Scott, Amundsen and Science: 100th Anniversary - Ed Larson (SETI Talks) 

Well if you are tired of it, it’s probably that you don’t know anything about it. Read Ranulph Fiennes book Capt Scott.

@@drstrangelove4998 Rarther than promoting a book, why don't you present your own opinions. Isn't that what comment sections are for? Enlightened me, my friend, I gladly consider differing points of view.

​@@drstrangelove4998Fiennes is the moron who claim Scott was right on man hauling because couple decades a go (1993) modern equipped, modern trained, modern doped (Norwegian again BTW) managed to cross Antarctic by hauling his own food and supplies. Give sled dogs similar boost on performance vs human 1910 vs 1993. Like giving them anabolic steroid regime and then observe which party will win. Its dogs again.

Amundsen lied to his backers and his men he said he was going north scott didnt know he was in a race Amudsen was a sly bastard

Scott States: "If the polar journey comes off, nothing, not even lost priority at the Pole, can prevent the Expedition ranking as one of the most important that ever entered the Polar regions - north or south". The Scientific part of his expedition was first class. He showed huge interest in the Scientific work, and gave it high priority. Knowing he had Amundsen as a rival, made the Scientific part even more important. His major Challenge comes in his ability to calculate risks, and perhaps understand the need for margins on a trip to the south pole (?). Everything from a complicated and vounerable transport regime to all the smaller details, like the bad washers and evaporation from the fuel cans to marking of the depots visualize this Point. The list of examples where his calculations for magins are low or nonexistent is long. Due to lack of polar experience (compared to Amundsen), many of his choices was sub optimal as well. With better magins he might have made it back. Perhaps Donald Rumsfeld statement can be in place here: "As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history, it is the latter category that tends to be the difficult Ones". Amundsens statement "this is not a place to take risks" makes a substantial difference.

@@bardhaug What on earth are you talking about? Scott, Amundsen, Mawson, Peary, Shackleton (insert name of your choice) took risks and made mistakes. Amundsen made a potentially fatal mistake by not realising he'd built his base camp on an ice flow - which could, on the roll of Mother Nature's dice, have broken off and god only knows what would have happened to the entire party. And what is this "polar" experience you are talking about - as though the North and South poles are somehow similar environments when you might as well say Nova Scotia is similar to the United Kingdom because it's on a similar line of latitude? Sure, Amundsen had tremendous experience in the north. But in the South? Not so much. I've no idea what "non-existant" margins you feel are important enough not to mention - as if they are somehow self-evident. How about you list some of them and we'll see if you know what you are talking about or not? Scott is open to criticism on the fuel cans. But whilst inconvenient - it wasn't make-or-break. Primarily because there was sufficient time in the schedule to compensate. Scott's biggest mistake was in failing to recognise that his team's condition was deteriorating exponentially between the ascent of the Beardmore and their arrival at the pole. Despite pulling a relatively light sled they struggled tremendously in cold conditions and lower oxygen at 10,000 feet. If Scott didn't recognise this alarming deterioration Wilson certainly should have. Almost immediately after turning for home you begin to hear ominous references to "cold feet" and frostbite. The biggest single issue which effectively sealed their doom was the deterioration and expiry of first Evans and then Oates. Far too much time was lost walking at the speed of the slowest member of the party. It's something of a mystery what precipitated Evans' alarming collapse. Some have suggested he might have suffered a brain haemorrhage after one of several heavy falls. I think it's more likely he had reached a point of physical exhaustion. He was a large man and such tend to burn out quicker than those of shorter and lighter builds (Bowers - who was the fittest member of the team - being the most obvious example). On any expedition into extreme environments (Everest, pot-holing in the really deep cave systems etc.) the rule is simple: if you are injured you risk the lives of everyone else. But what was Scott supposed to do? Administer a lethal injection? Leave Evans out in the cold? Same with Oates - whose feet were already going on the plateau with hundreds of miles remaining. Had Scott been a more ruthless man he would have cut the men free and doubtless been home in time to catch the ship. But he was a human being - and we shouldn't hold that against him. Let us not forget that years earlier he, Shackleton and Crean(?) had made it back despite Shackleton being delerious with scurvy. But not in those temperatures (which were *extremely* unusual compared to a hundred years of met data from the region). Amundsen had his own brushes with death on many occasions. And many of those situations were self-inflicted. He lived. Scott didn't. Another day - another result.

