Eisenhower’s Broad Front vs Monty’s Narrow Front in 1944 

One, single thrust by an allied army would have meant that the bulk of available german forces would have opposed it. The offensive would have sucked all fuel and resources from other Allied armies, resulting in those Armies being unable to defend the flanks of a single thrust. This is where a single thrust becomes vulnerable to counterattack, as seen many times on the Eastern front. Eisenhower's strategy was the correct one, he took into account how overstretched the supply lines would become trying to support a deep penetration into the enemy's lines.

@@gawdsuniverse3282 Counter-factuals can be tricky - we will never know for sure what would have happened had they gone ahead with Monty's plan. To some extent, as TIK points out, Market Garden was more an attempt to secure Antwerp, which had it succeeded, would have alleviated many of the logistics problems. But beyond that, it is hard to say - what would the Germans have done differently, for example? We will never know.

@@JackRussell021, I completely agree with you, Eric. Every argument has a counter-argument, and debating what-ifs just comes down to people's opinions that can't be proved right or wrong.

@@gawdsuniverse3282 The available German forces in September/October 1944 would have been powerless to oppose a concentrated 4 army 40 division immovable allied force. Listen to Gunther Blumentritt: ""The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine. "" Gunther Blumentritt in, The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart.

@@lyndoncmp5751 his account is inaccurate, the estimated strengths of what Germany could muster in defense of the homeland are grossly underestimated. The breakthrough he preaches would have to overcome some of the most challenging natural obstacles with an overstretched, underperforming supply line, then saying the Ruhr could be taken in a rapid conquest is farcical. Gunther Blumentritt's hindsight is self-serving, and not to be trusted, as Tik often illustrates with evidence about other German General's accounts of the war.

The logistical situation was worsened by the dispersed broad front. It is actually closer from Le Havre to the Ruhr than it is to the Alsace. A larger concentrated effort in early autumn 1944 on the Ruhr should have been made instead of sending forces into the Lorraine and later the Alsace.

I'm wondering about an issue so often overlooked even up to current times. These liberated areas were not unpopulated. Lots of people who probably did all they could to survive German occupation also needed to eat and such things cannot be completely ignored. Granted that oversimplification is unavoidable here, but the general point has to have been another factor with possibly more than minor significance.

It's looked over because logistics is boring to most people. Battles and tanks now that's exciting. No need to know if the soldiers have enough fuel or ammo. Lol

It's definitely a nice change of pace

Yea, got tired of hearing about Russian orcs

Battlestorm Bulge should be good

@@crocrox2273As opposed to what ?…Einsatzgruppen or OUM elves ?

@@albertarthurparsnips5141 There are people walking around thinking real life is a fantasy MMO. I think hitler also thought that the jewish were a suboptimal player race that couldn't create faction bases and that his aryan races had better stats and could clear dungeons better.

TIK, I was wondering where I could find the 'key' which defines the task group rectangles and the symbols on them? Any links to that would be greatly appreciated!

I know right! I always overlooked Allied supplies and figured that it operated pretty smoothly 😮

My husband said Monty couldn't fight his way out of a paper bag Patton could do more in his sleep than Monty did awake

@@dallasmars2 Ya know they say the opposite on this board knowing history can't possibly save their hero so they try revision

​@@dallasmars2 Well he didn't do a bad job at El Alamein (before the U.S.entered the War.)

​. Where did Patton do these great things ??

Genau!

I can kind of understand why to an extent. The US was waging two completely separate wars on different sides of the planet, both thousands of miles away from its own shores. Logistics was paramount to the United States' overall agenda, not just in the European theater. By all means it could have been handled better, but it wasn't necessarily an insane decision.

@@stevej71393 It was insane. It made sense in Washington, but not on the battlefield.

Currie was a fantastic general but by 1918 Haig had got the British and commonwealth armies into the most effective fighting force in the world and the 100 day offensive where Haig basically let each army commander do what they deemed necessary with a little tinkering was because they were all in his own image and had no dissenting voices . Haig had already won his trial of strength with Lloyd George and was safer than ever . The fighting troops of Canada were as elite in the second war as in the first and while Currie was exceptional he always was allowed extra time to train by Haig and never had the reduction in manpower that all other armies had when they switched to fewer divisions so could sustain casualties and training time more. I also think the generalship of the Canadians was not any worse than it’s counterparts but I do believe their missions were perhaps the hardest in the war with no way to flank and always attacking heavily defended areas with motivated troops . Like all allied troops though much of our equipment was not quite good enough in comparison to the germans although we did have far more of it and of course controlled the skies but I think the Canadian soldier of WW2 vintage could rightly hold their heads up as other did in the past and I’m English.

John English has pointed out that most of the 'Canadian' troops who fought in WWI were actually British born and raised, and implies that this was why the Canadian units in the First World War performed better than those in WWII, when the great majority of troops were Canadian born.

Certainly some were, but the Cdn Corps in WW1 were largely farm boys from rural Canada and were several inches taller than the typical Tommy, so that's nonsense. The prob in WW2 was less skilled leadership, not the soldiers themselves.@@dupplinmuir113

65% of Canadian troops at Vimy were British born.@@JK-rv9tp

At best British born were less than half in the end. With many being children when they came to Canada. By the end of the war it was more and more Cdn. born and almost all Cdn. led.

Agreed!

But without enough gas.

But the concentrated northern thrust in September would have cut off Antwerp reached the Ruhr (the German industrial heartland) sooner. Both of these would have had enormous benefit to ending the war sooner. The broad front failed to achieve these objectives quickly. Metz was not important. The Ruhr was.

Oh wow! I know you've been saying you wanted to catch up for a while, so it's great to see you do it! I'm interested to hear what you think of this video, because it's like the Battle of the Bulge video and shares some points with it

@@TheImperatorKnight I will take a look today and make a comment later. Your Stalingrad series is great. I know you burnt out on it, but feel proud at what you accomplished. I am a Patron of you for your hard work. :)

@@vassilizaitzev1 Too bad that the Stalingrad Battle Storm series cost TIK so dearly , because I love it. However, all understanding for this and I like to tune in on TIK's channel at 6 am every Monday.

@@TheImperatorKnight I suspect you are probably already planning enough things to keep you busy until 2080 or something, but I would love to see you do an episode or several on the head honchos of the Allies and the clichés that do the rounds about them. As you allude to: Monty alone would be worth an enormous amount of time. I'm sure you can put some fresh perspectives on their biographies. And hell yes, get political. For what other reason than politics are wars fought anyway?

I do have other areas - I mean, I've done videos on the inter-war period already. However I'm open to suggestions. What periods of history interest you the most?

@@TheImperatorKnight Well that's quite the opened ended question, as a child I enjoyed the ancient Roman/Greek/Egyptian periods. For my A levels I studied UK politics specifically the formation of universal suffrage, from a few having the vote, right through to WW1, which at the time wasn't that interesting, although it did give me a reason to watch black adder the third 🤣 but given the current political climate it has been very good at giving context to the world and has helped me to understand and question some of the narratives being pushed these days. I'm a strong believer in the understanding past event so that we don't repeat them and given what's happening right now in the world have you thought about going into the cold war, to give perspective on current events?

@@TheImperatorKnight I know it would be a big jump but have you ever thought about doing some work on the late Roman republic era? Caesar in Gaul, first expeditions into Britain, Pompeian civil war, fall of republic and start of the Empire, all of this incredible history is jammed into a few decades. I know it’s been covered a lot but I think it would bring some new viewers and could be a nice change of pace for you to help with the burnout. Don’t get me wrong I love your WWII work, it’s just a suggestion since I’m currently reading the Landmark Caesar work right now and it’s just fantastic 😅

@@Dan-by1jd lmao why are you being so vague about "universal suffrage" and "narratives these days"

@@TheImperatorKnightHow about the role that logistics played during the American Civil War?

