The Is / Ought Problem 

Well Seymour I made it, despite your directions.

I thought the exact same thing lol

Joseph less strictly.

People would rather be told what to think then actually try to find out the facts.

Ben Thornton Was Adam Smith a moral realist. What books do you recommend one should read with respect to the ought/is gap and ethics?

Ben Thornton yes, not un-bridgeable. Hey the video is only 90 seconds long. ... bridging the gap seems to be a problem of morality itself, maybe.

+Ben Thornton Here's something not shown in the video, the logical formula for the is/ought gap: Is-ought gap formula: for all sets of propositions A, and all propositions p and q, if p being a member of A implies that p is morally indifferent and q is morally significant, then it is not the case that q is derivable from A. (∀A)(∀p)(∀q)(((pϵA)>In(p))&Si(q))>~(A⊢q)

Okay, good on CosmoShidan! This is the first time I've seen propositional calculus in a RU-vid comment. Thank you sir.

Not really. It's still a logical fallacy if you put a telos, it depends on the type of argument. Basically Aristotle bases his morality on excellent men in society, as a telos. So yes, once that is done, you can deduce is from ought, but you have to agree with the premise, that those people actually represent what ought to be, or that society is better this way, and you can only do that through rhetoric, not logic. Basically it is putting tradition as the arbiter of morality, which is fair in a general manner, but is far from being absolute and convincing in all cases. In other words, it is only good insofar as people believe the society is good, and the people that strive in it is good, and that for the most part, nothing needs or should change, as any change would be bad. And I do agree with Aristotle it should be the basis, but it is not the end of the story, far from it, and as far as the science of morality goes, it should be what it is about, and that is what he was describing. In practice though, it is totally different and some other concerns have to be taken into account, because economies change, and social structure change, and therefore tradition also change, and the faster those changes occur, the less tradition actually exist. So today, it is a hard sell, since there does not seem to be excellent men, since there are no tradition. At best you have revolutionaries, and creators, they are the only ones people look up to, so progressives. And this is because mostly people believe society is bad, so if Aristotle was writing today, it is unclear he would see it in the same way, and if he did, it would not convince many people since there is nothing to hang on to. No tradition, no heroes, and the heroes that are set up are simply celebrities, which are set up for a fall eventually, sometimes brutal, as soon as they stop innovating and entertaining.

@@OneLine122 In other words, Sam Harris and Matt Dillahunty are wrong.

enlighten us

​@@0ld_ScratchSee. Any argument that calls history, tradition, or 'naturalism' as a root example. "Humans evolved to eat meat.' 'This is the way it's always been.'

It’s only a fallacy if there is no value statement linking the is and ought. In fact most political debate takes place in this space and most people have already decided on their ‘is’ and ‘ought’ the rest is merely rationalisation and justification.

@@EOTA564 These most people decided their iss and oughts mostly by what they were brought up on, the religion they follow, what appeals to their desires and what suits them etc. and all these means are unexamined and unsound reasons to base our is and ought decision on. The best people to yet succeed in closing this gap are religious people, through superstitions and faith; as dogmatic others might call it, it's the closest one to close the gap really. Be aware, I am not arguing for religion or anything else, but I am making a case that one can not deduce morality from everyday life because either they would fall in the utilitarian error by only focusing on the ends, or fall in the kantian error by only emphasizing the means and deem them as duties that should be always followed regardless of the situations. And Humes's is-ought problem, in conjunction with G.E. Moore's open question argument, add another whole 2 sound and challenging arguments in opposition of both kantianism and utilitarianism, showing that the 2 moral theories are actually 2 sloppy flawed attempts to ground morality.

It's only natural, I guess. XD

Not necessarily. We can recognize something but still argue well with a type of negative capability. This makes one not a moral nihilist. If a person truly cannot decide between right and wrong, then you may be right. However, I propose that any moral nihilism is only temporary (assuming one is of sound mind) since given time and circumstance one will at least make one or some ethics-based value assertions, themselves not entirely divorcable from a moral compass. Example: saving a dog because you want its company, or a thief helping her accomplice escape from a tight spot (even if the end game is to score drugs and get high).

@@RottenDoctorGonzo Exactly. Hume's problem doesn't preclude any kind of morality. It merely highlights a logical leap from the way things are to how they should be. Any kind of moral premise or distinction between Right and Wrong must acknowledge an underlying assumption of what IS right or wrong, that either bridges that gap or assumes to do so.

