I just applied that military doctrine to a warno game. works very well especially when you have a player acting as a commander who uses artillery, heavy anti-aircraft missiles and air force well enough to suppress enemy fire (especially air force with carpet bombers). In A 5 vs 5 match, 1 person's mission is to act as scout and vanguard, 2 to act as the main force, 1 to act as a reserve, and 1 to act as commander and support. When our unit was able to push the main force to the rear of the enemy and round to their flanks, they completely lost control and only reacted to our movements.
You always find another step up to forward your content. First a cinematic storytelling of your pvp matches, then your historical walk through games, and now a podcast with a visual aid. Absolutely amazing lesson on soviet doctrine
This is probably the single greatest demonstration of Soviet tactical doctrine I’ve ever seen, it really flies off of the doctrine manuals. Describing it as magical would be poetic understatement.
Seriously, I’ve been blithely poo-pooing Soviet doctrine as inflexible for over a decade, but here it just clicks - and it’s less stupid than half a century’s worth of Western/American-centric history would have us believe.
@@FreeWhisky between both of you, you’ve succinctly and dare I say perfectly demonstrated/shown/taught an entire War College course worth of information in like 30 minutes. I’m still clapping 👏 👏👏
What a well visualized video! I do have some thoughts though. Mainly, the discussion of Soviet principles is a little narrow and the discussion of echelonment falls into very common western misconceptions. The way Soviet quantitative approaches are described in this video is so far removed it's not even wrong, and there's some big issues with how artillery is described. The combat action in this video is better described as an attack in a single echelon, not in three. Let's dive into echelonment first. I'm mainly going to discuss the use of echelonment in the attack, but keep in mind it was also used in the defense as well. I hope this isn't too scatterbrained, btw, I had to re-write it because youtube ate my comment. In this video the Combat Recon Patrol, Forward Security Element and Advance Guard are described as separate echelons. In fact they, along with the other various detachments, groups and parties (including the main body in one or more echelons), form the elements of the (combat, march or pre-battle) formation [poryadok] of a Soviet unit [chast'] (subunit [podrazdeleniye], formation [soedinenye], higher formation [ob'edinenye]). I know having transliterated Russian in brackets is really clunky, but it's (IMO) necessary to keeping the terminology coherent, given things like translating poryadok and soedinenye both as formation when one means "arrangement of troops and forces" and one means "military command of ~independent brigade/division/corps scale". These elements, and the way they are arranged to fight, screen, reconnoiter, and move about the battlefield, are indeed designed to expose the minimum amount of RED to enemy fire while ratcheting up pressure on BLUE. But, importantly, these are not echelons. In the Soviet definition (using Sovietskaya Voennaya Entsyklopediya. See Vol. 2. p. 421; Vol. 6 p. 392, Vol. 8 p. 617-619) an echelon is an element of the formation [poryadok] of a military unit (etc) with a specific mission assigned before its commitment. We can shed more light on this by looking at the definitions of the first and second echelons. The first echelon is always formed, always task organized, always combined arms, and *as a rule* existed to fulfill the initial mission of a unit (etc), and may achieve the subsequent mission depending on battlefield circumstances. In the 1970s and 1980s the 1st Echelon might consist of 1/2 to 2/3 of the combat power of a unit (etc). If an enemy defense was incoherent, weak, or unprepared the Soviets would use a single echelon. The second echelon is often formed, and exists to further the success of the unit (etc) in combat. It remains uncommitted at the start of combat like a reserve, but it receives a specific mission, alongside an intended axis of advance as well as details of the intended time/manner/place of its commitment. This is not locked in stone, the mission, commitment, objectives etc are all subject to changing battlefield circumstances. The second echelon is formed generally (in the attack) when the enemy's defense is reasonably coherent/dug in and allows the commander to flexibly develop the combat action by rapid commitment of significant combat power. In the 1970s and 1980s a second echelon generally had 1/3 to 1/2 of the combat power of a unit (etc). A third echelon was very rarely formed, generally only if the Soviets were fighting in restricted terrain like mountain valleys or something. Typical missions for a second echelon might include further developing the attack, achieving the subsequent objective of a Soviet unit (etc), conducting the pursuit, liquidating bypassed enemy groupings, defeating a counterattack, or replacing in part or whole first echelon forces rendered combat ineffective before or during their commitment (e.g. replacing losses to interdiction). It is REALLY important to note that as a rule further echelons were used to reinforce the success of the first, NOT to redeem failure. The Soviets held that the best assistance to a unit (etc) struggling in combat was the headlong success of their neighbor. If the first echelon was having trouble the second would not charge in to reinforce them, but be committed on a different axis to envelop, pin, turn a flank, or even perhaps become the main axis of emphasis. As in all things with the Soviet military bold and sensible audacity should guide superior and subordinate. Creative and flexible adaptation to changing battlefield circumstances are necessary for success on a changing battlefield. To recapitulate sizes: 1st echelon = 1/2 - 2/3 of a unit's combat power. 