Interesting points on the historical and normative influences on meaning and value. Still, where does the biological influence come into this picture of nihilism? Because as evolved creatures with animal instincts-our evolved desire for love, social relations, and goal attainment-our actions and values seem to necessarily have a biological substrate, even if the objects and nuances of the passions are enculturated.
Worth reading Bernard Williams' paper(s) on this. In his book 'Making Sense of Humanity'. Also, look at Geuss' analysis of 'needs' in his political philosophy.
If parts of life and life in whole doesn’t matter, then there is no matter to take up with nihilism. If you are bothered by nihilism, then there is the proof you don’t really think aspects of life have no value. The task then is perhaps to work out what else may be cared about, or may have been cared about, using ourselves as the measure of the matter, just as we did even originally when we perhaps took issue with a supposed meaningless to life. :)
I think that Geuss misses the point, his focus on normative (subjective) issues is not the problem; the problem lies with positive (objective) issues. I am not entirely sure why he chooses to frame it this way. Personally, I don't have an issue with adopting normative aspects to form a worldview, but this doesn't mean this is any more defensible than some other competing view. He is spot on about the perjorative connotation to the term.
You missing the point about normativity. If you want to hide behind relativistic cop-out that's predicated on absolute objective truth being attainable, that's your business. His point is that everybody has normative values, even if they're distasteful or idiosyncratic, so despite any nihilistic posturing, one's actions will be guided by some kind of normative framework. Here's something to at least give you the best explanation for why hiding behind metaphysical questions where morality is concerned, is silly: philosophybites.com/2012/03/ronald-dworkin-on-the-unity-of-value.html
I listened to the audio clip, and I respectfully disagree. Just for the record, I am a materialist who gives metaphysics no credence. I agree that everyone has normative values. In fact, that was my original claim: any and all moral systems are necessarily normative because there is nothing else for a moral to be along this dimension. My point was that, being normative, Dworkin’s opposition notwithstanding, no one claim is superior to another, as inconvenient for jurisprudence as that might be. One may create laws, mores, and customs, and one may enforce infractions, but they can only be judged relative to the imposed framework, and the framework cannot be proven to be superior to any other framework. Following the Emotivists, to argue that a thing is ‘right’ is to say, ‘I agree with that thing’, and to say something is ‘wrong’ is, following Ayer’s perspective, akin to saying ‘Boo thing. I don’t like that thing’, and nothing more. I’ve got to say that Dworkin talked in circles. In the 1-minute clip he posits that just because you have conviction, it doesn’t follow that you are right. I agree with this. Just because you can’t get unanimous consensus doesn’t mean you are wrong. I agree with this. Where he goes off the rails is that, given the previous statements, there is a right, and you just need to think about it. My response is: so, and? Right, justice, liberty, goodness, and so on are non-ontic concepts, constructs of language: figments. They are amorphic, and a precise and workable definition will never be attained. In the same manner as an Impressionistic painting cannot withstand scrutiny, as it loses form upon too close an inspection, so these other non-ontic terms fail to convey content with anything more than a cursory glance. These terms are emotive and attempt to encapsulate the emotional content in a conceptual noun, which is much like trying to explain with words to another how to recreate a painting s/he has never seen. It may approach the original intent, but it will never actually be a representative copy.
I think there is a misunderstanding on both your parts. His focus is NOT some subjectivism about normativity. He is a contextualist, which is why he critiques positions that arise from decontextualising and flattening history. Read his work and you'll see where he is coming from. The position Bry Willis is taking is precisely the one he is calling into question. The kind of Emotivism that Willis is talking about assumes the universality of a decontextualised position on 'emotion'. The historical conditioning of this or that concept shows us a very, very different picture. In other words, what people will say 'Boo!' or 'Hurrah!' to is subject to a great deal of historical, and contextual change, which brings into question the very idea that an 'emotivism' is the only antecedent condition for understanding 'morality' or normativity.