I'm currently reading Jack Didden and Maarten Swarts' new book, The Army That Got Away - The 15.Armee in the Summer of 1944 (2022). The channel port garrisons really hampered the Canadian 1st Army's ability to pursue the 15.Armee up the coast. Much of the less mobile infantry was left behind to invest the channel fortresses, while the armoured units (1st Polish Armoured and 4th Canadian Armoured Divisions) were more mobile and continued the pursuit. When the 15.Armee withdrew into the Breskens pocket west of Antwerp, the canal zone terrain really required infantry as it was not suitable for amoured operations. Considering the 15.Armee was composed exclusively of infantry units itself, with mostly horse drawn transport, they conducted a very skilled withdrawal.

How wide was the front for Barbarossa ?

@@nickdanger3802 Did the Germans invade France on a broad front? No, they concentrated their forces in the Ardennes.

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- If you are talking about the 1940 German Attack, while the main thrust was by Army A in the Ardennes, Army Group B attack through the Low Countries drawing the BEF and France forces into Belgium. Also, Army Group C facing the Maginot Line, with the role of stopping France moving force north to the Somme. Clearly it was a broad front approach with the concentration in the center. Remember that the British launch a counterattack at Arras that threaten to cutoff the head of the German advance.

@@johnlucas8479 German tactics in general were focused on concentration of force ( Schwerpunkt) The German’s attacked on a narrow front using overwhelming numbers against the defenders at that point, with the French being unable to react quickly enough to reduce the odds.

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Poland 1939 Germany Plan Main Army South attacking from Germany Silesia and Moravian and Slovak Border 8th Army driving easy towards Lodz, 14th Army towards Krakow 10th Army (with Armour) driving with a northeastward thrust into heart of Poland. Second route Army Group B from Northern Prussia included 3rd Army from Eastern Prussia. Barbarossa: 3 Army Group North toward Leningrad, Centre Moscow and South toward Ukraine. Norway Targets on day 1 Narvik, Bergen, Olso, Trondheim, Kristiansand, and Arendal. Clearly German tactics did not focus on a concentration of force. France Army Group B attacking in the lowland, while Army Group A attack through the Ardennes. Clearly not a narrow Front.

I do want to continue with North Africa because I want to cover El Alamein, then Torch, Tunisia, Sicily, Italy, then Normandy, and see all the relationships between the generals from the beginning, but yes I understand why people are getting fatigued.

@@TheImperatorKnight Well i'll watch regardless.. i have to say you caught me off guard at 39:30.. after 40 minutes of build up where i'm like "yep i 100% agree a narrow front was obviously the right approach, only a moron would think otherwise, i'm 100% convinced" you bamboozle me.

"Monty" just didn't matter....that's the perspective. Narrow front? The idea is to drive into the other guys country and pick a fight with him....then kill him. Meanwhile you break all his stuff. You see the narrow front in reverse where the Germans marshalled everything they had and attacked at bastogne....then we killed them. Basically destroying the entire German army in Western Europe single handedly. Why waste time with their opinions on everything?

@@dhardy6654 I agree that "Monty" shouldn't have mattered. Sadly, I think he (or at least his abrasive personality) very much did matter, and while I think TIK does a great job of showing that he was much more aggressive than is usually allowed, he was a lousy politician, and in alliance warfare, this matters. If I understand TIK correctly, he is saying that in his opinion, the single thrust would have worked at the time the German armies collapsed after Normandy, but that allied command didn't really appreciate how bad their collapse was at the time, and therefore were unable to adjust their thinking in time. I was simply wondering if Operation Dragoon, which happened pretty much at the same time as the break out from Normandy occurred played into Eisenhowers thinking and preference for a broad front, as there was another US Army Group coming up from the south. As you note, the Ardennes was essentially a single thrust that didn't work. But I think you have to consider all the moving parts on the board if you are going to understand why history happened as it did...

@@colinplatt1963 I think you're right about Dragoon. The operation didn't make sense except as part of a "broad front" strategy. Though I suppose it could have been used to liberate Northern Italy if that had been thought desirable.

it would have also liberated most of the Dutch population as well.

One of his best

Patton thought that by getting to the Westwall before it could be properly staffed, the Allies would avoid getting bogged down over the winter. He was likely correct, but we can't know for sure, as his advance was halted by the lack of supplies as you said. I don't understand the criticism of "outrunning his logistics". The purpose of the western front was to advance into Germany as quickly as possible. Why is it Patton's fault for trying to do this, not the logistical train's fault for failing to adapt to changing realities of the war allowing for more rapid movement?

@@terpfen you say that as if the logistical train had a choice. They weren't just being lazy. "I don't understand the criticism of "outrunning his logistics". The purpose of the western front was to advance into Germany as quickly as possible." If you have resources for ONE breach over the Rhine, you better concentrate them and make it count. Patton's advance had more disadvantages than Monty's thrust into Belgium and Netherlands. However, I don't understand why this is Patton's fault either: the buck stops at Eisenhower, and it is unclear that he understood the advantages of a narrow front (even back in Italy campaign).

@@terpfen Because Patton didn’t take his objectives in Brittany.

Johnny ring the nurses station you are realizing hallucinations again. Patton could have closed the Gap in Falaise but Monty couldn't bare getting upstaged again

It's funny, but German Generals felt the same way about being transferred to the West!

cant have the man burn out before we get a battlestorm: kursk

except you're disregarding the fact that with Market Garden, it wasn't one armoured division, it was three army corps that were making the assault. The problem was that due to the fuel shortage issues, the other two flanking corps couldn't get their start at the same time so were always too far behind. The "plan" was a good plan and even the Germans thought so - the execution was screwed over by a) Gavin not taking his primary objective, causing XXX Corps to be left on the wrong side of the Waal for too long, and b) Eisenhower not having the balls to say to Bradley, NO, you are NOT going to have the use of half of IX Troop Carrier Command from the 17th to the 20th of September, so that we can drop ALL of the airborne elements on day 1 - IX Troop Carrier Command was created to drop the airborne troops, not to act as FedEx for 12AG, but that's what they were doing!!!!

To hurry along the liberation of Antwerp to allow more supplies to be landed.

@@johneyton5452 a successful Market Garden would have rendered the need for Antwerp to be mostly superfluous, as it would have potentially opened Rotterdam, instead

Yes only a bridgehead across the Rhine was the goal (as far as a Ruhr manoeuvre is concerned). After moving north to cut off the Netherlands and open Antwerp, no move on the Ruhr could have occurred without the US 1st Army to the south moved eastwards in tandem. They needed to get beyond Aachen first, and they had a tough time with that.

Suggest we are looking at different scenarios. Agree with your points if Market Garden had been part of what might be called Monty's "Plan A"...that is a full blooded "narrow front" northern thrust. That wasn't the case and what intrigues me about TIK's presentation is the question what was the plan/objective...assuming the bridge at Arnhem had been captured and Guards Armoured had got across the NederRijn...in the actual circumstances (including the prevailing supply constraints) that Market Garden was conducted. I've never really seen this considered in any detail...I went back and quickly checked Neillands and Wilmot ("Struggle for Europe") and there's not much there about this. Horrocks' orders for XXX Corps are pretty clear though..."exploit north to the Zuider Zee". I suspect the real answer is a bit more nuanced. Eisenhower appears to have seen the operation as a way of extending his broad front to the north. I suspect Monty hadn't given up on his "Northern Thrust" plan and if a bridgehead over the Rhine had been secured he would have been in a stronger position to argue the case for reinforcing success. Even in those circumstances, however, Eisenhower would probably still have stuck with the broad front approach, because of the broader "political" considerations.

