Naval Heritage | Jonathan Parshall: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway 

thank you.

Thank you sir.

@Jason Forbes Current project is a new history of the year 1942, all theaters. It's a heavy lift, and it's taking a while... ;-)

I discussed the battle of Midway with my son and committed the error regarding the Japanese CAP being too low to stop the divebombers. I wish I had watched this video beforehand! Outstanding stuff!

Thank you!

I was thinking the same thing. Then I realized 112,491 people viewed at least part of this presentation since then. That's a pretty big lecture hall.

i notice that also.

I read your comment as a had started to watch this presentation and struggling to become engaged. Your comment kept me going and I became fascinated with it. Thank you for that, Mr Serpent....

People would rather watch cat videos on YT...sadly.

@@jonlocke1624 But hopefully that does not apply to students, faculty, and staff at the Naval War College.

MIkuma and Mogami were cruisers of the Mogami class, they were not battleships. That fact in no way detracts from their heroism.

Remarkable! Have you read Herman Wouk's 'War and Rememberance'? One of the main characters dies under same circumstances as your relative.

Iowans at sea. Its a reality that many Iowans fought at sea. The Sullivan brothers as well. I think it deeply appropriate you remember their sacrifice by name these many decades later.

I call bs

@@kentamitchell This was my first thought, too. It's exactly the story of Warren Henry...

Your friend is a hero of the highest order. I hope there is a special place in heaven for him and all the others that fought for our way of life today.

Unfortunately it looks like they don’t make them like that anymore!! Unless it’s fighting by video and social media!!

Dad was an Em2 on the Yorktown and was in the forward elevator pump room on the bottom of the ship.They barely escaped thanks to dad I found out years later from his friends.

I do too. and he certainly has debunked a lot of myths. But I also think his dismissal of Japan's alternatives to attacking US forces as "counter factual" is not well thought out. Of course it is hindsight, but hindsight is helpful in history studies. And if Japan had just attached UK and Dutch holdings it would have had the resources it needed, especially petroleum. Sure US presence on the Philippines would have been a threat, but his claim that it would have been a "knife at the that of Japan" is hyperbole

On one hand I agree with you, having thought the same thing back in the Seventies at least. On the other hand, FDR is trying to strangle Japan and force it out of China and was achieving great success by December '41. I think the President would have awaited the use of those shipping lanes and then something else would have brought us into the war-imagine the sinking of one of our "peaceful destroyers" or the like. In that scenario Japan would have been utterly vulnerable. The US would never cede the Pacific to anyone. Control of that ocean has been doctrine since 1895 or so. Whatcha think?@@thecooper1073

And he does the same with his books. Military history books can make it hard to follow the action. He makes it easy. Not simplified but easy to follow.

tosius2 Great point and I would argue that the skill level to drop that "one" bomb was greater than what was achieved with the dropping of the atomic bombs. Their accomplishment was more in the laboratory not the pilot's/ bombardier's chair... I guess he had the bravery, fortitude, foresight and will (travelling to the other ships and dropping the bomb on target) to see the operation through to success.

k6151960 You have to know that Best and his wingmen were flying through some really severe (withering) flak and fire as the Akagi and all of her support ships were no doubt blasting away with everything they had and there were only three targets. Best literally dove through the jaws of death and the mouth of hell and had the focus and skill to deliver his bomb "on target". I've often wondered why he never received more recognition for his actions on that day. His quick, decisive and deadly action at precisely the correct moment is right there with Joshua Chamberlain's actions at Little Round Top during the battle of Gettysburg. Perhaps I should write a book about him

tosius2 I always thought Dick Best was amazing. He always struck me as a fierce fighter with a good head on his shoulders. I hope he and his family realized what a critical contribution he made to the war and his country. What a warrior!

Best inhaled something in his oxygen mask back on the carrier that disabled him from flying and that was the last he flew

tosius2 Steve Ewing PHD mentioned in the episode of Heroships USS Enterprise that Wade McClusky prior to spotting the Arashi in the water was searching in vain he explains that he looked down at the water to see which way the wind was blowing cause he new the Japanese carriers would have to turn into the wind to launch so when he saw the wind blowing towards the north thats the direction he took VS and VB 6 and shortly after that critical decision they spotted the Arashi and followed the destroyer and the rest is history

"Get them in a headlock. Kick the weasel snot out of 'em." Simplistic, perhaps, but essentially true.