2nd Echelon = 1/3 - 1/2 of a units combat power. Combined Arms Reserve = ~1/9th of a units combat power. What we can see from all of the above is that the video Now, regarding Soviet principles, while mass and tempo are both emphasized they are among a broader swath of like seven or eight principles of varying importance. Note that they are flexible and change based on the nature, form and type of combat being discussed, as well as the material-technical conditions. Reznichenko's 1987 edition of Taktika gives (in no particular order): ---High Combat Readiness; ---High activity [aktivnost'], determination [reshitel'nost'], and continuity of combat; ---Coordinated and Joint use of combat arms and special troops (Spetsalnikh voisk) in combat and the maintenance of continuous interaction between them; ---The decisive concentration of the main efforts of troops in the main direction and at the right time; ---Maneuver by forces and fires; ---Comprehensive exploitation and use of morale, moral, political and psychological factors to further tasks; ---Comprehensive combat support; ---Maintenance and timely restoration of combat capability of troops; ---Firm and uninterrupted command and control of troops, unwavering commitment to achieving the intended goals, fulfilling decisions made and completing tasks assigned. Now, Tempo and Mass are on this list, in the second and fourth ones listed, but they're not alone! And these break down further, you wind up with a list of like 20 principles which I don't want to bog down here. Read Chapter 1 of Taktika '87 (Fundamentals of Combined Arms Combat). When it comes to understanding the Soviet mathematical / quantitative approach to war, I would really suggest the monograph "Calculating Combat Outcomes" by the Soviet Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst. The way it's described in this video is so far off base I don't even know where to start. Also, the scientific approach to the study of war isn't /just/ about quantitative methods, it's to do with creating a system of knowledge for understanding and analyzing war and armed conflict based on observations, experiments, data and analysis. When it comes to the implementation of Soviet artillery in this video (and I suspect in CMCW in general) it's just wrong. Soviet artillery was (for one) directed quite differently, running on a supply-push rather than demand-pull model where the artillery commander would generally be in 'collar grabbing' distance of the commander they were attached to and be maneuvering their fires directly, rather than putting calls for fire through an FDC. There's also recon-fires-complexes, where C2, observation and fires assets would be lashed together in a specific cell to hunt down high priority targets with very short see-shoot loops. In general, fires would be phased but with flexibility. The phases were generally, Fire Support for Movement Forward | Fire Preparation | Fire Support in the Attack | Fire Accompaniment. The average time to shift between targets for soviet artillery in the 1970s and 1980s was ~2 minutes. I don't know what it is in CMCW, but a quick google showed that it's like... 8 minutes in CMBS? That's absolutely whack. Chapters 7 and 8 of FM 100-2-1 (1990) and Red God of War are helpful on this. I will say, this video did a solid job showing off a Soviet combined arms attack, it just described them wrong. And that's not y'all's fault, most of the sources available are wrong and agree with each other. This is a pretty solid example of a soviet avangard attacking in one echelon. Also, just some nitpicking, the US until 1975, UK until 1963, the West Germans, French, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, etc all had conscription. They were all just as much mass-mobilized conscript armies as the Soviets were. Shit, so were the Israelis. The idea that there was somehow some kind of innate difference between a West German conscript and a Soviet conscript is absolutely bizzare to me. Sources: Soviet Military Encyclopedia Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary FM 100-2-1 (1990) Reznichenko's Taktika (1987) SSRC Calculating Combat Outcomes Chris Bellamy's Red God of War
That was an excellent read. Quite a few things here I didn't know, so thank you for that. The point of the video is ofcourse to give the viewer tools to use what's given to them in CM in a way that resembles doctrine from the era. For this, we had to cut quite a few of the principles out as they don't apply to CM (high combat readiness, high maintenance, etc) or are not as important, we felt. The bit about the terminology I didn't know and I would have used that info if I had known. But at least the info is now here in the comments, so thanks for that!
