No, the failure of this bridge was done way back in time. It seems as carrier ships grew to mammoth scales, no one thought to upgrade the key support pylons, as per dolphins used in many of other bridged retrofitted over the decades.
The need for better protection against massive modern ships was discussed MANY times but the "it hasn't happened yet so it won't happen in the future" mindset was too strong and politicians refused to fund the project.
They need to say which breaker tripped because of that terminal block , then the rest load shed , why didn't the emergency generator start up and stay online ?
Normal people moved on from this laughably stupid conspiracy theory long ago, Josh. If jet fuel burns at 410 degrees then why are jet engines built to withstand temperatures of over 3,000 degrees?
Normal people moved on from this laughable conspiracy theory long ago, Josh. If jet fuel burns at 410 degrees then why are jet engines built to withstand temperatures of over 3,000 degrees?
This reporter barks like my neighbor's dog 🐕. "It costs $2.17 cents" I gind it interesting that he yells this statement as if he's making some point. Is he trying to say someone didn't purchase the $2.17 part? These types of parts fail all the time.
I just read the NTSB report, and the reporter simply didn't understand what was said. The terminal block was simply part of a "control voltage safety electrical circuit" that was suspect in causeing the main transformer being used, at the time, to be taken off line at the worst possible moment. The circuit was associated with the high voltage contactor that was feeding the main transformer #1. So the investigation took all the the wiring associated with the probable cause of the accident and have that control wiring, which includes that contactor block, at their labs for analysis. Contactor blocks have no moving parts, they simply act as termination points for wiring. It is very unlikly that a contactor block would cause a voltage dip, that would then cause the high voltage contactor to trip off line.
This failure is far more complicated than the meda has the capability to understand and report accurately. Both the high and low side breakers on transformer #1 are reported to have opened. This is indictive of a high load on that transformer. This is indicitative of the regererative capability of the 440 volt bus ( many running induction motors) backfeeding into a motorized generator. The motorized generator was the result of a defect or error in the load share circuitry of parallel runnuing generators. The NTSB has a real challenge on this one. We are all egar to get more information.
1:18 Those appear to be what I know as "stab" connectors. A lazy and cost cutting measure. No under screw connections as in older times, just strip the wire's insulation and stick it in the hole. A too small of a contact area between the "blade" and wire reducing amp capacity. These type of lazy connections have a fair chance of existing in your home in recepticles and switches. They've been around since the 70's I belive. I don't know how these type of connectors managed to exist for so long. Wire under screw is the only safe way. Maybe one day engineering will remedy the thin ice they skate on, I'm sure they realized it from the start.
jonhamel1767 Yes, no moving parts required, just exceeded amp capacity at the terminal contact points between wire conductor and the terminal contacts or undersized terminal block used for the circuit's normal amps, causing excessive heat and resulting erosion of actual contact areas and creating a total failure of needed amp capacity creating an open circuit (a total "voltage dip"). I assume constant power flow is needed to maintain a breaker in the closed position, no flow causing a breaker to trip.
You would think that something controlling an important function would (1) have some indicator and alarm to show failure, (2) have redundant circuit as backup.
There is no failure of that magnitude that is due to a 2 dollar part - I am guessing they grossly oversimplified the NTSB report. Some industries have a concept of single failure criteria where systems are designed so no single failure can cause the loss of a key function. I would imagine those ships are designed and operated to similar standards. If I had to guess with no data, I would guess they had multiple failures, with one of them being the 2 dollar part.
Bullshit I’ve seen tens of thousands of these things and not a single one ever failed. Only way that’s failing is if it was installed VERY incorrectly. Next
I found a striped screw in something like that. It prevented the wire from being tightened properly. My repair saved the company tens of thousands of dollars. Do you think I got a thanks?
The containers with perishable contents are refrigerated and have power to keep them cold or frozen. The product might go stale, but it's not like that unplugged dorm frig at the end of summer break where the residents forgot the hamburgers.
1:18 Those appear to be what I know as "stab" connectors. A lazy and cost cutting measure. No under screw connections as in older times, just strip the wire's insulation and stick it in the hole. A too small of a contact area between the "blade" and wire reducing amp capacity. These type of lazy connections have a fair chance of existing in your home in recepticles and switches. They've been around since the 70's I belive. I don't know how these type of connectors managed to exist for so long. Wire under screw is the only safe way. Maybe one day engineering will remedy the thin ice they skate on, I'm sure they realized it from the start.
The bridge collapsed because, given 47 years, no one placed any structures to protect the bridge from impact. None. 47 years. As more time passed it became more and more likely a catastrophic event would occur. The solution is to reevaluate all such bridges in shipping channels and build temporary protection while designing permanent solutions. Weeks after this accident a barge hit a bridge in Galveston, again, no protection for the bridge.
People, these parts don't sit around and fail on there own. Somebody may have overtightened it, or not inserted the wire all the way, or used the wrong wire. These parts are built to UL standards and UL does surprise inspections at the manufacturer.
I’m going to say no. There are plenty of redundant systems in place to bypass that terminal block. And besides, the fact that the power went off twice tells me it wasn’t that part. Electronic parts can’t self heal, so once it goes it goes for good.
@@crazestyle83 I’m thinking of a terminal block. My overall point is, the terminal block shown could probably carry 30 amps at the most, depending on the voltage. That terminal block may have carried a control voltage to a set of relays that operated higher voltage equipment, but unless that high voltage equipment was all run through that specific bank of relays tied to that terminal block, I don’t believe one terminal block could have the effect shown with all the ships lights turning off then back on. The entire ships power control system would not be operating off of such a small bank of relays. What is seen indicates a larger failure of an entire system. In other words entire banks of terminal blocks and relays failing simultaneously. Basically a power outage.
They can also be weakened ... not fail, but become the next point of failure. If "A" fails you need to check everything it influences to make sure they aren't hanging on by a thread.
the part probably had loose connections from all the vibrations. Proper preventative main. will prevent these issues. Did they have a SOP book to follow?
Yes ... the maintenance manuals for ships do exist. They are HUGE, detailed step-by-step lists of what to do and when. I saw one once, that my brother was editing for new equipment. It's scary.