If you haven't already, read Shattered Sword. It's a great read, and possibly the best single volume on Midway.

If Dick Best does not hit the Akagi, the Japanese Navy likely would have won at Midway.

Tellgryn not really because even if the Akagi launched its planes the IJN pilots may have hit the Yorktown themselves. It’s not a given they would have found Task Force 16 (Hornet and Enterprise) which was brilliantly positioned in back of Task Force 17. Most don’t even bring this up but it appears Task Force 17 which has the Yorktown was offered as sacrificial lambs. Now it’s hard to say if the Hiryu pilots themselves would have went after Hornet and Enterprise. They may have scored some major hits too but it would have been at a heavy cost and history showed us that it was never easy to sink a US carrier or two or three. Victory for IJN at Midway needed to include vessel vs vessel combat. The IJN had an 11 vs 0 battleship advantage. Most US historians try to downplay the battleships and say they were obsolete. They were not. The IJN had 4 fast battleships that could have easily caught wounded US carriers.

@@f430ferrari5 The position of Task Force 17 had to do with how, where and when their strike aircraft and CAP launches and recoveries occurred. Task Force 16 was further south and slightly east due to launching their strike aircraft earlier than TF 17 did and the fact that TF 16 was on a Southeastern heading to recover her strike planes. I strongly disagree with your opinion that TF 17 was offered as a sacrificial lambs.

Robert Den Dooven you have every right to disagree and I have every right to believe in what I believe in. I believe the evidence or lack of evidence on your side kind of shows who is really correct. Feel free to do research on Point Luck. Find anything where it shows where Task Force 16 and 17 were. They are rarely shown separately. Why? See map. We all know Task Force 17 departed later vs 16. It would make more sense to physically position TF 17 further east. Why have her travel further west and north? Yorktown is wounded and would take her longer to get into position. It would have been way easier for TF 16 to be positioned further West and North. But hey feel free to share whatever evidence you got. Remember. In the end the strategy worked. Also even after Yorktown got hit during the first Hiryu wave...Hornet and Yorktown could have in theory moved into those areas and Yorktown moved out. The gap between the first and second attack was an hour apart? I know we don’t like to term it this way but it is what it is. I would have done the same thing. Tough choices. The right call was made. www.google.com/search?channel=iphone_bm&source=univ&tbm=isch&q=point+luck+midway&client=safari&fir=KrREv2eV3XjV5M%252C5cpUOUFISVW47M%252C_%253BQOcjE9AXsYUDZM%252CuHzG8f_2rYMt-M%252C_%253BX0Hh73IKNDr5nM%252CDxu3LbfbofWvGM%252C_%253BN3lP3djpvEAdDM%252CsMz6gE0ymGueFM%252C_%253Bg91kM3DOz19ZfM%252CbRDcT2svhKtf2M%252C_%253BlbQ1Iy8T8X5_-M%252CpShxotVRTs9OFM%252C_%253BrPO03l53VGkTMM%252CWm7sVA0kApm4hM%252C_%253BGHnCdIi2zvWdTM%252CCOMtqiIvtpaw8M%252C_%253Bd2gMhhM3R6AueM%252C6_FhbSGncHHaSM%252C_%253BK-EwwJ-h6MhtSM%252CWm7sVA0kApm4hM%252C_%257Cbattlefield%25201942%253Bdestination%2520point%253Bdive%2520bombers%253Bpearl%2520harbor%253Bcoral%2520sea%253Baircraft%2520carriers%253Bernest%2520borgnine%253Bbattle%253Bfleet%253Bwar%2520ii&usg=AI4_-kRXWEGT4XbCdJzvS9HXWgNe_QgR1A&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjD1Oi2uqXrAhXfJzQIHeoWAWEQ7Al6BAgEEC4&biw=414&bih=833#imgrc=KrREv2eV3XjV5M

