Admiral King was right about (Almost) everything-Episode 111 

Retired Jarhead (US Marine) here. While I like to think I know far more about the US Navy during WW2 then 95% of jarheads this series is dramatically expanding that knowledge . Thanks! And keep up the good work.

Delaying the beginning of convoying off the US East Coast was a serious mistake. It wasn't the only problem contributing to that painful time, but serious.

My dad, Sgt. James Gordon Richardson, was attached to Battery "D" AAA,Third Defense Battalion at Pearl Harbor during the attack. He said he was on his way to chapel at the shipyards when the attack began. The munitions for the 3" AA guns were on the ships. He said he took out his sidearm and began firing .I feel blessed to be able to listen to your podcasts. Thank you.

Great discussion. About the timing of Guadalcanal. It is true that the Americans were not ready. But by invading in August 1942, the Marines took the island initially at little cost and before the Japanese had completed the airstrip. Given that the battle for the island hinged on the airstrip, a good case can be made for acting when King did. In addition, the Guadalcanal action played a key role in the Australian victories in the Kokoda Trail and Milne Bay. The Japanese had to divert land forces planned for these operations to Guadalcanal. The Australians would have had a hard time if it were not for these diversions. All three of these actions have to be viewed as a whole. And while you guys did a great job on assessing King, I think the most underappreciated of America's four-star warriors, I was surprised that you did not mention King's refusal to order Atlantic Seaboard convoys in 1942. I would have liked to have heard a discussion on this.

I am disgusted that they did not defend Joe Rochefort. Joe Rochefort won the early Pacific War for Nimitz. He, from the start of his career (mid 1920's) was a crypto-analyst. Over a course of three years he learned Japanese. To further his education he was stationed in Japan. On the trip over to Japan he met a guy named Layton. Layton was also into code breaking and speaking Japanese. In the build up to Midway, in Washington, D.C. was a parallel office of Japanese codebreaking. They were competition with Nimitz' operations in Hawaii. They both read the same crypto and D.C. did not believe Rochefort's analysis about Midway. Layton, also had Nimitz' ear. Together they convinced Nimitz they were right. The rest is History. Nimitz stood up for Rochefort as much as he could. The office in D.C. was running a political campaign against Rochefort mainly because he wasn't Annapolis and because he was not a 4.0 in attire (smoking jacket, slippers). Washington had to "cover"their embarrassment that they were wrong about Midway and he was right. The guy who replaced Rochefort was a communications specialist named Redman. His admiral brother was a friend of King. King had a personal vendetta against Rochefort, because Washington was covering their butts and lying to King. Rochefort, crypto trained his entire career, bilingual in Japanese ended being put in charge of a dry dock and never went to a sea command ever. To top it off he wasn't even replaced by someone with crypto skills. That is King and Redman's doing. Nimitz' medal recommendations for Rochefort were denied by King. Just like Alan Turing (enigma), how fast we forget. Rochefort was awarded a few medals posthumously. Food for thought: How would Guadalcanal turned out if the Japanese navy kept two carriers from the Midway battle. You can thank Rochefort and his staff for that. www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/world-war-ii-profiles/rochefort-station-hypo.html

Nice to see a youtube channel that emphasizes the Pacific War for a change. Most Americans know little about that part of WW II

Even more lost in the entire history of the U.S. participation in the WW II is the Fleet Admiral who not only ranked King, but served as the highest ranking active-duty officer of the U.S. military - and who happened to be President Roosevelt's 'Chief of Staff': William D. Leahy. He stands beyond the precise remit of your 'unauthorized history' yet surely plays a role in it as well. It would be fascinating to see how you treat him.

This was probably one of the most balanced views I have heard of the controversial Admiral King. Whatever one's opinion, I think most can agree that he was a very patriotic man, a true Naval Officer of the "Old school" who was looking out for the interests of the United States as well as the Navy. The fact that President Roosevelt had confidence in him, despite his cantankerous ways speaks volumes. He may have been an SOB, but he was the right SOB for the times IMHO. Very interesting discussion. I especially appreciated the Captain's "insider" viewpoints.

