Bill, you have no reason to apologize for your voice. God bless you for your years of service to both our Nation & the free works as a whole. Enjoy your time before the microphone and share your passion of history with all of us. This former surface gunner’s mates salute to you sir cheers! Bravo Zulu for all you do.
I appreciate videos on this subject because my dear father made the first landing on Guadalcanal as a member of the US Marine Corp 1st Div-Amphib. When they were finally taken off the island in December 1942, he was deathly ill with malaria, dysentery and starvation. After recuperating in Australia, the Marine Corp shipped him back to California to recuperate further and serve as an instructor for Amphibious Div. He credited getting malaria with saving his life because it kept him from being sent to further Pacific battles. He went on to become a wonderful father to my two older brothers and me. He retired after 30 years on the Los Angeles Police Dept. He lived to 91 years of age, well loved and cared for, as he so rightly deserved.
Not a damn thing to apologize for Captain. You went to the danger, as all great leaders do. You contribute so much wisdom to this channel that I’d listen even if you have to tap things out in Morse Code! Fair weather and following seas!
Capt. Bill, No apology for your voice condition is necessary. Your explanation was more than enough. Appreciate your service to our country and will pray for your full recovery.
100% agreed. Both very knowledgeable and great presenters. If I were a high school history teacher I would have my students watch it and write a report on the episodes for extra credit. Captain the fact that your are willing to speak on such an important topic despite the pain it causes you reminds me of Grant writing his memoirs while suffering throat cancer. Well done Sir.
The M3 was a great tank against the Japanese armor till the end of the war. Plus, the 37mm gun had a helpful ammunition, cannister. Which was used in the 37mm AT gun and the Lee/Grant tanks used by the Australians.
I was a Marine officer flying CH-53Es from '86-'92. People don't believe me when I tell stories about the gear and conditions we dealt with. We looked like the Clampetts go to war. The Marines have done so much with so little for so long, they think they can do everything with nothing forever.
Captain Bill you have absolutely nothing to apologize for sir! I respect and appreciate everything you personally and professionally stand for sir! Thank you for being you sir.
This episode could’ve been titled “It’s All We Had.” Sympathizing with The Devil (Adm. King) for a second, with his strategic objective being the maintenance of the SLOCs to Australia,, you can appreciate him wanting to get it done before what would become Henderson Field was operational under the Japanese. We weren’t ready on 07Aug42, but we’d have had to fight our way through land-based air to get there if we waited any longer. Halsey & Fletcher catch flak ex post facto, but I’ll stand on the table for both of them, and Spruance. Halsey’s appointment to replace Ghormley was crucial. His operational style (I’m wearing two boots, the enemy has two asscheeks, they should meet) salvaged our first offensive of the war. And the war was won in 1942 by Fletcher, Spruance, & Halsey, when the US Navy didn’t have a pot to piss in or a porthole to chuck it out of, yet still kept managing to deny the IJN their strategic objectives, then go on the offensive. “It’s all we had” and those three guys and the men under their command made it work.
Wow. Great post. I appreciate your military acumen. I'm guessing you were USMC, or rather you were the guy they were looking for, as in a few good men (some that got better offers from the Air Force.) It's the third time I watched this bar discussion, as Seth tries to put 3 hours of mini subjects in a one hour podcast. Fortunately, He and Captain Bill frequently do over that hour. Tell your ( smart) friends, Eh?
Bill: I was studying your voice earlier today, and came to the conclusion that screaming at knucklehead sailors wore the old voice box clean out. It was decent hypothesis, don't you think? My stupid brother talked me out of joining the Navy when I was a kid. Submarines are still a love of mine. Run Silent, Run Deep....what a book!
Cap'n Bill's facetious interjections-like @ 58: 53 "Oh...so they moved the landings to September?"-are such a key part of what makes these episodes so brilliantly entertaining...I mean, in addition to the captivating storytelling. Superbly done! 😎
I'm very grateful for this podcast. My (now late) father had a minor role in the USN. He was a pharmacist's mate in every sea battle after Midway, and through early 1946. He told me very little about what he'd experienced; he said it too horrible for daughterly ears. He told me about the kamikazi and rescuing wounded sailors and pilots from heavy seas and burning vessels and planes. I had no idea was an incredibly near-run campaign Guadalcanal was.