Also losing the experienced Support/Deck crews on all four of the Japanese Fleet Carriers. These deck crews were what allowed such effective coordination between the different flight decks. Japanese doctrine was set-up for a level of coordination/communication that the US Navy really didn't get until mid to late 1944. Once spotted on deck, the Japanese could create essentially a 80%-85% Alpha Strike in less that 30 minutes, frequently 15 minutes. The US really couldn't create an equivalent strike in less that 45 minutes, more likely a hour. Losing that ability hurt them badly later in the war. Edit: One thing I found interesting in Saburo Sakai's biography was that as a tier 1 pilot, he really didn't find the quality of late war American pilots to be exceptional, but he DID find them to be good & CONSISTENT ACROSS THE BOARD. Pre-war & Early war Experienced Japanese pilots were individually better, but 1 vs. 4 or 1 vs 12, with subordinate pilots with less that 50 hours of combat time were odds that just ate the IJAAF & IJNAF's lunch by late 1943. Japan just COULDN'T keep up.

ovk8102 isn’t it kind of a moot point having discussions post 1942? Even Japan and Yamamoto knew himself that they had around 6 months to a year at most.

The real meat grinder was the Guadalcanal campaign.

More Japanese flight crews were lost at Santa Cruz.

The tools of War change. The velocity of War changes. The principles of victory really don't. If you can get into the other guys decision Loop and disrupt it you're going to have a good day. If you look at the first Gulf War, we were able to get inside the decision Loop of the Iraqi Air Force and their air Defence Force making them react which takes longer then making a decision to act. If you look at the Battle of Marathon the Greeks ran down the hill and full armor hitting the Persians before they had even formed their Phalanxes. They changed the velocity of War forcing the Persians to react instead of act. The expectation was both sides form their phalanx and then March at each other and have at it. That's fine if both sides play by the same Playbook. But the Great's were using a different book. Consequently the Persian force was destroyed and forced to retreat from the Greek mainland.

navythomas8 Great to see your name there NT8! I agree Mr.Parshall is excellent!

I'll pick a fight.. Concerning the 'Battle of Midway' I ended up disagreeing with virtually all Mr. Parshalls statements. Check my (long winded..) umm.. rebuttal (in new comments..). Actually can't believe this passed the War College muster..

@@NesconProductions do you mind posting it in this thread

@@seanmac1793 Err.. didn't want to spam Jive Turkey's (to me the screen name was a bit of a tip off ;-) comment with something so long winded & why my response was brief but alluded to a more in depth response. If people judge my response worthy of further investigation it's there. Bottom line there were participating pilots on both sides of that conflict that wouldn't agree with Mr. Parshalls view of the events that transpired at the battle of Midway.

@@NesconProductions I can throw up a comment for you to copy and paste it into if your worried about it.

@@NesconProductions I expect there were participating pilots from both sides that wouldn't agree with each other (i.e. other pilots on their own side as well as their enemy's) on some details of what transpired and on what might have developed if some things hadn't transpired.

This os a rehash of PAST HISTORY. Wake yp and smell the coffee: Aircraft Carriers are now "sitting ducks" (no longer succesful determiners in a modern World War scenario. The winner will then be the one with the MISSLE TECHNOLOGY (not the number of carriers, .i.e., "TARGETS" for thjose missiles). Compare the cost and you can see that while carriers are "showy", best is to have MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION to cause all aggressors to think twice before committing "national suicide". (In the end, it may come to that if the slanderers and back-biters hold sway--for kodern H-bombs are at least 1000 timea LARGER that the Hiroshima bomb. And there are enough to turn everyu hiuman being on the planet into "toast".

@@captiveexile2670 No reason not to study history, nor does it say that there are no lessons for today to be drawn from history.

... "early 2000s" ...

No quarter means taking no prisoners and is a war crime you crass dipshit. Very juvenile view point, not to mention your idiotic fallacy in your comment.

@@-VOR Oh sweet mercy, you calling someone a 'crass dipshit' and berating them for 'idiotic fallacy' is so deliciously ironic. The phrase 'no quarter' has both exact and broad meanings, and is used interchangeably depending on context. Only a true fool would be so needlessly abusive and offensive over such a trivial thing while simultaneously displaying their own willful ignorance and misplaced arrogance.

@@Cailus3542 lol speaking of fallacies... thanks for chiming in with one

Actually his analysis was poor for a multitude of reasons..

@@NesconProductions ok, in what way?