Geoff Foster which is why every little detail counts and cold weather experience 'flying hours' counts. Amundsen left food behind; he actually gained weight on the trip.

Not if your point was to mark that you had been there. An igloo will turn back into snow and ice after weathering.

I think there were two missions, one scientific- v successful; the other 'glory' & national egoism- a disaster. (A disaster repeated in the trenches 1914-1917, until finally they worked out what War they were fighting)

What are you talking about, you need to read something. I suggest Ranulph Fiennes Capt. Scott.

Oh. They did. It's just that everything went wrong. And the 'meeting party' failed to meet them. And the had failed to bring their 'onetondepot' far down south the year before. And Scott failed to study modern methods of navigation. And they failed to mark their route properly on the way out. And they failed to the fuel front. And,........ they brought an extra man. And one didn't have ski's,........ And......

You sound like a fool. The Scott-Amundsen story was taught in schools for the best part of three decades. Whilst Scott received the bulk of the coverage - this hardly constitutes some shadowy attempt to "marginalise" Amundsen. Scott was English. It is therefore logical to assume he will receive greater coverage in his home nation. Should I claim Norwegians are attempting to marginalise Scott because they concentrate more on Amundsen? Where do you get this idea that a nation of over fifty million people have a negative opinion of Amundsen when he is universally praised for his selection of dogs for the polar journey? And for your information - dreadful decisions are commonplace in high-risk ventures such as the polar journey. Scott's are magnified because he never made it back and therefore was unable to defend himself. But Amundsen (by his own admission) made plenty of blunders, too. Failing to recognise his base camp was situated on sea ice which could break away from the ice sheet at any time and kill them all was just one of many. If Scott did make a dangerous error it was in failing to assess the condition of his men during the march over the polar plateau. Instead of following a linear trend downward extreme cold and high altitudes (10,000 feet) accelerated it into an exponential drop-off in mental and physical fitness. So much so that by the time they arrived (and suffered the psychological shock of Amundsen's presence) they were pretty much exhausted. Still, with everything against them they still could have made it back if it weren't for Evans and Oates' becoming seriously incapacitated resulting in them being forced to slow down considerably when the truth is they should have left them. Everyone knows if you get injured on dangerous expeditions you risk the lives of everyone else. From the point when Evans suffered severe frostbite to his hands and face and looked physically finished he was never going to make it back alive. The same with Oates whose feet required amputation at the very least before they reached the foot of the Beardmore. If Scott were "reckless" about human lives he would have left them behind and lived. He didn't and so he died.

@UCNTw-ESCV9goLR9MF3EZrhw Don't talk such ridiculous nonsense. Even well funded expeditions to *known* regions don't prepare for "all possible situations". Scott & Amundsen were journeying into a region about which almost nothing was known. Which left a whole lot of possibilities they may or may not have to deal with. Had they took absolutely every piece of equipment and resources necessary to address each of the known challenges they might face they'd have never reached the Beardmore. And what about the unknown possibilities? The manned space program was the most well-funded feat of human exploration in history. And yet the astronauts knew perfectly well that they were only able to address a very finite number of deviations from expected conditions before they'd expire. Exploration into the unknown is always a trade-off between mobility and weight. Sure, Scott could have doubled the fuel ration (as well as the food) - but he was already maxxed out in terms of carrying capacity. Besides, he had enough fuel to address expected conditions. What he didn't have was enough to cope with unrecorded and therefore unexpected conditions. No one had ever experienced sustained low temperatures of that magnitude on the ice shelf at that time of year. To suggest he should have known such temperatures were possible and factored additional stores into the depots is such a lame argument. He'd already stowed enough to make it through the worst conditions anyone theorized were possible at that time of year. Just like the space program - they could not carry enough equipment and resources to address every potential problem - and that's before they got to (in my best Dick Cheney) - the unknown unknown problems.

