A Pilot's Lack Of Concentration (United Express Flight 6291) - DISASTER BREAKDOWN 

Do you know it is Tuesday?😂

Good research thank you

Hi, why do ypu use 'they' for a singular female? Manuela Walker, she was from ....'. Not, '...they were from...'. I am a language teacher and this is wrong. We should not use 'they' plural, for a singular person. We can use he/she or it. Well spoken native British speakers use he/she if the sex is unknown. This modern day usage of the last 5 years is fundamentally incorrect. Nice video! Never ending incorrect usage:- '...flight 123 was on their way to Ohia...' no:- '...flight 123 was on its (without apostrophy) way to Ohio. I teach these basic pronouns (subject, object, posessive etc) daily. Hard to listen to, really!

@@duc_busspotting3412 he is in Europe which is 8 hours ahead of USA EAST COAST time 11 hrs if in California and surrounding areas

@@tonycetin9821 I know I live in Germany

I can't imagine the agony you must have felt - coworkers dead and federal agents asking if it was your fault. I don't imagine you got much sleep after that. (I worked in Dulles Ops for WestAir/ACA in 1990-91. I probably knew a lot of the pilots you knew, but these names don't ring a bell. We only had J-31s and Brasilias then.)

@@beenaplumber8379 I may have known you. It still haunts me. Waking up to the “police knock” is never fun.

@@beenaplumber8379 your comment opened a flood of emotions I had hidden… god bless you and yours. (I’ve never been a plumber, always hired one. Haha)

Tail was 304. Airline wanted to sell the fleet so they bought a new J41 and numbered it 304. Many of crew didn’t want to fly it and I didn’t want to work that aircraft ever again. But I did and it’s probably still flying today.

@@merediths2cents I know the J-31 was a solid and reliable plane (compared to the Brasilias - always calling for maintenance in the early years) that the pilots loved to complain about because of its squirrely handling. (The looks on their faces when I told them the A/P was deferred...) There was one particularly old one they had - N331BJ, universally hated. I don't think it even had an A/P, and as I recall it had an even older instrument panel. I can imagine the J-41 being a nice plane for the role, but the new EFIS cockpit had to be a major change for the J-31 pilots. Then one crashes, and you were one of the last people (maybe the last) to touch the plane on the ground, responsible for loading, and knowing it crashed in a low-level stall. Maybe you marshaled it out, and your face was the last one the crew saw on the ground, and you were the last one to see them. I can only imagine how hard it would be going near another one after that. I think I'd have a hard time going back to work at all, even after it became obvious all your work was good and didn't contribute to the accident. I have a fear the crew were probably also fatigued. They worked long hours in those days, sometimes 8 segments in and out, and this kind of accident is one that could be brought on by crew fatigue. Just one second of confusion. I'm Don, the tall guy in ops, big glasses and unruly brown hair, very chatty with anyone who came by between banks. I left in Sept 1991 to get my dispatch license. If we did know each other, hi again! If not, I know our ramp crew was a great group, hard working, very coordinated, and decent people. You were part of a great group. (Do you remember Kwasi and his "Gotta go, gotta go!"?) I miss that job. It felt like we were all close. To have one of our planes go down was unthinkable to me. My heart goes out to everyone at ACA who lived through that. However painful it was, I'm sure you guys all went through it together.

So true. I feel like I've heard stories from all over the world

@@DethMayDie that’s because you have 😉

I do too. Messes all over the place!

Except Australia lol Unless he makes a vid on some of our small props that went down

I guess that’s a good problem to have

there's always general aviation accidents if he really does run out of commercial accidents...

Just do all transportation accidents planes, ships, buses, and train

Plenty of crash material it’s the US after all . 🤣

@@BrainScramblies Boat disasters are interesting

The copilot was absolutely green, and the captain failed a check ride few weeks before the crash

There were no "highly experienced" pilots in that cockpit. There was a brand new first officer in the right seat and a Captain in the left seat that should have never been there in the first place.

When I was stationed at what was then NAS Miramar back in 68 to 70 there was a large billboard outside one of the hangers saying "Complacency Kills". Question for the day: can overcoming complacency be taught?

@@vondumozze738 Complacency is human nature, so not without a massive change to how people think and act as a whole.