@@davidcroft9320 A fair question.. Did not agree with a number of Mr. Parshalls assessments. First if Nagumo would have received word from Operation K that the US carriers were not at Pearl Harbor he most likely would have kept his all his aircraft in a ship attack configuration rather than land attack and searched to destroy the American taskforce(s) first. The battle of the Coral Sea weeks prior to Midway had American aircraft carriers show up unexpectedly interrupting the Japanese invasion of Port Moresby. Nagumo may have already had an idea their code may have been compromised. Destroying the American carriers remaining in the Pacific was considered 'the' top priority due to the danger their mobility & projected firepower posed. Also luring the American carriers from Pearl Harbor was a key part of the Japanese overall attack plan. This idea is strengthened by the fact Nagumo kept half his aircraft in reserve loaded with air to ship weapons when the Japanese carrier aircraft attacked Midway despite not knowing or expecting any American carriers (or major surface combatants for that matter..) to be in the vicinity so soon (earliest expected arrival from Pearl Harbor was 48 hours). A screen of Japanese subs was also utilized to detect the movement of American ships between Pearl Harbor and Midway which they fail to do so initially. After the first Japanese aircraft strike on Midway was deemed incomplete a second was ordered to knock out the runway and the decision was made to rearm the reserve aircraft to that of a land attack role. Due to a delay in the launch of one Japanese patrol aircraft (due to a catapult issue on the cruiser Tone) that subsequently spotted the Yorktown taskforce considerably later than it should have if launched on time. Combined with radio transmitter difficulties on the same patrol aircraft had dire consequences for the Japanese fleet. Half of reserve aircraft had already be switched to the land attack role before Nagumo finally learned of the Yorktown's presence. Thus the decision to have the aircraft switched back again to the ship attack role. A side-effect of this was fatigued carrier crews with weapons & fuel below decks out of their normal storage compartments hastily scattered about out in the open. Combined with flightdecks of fully armed and fueled aircraft proved a lethal combination. TBD torpedo attacks played a critical role in success in the overall American carrier strike. Their sacrifice drew down the Japanese Zero air cover down to near sea level and made them expend most if not all of their remaining ammunition. Most of these air defense fighters had landed to refuel and rearm just at the time the SBD dive bombers arrived overhead is not a false tale. What Mr. Parshall fails to mention also are the 4 separate attacks by aircraft from Midway (though ineffective at 7:10, 7:55, 8:10 & 8:20 - & all came from different altitudes) that came prior to the 3 carrier based torpedo attacks (from 9:25 to 10:00) These earlier attacks were using up the Japanese air defenses fuel and ammunition as well. Constant US attacks and surrounding air operation plus the recovery & rearming of aircraft from the first Midway strike took precious time. The first SBD's struck at 10:25 just 25 minutes after the last torpedo strike. With the time it would take to dispatch this last wave of enemy torpedo planes then land fighters to refuel & rearm while at the same time readying all the Japanese aircraft for a carrier attack mission timing wise would put the SBD dive bombers in perfect position for an unopposed strike (as reported by US flight crews that participated ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-oQjDk7HSVyA.html see from 6:30 in the video). The Japanese didn't see the attacking SBD's until they were on their attack runs & too late to effectively maneuver. Such was also confirmed by a Japanese pilot who survived the battle and the war ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-NAKs-6xEzOg.html (see Zero pilot Kaname Harada's comments from 00:24). So participants in the climatic air battle at Midway from both sides are in stark disagreement with Mr. Parshalls view & are aligned with the generally know/accepted historical record. Though it was most likely Lt. Best bomb that set the Akagi alight both of his wingmen had very near misses that damaged the ship rather severely. One of these near misses was reported as such (as written here - en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway ) "Another bomb exploded under water very close astern; the resulting geyser bent the flight deck upward in grotesque configurations and caused crucial rudder damage'. This is significant for a number of reasons. First of all if the flightdeck was sufficiently distorted the Akagi may have been unable to commence any air operations. Second if the ships rudder were severely damaged and the ship were turning (as it surely was) it would be likely jammed (much like the fate of the Bismark when it was hit by a Swordfish torpedo). See here also www.midway42.org/TheBattle/IJNCarrierDamage.aspx. The reason this is of critical importance is in two fold. First combat laden aircraft need a carrier to be facing & moving at speed into the wind to create enough extra lift for the aircraft to successfully take off. The other problem a jammed rudder caused when the Akagi was hit would mean the captain couldn't maneuver the ship to assist in firefighting to blow the smoke and flame a certain direction, say away from the ship. Needless to say the distortion to the flightdeck and severe damage to the rudder would have prevented air operations from the carrier for a considerable amount of time. The U.S.S Nautilus was in the area and might have gotten a good shot at a circling/stationary Akagi or on one of the tending escorts (much like the fate of the Yorktown & escorting DD Johnson). Much may have depended if the bad American torpedoes at the time would have run true and even detonated if they hit a target, but all merely speculation now. Also the other near miss may have been responsible for flattening the Akagi conning tower but may have been merely one of the side-effects of Lt. Best direct hit (little difference in the final analysis). Seems like Lt. Best did best, but both his wingmen did their part as well kudos to all of them. Interesting footnotes in the Japanese interviews is that flight officer Harada said that his wingman was shot down by one of the TBD torpedo bombers (see starting at around 8:30 in the video). I've never heard/read before of this & to my knowledge such was never credited to one of the US torpedo bombers. Since almost all of the torpedo bombers were shot down it the attack the torpedo bomber that shot the Zero was probably shot down a short time later and the kill never reported. It should also noted before the SBD's made their fateful dives (considering the extensive destruction of US carrier torpedo planes, Midway's aircraft & ground targets from the first aerial strike) the Japanese were winning the battle rather decisively. In closing I'd hope in the years since this presentation was given in 2014 (now 2019) Mr. Parshall has continued to refine his understanding of the battle which I frankly have never shared. My knowledge of the battle came mostly from an outstanding paperback book - The Battle of Midway by Donald S. Sanford circa 1976. The book didn't deal in hypothetical theories, just the facts & events surround the battle. Probably my favorite book of all time & read it more times than I could count.