The best. Your detail and presentation is first rate. Thank you, Captain Toti, for your service. Your words are an important and lasting history of the U.S. Navy. I am glad you are still able to talk and share after being wounded.
For those that don't know President Roosevelt was at one time the Asst. Secretary of the Navy, this is where he and Churchill formed a relationship that endured throughout the war, they were actually friends, and the American public generally was a Churchill fan also, in fact, at least at certain times Churchill was more popular in the States than he was at Home.
My uncle Bill joined the marines at 16 and was on Guadalcanal soon after. He said there were only about 8 out of his company still standing by the end of the battle. He was then sent to several more island invasions. Definitely had a tough war but made it through, but with lots of psychological damage, I think, from what my dad said.
Bill, Inagree with Wrightsublette’s comment regarding your voice and love of Pacific war history. I really enjoy the discussions between you, Seth, and guests, when they are present. Your discussions about. Midway, with. Jon Parshall, were so excellent!
As a New Zealander, I have great admiration for the US troops, both Army and Marines, who came to NZ in 1942/43 to protect us and train for the Pacific campaign - they left many memories and infrastructure which is still in use! The 1st Marine Div trained in Wellington for Guadalcanal, the 2nd Marine Div trained on our East Cape for Tarawa, and the 43rd US Inf Div trained in and around Auckland and the Kaipara Harbour in 1943 before going to the Solomons and on to the Philippines. US Forces HQ under Admiral Ghormley, was based in Auckland and the Jean Batten State Building which housed it, still exists. US Memorial Day is celebrated every May at Auckland's War Memorial Museum and many Kiwi families descend or have a US Serviceman in their family - my own mother's younger sister married a US Navy sailor stationed in Auckland! Kia Kaha and Arohanui from New Zealand.
Agreed. I did subscribe to the Midway hypothesis but the more I learned the more I saw the span of time from Midway through the Japanese evacuation from Guadalcanal as the "turning point", if one can regard eight months of battles (on land and at sea) as a "point".
Add in Milne Bay, Kokoda track, Buna, and Gona New Guinea, which happen simultaneously with Guadalcanal. Essentially, the Japanese were able to win at New Guinea or Guadalcanal, but not both places simultaneously.
You suggest that Watchtower happened too early... surely if it was delayed, even a month the Japanese Guadalcanal airfield would have been active and loaded up with a Japanese Cactus Airforce, plus the Japanese carriers would have been more likely to be in the area to interdict the landing fleets... assuming that there would then be a couple of relatively tied carrier battles, such as Eastern Solomons which technically can be called a US victory because the Japanese resupply fleets turned around... they would then be losses as it would be the US invasion fleet turning around... Feels to me like Watchtower occurred at the only time it could have prior to late 1943 when the US had overwhelming naval assets.
My father joined the Navy on the idea that IF he had a bed, it would be dry; if he didn't have a bed, it would no longer matter. Jeep carrier, later in the war, mostly anti-sub duty.
I've watched many videos about Guadalcanal. I didn't think I could learn much more about it. This is one of the best. I learned so much. The back story leading up to it is fascinating. Thank you.
Boy talk about a shoestring budget. It almost seems as if some commanders don't care if the operation is successful or not. Bill, we enjoy listening to you--don't worry about your voice and how it sounds. Great lead in to the campaign Seth and Bill--thanks!!
The Guadalcanal campaign is among the most interesting part of WWII to study and discuss. Most of my interest is in the naval/air portions. 6 months long, 50ish war ships sunk, many surface night battles, fascintating history. so glad I was not there but, love to read and learn. have red dozens of books on the subject, many more than once.
I think Iron Bottom Sound is one of the most important historical places in modern history. I understand the Navy dedicates a wreath there, every year.
