Hey, Mark. Thanks so much for these videos. Maybe I'm missing something obvious, but a quick question -- is there anything to keep me from bracketing out the actuality or givenness of the conscious experience itself and thus the whole notion of bracketing? It seems like this is related to what seems to me a devastating critique of the cogito (at least in trying to use it as a foundational philosophical claim within the context of methodological doubt). For while Descartes may be absolutely correct in being unable to doubt that there are doubts, within his context, it strikes me that it is immanently doubtable whether or not there is an "I" in the "I think" (or, better, "I doubt"). He should have simply said, "There are thoughts," rather than, "I am a thinking thing." The claim that thoughts require a thinker is a metaphysical one, perhaps grantable by most, but not necessarily grantable under the assertion of methodological doubt. Just so, if Husserl insists that we suspend judgement about the actuality of our experience, then what about the actuality of conscious experience itself? Why not bracket out bracketing? How does his position not entail an infinite regress, such that my goal is to find out the necessary conditions that make my conscious experiences possible or meaningful, but then, actually, the necessary conditions that make the necessary conditions that make my conscious experiences possible or meaningful, but the the necessary conditions that make the necessary conditions that make . . . okay, you get the point. My "quick question" might not be so quick, but if you could point me to any relevant discussion of this, I'd be very appreciative. Thanks again for posting these videos. I really am learning a lot!
With Natural Attitude, Husserl was able to posit the consciousness of the other humans. Which seems to have developed than the earlier plan with his agnostic methodological investigation (and his boarder line solipsism). But its not just natural attitude of things. Here we are talking about other humans. If we could find the key to jump from "I" to "other" we are done. But I don't think we do that at least with Husserl. I think Heidegger has the right idea. The investigation between "I" to "other" will be provincial. There will be no totalizing solution. But then again, when we are not able to speak of Human, the civilization is coming down. (Therefore the continual work must be done in philosophy to establish human and their solidarity.)
But I don't think Husserl is solpsist in any meaningful way. His question is not really, "How can I justify my belief that there is a real world out there, including other people," and conclude in any sort of skepticism sans a theoretical basis. Rather, he's taking the real world as a given. It's a premise itself. The whole point of bracketing, as I understand it, isn't to really doubt whether or not they exist, but whether to set the entire question aside and ask, given my experiences of this world, whether this world is real or not, what conditions must apply for this experience? So getting to other humans isn't so hard. I intuit (in the meaning earlier described) as a part of my experience other things that live in this same world that, again, I intuit. We don't have to justify our claim to their existence. That's presented naturally in the phenomenon. We have to justify what it means to even have the experience of the phenomenon. To me, that's a different question than our ability to posit the consciousness of other humans.