Geoff Foster You contradict yourself. Scott on your logic was reckless in NOT leaving Oates/Evans earlier to die. His decisions killed five when maybe one or two might have lived. That is a terrible choice but one has to face it.

Geoff Foster But Scott made numerous small, avoidable errors that together stressed his plan's capacity to meet the unknown. Clothing, transport, fuel, depot laying, bearing taking, man-hauling, medical fitness of polar party etc etc A chain reaction of errors that made failure much more likely

@@nickcrosby9875 Errors are inherent to discovery. That's why it's called discovery and not routine. Show me *one* explorer's journal in which they claim they didn't make a single error (some serious) and I'll show you a liar. You can make a case that he should have left Oates - although really Oates should have left himself as it was incumbent on him to know his condition and chances of survival. As for Evans - judging by the text they really weren't certain what exactly was wrong with him. There was some suggestion of a brain haemorrhage. But without skills and equipment seventy years into the future they were guessing. As far as they were concerned there was good reason to believe he would recover in the thicker air at the base of the Beardmore and with increased rations. And that was a reasonable conclusion. I'm not entirely certain why you have listed some of the things you have as "errors" when they clearly weren't. For instance - Scott's clothing might not have been optimal by today's standards (and for the role of man-hauling and not dog-sledging which it was not designed for). But similar had worked (provided protection from the elements) on several missions in the past. "Bearing taking" - I'm not sure what you are talking about here. You make it sound like the polar explorers were ultimately in control of their fate in Antarctica. A decision here - survival percentage goes up! A decision there - survival percentage goes down! Add them all up and BINGO! you have an answer. I'm sorry - it just doesn't work that way. In Antarctica Mother Nature calls the shots. And you live and die on her caprice.

Scott was a poor explorer

Little chance of that. Evans retired an Admiral and War hero, KCB and DSO.

Not sure how Evans would have been able to remove supplies from the depots without Lashly and Crean noticing. Did he remove Pemmicon and fuel into his own bags and then dispose of them on the way back? Again without Lashly and Crean noticing. And deliberately refusing to pass on critical instructions that only he as 2IC had been briefed by Scott? Especially as Scott didn't fully trust him anyway. It could be that Lashly and Crean simply didn't notice and couldn't imagine how Evans could possibly have sabotaged the expedition in a fit of anger for having been left out.