Hey Bill Thanks for letting us know about your voice. I was born with some birth defects. So, I understand where you are coming from. I never let it keep me down. Congrats to you for powering through. Your voice sounds good to me. I appreciate your insights. Take care John
This is a great series on many levels. To follow up on Mr. Hannigan's comment below regarding Fletcher's decision making, it is fascinating how pro/anti Fletcher online communities have evolved. It might be prudent to not so strongly hold judgements when a great many factors come into play, particularly in high stress, imperfect wartime settings.
We agree. The issue of Fletcher's leadership is extremely polarized. Many, to include King, couldn't wait for him to get replaced. Others point to his unassuming leadership at Midway as being at least partially responsible for one of our greatest victories.
At Johnsp... great perspective. How much untapped talent in Archer Vandegrift that it seemed all that was needed was the opportunity to shine, and he was THERE. Same for the commander at the operations level in First Marines. Amazing professionalism from the beginning. These men hadn't been just sitting as the world headed to Hell.
The details provided by these videos are on the level of graduate courses. Much would be forgotten if this series didn’t exist. As the son of a Navy Corpsman who served in the Pacific, I am grateful to learn how to fit the puzzle pieces together with detailed explanations provided in this series.
OH Captian Toti.............I'm so sorry. I knew that it was different than from interviews when you were younger. God Bless you for serving your country. You're a great American
One of the big lessons from the beginning of Operation Watchtower was logistics. The need to develop combat loading of the transports. The type of containers used to carry materials. Cardboard boxes weren't appropriate to carry supplies. A better way to land those supplies and more of it.
Bill, NO apologies are in order now or ever ! Your sharing with us the events by which your affliction was so cowardly imparted upon you, at least in the opinion of this old backwoods Vitginia lawyer, should ever steel our resolve to be increasingly vigilant. You are in my prayers ❤.
Fletcher had two veteran CV's and an inexperienced hybrid CVL/CV, the Wasp, against only two IJN veteran CV's and two or three CVE's. His pessimism was unwarranted and unprofessional. There was no way that the superior Japanese battle line could trap his carriers with all of the Coral Sea to maneuver in with secure bases in New Caledonia and Northern Australia to fall back on. Therefore, the only real threat to his Carriers were the IJN's Carriers. Also, the only major Japanese airbases were in Rabaul and Truk at this time. The problem with Ghormley's command ineptitude began with him being absent and unable to either ride herd on Fletcher so he would commit and fight or getting him replaced. I think the task mentally became too big for Fletcher to handle. The Peter principle in effect.
In most of the battles of this era communications was a problem. Senior commanders seldom talked face to face and seldom had conversations over radio either. To send a message he writes it out or dictates to an aide. It is then dictated encoded and put in proper format in the communications center. Then taken to the radio room and put in an in basket to be sent. Then sent to sender and possibly it needs to be relayed through another station. Each transmission is by Morse code one character at a time. When it gets where it is going, the procedure is reversed. Additionally most in the chain have little understanding of how important it is. A senior commander might send and receive hundreds a day. When you add this to the difficulty of radio communication in the 1940s you can understand how sometimes not everyone was on the same sheet of music. Love this series. My father served in the army and was in New Guinea, Leyte, and spent time on occupation in Japan. When the war ended his unit was training for the invasion of Japan.
I am listening to podcast chronologicaly so only now I know - I wish Bill best health. This show has to main pillars and I prefer it to be kept that way. This dualistic complementary perspective you present guys is really big value to the show. I've read dozens books on WW2 and Pacific but I still find podcast interesting and entertaining.
I've only been listening to these shows for somewhat short time now first for tarawa podcast then I went back and rewatched it here on RU-vid. I haven't watched for a few months but I'm now trying to add you to my daily routine at night watching on RU-vid. Definitely top of the line show
Just a quick note to thank Seth, Bill and the excellent guest speakers for a very engaging series. I am a retired Brit in London and enjoy the knowledge, tempo and "banter" of you guys so much I am now on a repeat of Series 1. Wishing you all well on this epic undertaking. I often wonder if a series 3 will take on the Atlantic to show the kind of insight that is the hallmark of series 1 and 2.