Two well-educated, personable, articulate gentlemen sharing important history. Well done.

The bug of military history bites even non-service amateurs, who eventually dig deeper into the grit, background and detail. My idea of an almost perfect example is Ian Toll's history of the Navy in the eastern pacific campaigns. This series is at the same level of authority, and I continually go back to pick the brains of the hosts on details I'm foggy on. There is no comparable series that covers the entire pacific war in such depth. Thank you and keep it up.

I had a class in high school, The Naval and Military History of the United States. The teacher was a Mr. Bill Oxx. He said he was the youngest naval officer to serve in the Nuremberg trials. He was an interesting gentleman and I enjoyed that class. He would have enjoyed your discussions. ...I certainly do. I just liked and subbed to help push your content out to others. V/R, Steve

Very glad I found your channel. When I was a kid growing up, I was surrounded by WW2 and Korean War vets and unfortunately, because of my age at the time, I didn't realize what treasures I was surrounded by. Fortunately though I did get to hear about a fair amount of stories from time to time and it was amazing what these people endured during that time period. Sure wish I could wind the clock back and have more in depth discussions with these great people.

Admiral King once said this about dealing with the media - don't tell them anything, then tell them you won

It's funny how people only want to hear about Battleship Confrontations when there were equally action packed Destroyer vs Destroyer battles, even Cruiser on Cruiser actions that deserve remembering. I guess it's just like boxing, the Heavyweight guys get all the kudos..

My understanding from reading Jonathon Parshall, is that Nimitz bascially had to sandbag King to get his to support to go to Midway. Not only that but Nimitz had to cut protocols to get the intelligence about the Midway attack, because once it came from DC, it was late, or washed.

Great episode guys thanks for that!

King also realized that any British interests in the pacific would necessarily have colonial overtones. Later this would become "self determination except east of Suez," a famous quote.

The rumor of the vendetta against McVay III was due to the letter of reprimand from McVay II when he was a junior officer and was caught with a woman on board his ship. The rumor was started by McVay senior as there was no other explanation for his pushing for the Courts-martial when even the captain of the Japanese sub said zig-zaging would not have prevented the sinking. To this day I wonder how he became so powerful with all the things he did.

He made big plans with meager forces because he expected the ships to be manned by sailors like him.

You guys are doing a great job with these videos

Great series so far. Looking forward to finishing it in the coming days.

Incredible knowledge and awareness of the Pacific campaign. These guys are truly amazing. Thank you.

King's big failure, imo, is neglecting ASW off the Atlantic seaboard in early 1942, which caused enormous losses in shipping.

You guys are great! I love your shows!

Learned a lot in this one guys. Thanks

I think King was also wrong about Frank Jack Fletcher. Yup, I'm one of the John Lundstrom disciples on that item, lol. (Lundstrom's "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral", btw, is a superb read not just for specifics on Fletcher himself, but in the process of telling that story, is itself an excellent discussion of the 1942 carrier war in general). IMO a bit of larger context was missed while discussing King's qualification in aviation. Right around that time in the late 1920s, Congress passed a reasonable-enough law that naval aviation commands - including aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders - had to be commanded by naval aviators. Okay, fair enough, but there was one problem...naval aviation was still so new that there weren't yet any true career-long naval aviators actually senior enough in rank for these major commands, especially 30K-ish ton ships like Lexington and Saratoga. And there would not be for years. So there were a LOT of surface destroyer/battleship-type officers suddenly going through aviation training in mid/late career. Ernest King was part of that larger trend. It wasn't just that these surface-fleet guys finagled their way into aviation solely through ambition (although obviously that played a large part too)...the Navy NEEDED a cadre of such officers for more than a decade. I've read that Commander R.K. Turner was in King's same flight-school class. William Halsey and John S. McCain are two more examples. Yeah, the "Johnny Come Lately's" were resented by the true career aviators, but there wasn't much of a way around it...they were the best - well, only - solution available for a relatively small but critical officer-management personnel issue from the late 1920s through the beginning of the war. And there was a "domino effect" as well....by 1941/42, now some of these "true" aviators have gotten through or into carrier command as CAPTs, but there's still very few who've actually made flag rank yet. If one wonders why so many 1942 carrier task forces were commanded by "black shoe" admirals like Spruance, Fletcher, Wilson Brown, and Thomas Kinkaid, well, a scarcity of readily-available aviation admirals was one factor.