This is on record?

I think he also makes that case in one of the Afrika series. "Why not give Rommel another Panzer division or two?" Can't supply them, obviously

And that's where he should have remained, being a desk man politician, not taking over ground strategy over the heads of experienced battlefield commanders. This insistence of Eisenhower's stalled the allied advance for six months, with even a retreat thrown in.

Eisenhower had a massive ego of his own. Don't buy into Stephen Ambrose's myths.

@@lyndoncmp5751 Yes!

@@zen4men 👍

Experienced? When the odds were even monty got his sorry little self smacked of the continent. And only won with advantages any other genral would have. Winston ran out of officers to sack and got stuck with him - which he regetted

Great list. I'd add Drachinifel, Yarnhub and The Armchair Historian.

Mark Felton??? Really? He is a silly propagandist. He makes politiced episodes aimed at brainwashing his viewers into the narrative of UK warmongering foreign policy. I don't respect that dude at all.

For navy history, add Drachinifel!

montemayor

@@Fjodor.Tabularasa You'll delete your message after people disagreeing with you. Mark Felton is a brilliant channel and it's definitely not full of propaganda lol

I understand the hatred of Monty, but at the same time, I think historians let their blatant NATIONALIST views cloud their judgement. Yes, Monty's attitude sucked, and he himself was "pro-British". But it's okay to give credit to someone you dislike when they do something right. Monty did make mistakes, but he also did good things. They're throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

​@@TheImperatorKnight A lot of American historians definitely have nationalist tendencies. It's the "America won WWII" thing.

@@TheImperatorKnight TIK you should do a video on the Falaise Gap controversy

Was Market Garden the brainchild of a cautious man?

@@Perkelenaattori the whole Gatwick scheme honestly is like that. Also I fully think it was worth the punt, purely on the basis of potential rewards yielded if successful

So why wasn’t this situation planned for ?

@@californiadreamin8423 Humans.

@@wysskey1 That’s not a sentence. Edit: your response was “Humans”.

@@californiadreamin8423 the biggest issue with the logistics is that the British, Canadian and US Armies moved far, far quicker than the planners had expected. At the 100-day mark, all of the Allied armies were at places that were not expected to be taken until around D+300 (or even D+350). If the pace of advance had been slow and steady, it would have given the engineers the time needed to rebuild the shattered French railway system, which was far more efficient at getting large quantities of materiel closer to the front lines than the use of small trucks (such as was the case of the Red Ball Express, which used mostly 1.5 ton and 2.5 ton trucks to cart things around the clock in an attempt to keep 3rd US Army supplied - this was so inefficient that it was burning more fuel than it was delivering!!)

@@sean640307 You make a good point. Nevertheless what was SHAEF….commanded by Eisenhower, with Bedell Smith by his side, and the massive supporting staff created…..doing prior to Eisenhower taking over from Montgomery as Land Force Commander ??? Not an example a seamless transition of command , with Eisenhowers first HQ in France located on the Atlantic coast opposite the Channel Islands without radio communication, while Patton was halfway to some infamous forrest in France, and Montgomery’s forces were half to the Ruhr . I think the strategy was being decided on the hoof , with no forward planning, with lots of unnecessary deaths, and ever since Montgomery has been the ideal candidate to cover up this failure of command.

Agreed, it has always seemed to me that Monty didn't take those islands on purpose so that he could get the go ahead for Market Garden. Had he taken those islands then Market Garden is not needed and all the Allied armies can continue to advance as one as was Bertram Ramsay's plan that he and the other plan makes such as Eisenhower had made up months before D-Day even happened.

@@mariopineda4774 Bertram Ramsay deserves so much more credit for what he did in WW2 then he gets. If he didn't die he would be remembered up there with Eisenhower as one of the smartest allied generals. And while no one individual officer is making any plans during WW2 and there was a massive staff for D-Day Ramsay according to all of the officers (both American and British) seemed to be the driving force behind making the allied strategy of landing at Normandy and how to push out from there into Germany (the broad front plan).

Ramsay would have torn Montgomery apart in his memoirs had he lived to see the end of the war. He told Montgomery on at least 4 times we can reference that he needed to take the islands leading to the Amsterdam port as soon as he could. But instead of doing anything Montgomery left them to be fortified by the Germans. And then when questioned on why he let the more Germans onto those islands and let them dig in, Montgomery had the nerve to say he told the Canadians to take those islands. Montgomery then used the Canadians to take the islands after Market Garden failed Browning and his staffs fault) which led to very large casualties among the Canadian troops. Ramsay > Montgomery.

@@dovantien713 Agreed. While no operational plans in WW2 are being created by one single officer (they all have at least their staff helping them work on any plan) most operational plan include the officers from all over the place. From the Chiefs of Staff, each force (army, navy, air-force and son on), each nation and the staffs of each army and corp that is going to be involved in the battle and most likely the leader and his XO of each division as well. That is why I never like the put to much blame or credit to any one individual general once we get to like WW1. At that point the single general in charge calling the shots isn't really a thing anymore like it had been through all human history. By WW2 decisions )especially major ones) are being talked about and thought of by hundrads of officers (even more in joint operations like for D-Day). But then even with that hesitation it is clear Ramsay was a genius. It is hard to find anyone saying anything about him and most comments about him are about how he planned everything out perfectly. Maybe that is just officers being nice since he died during the war but I don't think so.

The issue of clearing the Scheldt before Antwerp (not Amsterdam) was that Antwerp was taken ahead of schedule (and intact!!) almost by accident. The clearing of the Scheldt had already assigned to First Canadian Army BEFORE any moves of things like Market Garden (or its predecessor, Comet). What was not appreciated by anyone in SHAEF, or even by the Canadian commander, himself, was that the First Canadian Army was exhausted - the work of taking the other channel ports was far more sapping than was understood and the Canadians just simply didn't have the reserves of manpower they needed, even with the support of the Czechs, Poles, Scots, etc...... Then you have the lack of the element of surprise, had it been done the other way around. If you think about it, had 21AG concentrated on clearing the Scheldt first, then the Germans would simply have blown the bridges over the Waal and everywhere else in advance of the British and Canadian advance. Market Garden, on the other hand, had the practical goal of ensuring that these major bridges were captured intact and that was far more influential. If Market Garden had been successful, the ports of Rotterdam and potentially Amsterdam would have been within the territory captured by 21AG so rendering Antwerp as being a "nice to have" asset, but by no means essential. The mistake that Montgomery made was not purely his alone, although he's the only one who actually ever accepted that clearing the Scheldt should have been given a higher priority. Nobody in SHAEF expected that the German resistance would have been what it was, and as for Ramsay, he was being purely self-centred as he knew he couldn't get his RN minesweepers into the estuary whilst Walcheren Island was still a German fortress (& if you read the book "Battle of the Scheldt" by Whitaker and Whitaker, it clearly describes the fortress of Walcheren being what it was BEFORE Antwerp was taken). Also keep in mind that Montgomery never ignored the clearing of the Scheldt. In fact, one of the airborne drops he requested from First Allied Airborne Army was a drop on Walcheren Island to take place on or about the 8th Sept, but this was rejected by Brereton, who reported to SHAEF, not 21AG. This drop would have coincided with Operation Comet (Market Garden's predecessor)

MacArthur didn't manage it during WWII, either, and I'm not aware of Monty getting the chance afterwards.