Excellent explanation of the soviet military! If you don't mind me asking, why did the modern Russian army operate in a very disappointing manner in Chechnya and Ukraine? Is it because of corruption and the expectation that a war with NATO was unlikely? Was it because the Russians wanted a force that was more focused on shock-and-awe style operations like in Georgia and in Crimea? Or did they drop the doctrine altogether after the Soviet Union broke apart?
@@andrewuy1294 it's a complex issue that I would say still can't be fully answered. There's many factors at play leading up to their failure in Ukraine, some of them peculiar to this conflict, some of them systemic. It's also a changing target - the Russians are learning and changing as they go (as are the Ukrainians). The Russian threat after the war won't be the same as it was before the war, and not just because they will have to rebuild it. They're changing and learning.
Reminds me of discussing Doctrinal Templates for Soviet forces in my MDMP classes as a LT in the late 90s at Ft Sill. As a non-intelligence branch LT, you get the distilled version. Our S-2s were highly versed in the doctrine and employment of the "Krasnovian Guards MRR" or whatever they called 11th ACR OPFOR back then.
So if I'm understanding this correctly, these three parts shown in the video are actually used in a realistic manner, but are actually groups within a single echelon, while an actual second echelon would be as a rule uncommitted but with explicit (though flexible) orders upon its committal.
Although I don't play Combat Mission, my friends and I have applied this form of fighting in our games of WARNO, and found it incredibly useful when playing PACT. Really great video, and I hope you continue to churn out these types of videos! Really good, high quality content, and hearing you talk and ask questions and discuss these doctrines and stuff really makes it relatable and understandable.
Soviet doctrine, nothing a wing of tactical nuclear armed F-111's couldn't handle or so we hoped at the time. I was stationed at RAF Upper Heyford during the early 80's as a crew chief on the F-111E. Almost all of our exercises started non-nuclear but ended with a mass launch of simulated nuclear armed jets. As part of the exercise, we always got gassed (good old MOPP 4) and or nuked. We had 9 jets on Victor Alert ready to go 24/7. Good times.
Combat Mission doesn't show it, but I believe the Soviet doctrine is centered around the assumption that WW3 would be fought in an apocalyptic wasteland - hence the mechanized focus and general lack of dismounting. Also, I've flown in DCS squadron with a cold war era veteran pilot. Wonderful stories he could tell about that time also...
@@FreeWhisky At least they were prepared to fight in the wasteland, but for what purpose? With millions of deaths and destroyed cities/countries what did you win? The question answers itself hence they never attacked. Taking nuke's out of the picture it would have made great reading 50 years after the war, much like WWII.
This is a great video that turns some of the less digestible field and tactical manuals into an excellent visual aid while still being entertaining. Great job Whiskey, really punching above your weight with this video!
11:14 very cool application to what John Boyd called "getting inside the opponent's OODA loop" Forcing your enemy to perpetually be in a state of observing and orienting, you prevent or at least reduce their ability to decide and act.
