1-Also the part about including the Merkle root of another block (evil forks, min40 I think) is similar to what Catena lecture7 said they might do sometimes to attach another Merkle Tree of TXs to this block by writing the Merkle root in the OP-Return part . 2- I wonder was the same about transaction replay attack applies to EIP-1559; ie some replay protection must have been applied otherwise people could use an old EIP to get an equivalent amount of ETH after EIP-1559?
Yes, some classes are missing. Lectures 9, 19, 20, and 21 are not available. Those were guest lecturers... most likely we were unable to get permission from them. See ocw.mit.edu/MAS-S62S18 for more info and materials.
So it's the coordination of (like voting on) CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY that happened thru the fork coordination protocol introduced in BIP-9 (min49:17 in here I think), not the implementation of the operation itself that was introduced in BIP-112 I think, why didn't you guys clarify it in lec8 comments instead of deleting my reply? (Or after deleting it if u must, I'll still be grateful for the free material u offer)
Could the "evil fork" be solved simply by upgrading nodes to reject all blocks that do not contain enough txs with respect to the size of the mempool? I've often thought this would be a good idea anyway. Prevents tx censorship. You could even penalize miners who are ignoring transactions that have been in the mempool a long time. Thoughts, anyone?
I've always thought 1 transaction blocks was weird too, but every block you add to the blockchain increases the security of the transactions, as it becomes harder to rewrite history. The problem with transaction censorship is, the mining pools create the blocks (deciding which transactions are or are not in the block), *not* the miners who use the pools. So theoretically you could find the top 3 mining pool owners which control over 50% of the hashpower and coerce them with a gun to their head. People will say, oh, but the miners will switch to another pool - maybe they will, maybe they won't, but in that case you could just put a gun to the heads of the top 10 mining pools, and now you have coerced 90% of the hashpower. I think they are trying to change this, to where individual miners can choose the transactions they put in a block, but inertia is making that hard. It doesn't seem like Bitcoin is enough of a threat to the powers that be yet for them to do this coercion scenario, and whatever else people (Bitcoin religious fanatics) tell you, I think that's a vulnerability in Bitcoin.