Great episode!

Good Presentation. I am surprised the part about King having doubts about Nimitz was not discussed. My view has always been that King was most heavily in planning and strategy while Nimitz was the man that executed the plans.

Yes. Until recently, I had never heard of him. What a guy. Also, I did see a picture of him smiling.

Thanks, good job gentlemen.

You guys I love watching

Gentlemen: Another excellent episode. Well done! Thank you.

Thank you for setting right the narrative of King's leadership and essential contribution to the enormity of the U.S. Navy's growth to become the undisputed master of the seven seas. I am tired of the carping about u boats and such. Not that the losses sustained on the eastern seaboard were not worthy of remembrance. But, come on, the fleet that sailed into Tokyo Bay in September 1945 was the greatest achievement in naval history. And COMINCH was King, and thus nobody else deserves the ultimate credit for that triumph.

Thanks a lot for your great effort.

I have always been much more interested in the European Theater WWII till I found your series. I find every minute of all your videos so far to be interesting. WOW

I’m so glad I found this podcast. I forget how I stumbled upon it, may have been searching Guadalcanal. Sadly I’ll be caught up and current in no time then I’ll have to wait a week in between videos.

Interesting episode and thoroughly enjoyed the discussion. Was most interested in your comment that Guadalcanal was too early. Agree that no one had a crystal ball that would have predicted how persistently the Japanese would react to take it back. The converse of that is what would it have been like to invade the island if Henderson Field had been an operational Japanese airbase? Perhaps the move to invade was to deny this - not only as a threat to cutting off the direct route from US to Australia - but also having to deal with it; as the Japanese later had to as an American airbase.

Symonds, & Ian Toll (& Hornfisher) included King's early heavy handedness for the first year in the Pacific

Great video, love the channel.

I’ve learned so much from this podcast it’s just ridiculous.

I think the best thing I could say about you two is that I would love to sit down and have a beer with you guys and talk history. Could not imagine a better time!

David Kohnen at the Naval War College has written a three volume on King. Unfortunately, he is having difficulty finding a publisher.

You guys are great! The best place to get the skinny! Thank you Gentlemen!

The phrase Hair Fire brought back a memory. A phrase that had oft' been used after I left submarine duty (short time compared to Mr. Toti) was August Hair Fire. It always happened in August back then.

Love it you guys are great. Thank you for the informative show😎

Before seeing this presentation the only thing I knew about Admiral King was his name. Concerning Captain McVeigh, I understand that Condition Yoke was not fully set and USS Indianapolis was not zigzagging when she was attacked and sunk. Still, I think he was scapegoated to cover up for failures higher up. I’m sure you guys will cover this in detail later on. I really enjoyed this discussion. Thanks for starting to bring this relatively obscure personage to life.

Thanks!

The timing of the Canal in 1942, Was there ever a good time. As you both stated in the program the Japanese were only going to get stronger. Had the Japanese made another major push in 1942, well we would have had to counter. The canal would have waited until 43, how well defended could it have been then? I was just a GMG2 71-75, but I consider myself well read on the Pacific war. regarding the USS Indianapolis, I have always been dumbfounded as to how the Captain was found guilty of the loss of that ship. Great show thank you.

Liked the commentary very much. The comentators seem well-informed and truly interested in the subject matter. I've read many treatments of King. Seth & Bill touched on most of the important issues surrounding his "colorful" wartiime career. Look forward to more topics from the Pacific war.

About 25 years ago I read King’s autobiography. It was interesting, but the thing that I remember most about the book was it was the only autobiography I ever read that was written in 3rd person.