Yes, I was constantly reacting to what he did and I was quite constantly lagging behind. You can't tell from the video but the main attack rolled in on turn 9 or 10... Not much time to adapt to anything that way.
Artificially compressed from the doctrinal timescales - you'd typically have 30 minutes for the CRP and 30 minutes for the FSE, or something like that. The compression is mostly as the map is tiny, and Quick Battles don't allow you to set reinforcemements, so they were just piled in the deployment zone. The decision when and where to release the main body was flexible, but I felt that I'd done all I needed to by that point.
Congratulations to you and Domfluff for producing one of the all time best CM videos. Very interesting analysis and I look forward to the in depth continuation.
Thank you Sir! I just got Cold War myself and have been doing a deep dive on Soviet doctrine for some time since I find it so utterly fascinating, reading all the relevant literature and now playing the in-game training scenarios is great but the thing I'm really grateful for with this, as well as Domfluff's 'Death Ride to Schweben' debrief with Hapless, is the explanation of *why* the doctrine works this way and the conceptual building blocks that join up at the back to produce the end result. Since understanding that makes it easier to execute as intended. I'm looking forward to that next video!
Glad that you found it of help! I was hoping it would give new comers some extra perspective, on top of the training scenarios, so it's good to hear it did!
This "plans within plans" mindset was of a Russian master chess player kind of level. It will take a while to install it to my mind but I am certain in the future it will prove useful and worthwhile. (even if I do not play the game, these advices can even apply IRL.)
Absolutely fantastic video, breaking down the why rather than just the how. I appreciate the use of non-ideal terrain as well; Hapless' MRB attack video is great as a textbook demonstration of a single element of this echeloned machine choosing to engage on ideal ground, but now we also have a brilliant example of the pointy end of the echelon itself being applied in a less sterile environment. Also, the sight of those T-64s rolling into view en masse around 15 mins in, and then beginning to engage as they spot targets, tickles me in ways I can't quite describe in a RU-vid comment 🥲
The masses of tanks rolling forward are the main attraction, aren't they 😉. Yes the idea was to show it in a 'real' CM environment. I have since tried it in other battles and it's definitely a learning curve outside of ideal conditions, but a fun challenge also!
Brilliant as ever. One of the best bits of CM is when you are able to get your opponent's perspective on what they did, where, when and why. This Video does that brilliantly. Thanks!
I don't really play Combat Mission but I hope you do a video in style on the western forces as well (US and French forces especially) because it's actually very interesting.
You know Whiskey it's funny that I was JUST thinking about making this exact video! Appreciate the efforts of yourself and Dom to make this happen so I don't have to! 🤣
When I was in the military, something I heard often was that in the West we fire to maneuver, in Russia they maneuver to fire. A gross oversimplification, but it describes it well. Soviet recon elements would keep maneuvering till they found the path of least resistance, then their command would throw everything that direction. Western recon elements would find where the enemy isn't, and exploit that.
Strictly the "shift axis to follow the path of least resistance" is an operational level thing, where the doctrine is significantly more flexible and fluid. That's what the Regimental, Divisional and Army recce units will be enabling. On the CM level, that work should have been done, so you're already encountering the weak part of a line, with sufficient force to destroy it (at least in theory). That means that the formation reconnaissance is instead tasked with finding an enemy that you already know is there somewhere - typically I abstract that "you know the enemy is somewhere on the map". So the tactical reconnaissance is forging ahead, a Command Push along the expected or ideal line of advance, where timing is of the utmost importance. The NATO equivalent of that is a more tentative Recon Pull - the main force is held in reserve, and the plan is derived from what the reconnaissance can find. This is significantly less risky for all concerned, but costs time, which means there's more chance for the opponent to do something about it.
The soviet approach to war as a science is a pretty fascinating topic. It almost feels like an engineer's approach to war with artillery normograms calculating shells required for given condition.