@whatthe Yep, and yet 99% of the adherents to that continue to make moral claims as if they are definitive with no way to justify them in that worldview.

@whatthe Really is ironic, meanwhile their supposed superiority gives us a world characterized by decadence to keep them busy as literal evil manages the world.

@whatthe //"They also pretend to be morally superior."// Do you see the irony this statement? Or do I need to spell it out for you?

That's true. Although to be fair, not valuing what seems to be the prerequisites for science will likely lead you nowhere in the pursuit of knowledge, measured as your ability to predict future events. By the way, I think reason is redundant in your list, as it can be defined as a combination of the other elements (depending on what reason means to you). Arguably, non-contradiction is also derived from logic (at least some versions of logical systems).

Well when it's assumed one values reason and logic when one comes to the conclusion of the is-ought problem.

There are three fundamental assumptions in philosophy necessary before any discussion can be had; That the universe exists That you can learn something about reality Models with predictive capabilities are more useful than models without predictive capabilities If you disagree with these Id be interested to hear it.

Values require a frame of reference, maybe. If you define that, the oughts are logical.

laws of logic are not values. that is, they are not grounded in moral law and are true independently of any moral ought.

Now that seems like a logical gap! This is just showing that people need to be more careful about their reasoning, not give up on reason entirely!

Doğru olan Kur'an-ı kerimin Ahlakıdır

It never was nor will ever be scientific. No agreed-upon standardized units.

@@theboombody Kur'an-ı kerimin Ahlakı Doğru Ahlaktır

It's completely in retrospect to goals. There is a an "IS Ought Gap", you cannot go from an "is" to an "ought". But you can go from two "is"'s to an an ought. This "is" my situation, This "is" my goal, therefore I ought to do this.

That does perform the role but not in the sense that is intended. It is meant to show that you cannot derive a morally objective ought from what is, your example leaves us with a subjective ought.

@xa xa I don't think you're wrong. I also " feel like even (most?) people who proclaim to hold a value like piety for example wouldn't think it's moral to sacrifice focus on well-being or suffering in favor of their strict moral rules." Perhaps then it's those people who suffers from real cognitive dissonance, not you? And perhaps that's why a challenging situation like you've described is sometimes the trigger for their "loss of faith"?

@@sleepyd1231 Your second "is" is pointing at something subjective, though. Hume's whole argument is that people seem to be filling the gap with subjectivity, and you're doing the same. Ironically, there's no such thing as an objective objective.

@@TheHuxleyAgnostic Agreed. The goal is subjective but once you have the goal the best and most efficient route to achieving said goal is objective.

Aha... but is it still a door lock, if it does not lock doors anymore. :)

No Google, I don't want to use my real name. Dude aply this logic to Slavery LooooooL

Beautiful passage; Mill was certainly an eloquent writer.

He sounds like principle skinner not Flanders

The passage of the "Treatise of human nature" in which Hume exposed this principle was not considered really important by Hume himself. For him what is important is that mere reasoning cannot explain moral judgments, so when he said that "you can't derive ought from is" he intended that this is a reasoning and you can't obtain a moral value from a reasoning. He is a naturalist in this sense: our moral judgments derives from the natural (opposed to rational) relations between our passions and from our sympathy towards other human beings. If you are interested in Hume's naturalism I suggest you to read "Freedom and moral sentiment - Hume's way of naturalizing responsibility" by Paul Russell.

Not necessarily... but I think they fail to complete the thought about "well-being". Pain is both an "is" and an "ought", feeling pain by proxy and acting in self-defense against any proxy pain would qualify as an objectively moral motive. EG: the pain "is" and one "ought" act to minimize it... try refuting that without invoking a further "self-defense" :)