@@vondumozze738 teaching it has probably prevented even more accidents. But it will never be eradicated

It is a real head-scratcher for sure. One of the first things you learn as a student pilot is to ALWAYS monitor airspeed on approach to landing. That neither pilot was aware and that the reaction to the stall warning was to raise flaps is hard to believe.

It is. Raising the flaps means that the plane needs more power to get out of the stall.

It’s odd. Perhaps he was just trying to raise the airspeed, believing that to be the most critical factor in that moment? It’s hard to say exactly what any of us would do when we’re completely task-saturated and the stakes are so high. Accidents like this “shouldn’t happen”, but I still really feel bad for pilots that get themselves into impossible, or nearly impossible, situations. I’ll bet there are some really great days in a commercial pilot’s life, but I’m glad that’s not my day job and that I don’t have that degree of responsibility.

So raising the flaps was correct BUT it only should have been one notch AND must be done AFTER application of power. This is basic. Even in a C172 you learn this. Power first, flaps second. And you never straight up dump all your flaps in one go. Especially when you’re that low to the ground.

@@c208driver6 that was my thought as well. In his startle he was thinking he had a wide enough margin to raise the flaps then nose it down and gain more airspeed. Flaps can also cause a nose up attitude and make it harder to push the nose back over in a stall but that low to the ground he didn’t have enough time.

I worked for them too!!! I was in ops at Dulles. I left in 1991 to work for DynAir (Taca dispatch) when I got my part 121 dispatch license. (ACA didn't have part 121 aircraft yet - all part 135. Their callsign was Sundance then - SDU.) I've never heard of this accident. I'm so glad that I didn't know the FA and the pilots, though I realize that's selfish of me. I easily might have known them. I'm kinda freaked out right now. I left right after the ACA group bought the Atlantic Coast division from WestAir. (I didn't like them... they kinda creeped me out with their sales pitch to current employees and why we should stay. It made me want to leave all the more.) It was a very well-run airline - great maintenance, excellent flight ops - and I know they were really successful in the years after I left. I'm just shocked by this, and still a bit freaked out. The pilots were a great group of people to work with. I had less contact with the FAs, but they were very professional. It was a very good airline when I left, and I'm so sorry to hear this happened. We had a Jetstream run off the runway on takeoff because of a silly mistake by the captain (no injuries, no damage at all to the plane, pax were delayed, probably scared, thankfully nothing worse), but that was the only serious incident that happened while I was there. I think that was also in Columbus, but I wouldn't swear to it. (We had instructions where to direct press inquiries and everything, but we never got any.) I just can't believe how close to home this one struck. I'm glad the family survived. I'm so sorry for those who died. Sounds like the flight crew made a bad error all right, but it also seems there was a shortcoming in transition training from the J-31 to the J-41, which came after I had already left. I rode jumpseat whenever I could (part of my job), and I remember the J-31 instrument panel looking like the Cessnas I flew - nothing like the Brasilias with their EFIS/glass cockpit. That would have been an abrupt transition. Sorry for the long post. I'm still kinda shaken by this one. I hope your career has gone well since ACA!

Thank you very much!

Indubitably

What lessons were there for ramp employees? (I mean, it seems _completely_ unrelated to their job, from a n00b perspective, lol)

@@MrNicoJac 6291 was clearly a company and pilot error. ACA as a company during training, which was ongoing throughout my time there. Was very open about talking about the accident. They used to use it as an example to instill on us rampers the importance of accuracy. The danger of complacency. They would stress that it doesn't matter what you do. We all have a part in making every flight safe. We were responsible for filling out bag load and distribution sheets. Those got passed to the flight deck where they would calculate take off weights. Accuracy was extremely important. On several occasions I was reminded "don't fuck up the sheets so you don't cause another wreck." Burlington VT was a notoriously annoying flight to work. During the winter it was hard to balance out all the skis and snowboards with the passengers and luggage. I would have to go back several times to make sure the load was counted right.

ACA never operated the 146. WestAir, which created the Atlantic Coast Division of WestAir Airlines in 1989, eventually in the early 90's split off from its parent company to become ACA, did, but the 146 never saw the east coast. Worked as a pilot at the different iterations from 1986 to 2006.