That was fabulous! Please do another like this explaining the doctrine of the NATO forces or US Army... This was more educative than anything I have read or watched before ever! Thanks great job! :)
Great explanation of Russian Operational art and its prescriptive approach to war. I recently had to learn how to write a Soviet/Russian Op Order for a Btl Recon unit. These orders can be in depth and contain plans B/C already in them for exactly the reason you stated. There is so much myth based on propaganda , historical biases, and myth about Russian Deep Battle Operations and the way Russian Military Operates. We are seeing the results today, and I will leave it at that. Thanks for for showing people some reality as to why.
@@FreeWhiskyif there is a reason this doesn't have 288,000 views it's because it takes a tough dedication to historical realism to play the 1979-1983 NATO v WP WWIII scenario. Everyone wants overpowered American weapons king of the battlefield M1 M2 M3 Apache MRLS combination. Nope it's m48s and m60s starships and unprotected M113 gunners fighting numerous and better Soviet tanks and BMPs
Looking forward for the next video. :) Domfluff insight on the soviet doctrine is quite interesting. The combinaison of the theory and practice goes very well together.
I would be interested to see videos of this nature for the US in CMCW and other factions in other editions of the game. Your video was clear, educational, and enjoyable.
@@FreeWhisky I'm guessing the US way of war is a bit more mutable/adaptable. I looked at your channel and didn't see any links to other media. Do you have a podcast outside of this or are you referring to the videos here? I would definitely check it out if so.
@@emmettochrach-konradi2785 I meant that my next video will be the bits of the conversation that Domfluff and I had and that didn't make it into the video, presented in a sort of podcast style, but here on RU-vid.
This was a very informative demonstration of Soviet Doctrine. Well explained and illustrated; imminently digestible compared to reading tactical and field manuals. Fascinating to see what they came up with to maximize the strengths of a mass mobilized firepower centered conscript army. Theory and Practice come together in something that looks beautifully simple if it works well.
The problem with that is that Soviet defensive doctrine was not as well developed - the intention would have been to be on the attack as much as possible. The broad concept though, was defence in depth (so mutually supporting islands, built around a mix of AT assets - recoilless rifles and ATGMs in pairs to compensate for each other's weaknesses, and dug-in infantry and vehicles), supported by wire and mines. Then, as much as possible of the force was kept in reserve for a counter-attack, since that's the best way to maximise your mass and keep the enemy on the back foot. The issue with a lot of that is that it's a lot harder to visualise in a CM battle, especially in this kind of abstract Quick Battle "typical combat mission" scenario.
I should probably add that 00000spoon00000 is our good friend Domfluff in disguise😉. We do talk about it for a bit in my next video, but what Domfluff wrote here is pretty much the gist of it.
@@FreeWhisky ok and thank you for the video I am currently reading weapons and tactics of the soviet army by David C Isby, I having a hard time imaging what soviet offensive would look like (rush to b meme)but your video help with that
Super cool video, thank you to both of you for taking the time to bring this to us! It's funny to see the doctrine of turning combat into a science litterally played on a computer that does just that, turning everything into numbers and dice rolls 😂 Edit: does Dumfluff have a RU-vid channel?
This is a brilliant piece of work. I have seem media on Soviet Doctrine that is more precise and media that is more concise. But this is the best video I have seen, so far, where so much is explained in so little. It's highly detailed but maintains a good pace, while being engaging and making a remarkable use of the media available (a game you just discovered to me). Genuinely impressed by this video. It's extraordinary.
So nice to hear you enjoyed it! There are free demo's of this game at the Battlefront.com website since you just discovered the game, just not of this particular title sadly. Or just enjoy my content about it; I do that for other games, all good 😊
Domfluff has once again bribed his way onto another channel to espouse the glories of tactical socialism while fighting monkey model M60s and troops demoralized after Vietnam. He can't keep getting away with this. Otherwise, an excellent video that goes into some nice intro-level concepts and dispelling of some common myths in a relatively short, accessible, and entertaining time frame, as always. I'm really excited for a more in-depth look as teased at the end of the video as well. There is so much more complexity to soviet doctrine than a lot of people believe, even at the tactical level. And cold war has been the best tool ever made to actually practice or even display that in a way that allows the results to be easily shared and taught to a general audience. I cannot wait for the greater deep dive, and of course where ever else this channel goes in the future.