@@NesconProductions i am not seeing your comment can you repost it please

@@NesconProductions her preferably

I disagree. The real back breaker was Midway of course. Had the IJN won then there would have been no battles down south. The area of future battles would have been around Hawaii. Also there was no way the IJN could achieve a decisive victory unless they made much better use of their surface ships in combination with their carriers. The US Navy War College declassified vid even states this so it’s always interesting how folks like Parshall never focus in on this.

Harold Moore gave a lecture on LZ X Ray during the 1CD Reuinion in 1995 at FT Hood. He gave the lecture, and then said we were released unless we wanted to participate in an after lecture talk. I was in 1-7. 2-7 was there too. When he said that, 2-7 as a unit got up and filed out. We stood fast. He stood and watched silently as 2/7 filed out. After they had left, he said; "That's why they will always be 2-7" There's a difference between the two, even at the time. LZ Albany is there. There's not a question about it. Anyone that has anything that they are willing to offer is worth being listened to is worth being listened to. BTW; I was a Medic....I went to basic at FT Knox. :)

Garryowen!

I don't think the public is allowed onboard the NWC for these lectures.

Recall what Gen. Patton told his Third Army men about patriotism. It was not dying for your country. It was make the other poor SOB die for his country. The Japanese lost more quickly because their best thought it was their duty to die in combat even when their deaths accomplished little or nothing.

Those are not really the reasons. You’re looking from a perspective of a “long term” war which the IJN had no intention of fighting a long time war. So the analysis must be within only the first 6 months to a year.

I've read Bywater's book. It opened with a Japanese sneak attack, a bloody debacle of the US trying to take the Bonins (Iwo Jima), and a climatic clash of battleships at Yap.

Were the battles described involving carriers?

The climb rate of Zeroes is one factor of many, and is likely a best case rating. For example , a truck with a lot of miles is not going to tow as much as a new, well-tuned truck.

I believe he said "refreshing" malted beverages. But I agree with your comment. Children today are taught ideology, not history. They are are ignorant of how much they owe to the sacrifices of those who fought and died for the freedom and prosperity that they enjoy.

And they should have brought a fifth carrier to the fight! Of the two left out of the battle, one was damaged, yes, but its air contingent was largely intact. The undamaged carrier had a depleted group of fliers. Had Nagumo brought a fifth carrier, the day might have been much more costly for the USN.

I also feel this is one of the best books ive ever read! Congrats.

Scott Elmore think Vietnam and realize that logistics do not matter if the spirit to fight is gone.