@@pimplequeen2 The thing is that everything we group as subjectivity (biases for or against, likes and dislikes, emotions, caring, feelings, desires, values, etc.) objectively exist within the subjects in question. Some people might get pleasure from an amount of pain that others might go screaming and running from. Even though, eventually, everyone will dislike some level of pain, that doesn't turn a subjective dislike objective. It's simply an objective fact that a subjective dislike of pain is giving you a subjective desire to avoid that pain. It ends up being the same subjective filler as all the other examples. They are all subjective if_then fillers. If you subjectively value naturalism, then you ought to do what's natural. If you subjectively value hedonism, then you ought to do what gives you pleasure. If you subjectively value not feeling pain, then you ought to avoid pain. It's not an objective automatic that we ought to avoid pain, or potential pain, though. People endure pain, to try and win various martial arts titles (subjectively value wealth or status over pain avoidance). Prople risk incredible potential pain to set records, or even just to have fun (subjectively value legacy or hedonism over pain avoidance). People endure pain to save others (subjectively value others over pain avoidance). Women endure pain to pop out a spawn (subjectively value naturalism over pain killing drugs). Etc. That is how we use science, as well. If we subjectively value going to the moon, then we ought to do X, Y, and Z, to get to the moon, and science can help us achieve our goals, and tell us if we're closer or further away from what we subjectively value. This is what Harris agreed was a given, from the outset. His aim was to challenge the general consensus that science can't tell us what we ought to value. Science won't tell us we ought to go to the moon. There's no objective ... we ought to go to the moon. Harris failed, and never got beyond the given. If you subjectively value a subjective "well being" concept, then sure ... science can help you achieve your goals, tell you if you are closer or further from what you subjectively value. He did not show how science tells us that we ought to value his subjective "well being" concept. He tried to argue that all versions of morality concern "well being", but that would mean there's as many "well being" concepts as there are morality concepts. Instead, he pretends there's a singular "well being" concept, his own, and then judges all others, based on that. He's really pretty terrible at philosophy. His "analogies" aren't even analogous.

@@TheHuxleyAgnostic “Well, that’s just your opinion man”… :) A great deal of preference does indeed appear to be arbitrary in this way… but not everything. Your definition of pain is making me nervous with its fuzz and wiggle room so can we replace it with the word “aversion” as that will remove the fuzzy boarder between things like “extreme nerve stimulation for sexual pleasure” and what “I” mean by pain. Not all humans have two legs but that does not prevent my having two legs from being objectively true. A class of human can have an “objective” motive to prevent or minimise other people’s strife, acting upon it is a deterministic, self-serving, self-defence against this aversion. To them, it is “objectively” better to trespass upon person (A) to prevent person (A) from stealing person (B’s) food and there are no means for person (A) to object to this trespass without falsifying the legitimacy of his own trespass :) This “proxy-pain” class of human in this scenario has an objectively legitimate motive to trespass upon person (A) that is an objectively correct sum of an objective calculation. 1+2=3 … Some people are averse to other peoples suffering (objectively true) An aversion contains a deterministic drive to minimise or end its cause (objectively true) Minimising or ending suffering in others in order to minimise or end suffering in oneself is a "moral" act. Some people are capable of objectively moral acts (the vast majority of humans) That’s not “an opinion man” :)

@@pimplequeen2 Yeah, you shouldn't write philosophy either. All you did was prove you don't grasp the first thing I pointed out ... that everything we group as "subjectivity" objectively exists within subjects. "some people are adverse to other people's suffering (objectively true)" Objectively true they have a subjective aversion. aversion: a strong dislike or disinclination

@@TheHuxleyAgnostic So 2+2=4 is "subjective"? What do you mean by "objective"? When we use the word "subjective" in regards to morality, it seems we are hinting at it being "arbitrary". "Vanilla is better than chocolate". There is a distinction between that and what I'm driving at. The aversion to other peoples strife yields moral actions that are deterministic and that are a "self-defence" (highest order of "moral" legitimacy)

That is factually not a moral obligation.

​@@RA-ie3ss One "ought" not *"Buy your slaves from the heathen nations that surround you"* for it Is not nor ever was a "moral" instruction and certainly not a moral reference standard that anyone should adhere or aspire to. Do you agree *YES or NO* ?? 🤔

exactly. that's the fallacy of this fallacy. who's the arbiter of the "ought." we rely on science to provide us with answers. by applying this fallacy to dismiss an argument, it leads to a slippery slope such as gatekeeping.

Right, when you say the universe has no purpose, there's no reason to be good.