The Soviet art of war was highly effective when used by our own OPFOR units in training. I can’t quite understand why the modern Russian army seems to have forgotten everything it learned at such great cost from 1941-45.
Just a thought - the people they're fighting now were once very much a part of that way of war. I think they have an idea or two about how to cope with that...
@@FreeWhisky I think it's much more likely that they simply aren't capable of executing their own doctrine for a variety of reasons- undertraining, corruption in procurement that prevents units from getting equipment they need to execute doctrine (like encrypted radios!), etc. The best doctrine- and Soviet doctrine is logical throughout- is worthless without a force that can execute, after all. There was some doubt about even the Soviet Army's ability to execute this doctrine, especially in the last few years of the union, and the Soviet Army's ability to execute was always miles ahead of the Russian ability to execute. Just compare the original Russian plan for intervention to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The differences are stark.
@@LOLHAMMER45678 You're right, but there are more factors than that. The first is, Russian Army seems to simply lack mass to execute this doctrine. BTGs are, obviously, a refinement of the Soviet way of war with their concentration of fires, however, their obvious strengths (ability to punch a hole in an enemy's defence) were not used, and their weaknesses (fragility in sustained combat due to lacking enough infantry) were, as they were forced into static warfare, suffered attrition and were forced to spread thin and weaken some parts of the frontline due to Ukrainian offensives (which allowed UAF to blitz through more or less undefended areas around Izyum and Kupyansk and forced Putin to start mobilization as said lack of infantry on the front was blatantly obvious at this point). Second, as all peacetime armies, Russian Armed Forces had selected their officers for being effective bureaucrats - being able to make their forces look good, not fight good. Ukraine, on the other hand, actually fought a (limited) war for 8 years, cycling their units through combat and removing some corrupt and incompetent officers through dismissal and attrition, which resulted in a more professional officer corps. And, considering that inexperienced and poorly equipped, but better-led (for the same reason) Donetsk and Lugansk Peoples' Republics' conscript units often were as, if not more effective than their professional RuAF counterparts, this is very important. Third, the plan for intervention had an obvious flaw: it relied heavily on the fact that whatever backroom deals that were brokered would be honored. And there were such deals, considering that the RuAF had basically zero rear security elements during the first week and simply blitzed through border towns - and, as those towns either raised militia units to destroy logistical convoys or stopped RuAF advance units in city ambushes, those deals were not honored in most cases. The plan was probably a RuAF-enforced coup d'etat, considering that the Kiev column had multiple Ukrainian politicians in it, likely intended for a transitional government (one of them, hilariously, basically served as a UAF fire observer due to powering up his phone and actively posting, with his phone being tracked and used as an artillery target). Which was also a reason for significantly tighter ROE for the Russian side - so they couldn't even use all the fires they had, and when intervention turned into peer combat, they obviously started losing. Nonetheless, it would be wise to remember that we are no longer in 2022 and the Russians are not incapable of learning from their mistakes.
@@cyberslav8722 This is a cogent analysis, and I appreciate the effort it took to articulate it. As you summarized, that was 2022. And perhaps 2022 will be analogous to 1941.
Think you could do some videos on other nation’s doctrine? Not many people in RU-vid go in depth into war doctrine and this is one of the best that I’ve seen.
That was a great insight, thank you so much! Really looking forward to your next video about this topic. Quite intrested in potential counter moves to such an attack.
Thanks! Interesting question; I'd suspect that it would require a whole video about the NATO/US defensive doctrine though 😉. Hm maybe a few pointers can be wiggled into the next vid somehow... Let's see!