@@_TEKNOIR_ So nice to see your comment. Thousands of people in "invisible" jobs are critical to operations but they don't get the training, support and appreciation they deserve so often. I know Burlington and I can only imagine your headache.

@@kerrymartin7650 Kerry? Did you fly Brasilias out of Dulles in 90-91? I'm Don, the big tall guy in WestAir Dulles Ops. I think I remember you, if you're the Kerry I'm thinking of. I left in fall 1991, just after the investor group bought WestAir's Atlantic Coast division, before they went part 121. I remember a Brasilia pilot named Kerry. (Did you have an encounter with a deer on landing somewhere in NC? Memory's foggy... quick reaction lifting the nose, saving the radome, piece of antler stuck in the wing.) I remember people and faces, but I'm not so good with names that long ago. Learning about this accident has me kinda shocked. I don't recognize the names, but I'm sure a lot of the pilots & FAs I got to know were still working for ACA at the time.

There were initially four survivors but the other survivor died when the aircraft was engulfed by flames. The family of three were able to escape despite having issues with getting their seatbelts to release.

@randyp, I left ACA 2.5 years before this crash. I just learned about it today, and I'm kinda shaken. Did you work there in 90-91? If so, I'm Don from Dulles ops. (Big tall guy with huge glasses and unruly brown hair. I think we were acquainted - if you're the Randy I'm thinking of. Did you fly Brasilias then?) It was a long time ago, but I don't recognize the flight crew names or the FA in this flight. It feels very close to home. I can't imagine what it must have been like to have worked there at the time, or to have known any of them. It felt like a tight-knit group, though growing fast. Everyone was still guessing about UA 585 while I was there. I never dreamed one of ours would go down.

The Captain had numerous issues during training. He should have never been in the left seat in the first place.

Great insight from a pilot with first hand knowledge, thank you!!!🙏✈️

As I'm sure you are well aware, stall recovery is an elementary part of training for even the most beginner pilot trainee. 1. Full power, 2. Drop the nose, 3. Raise airspeed, 4. If on approach, leave the flaps extended, 5. Fly out of the stall and after acquiring sufficient airspeed, retract the flaps as necessary. Amazingly, this pilot did none of those things.

@@thomassnapp1341: The correct response to an imminent stall is different from the correct response to a stall.

@@thomassnapp1341but most pilots are woefully inexperienced and legitimately have no idea what they’re doing, which is why they constantly misrepresent their flight experience. Stop and think about what OP said, “I’ve flown with co-pilots with 30 hours on type!” You’ve what? You realize that’s not even a *full week* for a real person’s job? I had more training to answer phones for AT&T, and don’t give me that “well he flew other planes,” yeah, and I’d answered other phones, still got 160 hours paid training before I was given the chance to *offend* a real customer. Forget *kill* them, *offend* them. And when they switched my contract and gave me 40 hours training I had no idea what I was doing and was sent back where I came from to do well on the programs I was actually taught to use again. Because 30 hours experience means you still have no idea what you’re doing. “The pilot was extremely experienced, he had 7000 hours!” I have over 3,100 hours experience in my job! That’s a year and a half. Double it and I’m not “extremely experienced.” Having a quick glance at the Air Canada site, 6 weeks training to work for them as a flight attendant, that’s apparently 210 hours more than OP’s co-pilot. Makes sense, who cares if the passenger is dead, after all, dead men tell no tales.

I agree. Most of the videos that I've seen on jet flight 81 or rather short, I believe you would do an excellent job breaking this flight down. And yes, the CVR is a rough one to listen to.

I agree, but I wouldn’t personally criticize TheFlightChannel, as I feel that he brings a lot of interesting incidents to the general public’s attention. Based on many of the comments there, many viewers find the subjects covered to be interesting and even reassuring, and that they highlight the rarity of these types of events, as well as demonstrate the fact that crashes aren’t completely random events. You’re absolutely correct though, the coverage is geared toward a less aviation savvy audience, doesn’t provide as much context and the presentation is somewhat more theatrical. I sincerely appreciate the more in-depth coverage provided by Disaster Breakdown. In the end, I understand the different approaches to covering the subjects and appreciate them for what they are. To Disaster Breakdown: thanks, keep up the good work!