@@boobah5643 Thats the rub, MacArthur got his second chance to fuck around, so someone decided he should find out.

@@boobah5643 well, he DID get command of both 1st US Army and 9th US Army during the Battle of the Bulge and post-war, he was appointed to be deputy of NATO, so clearly he did get the chance, but with the US being the big fish in the ETO, and Montgomery being personally on the nose with a few select (but pivotal) US commanders, he was severely curtailed thereafter!

Monty originally wanted 20 divisions to attack with another 20 protecting the flank. Calling him semi-competent shows you’re clueless. Monty was easily the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander. This is not opinion. This is historical fact. Montgomery was the most decisive ground commander the Western Allies had in WW2. Could you even list Monty’s victories in WW2?

Montgomery was the most competent and most savvy Western Allied ground commander of WW2. Nobody did as much to win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery. Nobody.

3x Corps advanced for Market-Garden. XXX Corps in the Center thrust, VIII Corps and XII Corps both advanced slightly along the flanks. Unfortunately, the combination of terrain and logistics meant that they could not advance far, and they would not secure XXX Corps' flanks, allowing the Germans to cut the corridor.

There was no failure by Montgomery in North Africa. No failure in Normandy either read Bradley's book

The 100 days would make a great battlestorm video. And yes it really would help clear up the stab in the back myth.

I'll be honest there's only a handful of books in English on the Romanians, and the only one I've read is Axworthy's "Third Axis, Fourth Ally". I can definitely recommend it though as it's good.

@@TheImperatorKnight Well, I know about "Third Axis, Fourth Ally" but I didn't find it anywhere.

Basically Monty decided to go for a 'long envelopment' at The Seine rather than just to close-off the gap. I believe its called over-reach. The problem is the visceral American hatred of all things Monty and their insane attempts to blame every reverse in WW2 on Monty. Reasoned historical debate is hopelessly mired in the torrent of bile they heap on Monty's head. You can not have an intelligent conversation with the demented Monty-haters. The fact he had to help save Bradley's arse during the Bulge seems to be the thing that drove them over the edge. It knocked a big hole in the Exceptionalism' myth

Bradley said he halted Patton at Argentan instead of letting him drive on to Falaise because he doubted Patton's ability to hold the German stampede. "I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise" Bradley also said he did "not consult Montgomery. The decision was mine alone" Both quotes from Bradley, A Soldier's Story.

I too want to see a video on it, it would expose the lies that have been spread about Monty, just like the lies about Caen not being a holding action.

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- _”As Bradley noted, the British and Canadian role on the eastern flank of the bridgehead was self-sacrificing, since there was no possibility of breaking out there, given the amount of German armor and high-quality infantry blocking direct access to the Pas de Calais and Paris. As Bradley wrote later, _*_Montgomery “did not ever envision a major ‘breakout’ from his lodgement; the major breakout was to be conducted by my forces…._*_ Monty would absorb the main shock of the enemy counterattack, pin down as many of the enemy as possible (keeping them off my forces), providing the solid nub on which we could turn our wheel._ - Montgomery: D-Day Commander. Nigel Hamilton

Probably recognition for people with limited historically knowledge, these are the type of videos to be quite approached to laymen.

Tbf they also use the modem us flag to

A reasonable comment.

Germany's West Wall or Sigfred Line was indeed a big issue that was covered up by the western allies.

@@markskeldon1347 The Metz and Hurtgenwald campaigns in particular

But what if the drive by the British along the Narrow Front had been cut off by the Germans and destroyed in detail?

@@davidbriggs7365 Monty wanted 40 divisions.

@@davidbriggs7365 The Germans didn't had the resources for it. No air power, limited and exhausted forces and low on fuel. They were capable of strong defensive actions and quick counter attacks, but that was it. If the allies had pushed them hard enough they would break.

And yes, I come for the tanks but I stay for the banks

I'm told that Hamilton's 3 volume biography of Monty is terrific. As you are into biography . . ..

@@brucebartup6161 yeah thanks,I just like seeing how it autobiographies translate over to the actual events kinda like how Caesar portrays himself as someone who is never in the wrong in some of his personal notes when we know he's just tryna avoid the blame for his own blunders

@Julian the German 10th army.

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Thanks

In all honesty - accusing a high ranking General to have an oversized ego is like accusing a general of having joy giving commands. It's actually essential in order to do the job when you think of it.

@@JosipRadnik1 Q What did your last general die of? Ans : DIs-obedience (pats Browning pistol affectionately) Honestly. You can't give orders unless you can take 'em. Any b'***d Corps, Army or group Commander gives you trouble - make 'em b****y swim home. I mean what part of Supreme Allied Commander do these prima donnas not get?

And desk man Eisenhower didn't have an ego by insisting he decided the strategy of the ground battle over the heads of actual experienced battlefield generals? Montgomery even offered to serve under Bradley if American public pressure demanded an American command all ground forces. Eisenhower says no and wanted that command himself. The result = a six month stall with hundreds of thousands of casualties.

How do you know it would have stop the war. From what I read about Montgomery proposal which is date late August 1944 with the Allied Armies at the Seine River. You would record that November Montgomery warned Eisenhower that the lines in the Ardennes region was thinly held and that there were no strategic reserves. Assuming that a division can hold a defensive line of 20 klms against light opposition. On the 23rd of August Montgomery Army Group of 40 Division start north with 1st Canadian on left, then the 2nd British, then 1st US and the 3rd US on the right. The distance from the Seine River to Belgium Border is approximately 280 Klms. So, by the time Montgomery Army Group reach the border, the 1st Canadian Army of 6 Division would have been deployed with the task of opening up the Channel Ports. Patton's 3rd Army would be responsible for expose right flank would require 14 Division to cover the right flank. That would leave the Montgomery with 20 Divisions. With his supply line reaching back to Cherbourg and the Normandy Beaches until the channel ports are open. If the drive continues to Eindhoven the distance would be approximately 200 Klms. That would require an additional 10 Division to be allocated to protect the right flank. The distance from Antwerp to Eindhoven is approximately 80 Klms so to cover the left flank will require 4 divisions. That would leave Montgomery just 6 division plus any additional division that would have arrived in France to continue his advance to the Ruhr. Just looking at the distances this Army Group would need to travel to reach the Ruhr, Montgomery would have run out of Divisions due to the need to protect his exposed flanks. The 21st Army Group started north on the 23rd of August, but by the 17th of September it could only committed 6 divisions to support operation Market Garden.

@@johnlucas8479 You should look at the situation facing the allies when Montgomery tried, in vain, to get a concentration of allied resources for an advance into Germany.