Yeah, one of the really fascinating things about CMCW should be that it can potentially demonstrate the differences in NATO doctrine. Classically the US, BAOR and Bundeswehr approaches were all solving the same problem, but attacking it from different angles - where the BAOR preferred a fairly static, defence-in-depth and counter-attack approach that relied on Chieftain as the core enabler, the US preferred an up-front, elastic defence (in Active Defence, at least), creating depth through manoeuvre and leaning heavily on TOW. The West Germans prioritised counter-attack and manoeuvre first, and looked to create depth in the enemy position, the mobile combination of Marder and Leopard 1. All "defence in depth", technically, but going at it quite differently.
I really liked your video and I am wondering are you planning on doing something similar for the US forces? The soviet army is usually the main point of interest when it comes to this period but I always wondered what was the US doctrine and tactics at the time to stop the red tide.
Great video! The only addition I would suggest is that Soivet's doctrine was heavy on strategic goals instead of tactical ones. If one division can break through the frontline, the enemy either has to retreat or risk being encircled. If the enemy is retreating they giving up their favourable positions and/or not have enough time to create a strong point of resistance. (A doctrine conclusion from the 2nd world war)
I remember arguing about this some tens of years ago in a youtube comment section lol The Russian tanks use auto-loaders because it limits the size of their tank and crew most importantly. meaning that with a 1000 people Russian can dish out 333 tanks, while the US will have to put up 250.
@@FreeWhisky Aye its a really engaging video and superbly put together - having both sides of the hill explain how they are seeing things and the underpinning doctrine explanations from Dom really brought this to life.
I'm so glad to see this video. I've been describing these kinds of tactics to people for years now and people just don't seem to get it, thinking that the entire Soviet way of war relies on Western doctrine. Non-stop I argue with people who are firmly convinced that the Soviets were undertrained morons whose equipment is faulty and flawed beyond belief, the T-72 with its autoloader and "poorly trained crews" being a stand out example. Nobody seems to understand why the Soviets fought the way they did or why their equipment was designed the way it was, and it is purely because they are taking Western doctrine and applying it to an army that had to learn to fight and win from 1939 onwards without advantages such as a highly-trained, university-educated officer corps, state-of-the-art technology and even radio.
thats on them tho. But regardless, in real life we are seeing that the fact they are at least two generations behind the West in military tech, and the tech they do have has been piecemealed and sold on the black market for vodka drinking allowance, in a real conventional war between soviet and western doctrine and military itself, the soviets would have gotten absolutely crushed.. the only thing saving them now, is their nukes that may or may not work
@@raidermaxx2324 This is the kind of argument I have had many times before: the mistake you are making is that you believe that the Soviet Union is exactly the same as modern-day Russia, which is like comparing the entire United States in the sixties to California today. Russia is a failed state that is still trying to recover from its economic collapse and now has to adapt to the combat conditions of the 21st century. Designs such as the Armata and Kurganets reflect Western thinking and actually surpass Western counterparts when it comes to crew protection, active protection and modularity. But if you can't produce them in quantity, nor possess the trained and educated personnel to utilise them, then they may as well not exist at all. In terms of the manpower it commanded, the money it could put into its military, and the ideological driving behind its policy, the Soviet Union was a completely different beast, and its military reflected as such. In a conventional war against the kind of military the Soviet Union had at its disposal during the Cold War, the West would only have been able to slow the Soviet advance, not stop it completely - I can argue the point if you like, as others have reached the same conclusion.
@@Firespectrum122 How so? How would the West only be able to "slow them down" when its clear that they could not conquer Costa Rica at this point, and Costa Rica dont even have an army?? Its fallacious of you to say that the Soviet Union is "sooo much different from present day Russia" when its the exact system of corruption, and mafia run governing which leads to the weakness and incompetence of their army. In fact the only difference between the Soviet union and Russia today, is its more authoritarian because at least there was a Politburo that had a say in calling the shots back then, unlike now when its just one man.
