#agreementofsale #registration
Karnataka High Court
H.M. Krishna Reddy vs H.C. Narayana Reddy on 9 April, 2001
Equivalent citations: AIR 2001 Kant 442, ILR 2001 KAR 3870
Bench: H Rangavittalachar
JUDGMENT
"The period of limitation for filing a suit to enforce an "Agreement of sale" is 3 years under Article
54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, if the agreement of sale provides or fixes a 'date', for performance of
the contract. Time begins to run from the said date'. The date need not necessarily be the 'calendar
date'. It also includes a 'date' referable to "happening of certain future event'. But, if the happening
of the 'event', on which depends the performing of the contract is 'uncertain' then it cannot be said
to be a 'date fixed' within the meaning of the first clause of Article 54 of the Limitation Act. In which
event, it is the latter part of Article 54 which applies i.e., limitation of three years begins to run from
the date when the plaintiff has notice of the defendant refusing to perform the contract".
26. Reverting to the facts of this case, in the agreement of sale the clause regarding limitation,
defendant should execute a sale deed "After repealing ban on registration by Government". What
the parties meant by this clause, no extrinsic or intrinsic evidence is available on record. But the
argument is that it should be construed as repealing of the Fragmentation Act, which was in force
during the period the 'Agreement of sale was executed'. This Fragmentation Act was not a transitory
piece of legislation; nor there was anything to indicate that this Act was executed as purely a
temporary measure. Therefore, the repealing of such a statute which was passed in 1966, cannot be
said to be an 'event certain to happen', for purposes of fixing the starting date of limitation. Besides,
it is also necessary to note, the Fragmentation Act did not totally prohibit 'sales'. It was permissible
to purchase, with the permission of the designated authorities under the Act. Therefore, I am of the
view that the agreement of sale, did not fix a date for performance of the contract, nor mentioned an
event, 'certain to happen' on the happening of which specific performance became due. Therefore, in
this case, the later part of Article 54 applies i.e., time begins to run only when the plaintiff had
knowledge of the defendant's refusal to perform.
27. According to the plaintiff, he came to know of the refusal to perform by the defendant only when
his notice dated 28-10-1993 was not responded favourably and the suit is filed within three years
from the said date. This factual situation is not in dispute.
28. Therefore, the substantial question of law framed at Sl. No. 1 is answered holding that the suit is
well-within the time.
29. Insofar as the substantial question of law framed at Sl. No. 2 is concerned, under Order 41 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the Appellate Court is a Court of appeal on facts also. It has the power or
jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the basis of materials.
Therefore, substantial question of law framed at SI. No. 2 is answered holding that the Appellate
Court was justified in concurring with the findings of the learned Munsiff by giving its own reasons.
30. Insofar as the substantial question of law framed at Sl. No. 3 is concerned, it was contended by
the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that an important fact viz., that the stamp paper
which bears the date "31-10-1975" is said to have been issued from Mangalore. But, the evidence
discloses that the agreement is executed on the said stamp paper at Bangalore, which on the face of
it is improbable. The said fact has not been taken into consideration. This contention overlooks the
findings of the Court below. The Trial Court at paras 25 and 27 of its judgment has referred to this
contention and has held that "on account of scarcity, the stamp papers issued at Mangalore were
also sold at Bangalore". Therefore, there is no merit in this contention.
31.
plaintiff has restricted the relief only for 30 guntas. Such a circumstance betrays the case of the
plaintiff. I do not understand how the said contention can be considered as the substantial question
of law.
32. Learned Counsel for the appellant is unable to show how the Courts below misread evidence.
Hence, the answer to the substantial question of law framed at Sl. No. 3, is that the Courts below
have not misread or not considered any material evidence.
33. Insofar as the substantial question of law framed at Sl. No. 4 is concerned, the records disclose
that the plaintiff has pleaded that "he was ready and willing to perform". Therefore, the said
question does not arise for consideration.
34. Learned Counsel for the appellant however did not submit arguments on other questions of law.
35. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
27 июл 2020