​@@theboombody Your argument suffers from "The fallacy of composition," ie. what is true of a member of a group is not necessarily true for the group as a whole. Just because things within the universe can create concepts like morality, does not mean that the universe itself can create concepts. For instance, while it is absolutely true that within a flock of sheep that every member ("an individual sheep") has a mother, it does not therefore follow that the flock has a mother. Is "the universe" capable of formulating "CONCEPTS" ?? Lol no of course not dear, Conversely mankind is entirely capable of creating CONCEPTS including thousands of subjective invisible "Gods" like the one that you adhere and aspire to dear 😜

@@trumpbellend6717 You're arguing something that wasn't stated. I said there's no requirement that mankind has to be good. Mankind can be evil to each other and go extinct tomorrow if that's what mankind wants. Can you give a reason mankind is not at liberty to make such a choice? I mean you can argue that what's true for one element doesn't imply truth for every element in a set if you want and I can't argue against that. But how does that help confine mankind to a morality if mankind doesn't wish to be confined to one?

@@theboombody / "Can you give a reason mankind is not at liberty to make that choice" // Lol its real easy, people can make that "choice" however the ethical and legal systems that reflect humanities overwhelming common goals with regard wellbeing and the values it incorporates empathy altruism reciprocity equality and respect ect will usually deal with such people. They will find themselves either killed or locked up in a concrete box. Either way they will be unable to contribute to the gene pool or in our moral discourse dear.

@@theboombody It's precisely because some people will _"make that choice"_ that we created our moral and legal systems dear. If we all enacted behaviours that were appropriate there would be no need for moral systems

You ought to stfu 😂

+Vinay Seth That is where Kant came in with his Critique of Pure Reason.

+CosmoShidan Ah. Thanks. They hardly ever care to explain the historical premise behind all these texts and just shove it down students' throats in college haha

Akıl bilginin kaynağına ulaştıran ama her soruyu sorduğunda kaynağa başvurmadan cevap veremeyen bir şeydir. Kaynak Kur'an-ı kerimdir

Can does not imply should.

That doesn't bridge the gap in any kind of metaphysical sense though. Why should the wants and desires of you, or any other person, affect what "ought" to be done?

Rowan Lau because of social contracts. An ought is created when multiple people agree that something is in their mutual interest; 'we all want this behavior and do not want that behavior and we agree to be punished and punish others for the behavior we don't want'

SidV101 Yeah but that's just your opinion why are yours & these people's values more important than anyone else's? what about the people who disagree with you? if people want to live a certain way then who is anyone else to tell them it's "wrong" There is no legitimate basis whereupon which one person can judge or govern another

​@@NextgenBeast93 Aren't the same arguments being made by flat earthers of the legitimacy of the claim that the earth is an oblate ellipsoid? They conflate scientific consensus with beauty pageants. Why "ought" we believe in knowledge achieved by scientific consensus? The argument can be made that it's all a preference; scientists "prefer" the earth to be round with their preferred method of obtaining knowledge and their values in that method while flat earthers "prefer" it to be flat with their preferred method of obtaining knowledge and their values in that method. I do not see an overall difference in the nature of ethical consensus from a scientific consensus. We often judge societies to be "backward" scientifically and technologically and ethically all at the same time. That just "is" the nature of things. Who but an omnipotent being that can speak to all of us -- including the skeptics -- is capable of persuading all of us of whether that "ought" to be the case or not? Maybe it's merely a matter of inevitably.

You are using a number of moral axioms like "we should act in such a way that gives us what we want". You also bring up social contracts, but why should we follow social contracts? Eventually you will come to some unprovable moral axioms/definitions like maximizing utility.

The problem, as you've presented the argument, is that you've failed to state one of its premises. So yes, as stated, it IS fallacious. Specifically, it's a Non Sequitur fallacy. Look what happens when we add the missing premise: "it's assumed that you regard cruelty as something to be avoided." Now the argument is complete, and turns out to be semantically valid. The fallacy has been eliminated. We've also explicitly identified a critical premise to the argument. If the premise is not true, then the conclusion is not justified.

@@starfishsystems My example of the is/ought fallacy is structured exactly the way the example argument is structured: fact about the world => we should behave this way ("We evolved to eat meat => we ought to eat meat" / "factory farms treat animals cruelly => we oughtn't buy factory farmed meat"). For the sake of argument, I'll grant you that there is a hidden premise. If -as you are suggesting- because of this hidden premise, we do not commit the is/ought fallacy when we conclude that "you shouldn't buy factory farmed meat", then one also does not commit the is/ought fallacy when concluding that "we ought to eat meat" due to the implicit premise "It is assumed that a diet rich in essential vitamins (e.g., vitamin A, B12, etc.) and high in complete proteins is desirable." But if that's the case, then we are left without a valid example of the is/ought fallacy.