@@raidermaxx2324 "How so? How would the West only be able to "slow them down" when its clear that they could not conquer Costa Rica at this point" The general argument is too in depth to go into on RU-vid, but can be summarised as follows: The U.S.S.R, in the years following WWII, had 30% larger territories and with it, 75% more manpower than it had in WWII, along with the increased industrial capacity. Furthermore, its victory following the "great patriotic war" meant the country was more ideological devoted than it had been in even the Stalin years, which was by no means small. Lastly, the Soviet doctrine, with its accompanying conscript army (of which this video only covers a small amount) emerged during WWII specifically to deal with a more technologically advanced opponent and was perfected during the latter stages of the conflict and was developed further during the Cold War. In summary, the Soviet Union that we would have fought in the Cold War gone hot scenario would have had more manpower, been more ideologically driven, had more industrial capacity and a perfected doctrine that had been used in the past to almost single-handedly defeat Nazi Germany, a military that specifically utilised the same style of western training and technology and was roundly defeated. Furthermore, Western combat power was largely reliant on the United States, with the rest of the component nations of NATO being largely aids rather than major players. After WWII, the United States was unwilling to be the participant in any major war, which was why every conflict following, from Korea to Afghanistan, was a defeat for them; they won the battles, and admirably, but were hampered by a civilian population that did not want to be a part of any major conflict and vocally protested against it, particularly when casualties started rolling in. So to summarise, a Soviet Union almost twice as powerful as it was during its peak in WWII would use its sheer mass against the weakest points in Western lines (a part not covered by the video) and done this simultaneously with massive assaults and encirclements, and it would have been able to do so for a prolonged amount of time. The casualties for both sides would be enormous, but the Soviet Union would be ready and willing to replace these losses while the West would and could not. The more the conflict drags on, the less the U.S. is willing to participate due to the aforementioned civilian protests, and eventually has to either carry the slog on while accepting the casualties, or give in and sue for peace, either leaving Europe to fight the Soviets by themselves (they couldn't) or accepting Soviet terms. "Its fallacious of you to say that the Soviet Union is "sooo much different from present day Russia" How so? The Soviet Union had much larger territories, far more GDP and much more investment in its ideology. Now it has none of this. If the United States balkanised, had its GDP reduced to a quarter of what it has now, got rid of the constitution and disbanded half of its army, we wouldn't call it the same country. Why should we compare present day Russia to the Soviet Union?
This is a great video, and has become one of my favorites on both Combat Mission and the Cold War. I was hoping you could answer a question. Around 9:35 you show a visual diagram of the organization of a Soviet Battalion. Can I ask what this is from and maybe also where I can find it?
Actually, don't worry; I managed to find it by googling around. It looks like it's from the shipbucket forum? Defiantly not what I was expecting but pretty cool none the less.
17:21 mechanized infantry tactics assumes that you just put the infantry to be quickly dismounted from the carriers take up a position, and then pop off your dragons and law. Rockets and destroy the enemy tanks. I think only the British understood that infantry will survive on the defense when protected with trenches and overhead cover as i've seen their training videos. American training videos from the 1980s don't seem to factor in how destructive artillery would be to troops only finding cover after getting out of the carrier. Cuz in the war games they played back at the training ranges, it's hard to simulate artillery suppression
Fascinating analysis. Very well done. The Soviets never had the opportunity to apply their tactics in a real conventional war. Ironically, the Ukrainians would be the ones to use them in the Kharkiv-Kupiansk offensive in 2022.
@@FreeWhisky OK Thank You, I've studied Soviet doctrine a bit myself and I think the discussions and demonstrations you two are doing is amazing. I was going to ask if he had an email or something to send a few questions on related topics.
Ah, I'm sort of thinking about expanding my horizon... if even for just one video... Keep a look out for hints about this in my next video - which will be more of a podcast 😁
Thanks! I love it when people who don't play CM enjoy the content non the less, as I like to think of CM videos as a way to tell a good story rather than a report of a game I played 😊. Welcome aboard!
Sooo nice Video! Please do the same with the NATO-Force-Doctrine in Cold War-Times. And after this a second podcast wich tells something about the worldwide mílitary situation today.