As I understand history, King was an ardent Anglophobe. Thus, he refused to take the advice of the Commonwealth about convoys and thereby condemned countless American merchant seamen to death by u-boat in 1942. We had had two years of fighting the Natis in the Atlantic and our experience, in King's eyes, amounted to nought. This might be an interesting angle to explore.

Really informative regarding Admiral King and comments about him from other senior officers.

Thanks

Very good job. Concerning the timing of the Guadalcanal campaign, you guys seem to forget that Japan had a LOT of influence on that. The US needed to keep the Japanese from building an airfield there, so it was a case of, ready or not, we had to go.

If you want to take another swipe at douggie you can talk about how Norfolk houses the MacArthur Presidential Library…..

thank you

Love the dark (Navy Blue) covers. Wish we had them during my brief time.

Great podcast! True, eye-opening discussion on Ernest King's contribution to winning WW2. Please comment on his apparently ineffective anti-submarine strategy, against the U-boats, off the eastern shore of the US, where the Germans sunk a large number of ships with apparent ease. Looking forward to your next podcast!

I really admire how aggressive our top Navy brass was during the Pacific war--pressure and gaining /retaining initiative was exactly the right strategy. Sure he was a meanie, who got things done. Administrative is a word for a lot of nut and bolt logistics; it takes a sharp intellect to handle all of it.

All served from beginning to end.

Thank you gents. Bit of a latecomer, but trawling through your excellent content. It makes me look forward to otherwise mundane household tasks now, because it's become enjoyable with you guys chatting in the background. Not heard of the acronym CINCUS before, and initially can well understand the desire for change. Having thought about it for a while I kind of like it though. It seems an appropriately Laconic response by a Navy to give when asked to surrender!

An amazing admiral just like myself.

Great episode gentlemen. A great source on King is the book ‘The Admirals’. It really goes into King and his career and success as CNO. I know we may not have been fully ready for Guadalcanal but neither were the Japanese.

Mk 14 torpedo ... Sorry you missed the boat, not right about that. Excellent audio quality, something that too many others fail to do on this platform.

Difficult to understand not addressing the criticism of King for the eastern seaboard "second happy time" U-boat successes in this cast, it's the main historical black mark often blamed on his command

King also helped Kenny get through the redtape goop pile, enabling special supplies to get to Kenny's Airforce..leading to bombers being turned in strafing nightmares..

Everyone know about King's hatred for the British, but fewer know about him hating on Macarthur and Bureau of Ordinance even more than he hates the British, for MacArthur he did his damnest to not having the Navy and Marines to go through Mac's head on assault on Rabaul (which was ludicrous), that's why he moved the boundaries of Guadalcanal area of operations into Navy's SoPac Command not Mac's SoWestPac Command. Also for Leyte Gulf he and Nimitz would never let Mac gains control or authority of the Fast Carrier Task Force (TF38/58), Mac eventually settled with Kinkaid's older standard battleships, some cruisers and the escort carriers, that is why there was a conflict of command and this problem shows lack of unify overall commander of Leyte operations which was then evident when Halsey steamed north with all his force without telling Kinkaid where he was going and never let him know there's no US surface force guarding Bernardino Strait.

When Admiral King was a midshipman at Annapolis he conspired with a couple of other classmates to tutor the classmates who were struggling before exams and were especially interested in the classmates who were being targeted by instructors bent upon failing them. None of his classmates failed. His daughter said that he had two moods: angry and enraged.

When asked about his meteoritic rise in the ranks to Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, King stated, “When the bullets start to fly, they come looking for the sons of bitches".

Good discussion. But if anyone wants a truly great overview of his career I recommend a video from Drachnifel. Thorough view and goes over well about how he turned a third rate navy into a world dominating navy. His subordinates Lee and Nimitz did him well too.