​@@myroseaccount Hitler was a twice-decorated war hero too. What, in your world an 'attaboy' in war eclipses all other actions in life? And who do you think pressured the Royal Geographical Society to bury the enquiry into the diaries of Scott & Wilson (who died on return), both of whom wrote of the "inexplicable" lack of fuel and pemmican on the return journey (Scott's diary going so far as to call it "lack of thoughtfulness & even of generosity")? Why Admiral Beaumont of course, Knight & Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society. Remember, these were not scientists like our expeditions to the Antarctic are today, they were Navy men, same as the ones who went to the Moon. This was a Royal Navy affair as much as anything, or 'colonial science' like the infamous Bounty expedition. Admiral Beaumont was a Johnny-come-lately to the affair though. Lord Curzon (President of the RGS) was the one first contacted by Scott's widow about the incriminating statements in the retrieved diary. Naturally, Beaumont first tried to pressure Scott's wife to conceal what she'd read. He's clearly grateful she came to them first and not the press: "It is good that you should have time to read quietly, and think over all that has come to you from him - it will enable you to decide what to do and be prepared for what the future may have in store. . . I cannot but think that more has happened than has been mentioned and that the diaries and journals that were sealed, contained things which had been done or said which it was not for those into whose hands the diaries had first fallen to reveal - I may be wrong - I hope most sincerely that I am, but I cannot put away the sense of fear which comes from knowing so much of the expedition and its members. . . I dread the gradual coming out of the painful revelations when the whole of the Expedition's people have dispersed to their homes. . . God grant that there may be nothing that will give you pain or add to your burden!" The diaries were enough for Lord Curzon to consider an enquiry, and most of the Fellows approved... except Admiral Beaumont, who expressed this in a letter marked CONFIDENTIAL to Curzon: ". . .[T]he important point, to my mind, being the necessity of deciding what attitude the Society should take with regard to your questions (a) & (b) that is:- the exhaustion of the supplies of food & fuel - and the conduct of the relief parties. I am not in favour of the informal meeting becoming a Committee of Enquiry - because for the Society to be on sure ground it would have to probe very deep and would have probably to disapprove of what was done in many particulars - it would be different if good could come of the enquiry, but I fear nothing but controversy would come of it." Nothing but TRUTH would come of it, and that was too much for the Navy. RECAP: Lieutenant Edward "Teddy" Evans was removed from official leadership of the expedition early on for his behavior, as explained in this letter from Scott to Admiral Beaumont: "Teddy Evans is a thoroughly well-meaning little man, but proves on close acquaintance to be rather a duffer in anything but his own particular work. All this is strictly ‘entre nous’, but he is not at all fitted to be ‘Second-in-Command’, as I was foolish enough to name him. I am going to take some steps concerning this, as it would not do to leave him in charge here [at the Cape Evans base] in case I am late returning (Scott, 1911) Later he was demoted by Scott from making the final run to the S. Pole because he had not been pulling his fair share and was eating more than his fair share (he had scurry from not eating raw seal meat as ordered). Evans was put in charge of the return party while Scott and the remaining men made the Polar run. Scott had earlier showed his reservations for Evans, saying he showed "boyish enthusiasms" and was "slow to learn" and although he made a good sailor, he made a poor explorer. Evans' wife died upon his return from the ill-fated expedition and that was likely the straw that broke the camel's back, the Navy figured he had suffered enough, the enquiry was cancelled. But I believe the Royal Navy whitewashed the disaster at the Battle of Jutland too, where like idiots their ships were leaving the sealed doors to the powderkeg open so they could reload the guns faster, which they knew was a massive risk. It's a helluva story tho: www.cambridge.org/core/journals/polar-record/article/why-didnt-they-ask-evans/224A49CABBF71E72B99C8C9C3B7236A4

@@myroseaccount Because Evans had done it before. When they were laying depots the previous year Evans mooched pemmican. One of the team members, Charles ‘Silas’ Wright, wrote in his diary: "I believe this [pemmican] was borrowed from the other tent. Evans' later attempt to borrow more from Birdie Bowers annoyed me to such an extent that I spoke to Bowers or someone else of his party urging them to refuse to do so" Evans was known to be subsisting on pemmican alone and refusing to follow medical advice to supplement it with seal meat to stop scurvy (he ended up being the only team member to contract scurvy). Team member Frank Debenham: "We did know that seal meat was a preventative, and only one member of our expedition got scurvy in severe form: Teddy Evans. . . Teddy really was a very naughty boy and wouldn't eat his seal meat. It's not fishy, but it is black, and tastes like very poor steak, and the rest of us ate it" This is Wright again on that same expedition: "Our sledge is slow and can[']t keep up with the Owner's. Teddy, the damn hypocrite, as soon as he sees the Owner's sledge stopped and they watching us come up puts his head down and digs in for all he is worth" Everyone was complaining about Evans. Cherry-Garrard in his diary: "Wright wanted to push Teddy Evans down a crevasse. When we dropped the oil cans down we never heard them reach the bottom. It is a pity he didn't" Now then, either Evans took the food without their knowing or they all knew. But that there was a coverup is not in doubt. The coverup whitewashes it so Evans is struck w/ scurvy farther south, making the missing supplies at least understandable, as Lashly and Crean would've been manhauling him and their supplies sooner than we think - and sooner is the "official" account. What we do know for sure is eventually they could pull no further and Lashly was left with him just south of Corner Camp while Crean walked the remaining 56 km to Ross Island and returned with help, saving Evans's life. The diaries hold the key, and Scott's was redacted in the official account and Lashly's had things just made up. It's all here: www.cambridge.org/core/journals/polar-record/article/why-didnt-they-ask-evans/224A49CABBF71E72B99C8C9C3B7236A4

Jim McMorgan it is correct and well-researched

Care to elaborate on why it is NOT?,...