@@thevillaaston7811 “You should look at the situation facing the allies when Montgomery tried, in vain, to get a concentration of allied resources for an advance into Germany.” Base on Montgomery Memoirs on the 17th August he outline his plan of 40 division as 1 solid mass of 40 Division that would move north-eastwards. From what I have read the allied situation is as follows: 1) The German forces in the west was in retreat 2) The only operating ports were Cherbourg and Mulberry Harbour at Arromanches. 3) Number of Division was 37 21st Army Group 16 12th Army Group 21 4) The Allied cross the Siene River around 18th to 20th August. 5) Paris Fell on the 25th. The point I was making that even the single thrust would not have reach Germany before it would be force to stop due to supply issues. We know historically that the Germans were able to start recovery in early September, which Montgomery acknowledge by cancelling Operation Comet and expanding it into Market Garden. If you just look at the distances that would need to be covered to reach Germany from the Seine. Ask yourself until the Channel Ports are open both the 12th and 21st Army Group supply line will stretch all the way back to Cherbourg and Arromamches. I give you an example, the distance from Arromanches to Rouen on the Seine River is approximately 160 klms, if we assume a 2 ½ ton truck can travel at 40 KPH, the round trip would take 8 Hours (160 x 2/40). Assuming the truck operates 24 hours per day. It would deliver 7 ½ tons per day. The distance from Rouen to Antwerp is approximately 380 Klms. For a truck to do the round trip would require 19 hours (380 x 2 / 40), if you add on the trip Arromanches to Rouen of 8 hours. The total round trip will take 27 Hours just to deliver 2 ½ tons of supplies. If you start at Cherbourg the distance to Paris is approximately 360 Klms which would require 18 Hours, if the advance continue to Aachen a additional distance of 420 Klms The total distance from Cherbourg of 780 Klm and the time for the round trip from Cherbourg to Aachen would be 39 Hours to deliver the 2 ½ tons of supplies. The Channel ports: 1) Dieppe captured 2nd September by the 9th 7,000 tons were being unloaded daily. 2) Le Harve captured 12/13 th September open for traffic 9th October 3,650 tons 3) Boulogne captured 23rd September open 18th November 4) Calais captured 1st October open 20th November. Only Dieppe would provide additional supplies during September. According to RW Thompson (Montgomery Field Marshall the Campaign in North West Europe 1944-45) on page 120 states the following: Montgomery conception of the ground force command was (a) To command 21st Army Group concentrating on the 2nd Army. (b) to co-ordinate the movement of the Alien (US) flanking army. (I assume the 1st US) (c) To ground the rest. (I assume the 1st Canadian and 3rd US) On page 178 18th of September Montgomery returned to his attack of strategy of the Supreme Commander. Again, he urged Eisenhower to strip all troops except for 21st Army Group and Us 1st Army of all transports and everything else to support one single Knife-like Drive toward Berlin. (the distance from Arnhem to Berlin 600 Klms) On the 16th of September Hitler started his planning for December Ardennes offensive. Page 179 On the 20th of October the Combined Chief of Staff in Washington came to the conclusion that the chance of winning the war in 1944 had disappeared. Only the early capture of Antwerp and it approaches might have made such a result possible. Supply problem facing the Allied late August early September would have stop Montgomery advance before he reaches Germany. Historically he stop 2nd Army in early September. That my view base on distances and the time line of when ports were open.

​@@johnlucas8479 Montgomery met Bradley on the 17th August, and spoke about Montgomery’s proposal that 40 allied divisions should move together towards Germany. Montgomery went away from that meeting in the belief that Bradley had agreed with that proposal. Montgomery met Eisenhower on 23rd August and proposed that, given the allied logistic situation, half of the allied divisions in Europe could kept on the offensive, if they were priotitized over the remaining divisions, but if no such prioritisation took place, then the whole allied advance would grind to halt. Montgomery proposed that the British 2nd Army, and US 1st Army could advance in the North to the Ruhr with such priotization. Failing that, Montgomery agree to the US 1st, and US 3rd Armies advancing into Germany, South of the Ardennes. Eisenhower did neither, for political reasons, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt. By the time that Eisenhower met Montgomery again on the 10th September, Eisenhower had taken on the role of allied land forces commander, and he again refused to concentrate allied resources into a plan that keep at least as sizeable part of allied resources on the move. He did however, agree to a limited undertaking, MARKET GARDEN, which was designed to give the allies a bridgehead over the Rhine, and to take the allies to the Ijsselmeer in the hope that such a move would degrade the German V-2 rocket campaign against Britain. The evidence is clear that it was not an attempt to reach Berlin, and that it was not expected to end the war in Europe soon… CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P336 ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.' His words. Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery had received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye: 'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP-UTRECHT-ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.' There can little doubt that if Arnhem had been taken then the GARDEN forces would have struck North, to the Ijsselmeer in order to stop the flow of V2 rocket equipment and supplies into the Western provinces of the Netherlands, before ground forces were turned Eastwards towards Germany. MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1986 P49 [Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’ ‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue: ‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’ In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that ‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’ And the 21st Army Group report into MARKET GARDEN: ‘21 Army Group Operations OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN” 17-26 Sept 1944 Page 3 SECTION 2 SUMMARY OF SECOND BRITISH ARMY PLAN, OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN” GENERAL 2. The object of Second Army, (with airborne forces under command after landing), was to position itself astride the rivers MAAS, WAAL AND NEDE RIJN in the general area GRAVE 6253 - NIJMEGEN 7062, ARNHEM E 7575 and to dominate the country to the NORTH as far as the ZUIDER ZEE, thereby cutting off communications between GERMANY and the LOW COUNTRIES.’ Thanks go to you for drawing attention to this. MONTGOMERY ALAN MOOREHEAD HAMISH HAMILTON LTD. 1946 P 214 ‘Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.’ 79 years later, it is clear, given situation that faced the allies after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy, and with the benefit of hindsight, that Mongomery’s appreciation of the allied situation at that time, and what should be done moving forward was the correct one. The seems to be allied understanding of the German situation from evidence from allied forces, and from intelligence sources presented a (correct) picture of German armies in the West… SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44: ‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’ SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44: [the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’ SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44: ‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’ CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P523 When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning [31.08.44] they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West. At that time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces in the area North of the Ardennes than had been in Britain after Dunkirk. The logistical situation was already easing as the allies moved into September, with the allied armies already getting 14,000 tons of supplies per day… Dieppe was liberated on the 1st September, and was operational four days later to give the allies another 3,000 tons per day, enough for the 1st Canadian army. Ostend was operational by the 28th of that month. October saw Le Havre (exclusively for US use), operational on the 13th, and Boulogne became operational on the 22nd. Calais became operational during November. Further, the road and rail network in the allied rear was improving by the day. By how much the war would have been shortened, and how far the allies would have got into Germany in the late Summer, and Autumn of 1944, due to a sensible concentration of allied resources is a matter that cannot be determined. That such a concentration of resources would have been the correct decision, is be beyond dispute. Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan of how the OVERLORD campaign would unfold, and gave the allies a huge victory. Only those that want split hairs can find serious falt with that plan. Eisenhower squandered the fruits of Montgomery's victory by adopting a plan that put political considerations ahead of military considerations, a plan that could have been devised by a fourteen-year-old. Eisenhower’s ‘Broad Front ‘strategy brought the allied advance to a halt, and gave the Germany the continuing use of the Ruhr until well into 1945, and in a broader sense, gave the Germans what they most needed after their catastrophe in Normandy, time, and space to rebuild their armies in the West. A look at German production in the Ruhr after Eisenhower’s fateful decision, and the make-up of the German forces in the Ardennes attack, make this clear. The immediate beneficiary of the ‘Broad Front’ mistake was Nazi Germany. The longer-term beneficiary was the USSR, who went into the Yalta conference knowing how much of Germany they could gobble up, and also, due to US leaders failing to recognize the importance of the Italian campaign, in a commanding position in the Balkans. Harsh but fair.

@@thevillaaston7811 This is what Alan Brooke (Montgomery Boss) said "Triumph in the West" Arthur Bryant page 232 "October 5th 1944 "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance to Arnhem he ought to have made of Antwerp in the first place." Clearly, it was recognized to late that Antwerp was the key for a successful drive into Germany, either by Montgomery single thrust or Eisenhower broad Front.

'Monty wanted to glorify himself' How so?

You don't read evidently mum or d-day daddy didn't either

" It was the Airborne element planned by the Americans that ultimately failed." How long did XXX Corps take to reach Arnhem? Any plan that involves a timetable dependent upon taking multiple enemy bridges intact is a fool's errand.