Guadalcanal was King's finest hour. Midway gave us the breathing room to do something aggressive, and King's decision to invade NOW (not later when we were stronger), when the Japanese possessed greater surface assets, was the key. The Japanese were out of balance because of their loss of most of the Combined fleet's flight decks, and King's brilliant mind sensed that THIS site was where the Japanese could be bled. In another two months the airfield at Guadalcanal would have been finished, the number of defenders would have increased A LOT, and the marines may not have been able to do the job. Timing here, is crucial. The distance the Japanese land-based air assets had to travel to reach Henderson was central to the plan, and we should have been able to track surface forces (even Cruiser 8), too. Some missteps and Japanese tenacity kept things in doubt for a good while. Guadalcanal, and the US industrial capacity, sealed the deal. If the first thing any American reads about the Pacific war is Morison, you won't have an inaccurate view of King. He loved Nimitz and Spruance and is (in my view) unfair to Jack Fletcher, but Morison's King seems fair to me.

The metaphor between Apollo 13 and the early Pacific campaign had been made by director Gene Kranz. All of his systems station chiefs said they had all but crashed, and the infighting started & Kranz had it . " Alright!! What systems work!?" And completely redirected operations towards a goal of survival and returning to earth 🌎

Admiral King called for the capture of Guadalcanal at the right time. 1. The island was on the border of the Japanese empire. Far from their main forces. 2. Our ships could sail out side of Japans patrol areas to resupply and support. 3. It was a burr under the saddle and a distraction from Japans plan. Forcing them into battle on our terms vs their terms. 4. We could do it without the Army and MacArthur! The Navy could do it with out the Army s interference. 5. It came at a time where the Japanese had run out of there planned war plans and we're involved in consolidation of their conquests. 6. Later Japan would be able to call in surplus troops from settled down parts of the empire.

- And in the Atlantic, King was criticized for not adopting convoying in the Atlantic from the beginning of the war. The U-boats caused huge losses in 1942, but in all fairness, the US wasn't ready to adopt convoying at a large scale, and holding up shops until convoys could be organized would have imposed significant costs in delays of material. Once he had the opportunity to accumulate sufficient forces in quantity and quality, King's "10th Fleet" did very well in handling the U-Boat menace.

Thank-you... King : Semper Iratus.. Capt, It was Gene Krantz; What do we have that still works.

Yes the margin was thin for the Guadalcanal campaign - But from the point of view where Admiral King was sitting in July-august 1942, it looked better than it would look after early American losses in the campaign. King was presented with the opportunity to get a strategically located island with an almost completed - but not well-defended airfield. He had temporary superiority in aircraft carriers, with 4 at his disposal. Japan only had two fleet carriers. I don't think King should have anticipated the disastrous one-sided loss at Savo Island. Even more-so, the loss of the Wasp, North Carolina (albeit temporary) and O'Brien in one torpedo salvo by the I-19 was a fluke that substantially changed the balance of power in the seas off of Guadalcanal. If the US would have at least held its own at Savo Island, and if the Wasp and North Carolina would have been available for the rest of the campaign, things would have been easier for the Americans.

General MacArthur also had a role in island hopping, it wasn't just Admiral King alone. It seems both MacArthur and King had poor personalities but were well endowed in strategic thinking.

Seems he was the expert in amphibious landings. Still use his uncanny accuracy in amphibious landings for casualties, still in use today. Wrote the book on modern warfare.

1st boots in Marine corps history are the Edson's. Halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli and the pepper wars in-between.

Okay, this desert rat, Army Vet, Air Force Brat (so far away from you Navy types) didn’t know anything about this cat! Thanks for expanding my knowledge 👍🫡

When you study the war college and the surgers vs. the island hoppers its very interesting. One school of thought was to hit Japan as quickly as possible, while the others were more conservative. These studies were going on during the 30’s especially after Japan shows its aggression toward Korea and China. When they played out the surge doctrine the losses were really surprising with the technology we had. They didn’t play out the development of the kamikaze which may have changed some of our notions about charging across the pacific….

I think the next major naval battles will be disgusting. Weird and very unexpected things will happen and it won't be good. We will have to learn again, but will we have the industry this time around in order to compete and conquer?

Interestingly, Admiral Doenitz used the US Pacific carbon-copy of his U-boat tactics to escape punishment at Nuremberg.