Our actions have real consequences ( *objective* ) But without the pre - agreed desired goal ( *subjective* ) we can NOT make a determination of what we *"SHOULD"* or *"OUGHT"* do or not do, we are unable to differentiate between human intentions, decisions, and actions that are appropriate from those inappropriate. If i hit someone they feel pain ( *objective fact* ) means nothing without first agreeing "we don't want people to feel pain" ( *subjective goal* ) only then can we say "I OUGHT not hit people"

Your ancestors always having kids does not mean you are morally obligated to have kids too.

By looking around the world and observing things, and using pure facts about the world alone, you cannot logically derive any moral statement about how the world should be. For example. You shouldn't commit murder. Try to prove it using only facts about how the world is. You can't. You can't because you can't go from a fact from how the world is to a moral statement on how the world ought to be.

Corrected. Late night mistake in sloppy comment from non-native speaker.

@Ruben O. Yeah, that's my point. I don't know why he can't get over this blind spot.

@@rubeno.1195 Agreement doesn't make something objectively moral even if it is enforced. If it were the case that rape was agreed upon by most in the population to be a good thing, it'd still be wrong. Enforcement or lack of enforcement don't have any weight on something's moral values.

Prove it.

DISPROVE THIS: (∀A)(∀p)(∀q)(((pϵA)>In(p))&Si(q))>~(A⊢q)

Who said I'm *ought* to *survive?*

+Tim Jadeglans Kant says to base our morality on reason (though later on he would say both empathy and reason, or implied it), Hume to base morality on empathy and desire, excluding reason. And to show that the is/ought gap holds, here the formula: Is-ought gap formula: for all sets of propositions A, and all propositions p and q, if p being a member of A implies that p is morally indifferent and q is morally significant, then it is not the case that q is derivable from A. (∀A)(∀p)(∀q)(((pϵA)>In(p))&Si(q))>~(A⊢q)

***** Define what you mean by "evidence" insofar as it has a different approach in philosophy, in that evidence is achieved by means of the structure of one's argument. i.e. the premises that provide the justification of a conclusion. Plus premises also provide evidence for one's own belief. Case in point, arguments in philosophy have to have propositions that are consistent with the conclusion of an argument.

Jourdan Immanuel That is where Kant comes in. Kant held that through his Categorical Imperative, that we derive moral intuitions based on both empathy and reason. From their, this allows human beings to formulate our duties or rules that arise from the law of non-contradiction. That means we have to have rules that do not conflict with our sense of responsibility, to ourselves and unto others. Hume however makes the mistake that an ought only derives from empathy, for he invented the is/ought gap from reason itself! Though, it does not mean that the is/ought gap is wrong, it just means that it is open to be expanded and improved.

Jourdan Immanuel "Empathy is not logical in-of itself. Pure reason cannot be used to define what is and what isn't moral." Then justify it if you think so. I am able to justify my position insofar as that if one only has empathy, then then they would not have the ability to discern right action from wrong action. One example is the character of Inspector Gadget, who is empathetic to rescuing a kidnap victim in an episode, but fails to notice when a MAD agent is luring him into a trap or deceiving him by creating a distraction. In this sense, Gadget is being respectful to the MAD agent, but not using his reason as to question whether or not the fellow in question is linked to organized crime.

Jourdan Immanuel First, since you won't defend your own argument, I can tell you that now you are just appealing to authority. Secondly, you should read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals which disproved the premise that moral intuitions do come from reason while retaining that human convention cannot be correlated with the physical world.

Most non-sequiturs are simply the omission of assumptions. P1: It is freezing outside. P2: Wearing a coat minimizes the probability of freezing. C: You ought to wear a coat outside if you don't want to freeze. I believe that's logically sound and contained provided the premises are correct.

That is not a moral statement.