I like both equally. Different styles, sure, but TheFlightChannel also has his strengths. One small thing I like is that he always dedicates his video to the deceased, and is always very respectful to them. Also he does a lot of effort to place you inside the cockpit. Its even more terrifying that way. (Not saying terrifying is good, just that it puts you in the seat.)

@@ramsfan1st43 yeah I totally agree on that part. He does a very good job at giving you the feeling of what it was like to be there.

How were the CRJ's engines?

Yes, such a response should instinctual and instantaneous.

@Jason Centors This one is very good. I also look at Mentour Pilot, also very good.

This has happened a number of times with disastrous results. Such a basic error. You'd think these pilots had never undergone stall recovery training.

@@Carlos44 The company didnt provide adequate training. (Wikipedia)

@@moviemad56 The impression I got from the video was the inadequate training was transition training from the J-31 to the J-41, which had completely different airspeed displays. Stall recovery that close to the ground isn't really possible either. It's really the slow response to the stick shaker/approach-to-stall. Remember also the time of day. These pilots had probably worked all day, and I'm guessing fatigue was a factor, whether the report said so or not. Their work schedules in those days were pretty obscene. They could be on duty for 15 hours a day and only have 6-8 hours of block time. It wasn't uncommon to see pilots sacked out in the crew lounge in those days. Remember, this was many years before Colgan Air. Pilots working the regionals were worked to their limits, usually 6 segments a day, sometimes 8. Obviously I don't know what role fatigue played in this crash, but I worked Dulles ops for this airline until a couple years before this crash, and I could sure see it as a risk. ALPA wasn't much help in that regard either.

Though in the Colgan crash, fatigue was a huge contributor.

It's not a simple matter of showing respect for the families. Pilot error is never a simple matter of pilot error. Why did the pilot make the error? Pilot error is no longer a cause so much as a category of causal factors. The NTSB does not use that phrase to describe accident causes. Was the pilot properly trained? Was fatigue involved? If so, why? Were shifts and rest times reasonable? Was there an adequate corporate culture of safety? Were the captain and the FO both new to the aircraft? If so, why were they paired as a crew? Did the FO feel he could speak up and tell the captain if he was doing something dangerous? If a pilot was unable to handle the aircraft properly, why was that pilot assigned to fly that aircraft? It's far more instructive to consider what actually happened rather than stopping once you reach pilot error. What's the lesson learned from pilot error? Don't hire pilots who make errors? Not helpful. By digging deeper, investigators can find meaningful causal factors that can be remedied or made safer.

Thanks! I really appreciate that

Imminent stall and stall have different responses.

It was a bad idea to keep that captain flying.

And one in Buffalo, New York

The weird thing is that they say flying is safer than driving. Isn't that bizarre?

@@AnAdorableWombat It's like ten thousand times safer. It's not bizarre at all.

I live near Mansfield and I remember this

Glad you enjoy it!

Correct responses to imminent stall and stall are different.

Nah, obviously the right thing to do is retract flaps. That quickly lowers the nose the nose.. within a few seconds after doing this, the nose was not just level with the ground - it was *on* the ground.

You're welcome!

Airspeed can change significantly with overall configuration. Don't need more audibles nor flashing lights!

No it wasn't. The Jetstream 32 had only 19 seats.

My condolences.

If I had to guess, I would say, THERE IS A LOT OF us who are "strange" in that kind of way. Haha. Yikes! 😎🤔

I was a BAe 32 Captain at ACA at that time. CA White commuted on my flight from White Plains to IAD earlier that day. Fatigue had most likely also something to do with this accident.

@@thomasstork6632 Man, that's always the first place my head goes when a regional goes down - fatigue. I don't know what it's like now, but you regional pilots had a rough life then. Two decades later Colgan Air showed things were no better. I hope someone did something. I can't imagine what it was like in the crew lounge when that happened. I worked in Dulles ops until fall of 1991 when I went to school to get my dispatch ticket. You pilots were an awesome bunch of people to work with (especially when I got to ride jumpseat, my favorite part of that job). So much support & encouragement while I was working on my private license, so many cool stories, though I wonder if half of them were true... 😉

He also thought the first officer did something wrong. The CVR even recorded him saying, “Tony, what did you do.”

Yes