@@mitchrichards1532 - XXX Corps were still on schedule when they reached Nijmegen and found that the Waal bridges were still in German hands and not the 82nd Airborne's. The 36-hour delay to force a crossing of the Waal sealed the fate of 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem, who had done their job and were expecting to be relieved. What was foolish was entrusting an unreliable officer to taking a critical objective. Gavin's judgement to assign this mission to Colonel Lindquist's 508th PIR, he had not performed well in Normandy and Ridgway did not trust him. The airborne plan was already compromised by Brereton and Williams, but Gavin failed to provide for a replacement coup de main operation on the Nijmegen bridge after Brereton had deleted Browning's glider assault planned for Operation COMET. Instead, he instructed Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion immediately to the bridge and he failed to do so. That allowed 10.SS-Panzer-Division to reinforce the bridges and the city overnight and force a delay on XXX Corp's advance to Arnhem.

@@davemac1197 Like I said: "Any plan that involves a timetable dependent upon taking multiple enemy bridges intact is a fool's errand." A plan that requires perfection or something close to it will inevitably fail when the enemy gets his say in the matter. Market Garden defied one of the main principles of war; simplicity which is the key reason it failed.

@@mitchrichards1532 - the plan was still working except where it wasn't even being followed at Nijmegen - that was the fatal compromise. Complex operations are broken down into simple parts and not following a simple instruction undid the plan at Nijmegen on the first afternoon. I don't see anything too complex about the 508th's mission, the commander was just not a good field commander and that had been demonstrated earlier in Normandy - most notably the attack on Hill 95 (Sainte Catherine near La Haye) on 4 July 1944, over open ground instead of a recommended covered approach, resulting in unnecessary casualties. Source: Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012), chapters 8 - 10.

@@mitchrichards1532 On the 10th September at SHAEF Eisenhower cancelled Montys Operation Comet and substituted Market-Garden. Monty still commanded XXX Corps, but US Generals Brereton and Williams were in charge ot the Airborne drop. The Airborne plan was a disaster waiting to happen for many reasons but Eisenhower approved it. The crucial mistake was Gavin's 82 Airborne at Nijmegen, failing to capture the bridge when it was undefended. Gavin went for secondary objectives, by the time he realized his error the bridge was heavily defended and took Gavin 4 days to capture it. XXX Corps getting to Arnhem 3 days earlier would have won the battle.

I know you say it was Lindquist, but I disagree. In the post-op interviews of both Gavin and Lindquist undertaken by Capt Westover, Lindquist denied ever getting the verbal orders to head straight for the bridge and his written orders clearly show he was to secure the heights first, which he did. Westover came to the conclusion that there was no misunderstanding and that these written orders did not take place. Look at the appendix of "Lost at Nijmegen" as the broad content of the interviews is in there, along with the operational orders for 508PIR. I think Gavin threw Lindquist under a bus, personally, and Pollussen's work backs that up

@@sean640307 - the "Field Order NO.1, 508 PIR" reproduced in the appendix of Poulussen (Lost At Nijmegen, 2011) was from "Hq 508 Prcht Inf... 13 September 1944" and signed "LINDQUIST Commanding" - these were HIS detailed orders to his Regimental units outlining the specific initial objectives for the Regiment on the Groesbeek ridge. They were not GAVIN's orders to LINDQUIST. Section 2. a. reads - ", be prepared to seize WAAL River crossing at Nijmegen (714633) on Div order" Section 3. x. (6) reads - "All Bns will be prepared to attack to the N, within their sectors to seize WAAL River crossing at NIJMEGEN (714633)." Lindquist relies on this to suggest he was not to move until given the order to do so from Division HQ. In question 2 in his interview with Westover, the Q&A were: 2. GENERAL GAVIN said that he gave you orders to move directly into NIJMEGEN? "As soon as we got into position we were told to move into NIJMEGEN. We were not told on landing. We were actually in position when I was told to move on" A more full account is revealed in Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th - Put Us Down In Hell (2012): Chapter 9: 'Put Us Down In Hell' - Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation." [Note, there's no date associated with Chet Graham's testimony, but I would surmise that Lindquist left this briefing to go and write his Field Order dated 13 September, but it is a divisional briefing days BEFORE departure for Holland] Chapter 10: 'Use Trench Knives and Bayonets' - Captain Ben Delamater, the battalion’s executive officer, got the command post organised. "The regimental commanding officer [Colonel Roy Lindquist], with his radio operator and two Dutch interpreters from the British army soon followed us onto our first objective. The planned defenses were being set up when several civilians wearing arm bands and carrying Underground credentials of some sort told the colonel that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen, that the town and the highway bridge were lightly held. The regimental CO had been instructed that if the initial mission were accomplished to 'go ahead and take the highway bridge if you can.' This division order was perfectly understood in relation to the primary missions and was not a weak, conditional order as might be supposed offhand.” “The regimental and battalion COs then planned to send one platoon of C Company [led by Lieutenant Bob Weaver], plus the S-2 section, plus two light machine gun squads on a reconnaissance patrol to approach the bridge from the south." Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liasion officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' " Nordyke's chapters on Normandy, the 508th's first combat jump, are also very interesting, because there were command problems in the Regiment then. Some were sorted out by Division CO Matthew Ridgway, but in August Ridgway was promoted to CO XVIII Airborne Corps and Gavin took over. Gavin, however, failed to replace himself as Assistant Divisional Commander and he was running himself ragged doing both jobs during Market Garden, as well as carrying a painful jump injury to his spine. My impression is that these are the cumulative factors resulting in the command failure at Nijmegen.

@@sean640307 - there's also the question of what happened to Lt. Weaver's recon patrol into the city. Weaver was given an SCR-300 radio set on the Battalion net - the comms within a Company did not have the range. The patrol got split up and lost in the back streets of Nijmegen and ran into some small pockets of German rear echelon troops still in the city. Eventually they received a radio message that two Companies were being sent to the bridge (the result of Gavin finally telling Lindquist to move), so Weaver decided to withdraw. However, there's an interesting story in Zig Borough's (vet 508th Demolition Platoon) book the 508th Connection (2013), a collection of letters and stories from 508th veterans: Chapter 6: Holland, Operation Market Garden - Nijmegen bridge - A battalion S-2 patrol led the way and reached the Nijmegen bridge during the daylight hours. Trooper Joe Atkins, HQ 1st, told that story: "I was called on to take the point going into Nijmegen. As we entered the city, a crowd of people gathered around us, and we had to push our way through. Three of us in the lead became separated from the other troopers behind us by the crowds of Dutch people. We three continued to make our way into the city until we came to the bridge. At the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon. I had a Thompson sub and a .45 pistol. The other two were armed with M1 rifles...” “The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark, and none of our other troopers showed up. We decided to pull back away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge." The "heavy equipment" was undoubtedly SS-Hauptsturmführer Victor Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9, which had come from Beekbergen via Arnhem bridge in the early evening of 17 September. Darkness fell at about 7:30-7:40 at that time of year, and they reached Nijmegen about the time Frost was moving into position at the north end of Arnhem bridge.