This is the second time I've listened to this RU-vid on Guadalcanal, I do volunteer work on the USS Cassin Young so this is right up my alley and I read and watch everything on sea battles off Guadalcanal especially November 12-15 "42" I like that both of you are frank and not one sided. I always called 1942 the year America learned to fight and boy did we in and around Guadalcanal. Bill and Seth great work!!!
I actually came here to say, that I absolutely love your voice and when Seth says, you sound like a proper sea wolf, he's 100% right. It is something that gives this podcast those 10% that push it to 110% 😊
I really have been enjoying you guys podcast because I’m a huge fan of the pacific war during World War 2 and have been fascinated about the naval clashes between the United Sates and the IJN. Bill you will be missed get well and I hope to see you soon!
Luck favors the bold guys. Kings timing was perfect or this conversation wouldn't be happening. You are pushing one of those big "what ifs" which I reckon is a historian's bread and butter.
Captain you did well in talking. I just found your youtube channel and am already hooked. One thing that we will see in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters is Leaders like Gormley and others who in the peace time played politics well but not necessarily led as they should have. The Army learned from this as well with Operation Torch and some of their leadership. The naval battles that are yet to come shows again leaders who were not aggressive enough and complacent in giving orders that got ships sunk and men killed. Looking forward to following along, and catching up.
The ambivalence and pessimism of both Fletcher and Ghormley about the operation is astounding to me. These guys were in COMMAND of the most important operation of their lives. One would think it was the ultimate pinnacle of lives dedicated to the Navy, yet Ghormley didn't even attend the rehearsal or the conference, and Fletcher seems to have had no notion of the OBJECTIVE of the operation, and only concerned with the safety of his carriers. Thank God for Vandegrift, Harmon and (eventually) HALSEY.
I've always wondered a bit at the decision not to bring USS Ranger (CV 4) to the Pacific. I've read the explanations: too small, not robustly-enough constructed, light AA, etc. And sure, up to a point I get that; it's understandable how in mid-1942 it would've been decided against. But goodness, by late 1942 after Santa Cruz, four US carriers had been sunk, another was under extended repair on the West Coast, a banged-up Enterprise was holding on alone in the South Pacific, and the Essex-class carriers building were still roughly a year away. At THIS point, surely that earlier Ranger decision had to have been seriously re-considered. She was no Yorktown- or Essex-class, to be sure, but was still a fleet CV, not a CVL. I bet Halsey would have been been tickled to death to see Ranger chop into SoPac.
Hi Bill, although your voice does not bother me, and I did not make note of it since I have been watching the podcast, I'm sorry that you have the problems that you have with your lungs and appreciate your service
I'm coming back to the beginning episodes of the podcast. You men, Bill and Seth did not make the same mistakes as Admiral King forced on his commanders, launching before "being ready". Things have unfolded pretty much First things first. Well done, and continuing on, first things first, filling when appropriate. I'm still trying to get all my friends and enemies to watch and listen. We are entering a world nearly as dangerous as 1941-42. Dusting off the lessons of 82+ years ago has value. Bless you, Men. Onward.😅
Seth and Bill addressed the preponderance of positive and gentlemen commenting with pointing out the existence of some outliers that need editing. Thanks to all the good people adding to the effort, encouraging Bill and Seth.
I’m a newbie to the finer details of the Pacific War. Your discussion of the first time logistics needed between the Amy Air Force , Navy and Marines was very enlightening. This was the first time I really understood what needed to be envisioned, understood and accomplished. Calculated Risk is also term I now appreciate. Perhaps some officers’ mind could not stretch beyond their own experience and self regard. Might as well use Calculated Risk and Go For Broke or one certainly gets trashed by history!
Bill, thank you for sharing the story about your lung and larynx issues. I'm sure the clinicians who care for you considered the role that inhalers (especially steroid inhalers) can play in altering a patient's voice. They can have direct effects as well as rendering a patient susceptible to fungal throat infections. If you use inhalers extensively, it might be something to explore unless it was one of the first things they considered.
