Aspasius and later commentators on perfect and imperfect virtues: can an action exhibit a virtue, and another action exhibit it to an even greater extent? @PhiloofAlexandria
The degrees of correctness ( Burkina Faso's capitale example) don't they depend on our subjective scale of value ( it's better to say cairo than to say egypt if Burkina Faso's capitale question was posed ) ?
Brilliantly concise as usual professor. Can that definition of a perfect virtue apply to things other than "actions"? How would you define that if it is possible?
I suppose you could apply it to persons-Aristotle does, imagining a person of perfect virtue-but the only candidates for having it might be divine beings. I've wondered what Aquinas meant in the Fourth Way when he speaks of perfections; maybe he has in mind all good qualities, but maybe it's just the perfect virtues. There is a maximal justice, for example, but maybe there isn't a maximal generosity. I'm not sure what to say about this yet.
I think that sometimes some answers to question may be more correct than others. For example, if someone is asked: “What is the capital of South Africa?”, then if this person answers either Pretoria, Cape Town or Bloemfontein, he’ll be correct, but naming all these 3 cities is the most correct answer. But this is only possible when the question has some flaws.
I've wondered about this, having done trivia contests for several years and seeing how frequently judges have to face the issue of whether to count a borderline answer correct.
Thank you Prof. Bonevac. Your presentation makes me think of Kant’s notion of Perfect/Imperfect duties: I wonder if there’s an overlap? I’ve heard it said one must take a stand on a single ethical theory at the end of the day because they must contradict but perhaps Aspasius opens a door here.
I've wondered about that. Aspasius, writing about Aristotle, doesn't discuss it, but the terminology is suggestive. Here's the idea I've been contemplating: perfect duties (e.g., to keep a promise) are normally perfect in Aspasius's sense. Can I keep my promise, but be such that I could have kept it more? I don't think so. (Maybe I could have kept it better, if my promise was to do something and I could have done that better, but that seems different from keeping it more.) To take a negative case: I have a perfect duty not to murder anyone; can I fulfill that duty, murdering no one, but have had the option of fulfilling it more? The answer seems to be no. Imperfect duties are different. I might develop my talents, or help people in need, but have had the option to develop more talents, or those talents more, help more people in need, or help the people I helped more, etc.
@@PhiloofAlexandria Excellent response - thank you for taking the time, Prof. Bonevac. Not to belabour, and no need to respond, but it seems to cash out even further in Berlin’s Freedom From/Freedom To distinction in a way as well.
In my opinion, it’s wrong to say that saving people from burning house is less virtuous that analogous action in more dangerous situation. In both cases person acts in the most possibly courageous way. Some people may act courageously in some situations, but cowardly in the others. However this doesn’t make their courageous actions worse.
I meant to contrast two possible courses of action in the same situation, but I didn't explain that part very clearly. When there are different situations, I agree with you.
Justly? Courageously? Who gets to decide? Who gets to set the "meaning"? Could one meaning be more meaningful than another? What meaning is more meaningful, that the morning star and evening star are the same star; or that the morning star is not a star, but the planet Venus? Which meaning is more correct and why? Certainly both are meaningful, but is one meaning more true, or is "truth" dependent on meaning? Definition and truth are fine words, so is meaning. Life and death and convenience and inconvenience are not measured by words but by sacrifice, effort, sweat. Piety and religios duty are a form of sacrifice. Job performed all his duties to God, did that protect him from suffering? Was his duty imperfectly performed? Did he miss the mark or the region? What philosopher could tell God what was the perfect sacrifice? Indoctrination by man is not indoctrination by Nature and its god.
