Richard Frank and the National Museum of the Pacific War gave a webinar on October 24, 2019 on the Battle of Leyte Gulf. This webinar was recorded and is now available to you
For what it’s worth.... I consider Richard Frank an accomplished historian of the Asia-Pacific war.However.... The historian H.P. Willmott offers a much superior analysis of the command errors of the Battle of Leyte Gulf than Richard Frank has offered here. In fairness to Frank, a book is a far better format for this topic than any oral presentation could be. The judgements of history are often harsh: the judgements of MILITARY history are especially so. Willmott’s criticisms of Haley’s leadership are far harsher than those of Frank, and much more damning. I my view appropriately so. The extraordinary developments in carrier warfare had passed him by, and by this point in the war he was something of a dinosaur. This does not negate Haley’s contributions earlier in the war. As an aside, I think history has been much kinder and fairer to Halsey than it was to Admiral Jack Fletcher; a much maligned figure in the Asia-Pacific War.( A salute to historian John Lundstrom for setting the record re. Admiral Fletcher).
I completely agree with assessment of the preceding video and your views on Admiral Halsey’s late war performance. May I add, Halsey did nothing to improve his reputation as a very mediocre senior naval commander in those final years of the war by allowing his fleet to be twice rundown by killer typhoons resulting in several destroyers sunk and over 800 sailors drowned. What is really the overriding head scratcher and best evidence that the leadership system was (is) open to some degree of manipulation is the fact they awarded Admiral Halsey that very rare fifth star prior to his retirement. I especially agree with you concerning the shabby treatment Admiral Frank Fletcher has received at the hands of history. The duplicity from the likes of his contemporaries; specifically Admiral Richmond Turner (a personality who seemed to have his own flaws to answer for) and the self-promoting government appointed naval “historian” Sam Morrison was shameful. Jon Parshall, one of the two fine authors of the bestselling book on the Battle of Midway, Shattered Sword, has on numerous occasions publicly stated how terribly Admiral Fletcher had been treated subsequent to his relief of command following the initial actions in and around the Solomon Islands in 1942. Parshall has said, and I paraphrase, Fletcher is one greatest unrecognizable U.S. military heroes this nation has ever produced. And I state…, and I don’t have to paraphrase, William Halsey was one of the most overrated war heroes this nation has ever produced.
My dad was very busy during this battle, flying an F6F with VF-19 from USS Lexington (Halsey's group). On 24 Oct., he shot down 3 Japanese fighters (2 Tojo in the morning; 1 Zero in the afternoon), and on 25 Oct., he put a 500-lb SAP bomb into the Zuiho, materially helping to sink that Japanese light carrier. (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edwin_Foresman_Schoch)
Many differences between Halsey and Spruance have been pointed out, e.g., Spruance probably would have kept the fleet close to the beachhead despite the danger of attack, and the Japanese knew how aggressive Halsey was and so sent their remaining carriers as bait to draw him away from the beachhead. Halsey saw during his raids after taking over the fleet from Spruance (August 1944?) how weak the Japanese forces in the area were and thus recommended bypassing Mindanao and invading Leyte instead. Question: it was unusual for a tactical-level commander to recommend strategic-level policies; would Spruance have felt it was appropriate for him to make such a recommendation?
Anyone have any idea of whether Oldendorff could have returned to the beachs if they had not pursued IJN forces after their near destruction at Surigao?
Although the invasion troop transports had mostly left by Oct. 24, it was still necessary to supply the troops ashore and sinking all the supply ships or causing them to leave would have set the invasion back drastically and perhaps necessitated withdrawing the troops. Don't minimize what would have been the effects of Kurita getting through to the beachhead. Off-the-wall comment: there was no combat in Leyte Gulf, why did the name of the battle change from "Battle FOR Leyte Gulf" to "Battle OF Leyte Gulf?"
I don't care how many carriers Halsey knew were up north, he made the flawed assumption that the center force was beaten and abandoned common sense. Even with Musashi clearly sinking and Yamato appearing significantly damaged. Like sure, chase the carriers but for gods sake leave a force behind. Give me Spruance.