I haven't been able to positvely identify the handful of troops guarding the Nijmegen highway bridge at this time before the SS-Panzer troops started arriving. Nijmegen was host to the BdO - Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei - HQ for the 'Order Police' for the whole Netherlands equivalent to a division HQ under Generalmajor der Polizei Hellmuth Mascus, evacuated from Den Haag in 1943 when the Dutch coast became a potential invasion coast, and evacuated again from Nijmegen on receiving reports of the airborne landings. They left north for their training depot at Schalkhaar (near Deventer) and eventually settled in Zwolle, but I understand they left behind their Musikkorps-Zug (the divisional music band platoon), since there were no combat troops available. I have some information that the bridges at Nijmegen and Grave were the responsibilty of a company from the Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Regiment 'Hermann Göring', which was the training unit for the Luftwaffe's only Panzer-Division (currently fighting in Poland) and was based in Utrecht. All three battalions of the training regiment were deployed to the front in the Belgian canal zone, but some other units were in reserve (including the tanks famously photographed by RAF Spitfire), and one of them was Kompanie 'Runge' under Hauptmann Max Runge, commander of the 21.ULK (Unter-Lehr-Kommando), which was the 21st (NCO) training company. I'm not clear on their exact dispositions at the time of the airborne landings, but some of them appeared to be forward deployed at Overasselt - the eastern end of the Maasbrug near Grave, and they evacuated as soon as they realised the paratroops were landing on both sides of the river and had them caught in a pincer. The ethnic German Dutchman tasked with detonating the bridge demolitions had failed to show up, so Kompanie Runge withdrew to the Maas-Waalkanaal bridges (road and rail) at Honinghutje, reinforcing the third rate home guard troops defending the canal bridges. When that bridge came under attack on the 18 September by the Americans, they tried to demolish the bridges - the rail bridge was destroyed but the road bridge only damaged - and withdrew into Nijmegen, where they were incorporated into the SS defences around the highway bridge and made their last stand on 20 September at the Villa Belvoir overlooking Hunner Park. The 18 Germans the Dutch reported guarding the highway bridge on the first day could have been from either unit or another I haven't yet pinned down. I've been working on the Nijmegen story for a few years now and still putting the pieces together.

I was in two minds about it because it could be frowned upon to add extra words into a quote... however, you can see the original text on the screen, and it really does provide context without having to explain everything in-depth

Manstein could have won the war if he became Fuhrer in July 1944 lol /s for our American friends

@@TheImperatorKnight It's perfect, also the General swear word or General communist YT guidelines is also that little bit of humor in what is otherwise a very serous topic. Keep up unparalleled content. Thank you.👍

@@AFGuidesHD By retreating all the way to the German border for his massive back end blow...lol. That mad man made him lose those victories.. cheers 👍

@@AFGuidesHD we don't do irony or sarcasm haven't you heard?

@@Edax_Royeaux That's why I said Dragoon first, Overlord then when the Germans send their best divisions South. Also, your description of Southern/rural France is a little bit harsh. I go there often, it's not that bad lol

The Germans would likely see Dragoon as the diversionary attack they were anticipating and released the divisions they held in the Pas de Calias to Normandy in a more timely fashion. Perhaps they would have retreated to some river line across France a little earlier.

I'm more of the mindset that what if the Americans had actually listened to the British and NOT done Anvil/Dragoon at all - those landing craft and units would then have been available for Overlord and the sixth beach (BAND) would have been able to be utilised.

agreed! Anvil, or Dragoon as it became known, was only ever treated as a diversionary attack. All it would have done is made the job of moving to Paris that much longer and arguably harder!

Wrong 6th Army group were in fact the 1st ones over the Sigfeid line. Churchill screamed like a cat in a fan belt when the GIs were going in with the French. It became obvious that the French and GIs could go it it alone and Winston couldn't get over that fact

Patton was only a minor General who couldn't see the bigger picture, he was no 'military giant'. His fame is from Hollywood fiction rather than the battlefield fact. Montgomery was in a completely different league and in the future history will judge him far better than it does now.

Nathan K……so why wasn’t Patton appointed ? Perhaps the US soldiers who died trying to rescue Pattons son from a POW camp, would have been happier ?

@@californiadreamin8423 you mean son-in-law and that operation happened well after the subject in this Tik

@@johnbrereton5229 Oh yes one of the most politically dangerous men in America was a minor general because he was busted down over the incident of him slapping a soldier and anti-soviet views. He was likely assassinated for the same reason as well(the latter not the slapping thing)

@@larrytestmi5976 You get my point though , right !!

"Bradley and Patton did not trust Montgomery to carry out the plan, given his failure to close the northern pincher at Falaise." It was as much Bradley's fault as anyone else. He and his Chief of Staff ordered Patton to halt and pull back XVth Corps in several phone calls on Aug 13. He did not contact Montgomery to ask that the Army Group boundary be shifted, and discouraged Eisenhower's offer to do so. Omar Bradley was thought Patton’s forces were too few to halt the "stampede" and Patton’s forces would be “trampled.” He ordered Patton to halt and gather his strength at Argentan saying “I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise.” Patton had reached Argentan on August 13th. He was ordered to retreat to an arbitrary line south of Argentan.

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Bradley was an infantry general, he didn't like speed. He also was a backbiting egomaniac who was not the great "GI" general he is made out to be.

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- exactly! It was Bradley who failed to close the gap. Another point that is always overlooked is that the Canadians were well on the way with Operation Totalise - part one had gone exceedingly well, but part 2 was stymied when the USAAF proved that they were less accurate during broad daylight than the RAF was at night when they bombed the leading Canadian elements!! This was a repeat performance of what had happened earlier, at St Lo, where the USAAF had bombed their own, killing McNair in the process.

If Falaise was Montys failure then what would success you like to you because it looks like a success to me. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falaise_pocket

Why would Patton and Bradley not trust Montgomery to carry out the plan? Every previous campaign of Montgomerys was a success. And Patton and Bradley would have been part of the plan for a 40 division 4 army concentrated northern thrust. Montgomery even told Eisenhower he'd serve UNDER Bradley if his proposal was accepted and if American public pressure demanded an American command all ground forces.

Just the point I was going to make. Additionally, Dever’s forces along with Patton’s could have been supplied from Marseilles - the largest Port in France. Much of the supplies from Marseilles went to supply the other armies and not Devers.

So what did this book say about Patton in the Lorraine, the biggest allied failure of autumn 1944? 55,000 casualties and objective not achieved?

@@lyndoncmp5751 My recollection, though scanty, was that Lorraine was the result of Patton not getting enough fuel to continue his move across France, giving the Germans time to regroup.

@@rufusmcgee4383 correct they stopped progress everywhere to accompany the laggard. The British Press propped him up beyond his limited accomplishments & abilities later realizing it. Gave everything available and he still ran things into the sand like Caen and Falaise. IKE allowed him to tag along for political considerations. If it wasn't for a looming Russian threat IKE would have drubbed him publically

@rufusmcgee4383 That was in September. In October Patton was well supplied and by the time of his early November attempt to get to the Saar and through the Siegfried Line he enjoyed a 3:1 superiority in men and 8:1 in tanks. He had 9 well equipped and well supplied divisions. 3 were armoured divisions. As von Mellenthin wrote in Panzer Battles, page 317: "" On 2 November Third Army was authorized to attack to the Saar as soon as the weather cleared. Patton now assured Bradley that he could get to the Saar in three days and easily breach the West Wall with six infantry and three armoured divisions, plus two groups, i.e. brigades, of mechanized cavalry. Third Army numbered approximately a quarter of a million officers and men. Its opponents, the First German Army, had a total strength of only 86,000. Seven of the eight enemy divisions were strung out on a front of 75 miles and the only reserve was the 11th Panzer Division with 69 tanks. While the German formations were necessarily dispersed defensively, Patton, with command of the air and ample mobility on the ground, had the capacity to concentrate overwhelming force at any point he chose. Even on a basis of direct comparison he had an advantage of three to one in men, eight to one in tanks and a tremendous superiority in the artillery arm" Patton was still failing to achieve his objective SIX WEEKS later when he was pulled out of the Lorraine.