After watching the Nimitz and King episodes back to back this one on King seems a bit unbalanced to me, I would expect the Nimitz session to be much longer instead the situation was reversed. I was left a bit confused as to who the author of the island hopping campaign was. Drachinifel’s session on King is about the same length and is much more informative IMO.

Excellent analysis.

I'm just wondering, with respect to the timing of the Guadalcanal campaign, if it wasn't due to a need to have a campaign on the drawing board and, thereby, being able to show a need for materiel in the Pacific theater, and not all the available material going to the North African campaign.

Why no comment about how Adm Leahy influenced the actions of King and dispositions of forces?

Island hopping was of necessity due to lack of resources - ETO first was eating all logistics and of design if you consider Japs lines of communications. King was caustically toxic. Would have made a typical USMC Officer.

King was a terrific Admiral the Pacific war region. Yet, his anger with Churchill and his mistakes in the Atlantic region were disastrous.

JOHN TOWERS is the father of U.S. Naval Aviation - excellent monography on him exists by Reynolds 600pp, (IMMSMC). Was in Nimitz ' s close staff throughout the war, but never in combat cmd cause N would not risk his ....services.

I agree regarding King and the Pacific War management, as well as his being wrong about McVeigh. I realize it's out if the channel's scope, but how would you respond to those who say he totally botched things on our eastern coast, resulting in the sinking if so many merchant ships early in the war?

Re Adml King's opinions on landing in Europe, some thoughts - Only after 'Black May', 1943, were Atlantic convoys sufficiently safe from U-boats for troops and supplies. Air superiority prevented air attack on shipping and landings. Developments before D-Day landings, random order... -Numbers of landing craft and ships -Mulberry harbours -PLUTO fuel pipeline -'Hobart's Funnies', modified tanks, incl DD (swimming) Shermans, Crocodiles, AVRE, bridging, ditch-filling, mine clearing -One million air photos -Locations of shoreline radars determined for attack from air -FUSAG deception plan -Bombing railways and road bridges over rivers to delay re-inforcements I am sure there are others from US Air Force, Army and Navy

Must watch an episode every night, I learn so much that I had so little knowledge of and for that I thank you all, one point.....could you organize them so we can better follow them, a matrix or alpha listing would do wonders, thanks again.

What about the east coast resistance to convoys and losses to u-boats?? However, great series- keep it going

You guys are so outstanding with this podcast/YT channel, I can’t get enough of your intelligent conversation. I normally agree with 98% of the things you say, but I have to take exception to your assessment of Admiral King in so far as something he failed to do; Acting to counter the German navy’s Operation Drumbeat in a more reasonable period of time. Admiral King dithered in responding effectively to the almost year long wholesale slaughter of U.S. and Allied merchant tanker shipping along the North American Eastern Seaboard during the earlier part of the war in the Atlantic (The U-Boat’s 2nd “happy time”). How much of this foot dragging by King was a product of his obvious Anglophobia and refusal to accept assistance and support from the British is debatable, but it was certainly a factor. A very dark stain on King’s record as far as I’m concerned. And I’m a little surprised you guys never discussed the issue in this particular video edition.

It is very Clear that Bill and Seth's favorite major actors in the Pacific War are Admiral King and Nimitz. Almost gushing over King.

I question whether delaying Watchtower would have been better. In a month or so the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal would have been complete an operational, as would the seaplane base on Tulagi. The US would not have had any more carrier aviation in October than in August. Yes there would have been time for more thorough training but Ghormley would still have been in charge All in all it is at least questionable.

At least King wanted to do something while many were saying to wait.

Credit for Guadalcanal goes to the on-site commanders. King threw a fit because of the emphasis on Europe. We were not prepared for the campaign. It was put together on the fly. Credit the commanders in the area, Vandergrift, Fletcher. His personal bias against some commanders & rudness to allies helped nobody.

Drachinifel has a great and amusing episode on Adm King....worth the watch. Title: Fleet Admiral Ernest King - Semper Iratus