Love this format and content. Thanks. And thanks for your service Admiral. A major factor, perhaps THE major factor, for the future in the Pacific was were the huge distances. So managing logistics was, I think, impressive. I’d love to listen to you discuss this. My dad served on an evacuation ship during most of the major assaults in the Pacific, hence my interest.
Yeah Bill, I know the aggravation and frustration, I've had multiple severe traumas that now retired am having difficulty with, really putting a cabash on my once normal life, had to change the way I now live. Medical science is always coming up with something new, never give in or up.
It was a learning experience early, the loss of carriers later was because of looping in 1 sector for days. They would have been safe enough if they planned out destinations in rang during daylight hours. Start south, go west, south west, etc so you do not revisit areas in a 5 day period.
You guys and guests are awesome! I only know of some of the people UHPC speaks about through filmed interviews. I am so impressed that you had contact with these persons. And a informed unique perspective
The reason that the Japanese army was so ill-prepared was the limited Japanese transport capability and the fact that the Navy kept the Midway disaster a secret from the Army,.
Bil I hope your throat does not give too many problems and you will be able to continue with these presentations for a long time as your input adds an fasinating experienced naval officers perspective in addition to the usual historian only format. Great respect for your military service and continued contributions to military history .
Just watched this for the first time. People have told me that my prayers have made big differences. I hope that is true. I have huge amounts of time to pray. Ill be putting your health in my prayers. I believe you are doing wonderful work here. Also, i dont know if anyone in the comments have mentioned this... Your resemblance to Fred Armistead is striking! Did the kids on your boat call you Mr. Saturday Night Live? Oops! I need to edit. Im talking to Capt. Toti.
Noticed in Seth’s background the mug from ‘twelve o’clock high’ on top of the bookcase (very cool). (Misidentified Seth as Ian in a different post - sorry about that).
I am sure air cover requirements were covered in the operations order for the invasion. I believe Fletcher dis-obeyed those orders by only having 3 days air cover during un-loading. Anyone seen the operations order??
Hey Seth & Bill, Bill I understand what you mean, I have extreme emphasima, but it comes with the more that I exsert myself the harder it is to breathe.Rickm.
The more I hear about it, the more I begin to see parallels between the set up for Operation Watchtower and Operation Corporate. Both are cases of a push to conduct amphibious operations on an island at the end on a long supply line, on short notice, with insufficient air assets and an impending deadline.
I spent a whole weekend at the George Marshall Museum ( now closed) years ago. One highlight was the Casablanca conference. King was pointing and I guess yelling at a British Field Marshal Brooke ( my notes are handwritten)- the next pic has Marshall and King outside talking. I don't have any notes on what happened.
This is Captain Toti responding-- I lived 2010-2019 in Leesburg, Virginia, not three miles away from George Marshall's house and would visit it often. I didn't know the museum was now closed. That's disappointing. And yes, there probably are many photos of King yelling at someone!
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Dodona Manor (Marshall's house) is still open for tour. Plan to see it in the next couple of weeks, as I still live in Northern Virginia following Army retirement two years ago. I agree with you that MacArthur's fame is undeserved and needs relook. However, I am glad the Army had Marshall. He was absolutely the leader we needed. I particularly loved walking the "Marshall Corridor" in the Pentagon (5th Corridor on 3rd Deck), which was adjacent to the corridor with portraits of the Army Chiefs of Staff (6th Corridor, same Deck). There seemed to be an unspoken truism for senior Army leaders, "You might be an Army Chief of Staff and get you portrait on the wall, but you'll never be George C. Marshall." All that said, a real tragedy of this era (WWII) is the pettiness of interservice rivalry.
It's fascinating to see the (obvious - totally agree) point made that the Japanese Army was dependent on the Japanese Navy when you consider the tremendous antipathy and rivalry between those services throughout the war. I wonder to what degree the loss of Japanese sea control had on IJA planning as the war progressed?
It had to have substantial impact. Courses of Action (COAs) substantially reduced. I think in retrospect the IJA understood the importance of the IJN, but rather than saying "we should have paid more attention to this," their attitude was "the IJN just didn't care or wasn't trying as hard as we were." In other words, they blamed it on lack of moral aggressiveness.
