It was developed throughout the war As was the Spitfire and Mustang All three airframes were continuously upgraded. Spit IX was a response to FW190 Perhaps Martin Baker could have provided the response.. But we kept with Supermarine..
@ Rory Gordon I know your not referring to me but I my self have 3378 battles in RB and 3796 battles in AB, I am at lvl 62, I have the entire German tank tech tree unlocked, I have an 80% scoreboard average in AB and a 68% scoreboard average in RB, and I have only been playing since February. Steam says I have 868 hours in WT, but it is a bit more then that due to me using non steam launcher and playing on devserver every once and a while. Again I know you were not referring to me, but I really just wanted to brag, oh I also am in one of the top ten squadrons(HAKA)!
Another great video. Another very accurate, entertaining and informative analysis. Keep it up, Sir :) Ur videos r always very well researched, correct and narration is great and to the point - without ever getting boring. In this video u expertly tackles a question going back to 1940. How did Germany establish one of the most formidable air forces in the world in a few years during the 1930s? And how was it defeated? I especially like the fact that u touch upon the Görings poor leadership, and the lack of heavy bombers. Another thing worth mentioning is the constant development of new Luftwaffe planes, jet power, rockets (V2), cruise missiles (V1) + very modern planes introduced late in the war such as the Me 262, He 219 and the rocketpowered Me 163 "Komet", not to mention the planned Horten bomber which would have been able to bomb New York.
"The famous Japanese ace, Saburo Sakai , once stated that if Germany had Zeros instead of Bf-109, the outcome of Battle of Britain would be very different. He believed Zero's superior range will enable Germans to strike deep into the interior of Britain." Is that true ? Not to say Zero 2 guns ... not only mg.
For what I know Zero's were nimble in flight but lacked any kind of armor and didn't exactly have the best of armaments. On the other hand, Bf's had quite a powerful engine and correct me if I'm wrong but I believe they also had (or at least some models) 20mm cannons beside the regular MG's. I don't think a Zero could ever outbest a 109 but maybe they could fly for longer periods?
Jiro Horikoshi said that A6M was projected to "attack, attack and attack". MKI Spitfire 8 mg .30 and Bf 109 1 15mm gun and two .30. To classify "it depends on the pilot" is, in my opinion, to escape from discussion. It will be interesting to know how Spitfire behave against A6M in Orient skies. Jiro Horikoshi once asked about "A6M is a copy of Western airplanes" answered that "this comments reveal profund ignorance about aeronautic design".
Such scenario would have been definitely interesting but i think the mere logistics would also have been an issue since Germany is considerably closer to the UK than Japan x )