​@@karlijn3230 Prescriptive moral statements operate by the same logical rules, do they not? Take one of the Deadly Sins of gluttony and the common rationale of Biblical interpreters used to justify it as immoral/sinful: P: Excessive indulgence in food and drink causes one to become unfit. P: Unfit people are ill-suited to serve others. C: People ought to practice temperance and moderate their intake of food and drink [if they wish to serve others]. From my standpoint, all prescriptive statements, whether we consider them moral or not, are contingent upon some underlying goal as a premise. They're only considered non-sequiturs if the goal is not explicitly stated and the conclusion not framed as a conditional in reference to that goal. Another dealing with ethics: P: A society that freely permits killing without any justification would be a very dangerous society in which to live. P: Laws and enforcers help to protect against undesirable behavior. C: We ought to establish laws against such unjustified acts of killing [if we wish to have a safer society for ourselves and the people we care about].

@@AnonyMous-og3ct I agree with most of what you say. But I think that the fact that these statements are goal-oreinted makes them amoral. In the first one (and the second one) you're merely making a logical connection, saying what someone should do if they wished to serve. There's nothing moral about it. It's not saying anything about whether it's good to serve (and why).

​@@karlijn3230 I find such incompleteness in most moral/ethical claims even when the goals are explicitly stated in both the premise and conclusion. We can question why we should adhere to those goals in the first place recursively until we work down to a point where we run out of contingencies and a problem that seems about as difficult to contemplate and solve as the origin of the universe. Yet I typically tend to find, when given the ability to question away all the contingencies, some root goal that seems to revolve around protecting ourselves and others we tend to care about (which could be very few others, if any, in some cases) as the root premise to justify what is considered morally "right/good". That seems to be a constant and fairly self-evident motivator in all sorts of people throughout history and across the world: to protect themselves and/or others. Where things get extremely complicated to me is how that underlying motivator then interacts with complex beliefs about the world and how a large number of people given such motivators go on to form complex societies where the citizens largely share a large subset of the same values.

If we take for granted that the premise is valid, then for a start it's not necessarily the case that refraining from sin is the same as benevolence. Your God may command ritualistic sacrifice or genocide, for example, and there may be a lot of basic behaviors that are neither sinful nor benevolent (ex: negatively judging a heretic or homosexual). The second statement is also a conclusion, and it's not clear to me why someone should obey your God even if you can prove without a doubt that He exists in a way where skeptics can test that hypothesis and discover His existence for themselves.

@@AnonyMous-og3ct Anony Mous Anony Mous not quite. I think you've committed straw man. I've found the answer for this. The argument I proposed is valid but it's in the form of Kant's categorical imperative.

​@@ihsannuruliman4005 Can you point out the strawman I made? I would simplify it down to a basic definition of "benevolence" not necessarily aligning with "refraining from sin" unless you consider all forms of "sin" to be any behavior that is not benevolent.

​@@ihsannuruliman4005 The is-ought gap though is basically a problem with incompleteness. The reason we can't simply derive an "ought" from an "is" with formal rules of logic is due to how there are implicit assumptions being taken for granted, like your assumption that benevolence is equal to refraining from sin. The exclusion of those assumptions leads to a non-sequitur. If you state all the hidden assumptions/goals, then you can bridge that gap between the premise and conclusion. To try to fix it, I would do this: P1: God commands to refrain from sinful actions. P2: Obeying God is the definition of benevolence. C: A man must obey God to be benevolent. I would find faults with P1 and P2, but assuming they are valid, then the conclusion is logically valid.

Your argument is presented in an unclear way. To find fallacies easier write them in if-then form: If God commands something then a benevolent man ought to do it. God commands not to sin. Therefore a benevolent man ought not to sin. This argument is valid but the premises are incorrect imo

"highest level of lifequality"..... That's a "moral" conclusion :)

If only had you ended at "...and negative experiences"

@@pimplequeen2 whats a moral conclusdion? the playground weve been dealt, the universe, has one potential evaluative quality within it.. the only mathematically relevant factor is how much qualitative structures that the universes produces during its lifetime.

@@gamblerofrats ended with that where?

@@wasdwasdedsf The "goal" of getting the highest "lifequality" you can attain is basically an "ought". So despite saying "there is no such thing as morality" you conclude with a moral statement that is basically the broadest expression of the old self defense against that which we are averse to (low quality) All moral conclusions are, in antecedence, a self-defense against those things we are averse to. Its NOT supernatural :)