@@lyndoncmp5751 That's a great passage, thanks. Which begs the question, "What happened?" It sounds like it should have been over pretty quickly.

Well, he did blame it on his corps commander... the question is, which one? He technically had two corps commanders. And if it was the American one - the one who hated Monty...

"You have only to kick in the door," Hitler told Rundstedt, "and the whole rotten structure (USSR) will come crashing down."[41]

@@nickdanger3802 What was the point of posting that quote?

what author, book and page number??? Monty isn't studied except as a bad example and didn't cross the channel for 4 full years - only with the big boys after the dunkirking. Blumentriit didn't know the GIs were propping up the snogging wanker Bernard for political purposess. IKE should have been removed for basically desrtoying the British Army at Caen *The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page407 Churchill had cabled Montgomery "I greatly fear the dwindling of the British Army is a factor in France as it will affect our right to express our opinion upon strategic and other matters"* *Intelligence at the Top,by Sir Kenneth Strong Montgomery was letting Bradley's Army lead the way out of Normandy because the Americans could replace their casualties and the British could not .PM Churchill also talked to Eisenhower about the problem the British were having. Churchill called Eisenhower on the telephone and asked him ".....if it was possible Eisenhower to avoid too many British casualties"* *Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts, p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse* *With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63 Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July. I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause* *With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586*​ "Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. *Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. *Eisenhower's efforts covered up Montgomery's lies​ in Normandy"*

Bullet-Tooth-Tony From Para Dave (aka big woody) 'Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts, p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse' There is no sense in that. Britain did not fear invasion in 1940, let alone in 1942 or whenever Even in the unlikely event that Germany defeated Russia, how many years would it have taken for Germany to mount an invasion of Britain? It took Britain and the USA several years to build up an invasion force for OVERLORD, and this against a tiny German Navy, and an emaciated German airforce? What sort of victory could have Germany gained against Russia? Some sort of uneasy peace with Germans having to man a front 700 miles into Russia? If Britain had gone to the Germans and said 'can we talk?' They would have bitten our hand off for a deal. The last time that I saw Robberts on TV, he got destroyed by a couple of Indian historians about the state of India at the time of Indian independence. The bloke is a rubbish historian. I understand he goes down a storm in the USA.

@@thevillaaston7811 As an author, Roberts is well-known internationally for his 2009 non-fiction work The Storm of War, which covers socio-political factors of the Second World War such as Adolf Hitler's rise to power and the administrative organisation of Nazi Germany. The work received the British Army Military Book of the Year Award for 2010 as well. wiki

Ah... which flag should I use instead? And I'm using the wrong American flag, but in that case I kinda don't want to change it because it's a lot of work just for one star 😔

@@TheImperatorKnight The Red Ensign is commonly used to represent Canada before 1965. But it wasn't an official flag either tbf.

@@TheImperatorKnight did you even read Monty’s Memoirs? Monty says hie’s going EAST and you say otherwise. How did you reach the opposite conclusion?

IWM Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy "By 1944 Britain was running out of soldiers. The campaigns in the Mediterranean and Far East, the war at sea and the bomber offensive had all drained her manpower reserves. The army that was sent to Normandy lacked for nothing except adequate reserves of fighting troops. Though well supplied with weapons, vehicles and equipment, Second Army could not afford huge losses, militarily or indeed politically. With vast reserves of US manpower now coming on stream, it was vital for Britain's interests and national standing that her field army was strong enough both to engage and defeat the Germans, and then also provide a sustainable army of occupation. Everything had to be done to minimize casualties and preserve the army's fighting strength. One who understood this only too well was the land forces commander, General Sir Bernard Montgomery. 'Monty' was a controversial leader, criticised by many, as much for his personality as for his handling of the campaign. But his operational methods reflected an acute awareness of the size and limitations of the army under his command. Much of it was untested in action, having spent long years training in the UK. Even his veterans lacked the sort of intense combat experience gained by many German soldiers on the Russian Front. Nor were his men imbued with the political and ideological fanaticism that characterised some German units, particularly Waffen-SS formations."

@@nickdanger3802 This sounds like a decent summary of the concerns for British casualties. This makes Monty's desire for a narrow front, led by the British, a bit out of touch. Had he gotten his way, his forces would have taken the bulk of all casualties. As the narrow front evolved, the Germans would have put everything in its eastward path which would have increased casualties and eventually had a chance to culminate his advance at or before the Rhine (aka Market Garden or similar). As he penetrated deeper, his southern flank (running west-to-east) would become increasingly vulnerable and require more and more troops. Even if we allowed American troops to man this flank, it still leaves the need to uncover the ports in a timely manner to British and Canadian troops. Had he tried to take the fight "all the way to Berlin" on a narrow front, it would likely have been disastrous. And that is what would have had to happen to make sense. It would have done no good for British forces to advance 200 miles and then wait for the Americans to come up alongside to make additional advances possible. Imagine how a "Battle of the Bulge" scenario might have played out against a deep British salient. The further east he went, the more memories of Stalingrad would start to creep in. It is not inconceivable that the advancing army could be cut off by a south-to-north flanking attack if the Americans were sitting idly by back at the Seine. With this latter said, it would never have been exactly like Stalingrad as the British had access to the coast. However, for conversation's sake, imagine British advanced forces pushing onto and across the Rhine (say at Arnhem) along the northern route. The Germans could then attack Bulge/Stalingrad style at the flank that is always weaker than the main attack vector. They penetrate to the coast, not necessarily needing to get Antwerp. Anywhere to the coast would cut of land based supplies to the British east of the cut. We would be looking at something more akin to Dunkirk 2.0 with the exception that there would be no evacuation. Supplies would have to be shifted from the beaches of Normandy to the costal beaches under British control, but the point remains. The British would have to sustain the cut off forces until British and Americans could push forward and attack the western flank of the German corridor. Just a bad situation that is totally eliminated by the broad front approach. The ONLY problem with the broad front approach was that the Germans collapsed so quickly that both British and American forces advanced further in months than they expected to travel by mid-1945. They simply lacked imagination that Germany would effectively abandon France so quickly and did not have a Plan B for how to sustain the broad front advance on the shorter timeline. If there is any real criticism to be made about Monty on this point it is that he should have focused on capturing the coastal ports (including Antwerp) and putting them into service. While some would point to American struggles on this same issue, it must be remembered that all the ports that Americans were trying to liberate and make functional were WEST of Normandy and would not have improved the logistical challenges of transporting the supplies east to the front. In comparison, every port that Monty captured would be like a supply line directly to his forward forces. This would have reduced the number of trucks required to sustain his operations (due to shorter distances) and potentially freed resources to assist in transporting supplies from Normandy to the Americans so they could keep pace.

@@ToolTimeTabor The Germans thought such an attack would've torn the German front wide open. *"Blumentritt disagreed with the Allies′ strategy in the west, discussing the precarious nature of the German position with its meager one armoured division against the twelve of the Allies, and he stated that had Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group been unleashed earlier for a concentrated armoured assault (as he had wished) rather than fighting on a broad front, "Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."*

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- In retrospect, with our enemies telling us where they were weakest, perhaps. Unfortunately, when the lives of tens of thousands and the fate of the world is at stake and that information is not available, it is not always so simple to choose a course of action. Imagine today, if the Russian generals sent over an honest appraisal of their situation to Ukrainian intelligence. How much easier and more successful could be their attack?

@@ToolTimeTabor Of course that's hindsight, but the reality is the situation for Germany in August 1944 was dire. Their army had been mauled in France and comprehensively routed and driven all the way back to the Rhine. The Allies had air superiority in the West, the Germans did not, the narrow front strategy had a good chance of working given these circumstances.